FEB. 17, 1826.] might happen, in which, by the general ticket system, zation on which we profess to obtain it fairly, is only cal the vote of the State of New York might stand between culated to defeat it altogether. Under the general ticket two persons in the ratio of nineteen to seventeen-that, system, the true original principles on which this elective under that plan, the votes of the minority, which may power among the States was adjusted by the Constitution have been designed by the "People" to defeat a particu- is completely preserved, and the will of the People of lar candidate, are totally sunk into the estimate of the the several States, at States, is strictly regarded, and vote of the "State." This only proves, Sir, that the mi- takes its full effect on the election of the President. Benority, in such a case, must submit to the will of a majori-fore we adopt any amendment whatever to any part of the ty. There is some error in this argument arising from the Constitution, we must be satisfied that it proposes some use of terms. It would, in my opinion, be more correct valuable improvement to the system. The question beto say that the persons who compose such a minority may fore us is not altogether even whether, under the princihave failed in their expectation of defeating the sense of ples on which this power was settled among the States, the People for the will of the State and the will of the there may not be some necessary inequality or some inci. People of a State, are merely convertible terms when we dental inconveniences. It is possible that it can be imspeak of the Presidential election. There cannot, in my proved-but we are first to determine whether the plan opinion, Sir, be contrived, by any ingenuity, a scheme proposed by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina which may so effectually defeat not only the will of the is a better one, and so adapted in its operation as to remePeople of the several States, but of the majority of the dy these inequalities and inconveniences. Until we are Union, as the district system. It carries within itself the satisfied on that point, I trust we shall not give our assent chances of that result, multiplied in the same proportion to it. If the general will of the People of all the States, that we increase the number of the districts in a State, or as a common mass, is the end which it proposes to retheir aggregate in the Union. Under the general ticket spect, it is, in my opinion, better calculated to defeat the system, and throwing out of the account the votes derived very object which it professes to attain with so much cerfrom Senatorial representation, no person can be elected tainty. unless he obtains a majority of the electoral votes in the It is further urged, in support of the introduction of this gift of the People, voting on the basis of their true con- system, that it is adapted to remedy the evils which have stitutional power-by States. If there is occasionally any sprung up in many of the States, from the establishment inequality under the system of voting by States, like that of what has been commonly called the caucus systemwhich the gentleman from South Carolina supposed, in that the necessary consequence of the general ticket plan the comparison which he drew between the separate re- is to throw the power of the States into the hands of polisult of the election in New York and Pennsylvania, voting tical managers, who wield this elective power for the acby States, and the result of a vote in those States, if unit-complishment of their own political purposes. Whatever ed in one common mass, these inequalities are much may be the names which we may give to systems of this more striking and more highly mischievous under the dis-sort-whether we denominate them as caucusses, or if, as trict system. It is by this system that the minority of a in Pennsylvania, they assume the somewhat less offensive State may effectually defeat the will of a majority. Let appellation of conventions, I shall not here enter into any us consider what may be its effect on the vote of New particular examination of their merits, nor shall I differ at York in the election of a President, on a division of the all from the justice of the views of these systems which popular power of that State into thirty-six electoral dis- have been presented to us, or are to be inferred from the tricts. Let us suppose that the aggregate of all the sur- lights in which they were presented by the argument of plus majorities in nineteen of these districts, every one of the honorable gentleman from South Carolina. But, sir, which are in favor of one person, is fifteen thousand the true remedy, after all, against the operations of these votes and that the aggregate of these majorities in the party systems, is to be found in the stern independence, remaining seventeen districts, all of whom are for a dif- sagacity, and integrity, of the People. The moral power ferent person, amount to twenty thousand. The effect of this system can only be sustained by public opinion, co of this system is, in that case, certainly to defeat the will operating with it to the same common end. It may, in of the People as a State, and to give to the minority more some degree, tend to the more perfect organization of efficient power in the election than the majority. If we party-its discipline, efficiency, and activity; but it is to trace the consequences of this plan still further, we shall be most successfully met by public opinion, and its operafind that it may happen that a single district may give a tions defeated by the independent exercise of the elective greater majority, for instance, a majority of ten thousand power of the People. It is not in the Presidential elec. for one person, when the aggregate of majorities in the tion alone that it finds the policy which has given it existwhole remaining thirty-five may be only five or nine thou-ence in the States; and the district system in that election sand for a different person; and, in such a case, the pow-will not annihilate the party interests which sustain it, er of a minority under the district system is to that of an New York