FEB. 5, 1834.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[H. of R.

Mr. ARCHER said he was one of those who thought in no degree from the act of restoration, nor be augthe subject could not be too much discussed, involving mented by it from what it had been previously; as the the important bearings it did to the powers of the Gov- institution would stand not better after the restoration, ernment and the interests of the country. He should but worse, in this respect, by the diminution of its profits, not add a great deal, however, to the debate in this stage. and the great inflammation of the animosity to it incurred The position his State had assumed to the question, re- in the interval of removal of the deposites. quiring from some of her members the exposition of her opinions, and the deep participation he acknowledged himself to take in the feeling it had awakened in the community, would not permit him to give a silent vote.

Before proceeding with his remarks, he owed the respect of a notice to the personal appeal which had been addressed to him by the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. JONES.] That gentleman had invoked his opposition to the instruction for restoring the deposites to the bank, on the ground of his uniform advocacy of principles of construction of the constitution which would disallow the recharter of the bank, which the gentleman insisted would follow from the restoration of the deposites.

If it were supposed that the pressure of the bank on the commercial operations of the community was to produce the recharter, by demonstrating its necessity to the healthful course of these operations, then the correction of the alleged source of the pressure, the removal of the deposites, by the restoration of them, was the way not to continue but arrest the pressure and its consequence; or, if the pressure were nevertheless continued, the alleged reason (be it cause or pretext) being removed, then an adium would result to the bank, which would be the ef fectual preventive of recharter. Take the proposition either way, that the restoration of the deposites would, or would not, arrest the pressure of the bank, still it must arrest any tendency this pressure might be supposed to exert in the production of the recharter.

The principles imputed to him, he (Mr. A.) acknowledged; but he held other principles, he presumed, in common with the gentleman from Georgia, which no less But the victory which the bank would be achieving forbade him to tolerate a danger of another kind-intru- over the Executive! This was the subject of apprehension of one department of the Government on another, sion. Here lay the rub-the real difficulty and point— and permitting the fear of the legislative misconstruction, the matter not to be digested! Up to this time, it was which would recharter the bank, a contingent evil, to the Executive which had gained advantage of the bank, operate the sanction of the loosest and most dangerous not the bank of the Executive. The office asked of Conconstruction of the Executive authority in a case actually gress by those who would return the deposites was, to before us for decision, which had ever been exhibited in restore the parties to their prior and proper condition; the history of the Government. In this view, he had a not to give advantage to one party, the bank, but neiright to expect the concurrence of the honorable gentle- ther, on the other hand, to confirm advantage obtained man with him in the vote which they were about to ren- to the other party, the Executive. But to carry on this der. principle of fairness and justice,—to give equal measure The allusion to the appeal of the gentleman from Geor- to its adversary-not to refuse to ratify its aggression-gia led him to observe on the extraordinary effort which this, in the present temper of absolute, not to say abject was in progress here and every where to pervert the true devotion towards the Executive, was to give a victory issues of the case, by representing the question as equiv- over it! The restoration of things to their former conalent to that of the recharter of the bank. This had be- dition; peace in its best form; any thing short of affirmcome not the strong ground merely, but almost the ex-ing conquest to the Executive, was assigning victory to clusive ground, insisted on in vindication of the Govern- the opponent.

ment proceeding. Other defences had now been aban- But did gentlemen see the import of their argument? doned to fall back on this intrenched position; from which If the return of the deposites, the reversal of the act of the tocsin was sounded to the formidable host of prepos- the Executive, was to produce the recharter of the bank; sessions subsisting against the bank--a phalanx known to was not the inference fair, that the operation of the act, be invincible to argument, which, if it could be animated the removal of the deposites, was to prostrate the bank? to ardor in the contest, (for which topics of excitement Then the inquiry forced itself forward, how far the acwere abounding,) would not fail to bear down all resist-complishment of this object, however good, belonged to ance and conquer the cause. Of the great importance of the Executive? How far an institution, however bad, this movement of party stratagem every one was aware. standing on the basis of law, was to be put down by the It rendered doubtful a contest which, whilst it rested on fiat of the Executive; and the many momentous conseits proper forces, was on the point of being subdued. querces realized, which it was known must follow the Men who could not perceive (for that was not easy) the act, from the complicated relations of the institution with connexion of the recharter of the bank with the return the most essential interests of the country? What was of the deposites, were yet led to fear this result as some- the answer which was alone encountered to these inthing possible, though not intelligible. Another class quiries? That the bank must not be permitted to obtain feared the imputation of not perceiving the connexion; a victory over the Executive! What aggravation to the and the two fears formed the sustaining forces of the feelings proper to the subject was suggested by this topic Government proceeding, which could not stand deprived of vindication! of this support. Suspended in the scale of a false and prejudiced issue, the question of undoing the Executive act (the only effective corrective) might continue to hang doubtful, or even be weighed down.

