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latter has jurisdict:on* of the fact, as well as the law ? It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it appears upon the record, and pronounces the law arising upon it. This is jurisdiction of both fact and law, nor is it even possible to separate them. Though the common law courts of this state ascertain disputed facts by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact and law; and accordingly when the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have no recourse to a jury, but proceed at once to judgment. I conteod, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions, “ appellate jurisdiction, both as to “ law and fact," do not necessarily imply a re-examination in the supreme court of facts decided by juries in the inferior courts.
The following train of ideas may well be imagined to have influenced the convention, in relation to this particular provision. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, it may have been argued, will extend to causes determinable in different modes, some in the course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of the CIVIL LAW. In the former, the revision of the law only will be, generally speaking, the proper province of the supreme court; in the latter, the re-examination of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which prize causes are an example, might be essential to the preservation of the public peace. It is therefore neces. sary, that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain cases, extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. It will not answer to make an express exception of cases which shall have been originally tried by a jury, because in the courts of some of the states all causes are tried in this mode;t and such an exception would preclude the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might be proper, as where it might be improper. To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to declare ge
This word is a compound of jus and dictio, juris, dictio or a speaking or prononncing of the law.
+ I hohl that the states will have concurrent jurisdiction with the subordinate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal cognizance, will be explained in ms est paper.
nerally, that the supreme court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdiction shall be subject to such exceptions and regula. tions as the national legislature may prescribe. This will enable the government to modify it in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security
This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt, that the supposed abolition of the trial by jury, by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The legislature of the United States would certaiuly bave full power to provide, that in appeals to the supreme court there should be no re-examination of facts, where they had been tried in the original causes by juries. This would certainly be an authorized exception ; but if, for the reason already intimated, it should be thought too extensive, it might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are determinable at common law in that mode of trial.
The amount of the observations bitherto made on the authority of the judicial department is this : that it bas been carefully restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national judicature ; ibat, in the partition of this authority, a very small portion of original jurisdiction has been reserved to the supreme court, and the rest consigned to the subordi. nate tribunals ; that the supreme court will possess an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all the cases referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and regulations which may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial by jury ; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the national councils, will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which have been predicted from that source.
BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON. A further view of the judicial department, in reference
to some miscellaneous questions. THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. Time only can mature and perfect so compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consis. tent WHOLE.
Such questions accordingly have arisen upon the plan proposed by the convention, and particularly concerning the judiciary department. The principal of these respect the situation of the state courts, in regard to those causes wbich are to be submitted to federal jurisdiction. Is this to be exclusive, or are those courts to possess a conourrent jurisdiction ? If the latter, in what relation will they stand to the national tribunals? These are inquiries which we meet with in the mouths of men of sense, and which are certainly entitled to attention.
T'he principles established in a former paper* teach us, that the states will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively delegated to the federal bead; and that this exclusive delegation can only exist in one of three cases ; where an exclusive authority is, in express terms, granted to the union; or where a par. ticular authority is granted to the union, and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the states ; or, where an authority is granted to the union, with which a simi. lar authority in the states would be utterly incompatible. Though these principles may not apply with the same force to the judiciary, as to the legislative power; yet I am inclined to think, that they are in the main, just with
respect to the former, as well as the latter. And under this impression I shall lay it down as a rule, tbat the state courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enume. rated modes.
The only thing in the proposed constitution, which wears the appearance of confining the causes of federal cognizance, to the federal courts, is contained in this passage : the JUDICIAL POWER of the United States 66 shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such infe6 rior courts as the congress shall from time to time ordain 66 and establish.” This might either be construed to signify, that the supreme and subordinate courts of the union should alone have the power of deciding those causes, to which their authority is to extend; or simply to denote, that the organs of the national judiciary should be one supreme court, and as many subordinate courts, as congress should think proper to appoint; in other words, that the United States should exercise the judi. cial power with which they are to be invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribu. nals: and as the first would amount to an alienation of state power by implication, the last appears to me the most defensible construction.
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, is only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which the state courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to, the constitution to be established: for not to allow the state courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I mean not therefore to contend, ihat the United States, in the course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation, to the federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient ; but I hold that the state courts will be divested of no part of their
primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal and I am even of opinion, that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This 1 infer from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system. The judi. ciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Ja. pan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this we consider the state governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the state courts would have a con. current jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was
not expressly probibited. Here another question occurs ; what relation would subsist between the national and state courts in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I answer, that an appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the supreme court of the United States. The constitution in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court in all the enumerated cases of federal cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one, without a single expression to confine its operation to the inferior federal courts. The objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend to the state tribunals. Either this must be the case, or the local courts must be excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of national concern, else the judiciary authority of the union may be eluded at the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these consequences ought, without evident necessity, to be involved; the latter would be entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some