has adopted the district plan in that election, actual majority in the State, as thirty-five to one! This and yet this system has been there revived-perhaps with effect of the system is by no means problematical. I am as much efficiency as it ever had. In the choice of elec not indulging in fanciful theories on its consequences in tors, I doubt if the district system will provide a complete the States, and its probable tendency to defeat public remedy against the party influence of this political machineopinion. Experience has already, in numerous instances, ry; even at the risque of another evil, the fatal annihila confirmed the truth of these its fatal effects on the will of tion of the elective power of a State. So long as this parthe People. The history of many elections in the States ty system collects itself at one point, its evils are more which have adopted that plan, if they are examined, must fully exposed and accurately judged of. It awakens the show that such is its tendency. If the general ticket sys-jealousy and keeps alive the vigilance of the People. It fem, on any political hypothesis of the Constitution, occasionally disregards here and there in the States the minority of her votes, the district system within such a State directly leads to the still more heretical anomaly of principle, which defeats the will of the majority, or completely paralyzes the power of the State. Such a State may as well at once be struck out of the political system in the Presidential election. It is a mockery to call for the expression of the will of the People when the very organiVOL. II-90 then presents a single power, against which the moral energies of a whole State may be directed, and if crushed in such a contest, it rescues from the general wreck no remnant of the elective power. Diffuse it, and it still operates silently and unseen. The "central power" still keeps in motion, in other forms, the elements of party organization, and it will still find its way to the remotest corners of a State. So long as it remains concentrated, its power may be subdued; but diffuse it, and it carries its H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. contaminating influence throughout the body politic, Lainting the whole system and corrupting the vitality of our social institutions. (FEB. 17, 1826. dence is to be reposed on our integrity in this point, it deserves but very little on any other. But, sir, the honora ble gentleman has derived much of the force of this arguThe view which the honorable gentleman presented to ment from the liability of this House to be corrupted by us of the effect said to have been produced in Maryland, men in power. This illustration is but the same argument by a few votes on some occasion, from which it was infer- presented in another posture. The one is founded on the ed that only ten or a dozen men, composing a surplus ma- innate depravity of the body itself, and the other on the jority, produced an entire political revolution in that State, danger of its contamination from evil men. If we indulge attributes much more to their elective power than they are in the conclusions which are drawn from these consideraentitled to. It is not the surplus over a bare majority tions, we may come to the conclusion at last that the Peowhose will alone determines any question. These are but ple themselves are not to be trusted in the exercise of their the component parts which constitute the whole number elective rights. If those who are elected directly from of voters which make up the entire mass of the majority. the mass of the People are not to be trusted at all, how The Constitution was adopted in the Convention of Vir- dangerous might a direct election, by the People, of their ginia by only ten votes, and the late declaration of war President, prove to be, on the hypothesis of the honorable passed one branch of Congress by a majority of only four gentleman. If this House is so peculiarly liable to be misor five votes. It can hardly be considered as just to say, led or corrupted by men in power, is there nothing to be that ten men adopted the Constitution of Virginia, and apprehended among the People from men out of power? half a dozen, only, declared the war against Great Britain. Whatever may be the extent of the influence which men This notion was on that occasion carried so far, that I well in power may obtain in this House by "fawning and flatrecollect to have seen or heard of a book written soon tery," there is some reason, in all elective Governments, after that war commenced, the scope of which was grave- for the People also to be on their guard against the arts of ly designed to prove the extreme impolicy and absurdity men out of power, who, in the disguise of friends of the of going to war on the vote of five or six men only! A People, may flatter their pride, fawn upon their favor, and member of this House, from the State of Pennsylvania, and finally steal away their rights. The evidences of this danone of the Representatives from the City of Philadelphia, ger are neither few nor obscure in history. Among all the or its vicinity, was once returned here by a majority of only views from other times and other countries, which the one vote out of ten or twelve thousand; but we should honorable gentleman drew to his argument, he might hardly say, that he was elected by one man; or, if we do have found in the history of every Republic at least, some adopt that absurdity, we might as well add that as he was striking illustrations of this danger. My own reflections elected by one person, he was to be considered here as on the nature of this Government have led me to a conclurepresenting that person only. sion directly opposite to that of the honorable gentleman. On the other branch of these amendments, included in If this Government is to be demolished, it will never find the propositions before us, we could have voted more sa- the weapons of its destruction in the hands of men in tisfactorily if the resolution itself contailed the details which power. The Prætorian bands will never be led up to that the honorable gentleman suggested in his remarks to be fata! work from