But farther on this subject of danger of recharter of the bank: as there could have been no question of restoration of the deposites to produce it, if there had been no removal of them, did gentlemen see where the responsi It was of the utmost consequence to a just decision, there- bility for the danger, if it existed, was to rest? The fore, to show that this was a false scale; that the connex-President, in the paper read to the "cabinet," the Secion and dependance so much insisted on was not real be-retary, in his report, had told us that it had been decided tween the recharter of the bank and the restoration of that the bank was not to be rechartered. The issue had the deposites. And how was this connexion shown? By been "argued on both sides before the tribunal of the what mode was the restoration to produce the recharter? people, and their verdict pronounced." And this deBy the disclosure, it was said, of the power of the bank. cision on the subject had been assigned, in both papers, But the bank was to gain no accession of power or ad- as the leading ground of proceeding in the removal of the vantage by the restoration. It was only to be put in the deposites. If the danger of recharter, thus extinct, were condition it was before. If it was endowed with power now revived, as involved in one of the possible issues of to produce the recharter, this power would be derived the act of removal, would not this evil, too, if it were

H. of R.]

Removal of the Deposites.

(Feb. 5, 1824

realized, the theme of so much deprecation and declama- timate of its importance? The first we hear again of se tion, have to find sanction under the potential phrase-"I subject, in the next recess of Congress, after the ama take the responsibility;" which, though not proceeding ments rendered necessary by the changes which from a magician, had more than magical power, since it place in the departments, is the promulgation of the ind wrought the sanction of every measure on which it was determination of the Executive to carry the purpon 4 pronounced, without even a spell on the senses or under- the removal of the deposites into effect. The intera standing? however, before the reassembling of Congress, had no What, then, was the purport and amount of this argu- sufficed to mature the arrangements which were ment-of more influence than all others-that the return manded, and properly deemed necessary to complete of the deposites was to be forborne, lest it might lead to plan. In the immaturity of these preparations, adm the recharter of the bank? In the first place, the assump- to be essential, the project is consummated; howere tion of the consequence was gratuitous altogether; the little more than sixty days previous to the reassent just inference being exactly the reverse. And supposing of Congress. Did not the haste and the immaturty it just, the purport was, that this danger, which had no preparation warrant the inference, that it was part existence when the act of removal of the deposites had plan to anticipate that event? And, if it were, the been adopted, and but for its adoption could not have had (Mr. A.) had to ask, what was the construction to be s existence, was now to plead indemnity of that act in all its on the proceedings, both as regarded the respect parts-one of the mischiefs of which it would have been was due and the authority which belonged to the Le the creator beyond dispute-was to form its immunity tive branch of the Government? for it was to this bax from correction, no matter what might be its other de- that belonged the ultimate jurisdiction of the questi merits! Was not this doctrine monstrous? And what the removal of the deposites. That was not denied. T was the application, in the circumstances of the case? A (Mr. A. said) was no immaterial inquiry. The pove perversion and breach of law were alleged to have taken Congress to act, after the measure had been in operat place in the act of the removal of the deposites; an undue for sixty days, was no compensation for the power whe and dangerous power to have been assumed; a violent if in session, it would have had of preventing the blow to have been struck on the commercial operations altogether. Much of the commercial distress to and general prosperity of the country. The interposition from it would have had time to occur. The facties of Congress afforded the only corrective, if those asser- faculty of putting a stop to the measure would, from t tions were true, and was exacted by its highest obliga- ous causes, be much obstructed. It might be said, tions of duty. But, no! it was said; the interposal of was now said, that, the injurious consequences has Congress for this end would have (it was difficult to see been exhausted, there would be no saving in retracing how) the effect of giving new life to the bank. The law, step; and the bugbear of the recharter of the bank the constitution, (the general suffering appealing for re- be presented in advance, to prevent the correction of s dress to the high censorial and corrective office of Con- procedure. The feeling, too, or the discipline of part gress,) were to be lost in the cry which barked us on to might be appealed to; for the fact was not impossible, the hunt of this detested institution! nor incredible, that men, under this influence, might Such (Mr. A. said) appeared to him to be the charac-brought to sustain what they could not, in its inceptis, ter of the secondary, and what he regarded false issue, in have been brought to counsel or approve. this case. He should now proceed to inquire into the What he, (Mr. A.,) however, meant to say on this real issues. He had no complaint to urge that this second of the subject was, that the authority of Congres ary issue had been brought forward with so much industry been treated with gross disrespect, even suppos and effect. The change of position had become a neces- purpose to elude it. To advert to this derogation sary refuge in the defence of the Government proceed- breach of respect, he felt was demanded by the spir.. ing. Separate the act of the Executive from the feelings duty of his place. He was aware there were those indulged towards the bank; disconnect the return of the deposites from its asserted influence to favor the recharter of the bank; and, he appealed to the abounding evidence supplied by the public prints, the experience of every hour, and the candor of every man, that the materials of further contest would be extinct.

