What is Truth?, Volume 1

Capa
Richard Schantz
Walter de Gruyter, 2002 - 339 páginas

In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: what is truth?

To arrive at an answer, two further questions need to be addressed in this context: 1) Does truth possess any essence, any inner nature? and 2) If so, what does this nature consist of?

The present discussion focuses on the antagonism between substantial or robust theories of truth, with correspondence theory taking the lead, and deflationist or minimalist views, which have been commanding an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Whereas substantial theories proceed from the premise that truth has an essence, and that therefore the objective is to discover this essence, the challenge presented by deflationism is to dispense with this very premise.

 

Conteúdo

Introduction
1
Truths and Truthmakers
27
The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth
60
Truth Meaning and Reference
79
Explanatory vs Expressive Deflationism about Truth
103
Robert Brandom
120
Norms of Truth and Meaning
133
On Some Critics of Deflationism
146
An Argument Against Tarskis Convention T
225
What is Truth? Stay for an Answer
238
The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth
249
A Prolegomenon to a General Theory
263
How Not to Misunderstand Peirce A Pragmatist Account of Truth
283
Jay Rosenberg
299
Ralph Walker
316
Index of Subjects
333

Minimalism and the Facts about Truth
161
The Truth about Truth
194

Termos e frases comuns

Sobre o autor (2002)

Richard Schantz, University of Siegen.

Informações bibliográficas