this House. There are great masses of his intention to couple with this part of the amendment. feeling in different parts of the nation, and common inteHe states, that, if we should agree to take the ultimate rests which affect great sectional portions of the country, choice of a President from Congress, he proposes to pro- which must be first inflamed and put in motion by those vide for the contingency of a second election, by sending who seek for power-the spirit of anarchy will say to the back to the People either the two highest candidates, or North, "your commerce is to be annihilated"-to the the persons having the two highest numbers of votes, (I South, " your internal security is in danger"-and to the did not precisely understand which, and it is immaterial to West, your inheritances are to be taken from you, and the view which I shall take of the proposition,) for a se-your political power is trampled upon"-we may then look cond choice by the People, voting throughout the States among the People for those who, flattering their prejudiby districts, between such persons only. We must, there- ces-fomenting their passions-stirring up the deadly elefore, treat this resolution and this plan as one proposition, ments of party hatred, and exasperating the bitterest feeland consider its merits in connection with such a system. ings of hunan infirmity, persuade them to consider their The principal argument in favor of taking the election from public men and statesmen as traitors to their interests, and this House is founded on the danger that this power may to treat them as public enemies. Then, sir, we may find, be abused in the hands of the Representatives of the several amid the confusion of this tumult of passion and popular States here. This argument directs itself against the ex-phrenzy, tyranny, in its incipient garb, and yet unfledged istence of all political power, and all institutions of Govern- with power, mounting itself on "young ambition's lowly ment among men. If the innocent and pure are most lia- ladder." If we are really so unfit to be trusted, and so ble to fall, by reason of their too confident security, this little disposed to regard public opinion and the rights and power here might be more dangerous still. Now, sir, to will of our constituents, the honorable gentleman might my mind this species of argument, drawn from the possible have spared all his labor to convince us of the propriety of abuse of political power in all Governments, only proves this amendment. Experience and the history of our own that it is much better to go back at once to a state of na- country have not, in my opinion, yet shewn that either the ture and derive our notions of Government from the social integrity of this House or the country, is ever to be corinstitutions (if social they are in any sense) of the abori-rupted by Executive influence, or made subservient to the gines in our vicinity. If this argument is received by any will of that Department. During the Presidential term of one who is willing to act on the faith of it, it may present Washington, and with all the great and well-deserved to him inducements to abandon civilized society and unite moral power of his character, the House of Representahimself to the savage tribes; but it can receive but little tives, at times feebly supported his general policy in the favorable consideration any where, when we remember | administration of the Government. The administration of that, in all our forms of Government, there are restraints, his successor, closed its term after a very doubtful support both moral and political, which entitle all public bodies to by the Legislature, and the first Congress which convensome confidence. The obligations of an oath and of ed in the next year, reversed most of its public policy by honor-the power of conscious virtue and the love of one's decisive majorities. Mr. Jefferson was elected by the country, are securities which bind men to their integrity House of Representatives; and if the abstract principles every where. If this House is not to be trusted by the which the honorable gentleman has offered us as the tests People, to whom it is directly responsible, and no confi- by which we are to be governed in making up our judg FEB. 17, 1826. Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. ment on the conduct of public men, and the motives which we must certainly wish that those judgments had been guide them in the distribution of patronage are just, to spared which may inscribe a sentence so revolting to our what a deplorable situation shonld we reduce the respect- | feelings, on the sanctuary of the dead. When, more reability and moral value of that high station in the Govern-cently, one of our most excellent and accomplished men ment of this free country. Can it be believed, on any mo- was called from these seats to the service of his country, ral system, that the Executive patronage in the carlier was Poinsett-bought? If it is honorable to die in the serperiods of Mr. Jefferson's administration, or in any part of vice of one's country, is it disreputable to live in the pubit, was distributed as the wages of political iniquity?-or lic confidence, or to serve in its public councils? But I that the triumphant majorities which supported the gene- forbear to press these illustrations further. I do not deny ral policy of his administration, were maintained by Execu- that the power of appointment has been abused by some, tive influence-or that the decided support which his and may be by all men. But it is not every exercise of successor (who would seem, from the remarks of the hon- what is somewhat misnamed when we call it Executive orable gentleman, to have been endowed with political patronage, which is to be denounced as a defiling thing sagacity scarcely competent to select from the country a which contaminates all the healthful fountains of public cabinet,) found, during his whole term, in both branches virtue. Is it to become a stigma on the fame of men, that of Congress, to all his public measures, was preserved by they are called to the service or the councils of their the power of his personal influence, or