rate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general union of the states, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

"It is very probable, says he,* that mankind would "have heen obliged, at length, to live constantly under "the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not con"trived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal "advantages of a republican, together with the external "force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDE

"RATE REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which "several smaller states agree to become members of at "larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of "assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capa"ble of increasing by means of new associations, till "they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.

66

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter"nal force, may support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner "of inconveniences.

66

66

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an "equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. "Were he to have too great influence over one, this "would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with "forces, independent of those which he had usurped, "and overpower him before he could be settled in his ❝ usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the "confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should "abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those

"that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one "side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be "dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sove"reignty.

"As this government is composed of small republics, "it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with re"spect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means "of the association, of all the advantages of large mo"narchies."

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgement of the principal arguments in favour of the union, and must effectually remove the false impressions, which a misapplication of the other parts of the work was calculated to produce. They have, at the same time, an intimate connexion with the more immediate design of this paper, which is to illustrate the tendency of the union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the states. The essential characteristic of the first, is said to be the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended, that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members, has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the course of this investigation, that, as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be, "an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects, of the federal authority, are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished, so long as it exists by a constitutional necessity for local purposes, though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive, and very important, portions of the sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twentythree CITIES, or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to two, and the smallest to one. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says, "were I to give a "model of an excellent confederate republic, it would "be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive, that the distinctions insisted upon, were not within the contemplation of this enlightened writer; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS.

No. X.

BY JAMES MADISON.

The same Subject continued.

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed, than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion, introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favourite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. (Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority, However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be

rate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general union of the states, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

"It is very probable, says he,* that mankind would "have heen obliged, at length, to live constantly under "the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not con"trived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal "advantages of a republican, together with the external"force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDE

66

RATE REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which "several smaller states agree to become members of a "larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of "assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capa"ble of increasing by means of new associations, till "they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to "provide for the security of the united body.

"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter"nal force, may support itself without any internal cor66 ruption. The form of this society prevents all manner "of inconveniences.

66

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an "equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. "Were he to have too great influence over one, this "would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that "which would still remain free might oppose him with "forces, independent of those which he had usurped, "and overpower him before he could be settled in his ❝ usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the "confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should "abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those

Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I.