upon us.

worthier to assert this office, but it would be a repra to any member discussing the subject to pass the without comment; and he hoped he was one of the a omit to affix to it the just stigma of reprobation.

This, then, was the way in which this question had be brought upon us! Now, what was precisely the quest It was a material point of the inquiry, as related to the The President had declared that the deposites shoul proper question, in what manner it had been brought removed on the 1st day of October. The then Secre He would trace the history of this matter to the of the Treasury had refused to become the agent of House. In the annual message last year, the head of the behest. He had been dismissed for this refusal, Executive had expressed distrust as to the safety of the another put in his place, who had previously prom dr public deposites in the bank; and, in reference to the his readiness to acquiesce in the requisition. The Pr alleged limited power of investigation of the Department dent then had ordered and dictated the removal; the of the Treasury, recommended an auxiliary inquiry by retary had been the instrument of it. The fairness of Congress. The House of Representatives had conformed statement would not be disputed. It could not be, to the recommendation; instituted a protracted inquiry, out a violation of known facts, nor without disrespect, with a power to send for persons and papers; and finally to the President. He had said, in a paper which he responded, at the last moment of the session, when there promulged to the world, that "the measure w was leisure only for business deemed of the most essential own; that he assumed the responsibility;" and he consequence, that they regarded the public deposites" named the day by or before which he required it to as safe in the bank. This response, it was to be observed, effect. It had taken effect on that precise day, whe was strictly, under the circumstances, the expression and proved that the measure was, indeed, his own. He communication to the Executive of an opinion that the dictated, then, the measure which the Secretary a "deposites ought not to be removed;" not volunteered, adopted. This, it was said by his vindicators, he wa however, and obtruded, but given in compliance with the only authorized, but bound to do. As head of the Ex Executive request and consultation. What happened tive, he was bound to see the laws faithfully afterwards? What degree of respect had been evinced according to his judgment of them; and the exerci to this opinion, thus elicited by requisition, and thus com- his power of removal was proper in relation to municated at a moment, and in a manner, showing the es-dinates who should refuse to carry his views into effec

execus

FEB. 5, 1834.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[H. OF R.

He proposed (Mr. A. said) to examine the validity of this sion involved the right to prescribe the mode of exercise easoning, and of the powers which had been exerted in of the office. But the reason which justified the one inhe present instance, both by the President and the Sec-ference, did not hold in the other. The power to disetary. He believed he should be able to show that each miss was necessary to attain the real beneficial end of the had gone beyond the proper bounds of his authority. power to appoint to office, with some exceptions comI`hat either had done this knowingly, he was not at liber-prised in it. But the power to dismiss involved no such y to charge, as the regularity of their proceeding was consequence, as regarded that to prescribe the mode of he subject of so much question. discharge of the official duty. This last was not required by the ends of the first; just the reverse was the fact. If I had the power to direct an officer what to do, what need of a power to dismiss him? I only wanted the power to dismiss when I could not prescribe to him: a power to dismiss excluded, then, instead of affirming, a power to prescribe the conduct of the officer.

