APRIL 25, 1834.]

President's Protest.

[SENATE.

So the necessary officers to aid and assist the House of I hope, then, that I shall be understood when I say that Representatives in carrying into effect their legislative duties, are not legislators, but executive officers of this branch of the Legislature.

there are executive officers of the Government, who yet are not of or belonging to the Executive department, over whom the President has no control in the discharge of their duties; over whom an attempt to exercise such control, by virtue of his power of appointment and removal, would be a flagrant usurpation.

Neither the executive officers of the Senate, nor of the House of Representatives, owe any responsibility to the President, neither is he responsible for them. Yet they are officers, executive officers, of and belonging to the Legislative department of the Government. The two the President in this protest, and exemplified by the disHouses united and concurring in legislative action, must have agents under them to aid and assist them in carrying into practical effect and operation the powers and trusts delegated to Congress; and such agents are executive officers belonging to the Legislative department.

According to the powers and prerogatives claimed by missal of Mr. Duane, the Executive department, and the President as the head, claims the whole administrative authority of the Government. He does not confine himself to the political powers delegated to him by the constitution, and enumerated, but he stretches his hand over and So the Judicial department must have executive officers grasps all the effective administration of powers delegated to assist them whilst advising, and to carry into execu- to the other departments. Nothing is left to the other tion the judgments, sentences, and decrees of the Su- departments but to make laws and to decide in the courts preme and inferior courts. The clerks, marshals, coro- of justice. But the President claims to be the sole interners, grand and petit jurors, bailiffs, &c., are not judges, preter of the laws for all executive officers appointed by but executive agents and officers, whose duties appertain him and removable at his pleasure; he claims the right to the Judicial department; who are responsible for their to enjoin upon them what he considers their duty requires; conduct to that department and not to the President. and if they refuse, he claims (and has exercised) an unqualified right of removing them for disobedience. If he has the right to command or require, the duty of obedience is the correlative. Thus, the President claims the right to order the Auditors, and all the officers of the Treasury, to pass and pay a claim or demand. If obeIn this sense and meaning of executive officers, it must dience is refused, he will dismiss and appoint, so as to be evident that there are executive officers of the Legis- have his order obeyed. In like manner he may order lative and the Judicial departments, as well as executive that a claim be rejected; and, by the same means, enforce officers to administer the powers and duties and trusts his order. Of what use is the constitutional provision delegated to the Executive department. The duties as- that no appropriations of money to raise or support arsigned to the officers respectively, compared with the mies shall be made for a longer term than two years? If constitutional division and distribution of powers among the President has the custody of the money, and can conthe respective departments, must determine the depart-trol the officers of the Treasury, he can control whatever ment to which each officer belongs, and owes his direct money is in the Treasury. If Cæsar had been the head responsibility and obedience. By regarding this meaning of the department of the Roman treasury, having thereof the term "Executive," in its more comprehensive and by the custody and control, it would not have been negeneric sense, as well as the distinctive features between cessary for him to drive off Metellus by the terrors of the several species of the duties and trusts to be perform- death. ed by the executive officers, the powers delegated to each

The nature of the duties and trusts to be performed must be regarded, in determining to which of the three, great departments the officers respectively belong, and to which each officer owes his immediate and direct responsibility and obedience.

