It is easy to imagine, that occasions frequently occur in the communications to foreign governments and foreign agents, which render it necessary to speak of the friendship or friendly disposition of the United States, of their disposition to cultivate harmony and good understanding, to reciprocate neighbourly offices, and the like. It is usual, for example, when public ministers are received, for some complimentary expressions to be interchanged. It is presumable, that the late reception of the French minister did not pass, without some assurance on the part of the president, of the friendly disposition of the United States towards France. Admitting it to have happened, would it be deemed an improper arrogation? If not, why was it more so, to declare the disposition of the United States to observe a neutrality in the existing war?

In all such cases, nothing more is to be understood, than an official expression of the political disposition of the nation, inferred from its political relations, obligations and interests. It is never to be supposed, that the expression is meant to convey the precise state of the individual sentiments or opinions of the great mass of the people.

Kings and princes speak of their own dispositions. The magistrates of republics, of the dispositions of their nations. The president, therefore, has evidently used the style adapted to his situation, and the criticism upon it is plainly a cavil.

THE LETTERS OF HELVIDIUS.

BY JAMES MADISON.

No. I.

SEVERAL pieces with the signature of PACIFICUS were lately published, which have been read with singular pleasure and applause, by the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, who hate our republican government, and the French revolution; whilst the publication seems to have been too little regarded, or too much despised by the steady friends to both.

Had the doctrines inculcated by the writer, with the natural consequences from them, been nakedly presented to the public, this treatment might have been proper. Their true character would then have struck every eye, and been rejected by the feelings of every heart. But they offer themselves to the reader in the dress of an elaborate dissertation; they are mingled with a few truths that may serve them as a passport to credulity; and they are introduced with professions of anxiety for the preservation of peace, for the welfare of the government, and for the respect due to the present head of the executive, that may prove a snare to patriotism.

In these disguises they have appeared to claim the attention I propose to bestow on them; with a view to shew, from the publication itself, that under colour of vindicating an important public act, of a chief magistrate who enjoys the confidence and love of his coun. try, principles are advanced which strike at the vitals of its constitution, as well as at its honour and true interest.

As it is not improbable that attempts may be made to apply insinuations, which are seldom spared when particular purposes are to be answered, to the author of

the ensuing observations, it may not be improper to premise, that he is a friend to the constitution, that he wishes for the perservation of peace, and that the present chief magistrate has not a fellow-citizen, who is penetrated with deeper respect for his merits, or feels a purer solicitude for his glory.

This declaration is made with no view of courting a more favourable ear to what may be said than it deserves. The sole purpose of it is, to obviate imputations which might weaken the impressions of truth; and which are the more likely to be resorted to, in proportion as solid and fair arguments may be wanting.

The substance of the first piece, sifted from its inconsistencies and its vague expressions, may be thrown into the following propositions:

That the powers of declaring war and making treatics are, in their nature, executive powers:

That being particularly vested by the constitution in other departments, they are to be considered as exceptions out of the general grant to the executive department:

That being, as exceptions, to be construed strictly, the powers not strictly within them, remain with the executive :

That the executive consequently, as the organ of intercourse with foreign nations, and the interpreter and executor of treaties, and the law of nations, is authorized to expound all articles of treaties, those involving questions of war and peace, as well as others ;....to judge of the obligations of the United States to make war or not, under any casus federis or eventual operation of the contract, relating to war; and, to pronounce the state of things resulting from the obligations of the United States, as understood by the executive :

That in particular the executive had authority to judge whether in the case of the mutual guarantee between the United States and France, the former were bound by it to engage in the war:

That the executive has, in pursuance of that autho rity, decided that the United States are not bound :.... And,

That its proclamation of the 22d of April last, is to be taken as the effect and expression of that decision. The basis of the reasoning is, we perceive, the extraordinary doctrine, that the powers of making war and treaties, are in their nature executive; and therefore comprehended in the general grant of executive power, where not specially and strictly excepted out of the grant.

Let us examine this doctrine: and that we may avoid the possibility of mistaking the writer, it shall be laid down in his own words; a precaution the more necessary, as scarce any thing else could outweigh the improbability, that so extravagant a tenet should be hazarded, at so early a day, in the face of the public.

His words are...." Two of these [exceptions and qua❝lifications to the executive powers] have been already "noticed....the participation of the senate in the appoint"ment of officers, and the making of treaties. A third "remains to be mentioned....the right of the legislature "to declare war, and grant letters of marque and reprisal."

Again.... "It deserves to be remarked, that as the "participation of the senate in the making of treaties, "and the power of the legislature to declare war, are "exceptions out of the general executive power, vested "in the president; they are to be construed strictly, and "ought to be extended no further than is essential to "their execution."

If there be any countenance to these positions, it must be found either, 1st, in the writers, of authority, on pub. lic law; or 2d, in the quality and operation of the pow ers to make war and treaties; or 3d, in the constitution of the United States.

It would be of little use to enter far into the first source of information, not only because our own reason and our own constitution, are the best guides; but because a just analysis and discrimination of the powers of government, according to their executive, legisla tive and judiciary qualities are not to be expected in the works of the most received jurists, who wrote before a

critical attention was paid to those objects, and with their eyes too much on monarchial governments, where all powers are confounded in the sovereignty of the prince. It will be found however, I believe, that all of them, particularly Wolsius, Burlamaqui and Vatel, speak of the powers to declare war, to conclude peace, and to form alliances, as among the highest acts of the sovereignty; of which the legislative power must at least be an integral and pre-eminent part.

Writers, such as Locke, and Montesquieu, who have discussed more particularly the principles of liberty and the structure of government, lie under the same disadvantage, of having written before these subjects were illuminated by the events and discussions which distinguish a very recent period. Both of them too are evidently warped by a regard to the particular government of England, to which one of them owed allegiance; and the other professed an admiration bordering on idolatry. Montesquieu, however, has rather distinguished himself by enforcing the reasons and the importance of avoiding a confusion of the several powers of government, than by enumerating and defining the powers which belong to each particular class. And Locke, notwithstanding the early date of his work on civil government, and the example of his own government before his eyes, admits that the particular powers in question, which, after some of the writers on public law he calls federative, are really distinct from the executive, though almost always united with it, and hardly to be separated into distinct hands. Had he not lived under a monarchy, in which these powers were united; or had he written by the lamp which truth now presents to lawgivers, the last observation would probably never have dropped from his pen. But let us quit a field of research which is more likely to perplex than to decide, and bring the question to other tests of which it will be more easy to judge.

The chapter on prerogative, shews how much the reason of the Philosopher was clouded by the royalism of the Englishman.