The authority then claimed for the President in this case, was to direct that the act in question should be done; and to give effect to the direction, by the exercise of his power of removal of the Secretary not concurring in his opinion.

This he had done: had removed a refusing Secretary, and the act had followed. The first inquiry which arose, But could not the President, it was asked, employ his was, in what respect this differed from a power in the removing power to prevent mischief before it occurred? President to do the act directly himself? Was the differ- Was he armed with no power to arrest the Secretary, in ence any thing more than form? Yet, if the President a purpose of removing the deposites, if this had been his had signed the order for the removal of the deposites, it design, and the President had regarded the measure, as was admitted the act would have been illegal. That a its opponents do now, as both unauthorized and pernidiscretion was intended to be confided to the Secretary, cious? This question had been asked with great triumph, appeared from his being required to give the reasons of as if the answer were to overwhelm the opponents of the his procedure to Congress, if he should order the removal. act of the Executive. The answer was simple and suffiWhose reasons? His own; not those of some one else. cient. How was the President to know that the SecIn this case, the Secretary had given a transcript of rea-retary designed the act? Was he to play the inquisitor, sons which had been assigned by the President previously. to dive into his thoughts unannounced by any action? A Suppose that he had reported that these were the reasons principle of this sort was at war with the genius of just of the President; that there were none influencing his and legal institutions. The President could have no basis own mind to require the act, but that he had deferred to on which to plant the exercise of his power of removal the authority merely of the President in performing it; till the Secretary had acted. Was there any danger or should we not all have regarded such report as an out- mischief in this doctrine? Not at all. Mischief was as rage? Suppose he had added, that he had acted under effectually prevented by the President acting after the the intimation that he would otherwise be removed from Secretary had acted, as before. The day that the order office; would not indignation have broken the bonds of for removing the deposites was signed, the Secretary who party, if there were those who wore such bonds, in the issued it might have been dismissed, and another Secrereception of such a report? And how far did the facts tary have rescinded the order. This was not equivalent differ from those suppositions? That a removal of a Sec-to a power to dismiss beforehand. First, because there retary for non-conformity to a dictation which the Presi- would be legal ground for the dismission after the act dent could not execute directly had really take place, not was done, in place of suspicion or inquisition. Secondly, merely been threatened. a dismission for an act performed, or the power to dismiss But the President must have the law executed, con- for it, that act inducing a change in the existing state of formably to his own view of it! Might not a grant of dis- things, was very different from the power to produce the cretion to another officer be a part of the law which the change. A power to keep things in statu quo, (the law President would be bound to respect as much as any as it was,) is a safe power to recognise in the Executive. other part? It had been shown that the law gave a dis- That was the character of a power to dismiss after an act cretion to the Secretary in this case. Might there not be was performed. good reasons for such grant in this, as in many other cases? The power to dismiss, to compel action, was essenWhat would be the injury, if this might not be done? The tially different. It gave the Executive the discretion to President could not be fitted to prescribe the mode of alter the condition of things established by, and reposing discharge of every sort of function and office which it on, the laws. Could there be no dismission, then, for might be expedient the law should create. Suppose the omission? and would not this be very injurious? Yes, law directed a road to be laid out by an engineer-a legal certainly, where the omission was of an act specifically proceeding to be conducted by the Attorney General: prescribed. Then the intent of law was ascertained. was the President, who might be no engineer or lawyer, Omission, in such a case, was as much a breach as com(the law giving him no specific authority,) to be allowed mission; no discretion was superseded by removal in to supersede the professional capacity of those persons, such a case, which subjected the will of one officer to or, if they refused to submit, to remove them? Then, that of another, and made them one will, when the essenwhat became of the public interests which might demand tial principle of free government demanded scope for the exercise of these capacities? Individual interests and diversity of wills, in which, more than in "multitude of rights might be just as much involved. Take an example counsellors," there was safety. from the pension laws. Might the President, because he But the argument perpetually recurred, the President could remove him, direct the Commissioner of Pensions was head of the Executive; the Treasury was one of the which cases he was to pass, which to reject? If he could, Executive Departments; the Executive controls, at will, what became of the safeguards of the public, in the first all the members of these departments, and can be guilty case of the rights of the pensioners in the last? The ob- of no assumption of authority in exercising this control. jection to this doctrine was, that it merged all discretions Were all these propositions, or how many of them, just? into one discretion in public office, and left a single Ex-And first, was the Treasury to be considered as an Exececutive will in the State. utive Department? If it was to be so regarded, it was an The argument was illogical which inferred the right anomaly presented by our system to the ordinary and of the President to prescribe to officers the mode of dis-approved theory of free government. The Treasury an charging their duties, from his power of appointing and Executive Department! Then what did the safeguards dismissing them. It was said, that, as the power of ap- of free government require to be separated from Execpointment involved that of dismission, so that of dismis-lutive control? Not the sword of the State; that was