Under this unqualified power of control claimed and of the three great departments, by the constitution, will, and exercised over subjects not delegated by express enuin the practical operation and execution of the plan and meration to the President by the constitution, but claimed theory of Government, be preserved to each of the de- under the unqualified power of appointment and remopartments, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, in the ex-val, what is to prevent him from sending to the marshal a act proportions and divisions prescribed and ordained by list of grand and petit jurors, when a victim is to be sacrithe great charter of the constitution. By disregarding ficed? What is to prevent him from saying to the marshal, this distinction, and the general import of" Executive," The bail offered in this case is insufficient, you must not the whole order, proportion, checks and balances, pro- take it-and thereby indirectly depriving the citizen of his vided for by the constitution, will be disordered and con- liberty, and of the benefits of the provisions of law upon fused. The powers of the Chief Executive Magistrate civil and criminal process? The whole administration of will become augmented by the transfer of powers plainly justice is drawn within the Presidential power; he may delegated to the other departments; and his office will order that the judgments and decrees of the Supreme and thereby become one of overgrown dimensions and of inferior courts be not executed. In fine, this claim brings most gigantic and dangerous strength. into the vortex of Executive power and control, all the In this generic import of the term "executive offi-active administrative powers of the other departments, The cers," as contra-distinguished from legislators and judges, and concentrates the whole in the will of one man. and yet including executive officers appertaining to the whole is consolidated in a single individual, and the whole Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of the responsibility is melted into one mass, the responsibility of Government, the act of Congress of 11th September, the President. And what is that responsibility? To im1789, "for establishing the salaries of the executive peachment. That has long since ceased to be any effec officers of Government," (vol. 2, p. 50,) contains no in- tive protection to the purity of the constitution. It "is consistency between the title and the body of the act. in danger of being lost, even to the idea of it," in EngGentlemen have argued, because the officers of the Treas- land, as has been stated by Mr. Burke; it "has ceased to ury are provided for by the body of this act, under the be even a scarecrow" in the United States, as said by Mr. title of executive officers, that therefore they are execu- Jefferson in his day. It has become but little better than tive officers of the Executive department, and the mere a tale to amuse, like Utopia, or Swift's Flying island. But, agents of the President. But this style of arguing would the President says "he may also be indicted and punishprove, by the same act, that the judges of the Territories ed according to law;" "is also liable to the private action are also executive officers of the Executive department of any party who may have been injured by his illegal of the Government, and under the control of the Presi- mandates or instructions." This is truly a most marveldent; for this act does provide a salary "to the three lous responsibility, a most wonderful protection to the judges of the Western Territory." constitution and to individual rights. An indictment, or

SENATE.]

President's Protest.

[APRIL 25, 1834.

a suit against the President of the United States, for ille-ments have pursued those ministers who so advised and gal mandates or instructions! The illegal act is committed acted. These are the maxims of the British monarchy. in Maine, or Massachusetts, or in Louisiana, and the Pres As to the general bills of 1789, establishing the three ident is to be indicted or sued, where, when, and by departments, I have before given the history of the stri whom? Is the President to go to this mountain of respon- king out so much of the title from the Treasury bill as sibility, or is the mountain to come to the President? Put called it an executive department, and remarked upon the this mountain in labor as you may, and it will bring forth difference in the enactments, in the Foreign Affairs and nothing but a ridiculous mouse. War Department, from the Treasury Department. The No, Mr. President, such is not the theory of our Gov- President has alluded to the debate. That debate was ernment. Each officer is answerable for his own acts of upon the Department of Foreign Affairs. That the result commission or omission; the President is answerable only of that debate, connected with the body of the enaction for his own acts of commission or omission. Each officer as finally agreed to, do prove the opinion of the Conswears for himself, judges for himself, is responsible for gress, that the power of removal was vested in the Presihimself to the public and to the individual aggrieved. dent by the constitution, I am willing to admit. I have The constitution provides that the "President, Vice Pres- before so expressed my opinion of the constitution. But ident, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be the President's inferences are, that the power is “unremoved from office on impeachment for and conviction qualified;" and that the debate and the result prove the of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemean- Treasury to be an executive department of the political ors." The courts of justice hold each officer responsible power vested in the President by the constitution. That for his crimes or trespasses or other injuries to society or to the power of removal was argued as "unqualified," does individuals. Whether the illegal act has been done ma- not appear; on the contrary, Mr. Madison expressly arliciously or corruptly, is a question upon criminal process; gued thus: "The danger then consists merely in this: the but mistake does not exempt him from responsibility upon President can displace from office a man whose merits recivil process. The courts of justice cannot receive from quire that he should be continued in it. What are the an officer as excuse for breach of law or neglect of duty, motives which the President can feel for such abuse of his that the President had so ordered: and I trust this Senate power, and the restraints that operate to prevent it? In has never advised or consented to the appointment of an the first place, he will be impeachable, by this House, beattorney general, or district attorney, who would advise fore the Senate, for such an act of mal-administration; for that an officer was exempt from prosecution, criminal or 1 contend, that the wanton removal of meritorious officers civil, for an illegal act, upon the mere pretext of a com- would subject him to impeachment and removal from his mand or instruction of the President. own high trust." Others argued in favor of the power of In making claim to the unqualified power of removal, removal, as necessary to the public good, in cases of negand the control over all executive officers, the President lect, infidelity, loss of character, suspicions of intention has alluded to the former power of the King to remove to betray the public trust, as well as for those crimes and the judges, and to the act of Congress of 1789, establish-misdemeanors to be reached by impeachment, but which ing the three departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and latter proceeding might be too tardy to prevent the misTreasury, and to the solemn debate on the bill for estab-chief intended to be defeated by removal. The debate lishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. does not contend for an unqualified power, an arbitrary

