give definitions somewhat broader. M. Storch says it "is the science of the natural laws which determine the prosperity of nations, that is to say, their wealth and civilization." M. Sismondi regards "as the object of political economy the physical welfare of man, so far as it can be the work of government." And M. Say defines it as "the economy of society; a science combining the results of our observations on the nature and functions of the different parts of the social body." And lastly, Mr. Carey, in this country, dropping the title Political Economy as a general designation, and adopting the term "Social Science" in its stead, defines it as "the science of the laws which govern man in his efforts to secure for himself the highest individuality and the greatest power of association with his fellow-men."

It will be noticed that in several of the preceding definitions the term wealth is introduced as a part of the definition. This word wealth has been the banc of Political Economy. It is the bog whence most of the mists have arisen which have beclouded the whole subject. From its indefiniteness, and the variety of associations it carries along with it in different minds, it is totally unfit for any scientific purpose whatever. It is itself almost impossible to be defined, and consequently can serve no useful purpose in a definition of anything else. It has been much debated, for example, among political economists, whether the term wealth includes anything more than material products, such as houses, lands, metals, tools, food; or whether the skill of artisans and the services of professional men are also to be reckoned as wealth. Some include under the term

only material products; others, as Mr. Mill, widen the signification so as to take in those immaterial services which result in an increase of material products; while others still, with evident violence to the current meaning of the word, include under it all things, whether material or immaterial, for which something may be obtained in exchange. Thus the meaning of the word wealth has never yet been settled; and if Political Economy must wait until that work be done as a preliminary, the science will never be satisfactorily constructed. It is simply impossible, on such an indefinite word as this at the foundation, to build up a complete science of Political Economy. Moreover the word wealth includes the two distinct ideas of value and utility, -ideas which must be kept perfectly distinct, or else there is no sound thinking and no sound conclusions within this field. Men may think, and talk, and write, and dispute till doomsday, but until they come to use words with definiteness, and mean the same thing by the same word, they reach comparatively few results, and make but little progress. And it is just at this point that we find the first grand reason of the slow advance hitherto made by this science. It undertook to use a word for scientific purposes which no amount of manipulation and explanation could make suitable for that service. Happily there is no need to use this word. In emancipating itself from the word wealth as a technical term, Political Economy has dropped a clog, and its movements are now relatively free.

Of the other definitions quoted, against which the objection just considered does not lie, some embrace too little, and others embrace too much. The only

one which seems to the present writer to be exactly right, is the definition given by Archbishop Whately, namely, the science of exchanges. This definition, or its precise equivalent, the science of value, gives a perfectly definite field to Political Economy. Wherever value goes this science goes, and where value stops this science stops. Political Economy is the science of value, and of nothing else. To determine with distinctness what value is, to separate it from some things which have often been confounded with it, and thus to lay a foundation for the science at once satisfactory and complete, will be the work of the next chapter. But it is in order at this point to call attention to the second grand reason of the slow advance hitherto made in this field of inquiry. Value is a relative word. It is usually defined as purchasing-power, that is to say, the value of anything is its power of purchasing other things. It is not an independent quality of one thing, as hardness is a quality of a stone, but it is a quality of one thing as estimated in a corresponding quality of something else. It is not a quality, in and of itself, of gold, but a relation which gold holds to other things which gold will buy. The notion of value is not conceivable except by a comparison of two things, and what is more, of two things mutually exchanged. Political Economy therefore is based upon a relative idea, and has to do from beginning to end with a relation. Now in this there is an inherent difficulty, and a difficulty too which can never be obviated. It lies in the very nature of the subject. Men much more readily apprehend an absolute idea than a relative one. They more easily follow a discussion touching

the independent attributes of single objects, such as length, breadth, thickness, and many others, than a discussion touching value, which is not an attribute of any one thing, but a relation subsisting between two things. I am not aware that this difficulty has ever been remarked on by any writer, but I am at the same time very sure that it constitutes the principal difficulty in this class of inquiries, and has been the main reason of the tardy progress hitherto made in them. A careful analysis of the nature of value, and copious illustration bestowed upon the elements of the subject, will lessen this difficulty as much as the nature of the case will allow. To this then we next proceed.

CHAPTER III

ON VALUE.

IF I take up a new lead-pencil from my table, for the purpose of examining all its qualities, I shall immediately perceive those which are visible and tangible. The pencil has length, a cylindrical form, a black color, is hard to the touch, is composed of wood and plumbago in certain relations to each other, and has the quality, when sharpened at the end, of making black marks upon white paper. Are then these, and such as these, the only qualities of the pencil? No. It has another quality very important, which is neither visible nor tangible, but relative. It has purchasing-power. It had the power of purchasing from me, two days ago, the sum of ten cents, United States currency; and if I should. choose to take it back to the store where the exchange was made, it has doubtless the quality still of being able to purchase again from the storekeeper the same number of cents which it first purchased from me.

This purchasing-power, which the pencil possesses in common with all other articles which are ever bought, sold, or exchanged, is value, and is the subject of Political Economy. It is absolutely essential, in order to engage in any discussions in Political Economy with the least hope of sound results,