H. OF R.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[FEB. 5, 184

obliged to be in the hands of the Executive. If the Treas- point in dispute; for the power was the same in regard ury belonged to it, too; if it was lawful for the power all officers but the judicial. wielding the sword to put the whole purse of the State This doctrine, then, of the Treasury being the b into the hands of the paymaster of the forces; where was of Executive direction, was equally disavowed by the the "separation," or was there any, between the powers, theory of free government and our constitution and la the lawful possession of which constituted the theory of But, suppose the Treasury an Executive Departme despotism? What, with the lawful power to put the proper; still, was there any thing to forbid the Legislat whole treasure of the State in any place he pleased, stood from making an officer of this department its agent kr between the lawful commander of the public force, and specified purpose? And if there was not, would not ta that danger which had been the terror of all free States agent be, quoad, an officer of the Legislature, and re -a military force which might be turned against the sponsible only to the Legislature? If we make a Tras State? The gentlemen from New York, [Mr. BEARDSLEY,] ury officer our Speaker, one of the Auditors our printe and Georgia, [Mr. JONES,] had maintained, indeed, that would they not be our officers, responsible to us T this danger could have no existence in our Government. payment of the public debt was a legislative functio Why? Because, they both said, that the power of raising made so expressly by the constitution. We instituted i troops and money was placed by our constitution in Con- commission to execute this function for us. This c gress. But what did it matter to an ambitious commander mission (of the sinking fund) was composed of the pr of the national army by whose authority it was raised, or siding officer of the Senate, the Chief Justice of te by whose authority the revenue of the State was raised, United States, the Attorney General, and two of the Se if he might have the lawful control of the revenue, to ap- retaries-of State and Treasury. The two first were ply, if he chose it, in the debauchment of the army, and executive officers. Were the other three executive: turning their arms against the State? This argument was cers, though they sat at the same board, at the side o mockery, that because a dangerous man had not the law- those invested with authority from the same source, ful authority to raise troops and money, his misuse of them the same mode, to the same extent, discharging the s was not to be apprehended, if they were put into his cus-function?

tody! This was an argument that the thief, who had not The remission of forfeitures and fines, in like mame", got money by wrong acts, would not break trust if it were was an uncontested legislative function; and Congres committed to him to keep. was in the practice of devolving this function on the Sec