It is true that the King of England formerly had the despotic will, but for a qualified power, connected with power of appointing, paying, and removing the judges at the public good.

his will. Under this prerogative, he did claim the power I find that the causes of removal recognised in England of directing and controlling the judges in the performance by usage or by statute, are incapacity by age or sickness, of their offices. Under this power, the King did appoint or by engagement in other business; want of sufficient espliant judges, whose opinions he controlled. He sold de- tate in the country, or living in an inconvenient part of it; cisions in private controversies: he commanded the judges or extortion, or neglect, or misbehaviour. The power to decide in favor of one party, and it was done: he com- now claimed and exercised over Mr. Duane, exceeds the manded them not to give judgment, and the judgment prerogative claimed in the hereditary monarchy of Engwas delayed, denied, and deferred, at the will of the land. The odious abuses of the power of removal abolKing: he convicted and attainted subjects of treason, and ished by magna charta in England, and fenced against by plundered their estates: he despoiled corporations of their the constitution of the United States, are here revived chartered rights and privileges at his will, and by the over all officers whose tenure is not during good behaforced judgments of his judges. But these proceedings viour. The power is asserted, not for the purpose of genwere considered by the nation as enormous abuses of pre-eral supervision, and ensuring diligence, fidelity, and carogative, and produced those famous provisions in the pacity, but for control over their consciences and conduct magna charta of English liberty: "Nulli vendemus, nulli and judgment; for the very control which was used to negabimus aut differemus justiam aut rectum." We shall sell, delay, and hinder justice and right, and for despoilsell to no man, we shall deny to no man, we shall defer to ing corporations and individuals of their franchise and no man, justice or right. And this power of paying and estates. removing the judges at pleasure, was finally taken from The provisions of the statutes as to the two Departthe King by act of Parliament. The nation did consider, ments of Foreign Affairs and of War, expressly subjected and yet considers, that the interference with the officers the Secretaries to the directions of the President, with in the discharge of their duties, for the purpose of con- the qualification that they were "agreeable to the constitrolling by the power of appointment and removal, is a tution;" plainly imposing upon these officers the duties stretch of prerogative danderous and alarming to the lib-not to obey blindly and passively. These departments erties of the people. It is a maxim, that the King's pre-related to the execution of political powers vested in the rogative extends not to do any injury; it is given for the President by the constitution, such as sending and receivbenefit of the people, and, therefore, cannot be exerted ing ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, making treaties, for their prejudice; "it stretcheth not to the doing of any &c., and as comander-in-chief of the army and navy. But, wrong." The King's prerogative is far from being an un- as to the Treasury, the title of executive department was qualified power. It is the discretionary power of acting not retained, and the officers were not subjected, in any for the public good where the positive laws are silent; if part of their duties, to the orders or directions of the it is abused to the public detriment, "such prerogative is President. Why this marked distinction in the enaction? exerted in an unconstitutional manner"-and impeach-Because the control of the Treasury was, by the constitu

tion, committed to the Congress, not to the President; and neither the constitution nor the Congress intended to unite the power over the army and the navy with the power over the Treasury.

But the President alludes to his oath of office. All other officers are sworn to discharge the duties of their respective offices-to discharge faithfully the trusts committed to them; also to support the constitution. There is a difference in the form of the President's oath, which is appropriate to the difference in the nature and duties of the trusts confided.

[SENATE.

