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of the public good, on Had the proclamation side, and proclaimed islature, instead of berown under the dilement to that of the extive judgment, of prolepartments, extremeof the worst influence rests abroad. A varibe perceived, would onformity to the mere in the measures adopt

a proclamation could either of the parties at on of the light in which ilst, indeed, no positive Thostile purposes, it is uld have decently made d, that a proclamation ctory, or an honourable n satisfactory, if serious ed, because it would not ity which alone could dethe United States on the een honourable, because a

is due to a private diplove done so much more, nimity and want of dignity

was or was not applied to, ved to that circumstance, it 1, that the executive would nd so solemnly, proceed to tract, which the other party support by discussion, as its .It is asked, indeed, in a plays the spirit in which the proclamation and the treaty,

"The policy on the part of the government of removing "all doubt as to its own disposition."*"It was of great "importance that our citizens should understand as ear"ly as possible the opinion entertained by the govern"ment," &c. "If in addition to the rest, the early mani"festation of the views of the government had any ef "fect in fixing the public opinion," &c. The reader will probably be struck with the reflection, that if the procla mation really possessed the character, and was to have the effects, here ascribed to it, something more than the authority of the government, in the writer's sense of government, would have been a necessary sanction to the act; and if the term "government" be removed, and that of "President" substituted, in the sentences quoted, the justice of the reflection will be felt with peculiar force. But I remark only, on the singularity of the stile adopted by the writer, as shewing either that the phraseology of a foreign government is more familiar to him than the phraseology proper to our own, or that he wishes to propagate a familiarity of the former in preference to the latter. I do not know what degree of disapprobation others may think due to this innovation of language; but I consider it as far above a trivial criticism, to observe that it is by no means unworthy of attention, whether viewed with an eye to its probable cause, or its apparent tendency. "The government," unquestionably means in the United States the whole government, not the executive part, either exclusively, or pre-eminently; as it may do in a monarchy, where the splendor of preroga tive eclipses, and the machinery of influence directs, every other part of the government. In the former and proper sense, the term has hitherto been used in official proceedings, in public discussions, and in private discourse. It is as short and as easy, and less liable to misapprehension, to say, the executive or the president, as to say the government, In a word, the new dialect could not proceed either from necessity, conveniency,

The writer ought not in the same paper, No. VII, to have said, “Had the President announced his own disposition, he would have been chargeable with egotism, if not presumption.

propriety, or perspicuity; and being in opposition to common usage, so marked a fondness for it justifies the notice here taken of it. It shall no longer detain me, however, from the more important subject of the present paper.

I proceed therefore to observe that as a "proclama"ation," in its ordinary use, is an address to citizens or subjects only; as it is always understood to relate to the law actually in operation, and to be an act purely and exclusively executive; there can be no implication in the name or the form of such an instrument, that it was meant principally for the information of foreign nations; far less that it related to an eventual stipulation on a subject acknowledged to be within the legislative province.

When the writer therefore undertook to engraft his new prerogative on the proclamation, by ascribing to it so unusual, and unimplied a meaning, it was evidently incumbent on him to shew, that the text of the instrument could not be satisfied by any other construction than his own. Has he done this? No. What has he done? He has called the proclamation, a proclamation of neutrality; he has put his own arbitrary meaning on that phrase; and has then proceeded in his arguments and his inferences, with as much confidence, as if no question was ever to be asked, whether the term "neutrali"ty" be in the proclamation; or whether, if there, it could justify the use he makes of it.

It has appeared from observations already made, that if the term "neutrality" was in the proclamation, it could not avail the writer in the present discussion; but the fact is, no such term is to be found in it, nor any other term, of a meaning equivalent to that, in which the term neutrality is used by him.

There is the less pretext, in the present case, for hunting after any latent or extraordinary object, because an obvious and legal one is at hand, to satisfy the occasion on which the proclamation issued. The existence of war among several nations with which the United States have an extensive intercourse; the duty of the executive to preserve peace by enforcing its laws, whilst those laws

continued in force; the danger that indiscreet citizens might be tempted or surprised by the crisis, into unlawful proceedings, tending to involve the United States in a war, which the competent authority might decide them to be at liberty to avoid, and which, if they should be judged not at liberty to avoid, the other party to the eventual contract, might be willing not to impose on them; these surely might have been sufficient grounds for the measure pursued by the executive; and being legal and rational grounds, it would be wrong, if there be no necessity, to look beyond them.

If there be any thing in the proclamation of which the writer could have made a handle, it is the part which declares, the disposition, the duty and the interest of the United States, in relation to the war existing in Europe. As the legislature is the only competent and constitutional organ of the will of the nation; that is, of its disposition, its duty and its interest, in relation to a commencement of war, in like manner as the president and senate jointly, not the president alone, are in relation to peace, after war has been commenced....I will not dissemble my wish that a language less exposed to criticism had been preferred; but taking the expressions, in the sense of the writer himself, as analogous to the language which might be proper, on the reception of a public minister, or any similar occasion, it is evident, that his construction can derive no succour, even from this source.

If the proclamation then does not require the construction which this writer has taken the liberty of putting on it; I leave it to be decided whether the following considerations do not forbid us to suppose, that the president could have intended, by that act, to embrace and prejudge the legislative question, whether there was, or was not, under the circumstances of the case, a cause of warin the article of guarantee.

It has been shewn that such an intention would have usurped a prerogative not vested in the executive, and even confessedly vested in another department.

In exercising the constitutional power of deciding a question of war, the legislature ought to be as free to de

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