It would be an anomaly, then, if the Treasury was an retary of the Treasury, in relation to a large class of s Executive Department. Was it such in our Government, jects. Did that make the function executive, so that the by the constitution or the law? The constitution, in no President might take control of it, and direct the offcer instance, mentioned the money power in any of its in the execution, to which case he was to give, to which branches; the raising the collecting-the disbursing; refuse remission? Or was this the proper allotted func but it appropriated the power to Congress. But Con- tion of the officer himself, under no superior but the law gress, the Legislature, like the other departments, stood and the alterations of it by the Legislature? in the necessity of employing administrative functionaries. It appeared, then, that his being head of the Executive, Congress could not do every thing by committees; it and bound to see to the faithful execution of the las might, and was obliged to have agents for various pur- gave the President no control over the positive discretion poses. Every member of the money power, with the ex-vested in officers of the Treasury, whether this were ception of the direction as to the mode of raising the Executive Department or not. No one contested the money, must be discharged by agents. When the De- power to remove from office, for any or no cause, th partment of the Treasury was established for this end, or any other officer; but the question was, whether th were the agents submitted to the arbitrary direction of power could be exerted without abuse, to attain control the head of the Executive, to have the mode of exercise not designed by the constitution and law, over a subjec of their functions prescribed by him, and under his con- the very last which, in their just construction and inter trol? Strange and anomalous proceeding, if it had been ment, there could ever be thought of submitting to the so! No; the smallest sum of money could only be dis- Executive? Was there any difference in the amount of bursed, under the constitution, by an appropriation made reprobation due to the assumption of power or the abuse, by law; and as many as four officers were established, each if the sum of mischief were the same? The Executive with a duty of judging and watching, as to the regularity had the lawful command of the navy and army. Suppose of the process of disbursement, in conforming to the law he employed the first to make war in his personal qu for it. No one of these could the head of the Executive rel, or gave the last a lawful command to march to Was direct, or prescribe his discharge of duty to; and all were ington, but with the purpose to overawe the Legislature required to concur in every separate act of disburse- would these acts be in the least less criminal as being

ment.

irregular and abusive exercise of a legitimate authority, instead of a direct assumption of it?

though more directly and obviously connected with the subject, would be found marked by traits no less extraordinary than the other.

A person to receive and keep the public moneys," (the Treasurer,) was appointed, who, so far from being Such were the remarks which he had to make on the amenable to the prescribing power of the Executive head, power which had been assumed for the President, and or any other, was required to give bond (implying, of exerted by him in relation to this measure of the removal course, the possession of a proper discretion) for the dis- of the deposites. He should now proceed to discuss the charge of his duties. Finally, the head of this supposed exertion of authority on the part of the Secretary, which Executive Department, (the Secretary,) was to make report and give information to either branch of the Legislature, in person or in writing, (as he may be required,) respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office; and generally to perform all such services, relative to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform" of course, by Congress. Did this description fit an offcer who was to take the law and rule of the discharge of his duty from the mandate of the head of the Executive? The power of the head of the Executive to remove him, for any or no cause, proved nothing as regarded the such order or direction."

question had arisen, required that "the deposites of the The sixteenth section of the bank act, on which this money of the United States, &c. shall be made in the said bank or its branches, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct, in which case the Secretary shall immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and, if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons of

FEB. 5, 1834.]

Removal of the Deposites.

[H. OF R.

The Secretary claimed the authority he had exerted after the money had reached the custody of the Treasurer, under this section, and independently of it at the same which was the legal sense and acceptation of the treastime, as a power which he had before, not augmented by ury. The Secretary had transcended his power, therethe section. The parts of the claim were inconsistent; fore, in this respect. His authority to direct the removal for, whatever the law was previously, it was superseded of the deposites from the bank did not extend to the seby this clause, which comprised the whole power whilst lection of places, much less of persons, for their custody, it continued to operate.