"against all their enemies and opposers whatsoever.” The officers of the army and navy understand that the order of the President of the United States cannot protect them from their responsibility to the constitution and the laws; every civil officer knows that his oath and his bond are not to be satisfied with an order from the President. A Roman emperor wished the necks of all the citizens of Rome united in one, that he might strike off their heads at a blow. The President has united in one, the necks of all the holders of offices and places by his appointment, either immediately or mediately, throughout The liberties of the people have been assailed in other the whole Government, from the highest to the lowest, countries and in other times, by the person at the head of (except the judges and those appointed by them,) not the Executive power, commanding the armies, and dis- indeed for the blood-thirsty purpose of striking off their tributing honors and emoluments. The President was heads, but, that they shall live, and move, and have their intrusted with these more forcible means, which might being in his will, and subserve his purposes. This is be perverted to break and overturn the constitution; against the genius and frame of our constitution. therefore, his oath was more specific, to remind him of One of the great securities for liberty consists in the his duty to support, protect, and defend it. So is the division of the powers of government, in distributing them duty of us all. to different departments, and to plurality of persons in Does the President mean that this oath of office en- the same department. Thus safety in Legislation is conlarges his powers?-that his oath invests him with the sulted by having many Senators and many Representapower to make other men break their oaths? This oath tives. Safety in the Judicial department is consulted to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution, to the by having a plurality of judges. The errors, defibest of his ability," as well as the injunction to "take ciencies, mistakes, prejudices, or partialities of one, may care that the laws be faithfully executed," do not con- be supplied, corrected, countervailed, and checked, by tain any grant of new powers; they cannot give him the assistance of his fellows. So the safety in the Execpower to override the constitution and the laws, and to utive department, consists in distributing the powers into be the only interpreter of both. The oath and injunc- numerous compartments, assigning portions to each, so tion are intended to bind him to a great principle of free- that no one shall exercise a dangerous power, subjecting dom, established even in limited monarchies: "The laws each officer, by oath and by duty, to a personal responought to prevail above the commands of men." "Rex sibility, and to the law; whereby a government of laws debet esse sub lege et servare leges." The king ought is created, and not a government at the will of one man. to be subject to the law, be a servant of the law, and execute the law.

power.

An elective monarchy was not the government our forefathers fought for and established. They intended But if this doctrine prevails, that the President has a to establish a free representative republic, with checks legal ubiquity; that all officers are but his instruments; and balances, to prevent the encroachments of arbitrary that he is present and represented in the person of every power. They did not rely upon the judgment, prudence, officer not holding during good behaviour or appointed and goodness of one man to preserve, protect, and defend by him directly or by the heads of departments or their constitution and their liberties. The best and the others; and that he has a right to command them to do wisest often err, the perverse and foolish always. They this or not do that; then indeed he has a most fearful did not, in framing the constitution, trust to what a Moses, power. The laws act or cease to act as he wills; the or a Samuel, or a Washington, would do; but they looked decision of courts stands still if he so wills. The army back to history, to what men had done, to the claims of and navy, the more numerous array of civil officers, power and prerogative which they had resisted by the agents, and contractors, registered in the Blue Book, with war of the Revolution, and intended to secure against that others whose names are not there, not forgetting govern- which may come into the fancy of a furious, or wicked, ors and judges of Territories, and justices of the peace, or ambitious man, who might attempt to usurp a supreme all, all are to move at the will of one man. He makes and unmakes at his pleasure: "This is my will and that Whence did the writers of this protest derive their is your duty-I take the responsibility--obey me, or I notions of unqualified power, of responsibility of officers dismiss you, and supply your place by one whose opinions to the President, of his responsibility for them, and his are well known to me.' Can it be true? Does any free custody of public property and money, as "an approman believe it to be true, that all officers subject to the priate function of the Executive department in this and power of removal, are also subject to the order and di- in all other governments?" Not from elementary treatises rection of the President in the exercise of the duties and upon free governments and civil liberty. Not from the trusts which their offices impose, and which they are pure fountains of American constitutions. Not from the bound by oath to execute faithfully? Is the President writings and speeches of the patriots and sages who have the sole interpreter of the constitution and laws for them? been distinguished in the United States in settling the Are they but his "mere instruments" and "agents" of foundations of the State and Federal Governments. his own choice, to aid him? This prerogative power far custody of the public property and money "has always exceeds any possessed by the King of England: for been considered an appropriate function of the Executive there it is an established maxim "that no man shall dare department in this and all other governments." What a assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land." reckless assertion! If they had looked into the American The sacred majesty of royalty itself cannot absolve the constitutions, they would have seen that the State treasofficer from his oath and his responsibility to the laws. urers are elected by the State Legislatures, and are indeOur officers are officers of the law, not of the President; pendent of the control of the governors. In the number our government is a government of laws, not a govern- of the States so electing their treasurer, they would ment at the will of one man. Our officers of the army, have found the examples of the good old thirteen down to the non-commissioned and even the private sol- States who achieved the Revolution and established diers, are required by law to take an oath to support the the constitution of the United States, as also many of constitution of the United States; to bear true allegiance the States who have since been admitted into the Union. to the United States; to serve them faithfully and honestly They might have learned from the speeches and writings