even of his patron-country even from this House? If the interests of the age? During the next administration, I may appeal to country are better served, I know not why the path of many who are yet here, to say, if, during the greatest part honorable fame and honorable emulation may not be as of the last eight years, there has been scarcely a time when pure through this House as through any other branch of the whole power of Executive influence could carry any the Government, or as it may be any where. But few favorite measure through the House. On many of the men have risen to eminence among us, or partaken of the most important subjects of general policy, the opinions of highest confidence of the country, who have not first servthis House and the Executive have been essentially vari- ed her in her elective public councils. Jefferson and ant-and yet, I believe, it will be found that a greater Adams, Hamilton and Madison—and Washington-were number of appointments to public office, of members of educated in these schools of political experience. The both branches of Congress, has not happened under any gentleman from South Carolina told us, with great justice, administration. I well recollect, that a member of the that in England there has scarcely been a distinguished other branch of the Legislature, even accepted (and, public man for a century, who has not first heen called to doubtless, solicited,) as a miserable crumb from the Exe- the House of Commons, by the People of that country; cutive table, the paltry place of a Collectorship on one of and to this I may add, that, flagrantly corrupt as the genthe Northern Lakes. I can never bring my mind or my tleman presented that political body to us—as the very feelings, as an American, to suffer myself so to judge of purchased vassals of the Crown-these eminent and acour Executives, as to estimate the motives which may ac- complished statesmen were taken from the Parliament tuate them by the hard rules which the gentleman from and called to those exalted stations in the Government of South Carolina assumes-let them have come to that high that country on which they have conferred so much hostation by a constitutional election under any circumstan-nor. As freemen must be educated to liberty, (and there ces whatever. They are tests of such severity, that no is nothing more true) so public men must be educated man can stand the trial. If the Executive appoints his for public stations. I do not believe in the existence of friends to office, 'tis corruption-if he appoints his ene- men as statesmen by instinct. One may be born with mies, 'tis corruption still. If he appoints his friends, some qualities which may be suitable for other stations. he pays-if his enemies, he buys! Are these, sir, Nature may, for instance, confer upon a man many quathe unsparing judgments which a generous People will lities of a good soldier; but political science is a moral pass upon their public men? Are we to cherish, for a acquirement. To attain those high stations in public moment, doctrines which lead to such denunciations of all confidence which are so honorable in a free country, it is that we are taught by our national pride and the character necessary that one should devote a long life to the study of our institutions to respect? What should we say of of her laws and institutions, her history, her domestic and the justice of other nations, should they apply to our free foreign relations, the principles of her public policy, the Government these bitter reproaches? Let the advocates temper of her People, the genius of her political system, of the divine rights of monarchy, and Kings themselves, and the spirit of her Government; nor even then may he when they behold this great fabric of civil liberty, say, in expect the People to confer upon him their highest hothe envy of their hearts, nors, until he has served in their Senates, passed the or"How much, O Sun! I hate thy beams"- deal of public opinion as a statesman, and shown that he but let us never apply to our public men those judgments possesses that profound talent, those sound political prinwhich may lead the pettiest Prince of Europe to look ciples, and great moral qualifications, which alone can down upon the President of this free and enlightened adorn her public councils and perpetuate the civil liberPeople with contempt. The People of this country will ties of the country. It is there that he learns how prenot respond to the sentiments which we have heard. Be- cious these civil liberties are; it is there that he feels the lieve me, Sir, they are too jealous of their own honor and sanctity of the Constitution; it is there that he draws from the reputation of their Government, and too generous in experience the lessons of political wisdom; and it is there their nature, to cherish such injustice to their own institu- that he shows his fitness to be trusted with power. When tions and their own statesmen. If we invoke these judg-it ceases to be honorable to be here, this House must be ments upon those who hold the most eminent stations in come a scandal to the nation-a by-word among the Peothe Government, by what rule shall we ask them to judge ple-a reproach to the Government-the scoff of moof us? When Mr. Madison called from his retirement in narchy, and a curse to freedom. Why, then, should we that State which you, Mr. Chairman, have the honor to treat of it as only corruptible, and judge of it on abstract represent, to the public service of the country, one of her principles deduced from the mysteries of political metamost illustrious citizens and public benefactors, whose physics and the "philosophy of human nature?" The name and memory will be revered as long as distinguish-illustrations which the honorable gentleman has drawn ed talents and eminent public virtue shall be respected from the history of Rome are not at all applicable to this and honored any where, was Bayard-purchased? If country. I have long ceased to apprehend any danger the living only were involved in these tests of public in- founded on the existence of those causes here which detegrity, we could bear them with more composure-but stroyed that Government. It was a Republic, (if it now II. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [FEB. 17, 1826. "Retreated in a silent valley, sing "Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate, "Vain reason all, and false philosophy! deserves that name) of a single city-uneducated and its will not be seen in the public eye; and while they unenlightened-of condensed population, and corrupted and their confederates, in the profoundest conclave, vain in morals. Its dissolution only proves that the infuriated ly plot the means of successfully storming the highest batrabble of Rome, pinched up by famine, or the fear of it, tlements of the Constitution which obstruct their path to or dazzled by the glare of military renown, arrayed them-power-public opinion and the virtue of the Peopleselves under the contending chieftains of that city, and others shall, as patriots, were led on by lawless force and blind infatuation, to imbrue their hands in the blood of her best citizens, and to demolish all law-and order-and the Government itself. The history of these atrocious times only further shows that the vassals of Pompey and Cæsar, marshalled in the ranks of these military despots, were at last persuaded to cut each other's throats. But, Sir, I trust there are no analogies in this history which we can ever apply to the educated and enlightened population of our own country. Nor is there any more reason to apprehend in all future time, so long as this Government shall stand, and its People shall enjoy the blessings of education, and feel the obligations and influences of religion, that we shall find In all my reflections on the various propositions which any moral parallel between the election of a President have been made from time to time to amend the Constituand the absurd mockery and lawless violence of a Polish tion, in the election of the President, I have come to the Diet. This Union is not, in my judgment, destined to be conclusion, that the best plan for us is to go back to the severed by such violences as these. Its dissolution original system. Although neither that or the amendis rather to be expected from the operation of other ment of 1802, can yet be said to have had a fair experi causes. It can only be accomplished by first impairing ment; yet, if any thing is to be done, it is wisest, in my the confidence of the People in the integrity of their Re-opinion, to retrace our steps. That plan contained withpresentatives and its public councils-in raising up against in itself at least an effectual remedy against the operations it the States, by violating their rights, and in combining of the Caucus system. Although no amendment can preagainst the Government the moral power of the country. vent a systematic preconcert of party in the election, yet Then, Sir, you will find how weak this political system is it was in the power of any of the small States, or a few without this support from the nation, and it will expire electors-perhaps one-under that arrangement of the without a struggle. The security for the integrity of this elective power, to defeat the election of a particular party House is to be found in its responsibility to public opin- candidate as President. It was a valuable improvement ion. This has hitherto proved itself to be an active and on the pure Democratic principle in that election, and vigilant agent in the political system of all our free in- was calculated always to secure in the two highest stations stitutions, and as long as the People are true to their prin- of the Government, public men of the first grade of chaciples and themselves, we may hope that this Government racter. The small States lost much of their power when will stand. We may long rely, I trust, on their sagacity, they gave up this system. The Caucus system received independence, and patriotism, for its stability. Whatever its perfection from that amendment. In relation to the fears we may entertain of the evils of the Caucus system, Vice Presidency, it is calculated to operate, in bad times, or the integrity of this House in the Presidential election, as a mere bounty of twenty thousand dollars for personal it is to this tribunal that we must all answer. Postpone influence. Much as the small States lost by that amendthe elections in the States until after the Congressional ment, the plan now offered by the honorable gentleman term has expired, and you give this principle its full ope- from South Carolina proposes, in effect, to take away ration. In the State which I have the honor partly to from them the only remnant of their power. The amount represent, its power has lately been most signally illus- of political power which they are now to retain, and the trated. Out of fifteen members who attended the Caucus benefit which they are to derive from its adoption, is to of 1824, an honorable member, whom I have in my eye, reduce them to their original electoral votes, under every (Mr. CAMBRELENG) is the only spared monument among contingency, except the remote chance of a tie in the se us to remind the delegation of the existence of the sys-cond election. If they can find an equivalent in districttem. If one of the objects of this amendment is to destroying the large States, for the loss of what they yet retain, the operations of any "central power" whatever, by tak- they will doubtless be in favor of the amendment. There ing the election from the House of Representatives, it is is, in my opinion, no analogy, as the honorable gentleman questionable, in my judgment, whether this end will be stated, between this and the original system. It is, ineffectually accomplished. There is one security, even deed, true, that two candidates only are to be sent back under the Caucus system, whenever the election comes for the second choice, but the large States are yet to retain to this House, which mitigates its inconveniences and evils in that event the whole number of their electoral votes. in other respects. The members here vote under sacred The plan of sending back to the People only the two obligations, which the Constitution respects as its security highest candidates, is founded on the