and still less of uses (as had been the case) unindicated The Secretary must, therefore, rest his claim on this and unknown to the law. After the mandate of the resection. Now it was to be remarked, in the first place, moval had issued, the function of the Secretary in this that the authority "to order and direct" the removal did matter became satisfied, and the custody was remitted to not give right to the Secretary to be the agent of the re- the former and proper guardian, the Treasurer. This moval, or to assume the custody, or assign it for this pur- last officer might have yielded to the direction of the pose; but to give a legal mandate to some other person Secretary on this subject, and it must be admitted to have for these ends. He was to order and direct, not to do or been the usage of the officer to permit this direction. It act. It became, then, material to inquire who was the was deference to this usage and the construction of law, agent designed by the law to receive the direction. The which he found established in the department, which had function to take and keep the public treasure, or direct governed the Treasurer; for he (Mr. A.) had known him where it should be kept, had never been assigned to the long and well, and there was no man less capable of any Secretary of the Treasury. Before the enactment of this knowing surrender or dereliction of his duty. But whatsection, it had belonged to the province of the Treasurer. ever the usage, it was not warranted by the law, which Under this section, it had been confided to the bank. It had been studious to separate the office of keeping the was to the Treasurer, then, that the order and direction public money, which, in the absence of legal expression, were to be addressed, when the custody of the bank was included that of selecting the places of keeping, from the to be superseded, and who was to be the agent to remove office which was assigned to the Secretary, of superintend the deposites. This was no unimportant distinction, for ing the application of it to its legal uses. many reasons. The causes were palpable, why the per- He would now come to consider briefly the validity of son who was to direct the application of the public money the reasons which the Secretary had assigned for the exto its legal uses, (who was the Secretary,) should not ertion of the authority of removal. As regarded the bank, also be the person to keep it, which was the office of the the Secretary considered his authority as arbitrary; that Treasurer. The reason was an essential one-of safety the bank was entitled to raise no question as to the to the public money. The law in the bank act, as before, grounds of his action, be they what they might. This was kept this distinction in view. In the case of the transfer, a very extraordinary doctrine to maintain in the same as the disbursement of money, as the Treasurer transfer-breath with the statement of the proposition, which was red before the bank act on the requirement of the Sec-fundamental in the report, that the bank charter constiretary, so, by the fifteenth section of the act, all transfers tuted a contract between the Government and bank. Who (even where there was no branch of the bank in the had ever heard of a contract, and that of the very gravest place) were to be made by the bank, on the requirement form, a charter, the construction of an important clause of the Secretary, but not by the Secretary himself. He of which admitted the indulgence of mere arbitrium and was never to have the disposal of the custody, any more caprice? This was the first instance of the maintenance than the custody itself, of the money-and for good rea- of such a doctrine. It was the more extraordinary in son. The Treasurer, if he had it, gave security; the this case, because the language of the clause under conbank afforded ample security, if the bank had it. Not so struction was imperative-"The deposites, &c. shall be with the Secretary: he gave no bond--he might have no made in the said bank," &c. It was not only required, adequate responsibility. The power, then, to remove too, that the act of removal, if it took place, should be the moneys from the bank, gave the Secretary no author- founded on reasons, but the case was to be regarded as of ity to remove to any custody he pleased, nor to any other that peremptory character, that the reasons were to be custody than that indicated by law, and which afforded rendered to the supervising authority by the Secretary, responsibility-the custody of the Treasurer. When the at the first moment it could be done "immediately to Secretary had ordered the public money, then, to be put Congress, if in session, and, if not, immediately after the in hands other than those of the Treasurer, he had tran- commencement of the next session." scended the law, notwithstanding his authority to remove This clause was part of the charter, and of course of the deposites. There had been confusion in the usage of the contract with the bank, which the charter constituted. the Treasury, as related to the directory power of the This was so plain a matter, that, though it had been made Secretary over the places of deposite of the public money. a question, Mr. A. said he would not argue it. All the This power of selecting places of deposite had been stipulations on each side evidently formed parts of the exerted both before and since the bank law, by the Sec- contract. The power was reserved by the contract to retary, though certainly without warrant of law, after the the Secretary, to vacate or suspend one of those parts, money came to the charge of the Treasurer by his receipt- (that which gave the bank the deposites,) of course on ing for it. How was this irregular usage to be explained' sufficient reasons only, as he was required to make an imMr. A. thought he could furnish the solution. The Sec-mediate report of his reasons. Now, what were the rearetary had always been invested with the superintendence sons which could alone justify the vacation or suspension of the collection of the revenue. Under this authority, of a part of a contract? These reasons (unless in cases he possessed and had always exerted complete control as in which the cause was pre-existent to the contract) were regarded the places of deposite of the public money, un-reducible to a single form and description-some breach til it came, by his receipt for it, to the hands of the Treas- of the contract on the side which was supposed to have And this preliminary authority, as it appeared to incurred the vacation or "suspension." But the contract Mr. A., had run over the distinction as to the time when with the bank was complex; comprehended various conthe money became transferred to the Treasurer, at which ditions-some relative to the stockholders and communiit properly ceased, into a general usage of directing the ty at large; another class confined to the relations and places of deposite of the public money at all times, with- transactions of the bank with the Treasury. In the event out restriction. Nevertheless, however the usage might of breaches of the conditions of contract, neither party exempt the Treasury officers from censure, he repeated constituted, in reason or justice, the proper arbiter to that this authority no longer attached to the Secretary, pass on them. Accordingly, for general breaches with

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