The

SENATE.]

of one man.

of the wise and virtuous of ancient and modern times, tried public services recommended him to the confidence that no government is well constituted "unless the laws of the President and of the public. The Secretary of the prevail above the commands of men;" that they are ac- Treasury, Mr. Taney, I have long known as holding rank counted but little better than brutes who do not prefer a among the foremost of the profession of the law in his nagovernment of laws before the fluctuating, irregular will tive State. I esteemed him for his virtues. He came into the public councils with a reputation for talents and They must have studied the dark ages of high-toned integrity fairly earned and richly deserved, as I believe. prerogative, of non-resistance, and passive obedience, With the Secretary of War, Mr. Cass, I became acquaintand become infected with the divine right of kings, and ed in 1807: I then esteemed him for his social qualities, enamored of the writings of Fillmer and such like. The and admired his talents as of a high order: I have never President who can assert, before the Senate and the ceased to esteem him, from my first acquaintance to this people, such claims to the custody and management of day: his acquirements and the qualities of his heart and the public property and money, coupled with such claims his head have risen in my esteem. Of the Secretary of to obedience from the civil officers, must be ill advised, the Navy, I need only say he was of the Senate; his capacity or so intoxicated with adulation and love of power as to and fitness for the office met my hearty advice and consent. have overlooked the elementary principles of civil liberty Of the Postmaster General, Mr. Barry, I can speak and the spirit of the people. When I examined the pro- from an intimate acquaintance of thirty years. Many test and the doctrines asserted, I was startled and amazed honors had been conferred upon him by the people, by at their extravagance. the Legislature, and by the Executive of Kentucky. By When the excitement of the times shall have subsided; the people he was elected, repeatedly, a representative when the finger of history shall point to this protest, and in the State Legislature, Lieutenant Governor, and Repan impartial, enlightened posterity shall judge it, the doc-resentative in the Congress. By the Legislature he was trines it contains will be stamped with reprobation. I elected a member of this body. By the Governor of Kenhave confidence in the people of the present day, that tucky, with the advice of the Senate, he was appointed they will not prove themselves to be degenerate sons of first a judge of the general court, then the Secretary of a free and spirited ancestry; that they will preserve the State, and afterwards a judge of the supreme court. He inheritance of constitutional liberty, and transmit it, un-was appointed by Governor Shelby one of his aids, and impaired, to their children. was by his side at the memorable battle of the Thames. I feel no pleasure in dissecting this protest. I gave to Through all these successive employments he has passed General Jackson a zealous and an early and continued with reputation. He has risen by the rich powers of his support, against fearful odds in the circle in which I mind and the qualities of his heart. In the proud conmoved. I sincerely desired, that to the military wreath flicts of intellect with intellect-in the sharpest contests which adorned his brow, a civic garland might be super- for the powers and influences of the State Government— added. He has done much service to the state in time he maintained a lofty and honorable bearing. So he came of need. I desire that his hoary head and tottering frame, into his present official station. If he appears now under to which he has alluded, may go down to the grave in a cloud, that cloud has been thrown over him by the peace. But I am not content, as a tribute of gratitude to workings of an interior, invisible, irresponsible cabal, his military services, that he shall be master over the con- who, taking advantage of his unsuspecting nature and the stitution and liberties of his country. I pray that no storm goodness of his heart, (for he cannot find it in his heart to may come to teach him a lesson by its terrors and distrac- will an injury to any human being,) have thrown a retions. I pray that he may learn from his calm and sincere sponsibility upon him for that which they themselves confriends, before it is too late to profit by the knowledge, trived. But my confidence in him induces a belief that that there is on ever-during difference between the firm he will emerge from the cloud and shine again by the friends to the constitution as well as to his personal fame, light of his own proper virtue and intellect. and the slippery sycophants of a court. Of the Attorney General, Mr. Butler, I can only say