assumption that, in for their integrity, and they are responsible to their con- case a majority of the People should not unite in the fint stituents But if you take away this security, we may instance on any person, their second choice must necessaraise up in its place an irresponsible Caucus, which is rily be for one of the two highest. In this respect, the beyond even the control of public opinion. It will not be chance of electing the person whom the People might a Caucus of the members of these Houses, It will become select in the second election, is as much, if not more, rea combination of political adventurers without doors, who mote than under an election by the House, on the existing will there organize their schemes of power, and attract to plan, which presents three persons for our choice. It is far their councils a host of hungry expectants. When the from being certain that in every case the second preferelection shall go back to the People a second time, they ence of a majority of the People would be for one of the will be found engaged in poisoning their minds, and ren-two highest. It may happen that a particular candidate dering the public measures of their Government disreput- who might, by chance, obtain the second or even the able in their estimation. They will attack the principles greatest number of votes, might be so obnoxious that on which public opinion should be founded, and perplex those who voted for the other two out of the three highthe People with political disquisitions. The master spir-est would desire to unite, in the second election, on the least of the three. We have already had four persons voted for at the Presidential election, and the number is perhaps rather to be generally expected to increase than to diminish. The two highest may, in many elections, have but a comparatively small proportion of votes, which will be very far from a near approximation to a majority. Under the plan now offered, the People may be necessarily coerced themselves to elect a President against their will. There is to be no alternative more congenial to the feelings or wishes of the actual majority, and the scheme, in such a case, is calculated to defeat public opinion. It has not, in many respects, even the comparative advantages of a choice by plurality in the second election. If it was admitted, out of deference to the argument, that a choice by the House of Representatives out of the three highest by a majority of States, would in many cases defeat the wishes of the majority of the People, it is not improbable that the plan now offered would much oftener produce that result. It proceeds on the principle that it is of necessity to be inferred that a majority would unite on one of the two highest pluralities, and as it sets out on this false hypothesis, it leads, in the conclusion, to its own refutation, and brings the argument thus founded on unsound abstract principles directly to the reductio ad absurdum. The error lies in the premises, and it is not singular that the deduction should be equally vicious in principle. [H. of R. ed, as to re-establish the third clause of the first section of Mr. BUCHANAN said, it was far from his intention to The second resolution proposes, that, in that event, the sovereign States of this Union shall choose the President from the two highest on the list. When no election is made by the Electors, it simply confers upon the States themselves the power which is now exercised by their Representatives. It proposes that, in making the choice, the States, and not their Representatives in this House, shall each give one vote, in the manner which their respective Legislatures may prescribe. Mr. B. said, he did not propose the last amendment because he thought it the best possible method of taking the election from the House of Representatives; but be cause, after much reflection, he believed it was the only one practicable. That consummation was devoutly to be wished by all, and by none more than the Representatives themselves; and he felt persuaded that no amendment for that purpose will ever prevail, which does not leave the balance of power among the States, as it at present exists. Mr. B. said he did not intend to interfere with the de bate now progressing. In case the House should appoint Select Committee, he wished merely that these propositions may be placed in such a situation that they may be referred to that committee. But, Sir, I will detain you no longer with my views of On motion of Mr. ARCHER, the Committee then rose, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1826. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. Mr. BUCHANAN offered the following: These resolutions were referred to a Committee of the Whole. Mr. DORSEY offered the following: Resolved, That it is expedient that the Constitution of the United States should be so amended, that the same should establish an uniform system of voting by districts, in all the States, for Electors of President and Vice President; the number of districts to be equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the same may be entitled in Congress, and each Elector having one vote. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended, that, upon the contingency of no choice being made of the President and Vice President by the Electors, that a new election for Electors shall be held, and the Electors, from the persons having the two highest numbers on the list, shall choose one: but, in choosing the President and Vice President, the vote shall be taken by States, each State having one vote, and the majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended, that the Electors of President and Vice President, shall vote viva voce. These resolutions were committed to a Committee of the Whole House. The House then went into Committee of the Whole, Mr. McLANE, of Delaware, in the Chair, on the resolu tions of Mr. McDUFFIE, as modified by him. [Mr. ARCHER addressed the Committee; but, before he had concluded his remarks, gave way for a motion that the committee rise. The entire speech will be found Resolved, That the Constitution should be so amend-under date of the 23d February.] |