But the protest says the Secretary of the Treasury is that he came here preceded by a good report of his qual"the mere instrument of the Chief Magistrate in the exe-ifications for the office. cution of the laws, subject, like all other heads of depart- The estimation which these men had acquired in their ments, to his supervision and control. No such idea as country, the good opinion and confidence of their fellowan officer of the Congress can be found in the constitu- citizens, acquired by the general tenor of their actions, tion, or appears to have suggested itself to those who or- appear to me to be no mean pledges to the public that ganized the Government.” "No joint power of appoint- they would not betray the trusts committed to them in ment is given to the two Houses of Congress; nor is there the high offices which they now hold. any accountability to them as one body." Here the Pres- I do not, therefore, suffer myself to believe that a counident seems to consider that responsibility follows the ci! composed of these men, if left free to consult their power of appointment, as the shadow does the substance. own reason and judgments, could have consented to such And because there is no such idea as an officer of the doctrines as are set forth in the protest, or advised the Congress, and no appointments by the Congress, as one President that such prerogatives belonged to him by the body, therefore there is no accountability to Congress. constitution and the laws. In tenderness to the PresiNow the idea of an officer of the President, the mere in-dent, I must believe that, if left to himself alone, or to the strument of the Chief Magistrate, is not to be found in the advice of these heads of departments in council, according constitution; nor in the suggestions of those "who organ- to the usage established by his predecessors, he would not ized the Government." They are all officers of the Uni- have asserted such arbitrary doctrines as consonant with ted States, officers of the Government, officers of the law, the spirit or the letter of our happy constitution. I am responsible to the Government and the laws. And if the compelled, then, to ascribe these doctrines, not to the President makes out their responsibility to him, as he has visible, responsible cabinet, but to the workings of an irreclaimed it, he must make out that he is the Government, sponsible, interior, back stairs influence, called, in courts, the law, and the prophet. cabinet double. Wheresoever and whensoever such an Who advised the President to this protest? I cannot interior double cabinet shall prevail, selfish, cunning men believe it to have received the advice and countenance of will creep in: the affairs of the Government will be cona council of the heads of departments. The Secretary of ducted on the plan of court favoritism, for the benefit of State, Mr. McLane, has a high and honorable reputation the receivers of salaries, jobs, and contracts, and not upon for talents, integrity, diligence, and firmness. His well-any great principles of policy to advance the general pros

APRIL 25, 1834.]

President's Protest.

[SENATE.

perity of the people. The partialities and prejudices, the ident.) As tribune, he could suspend all proceedings of policies and intrigues, of the back stairs influence of the the Senate, (so can the President, by his veto, suspend interior irresponsible cabal, will produce the most incon- legislation not suited to his will.) As censor, he was the sistent measures and principles. The double cabinets in fountain of honor-could promote or degrade, (so can the England have produced fickle, fluctuating councils and President, by the power of appointment and removal.) orders, to the disgrace of the administration at home and As imperator, he commanded the forces by sea and land, abroad. Such results must always happen from like (so does the President, and he commands the treasury causes. The cabinet who stand responsible in the eyes and an army of civil officers and receivers from the treasof the people, must break up the influence of the irre-ury.) The republic retained its forms; there were meetsponsible corps, or come out from the administration, or ings of the senate and assemblies of the people; laws were be disgraced. If they remain, and consent to serve their enacted, and elections made; affairs proceeded as usual, inferiors, then they will be in the awkward predicament in the name of the proper authorities-the consul, the of standing god-fathers for odious measures, and of advising the President to principles in office to which he was opposed before he came into office, or as serving, after the loss of influence, for the gross emoluments of servitude.

censor, the augur, the tribune of the people; but he himself acted in all these capacicties, dictated every resolution in the senate, and pointed out every candidate who was to succeed in the pretended election. To constitute a despotic power, it was not necessary to introduce any new forms of office, nor to assume the name of dictator. The union of the offices of consul, tribune, censor, and head of the army and navy, was sufficient."

The powers and prerogatives claimed by the protest, united to those powers delegated by the constitution to the President, will leave us the substance of an absolute monarchy, disguised by the forms of a commonwealth. Octavius, surnamed Augustus, most reluctantly would A writer, deeply read in ancient and modern history, who accept the power of dictatorship, (so is the modesty of had studied the liberties of Switzerland, and of England, all ambition in its first shoots,) for ten years only; but, examined the foundations of civil liberty, and traced the by successive elections, retained it during his life. His causes of the decline and downfall of Roman liberty, has successor retained the power, without the formality of the given us the definition of a monarchy, and the necessary decennial elections. Precedent never fails to transmit to elements for the protection of the public liberty. He the successor the power by a surer title. And an effort says: "The odvious definition of a monarchy, seems to be is now making, by the force of Executive influence, to that of a state in which a single person, by whatever name appoint the candidate who is to succeed to the office of he may be distinguished, is intrusted with the execution President. of the laws, the management of the revenue, and the command of the army. But, unless public liberty is protected by intrepid and vigilant guardians, the authority of so formidable a magistrate will soon degenerate into despotism."

By a letter from a friend who was at the convention in one of the States, and who vouches the truth of the statement enclosed, an instructive lesson is taught, in characters too legible to be overlooked, that the patronage of Government is brought into conflict with the freedom of elections. This convention was for the purpose of concerting means for unity of action as to the next Presidency and Vice Presidency.

And what have we come to in these days? A single person, intrusted with the execution of the laws, with the command of the army and the navy, has laid claim to the custody and management of the public revenue and public The members of this convention consisted of 177 perproperty. He now manages the public treasury, which sons, of whom 106 were Federal and State office-holders, is continually replenishing under a permanent enactment and only 71 not holding office. This convention appointof taxes, by a system of his own; by the power of his ed committees of correspondence in nineteen congresveto; the voice of two-thirds of each House of Congress sional districts: of these committee men, amounting in all is necessary to repeal the taxes or take the custody and to fifty-two, thirty were office-holders, and only twentymanagement out of his hands, or to enact any system two holding no office. Of the thirty-six, sixteen were against his will. Add to this the doctrine that his power quartered upon the Government of the United States, the of control, by means of appointments and removals, is un- other fourteen, State officers. A State central commitqualified, that civil officers and all receivers from the tee was appointed for managing the affairs of the election, public treasury by salaries, jobs, and contracts, amount-consisting of nine members, seven were office-holders and ing to a very large number, are given to understand, by only two private citizens; and of the seven, five were the practice, that they are required to move in concert officers of the United States. Thus, throughout the with the plans of the court party, and we may truly say, whole machinery, the holders of offices and jobs were the that intrepid and vigilant guardians are necessary to pro- majority; and in or for the governing power of the systect the public liberty from the authority of a magistrate tem organized by the convention to operate upon elecso formidable. I thank my stars, that cast my destinies tions, the majority is composed of officers of the United in a land of liberty, that I am as yet free to raise my voice States. This is but a branch of the general system of the against the insidious sappers and miners of the foundations ruling dynasty, which is to be generally diffused through of free government; that I have compeers more power- the United States, to appoint the successor to the Presiful in argument and not less resolute in opposing those dency, and perpetuate the places and interests of the assaults upon the constitution. The great interests of the office-holders and receivers from the public revenues: to country have been deeply affected, disordered, and bro- point out (as Augustus did) every candidate who is to ken in upon by the mere act of the Executive. The mul-succeed in the pretended elections: to receive the voice titudes of sufferers, writhing under the tortures thus in- of public sentiment, as manufactured in the interior cabiflicted, attest this representation by their memorials day net in Washington, and return it in echo. after day presented to the Congress. And, as yet, I see Such a system, in the hands of men holding office at no remedy. The withering influence of the Executive the will of one man, who claims an unqualified power of power is still exerted. removal, is in conflict with the freedom of elections, cor

It is not necessary to a despotic power, that the old rupting to the morals of the people, and dangerous to the forms of a free government should be demolished. Ano-existence of free government. Elections will be made to ther writer, of great learning and research into history, turn upon the question of support to the administration has given us an account of the Roman empire, after Au- of the Federal Government. The administration candigustus had established in himself a despotic power. "As dates will be put up and supported by the office-holders consul, he was first executive magistrate, (so is the Pres- land the patronage of the Government-members will be