teaching hovers the ideal advantage to the student, the aspiration of every teacher who is indeed a missionary to the world. The realization of a thought life of wonderful interest is high consciousness to bring to another, the impress of the ultimate meaning of incalculable value. Poetry has power to relate what one does to its spiritual meaning, to interpret action, and power to show the moral lesson behind events and incidents. It is true, I think, that poetry has greater moral significance to ordinary perception than either music or painting. Life through the prophecy, the interpretation, the revelation of poetry loses its meanness of aspect and takes on its final significance, its lastingness. When the imaginative comprehension of life can prevent contaminating or unhappy experience there is a distinct gain for the human being: "What a man is, what he does, what he should do, what he may become, what he may enjoy, admire, venerate, love, what he may hope, what is his ultimate destiny,-these things are never absent from the thought of great poets, and that not by accident, but from their very essence as poets." The love of poetry means culture, not that of privilege and opportunity, but the fundamental culture of heart and mind. Poetry taught with human emphasis brings a sense of fellowship with mankind and that upon the highest possible plane; for the material advantage of the desired social state it substitutes the ideal.

Letters Relating to the Capture of Washington

BY JOHN C. HILDT, PH. D.,

Instructor in History in Smith College

On June 2, 1814, a detachment of Wellington's army, under the command of Major-General Robert Ross, set sail from Bordeaux for Bermuda. It arrived there July 25. After being re-enforce by another battalion, it sailed from Bermuda for the Chesapeake Bay, escorted by Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. Cochrane, who had been appointed, April 1, 1814, to the command of the British fleets off the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States, had suggested, on July 14, to his government that the destruction of Washington and Baltimore would be an excellent lesson for the American people. It was not until August 15 that Cochrane and Ross passed through the capes of the Chesapeake.* Before their arrival an anonymous letter, dated "At Sea, July 27th, 1814," and postmarked, "New York, August 1," had been sent to President Madison. This letter read:

"Honorable Sir,

"A friend to the United States of America, who, with many others, is compelled against his will to fight on board of the vessels of your enemy, has, fortunately, at this time, an opportunity of transmitting you such information as he hopes may be of use to your country. He subscribes not his name, and his good reasons for it: of which, ere long, you will undoubtedly be informed, and will so consider them. Of the purity of his design, he does hereby wish you to be satisfied.

"The information which he wishes to give you is, that your enemy have in agitation an attack on the Capital of the United States. The manner which they intend doing it is, to take the advantage of a fair wind in ascending the Patuxent, and after having ascended it a certain distance, to land their men, at once, and to make all possible dispatch to the Capital; batter it down, and then return to their vessels immediately. In doing this, there

*Mahan: Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812. Vol. II, pp. 330, 331, 340.

is calculated to be employed upwards of seven thousand men. The time of this design'd attack I do not know.

"If you wonder how the person who writes this, has been informed of the above, he will tell you that he does not tell you how: but he will tell you this, that as he has stated, so he believes is the intention of your enemy to do. But in order to be more secure, you had better be prepared for such an event. Do not repose under a too fallacious belief of security; for by so doing you may fall into the hands of your enemy in the defence of what your friends believe to be your rights. In haste

"Respectfully your FRIEND."* Anonymous letters generally deserve to be disregarded, but this one, apparently coming from an American sympathizer serving on board one of the British vessels which hovered like hawks off every seaport on the American coast,† seems to have made an impression on the President for it was turned over to BrigadierGeneral William H. Winder, the commander of the military district which included the District of Columbia and Maryland. This letter is remarkable for the accuracy with which it outlined the plan which the British subsequently pursued and the force which they employed.

A flotilla of American gun boats under Captain Joshua Barney had taken refuge in the Patuxent river at the appearance of the enemy and was there blockaded. Cochrane, after landing a force of about four thousand men at Benedict, started up the river with his fleet in search of Barney's flotilla. As soon as the news arrived in Washington that the British fleet was in the Patuxent, great consternation prevailed. Monroe in order to be accurately informed started out to investigate for himself the actions of the enemy. What he was able to learn he reported to General Winder in the following letter, dated "Augt 21, 1814-4 o'clock:"

"My letter to the President of yesterday was he informs me communicated to you.

"I have since taken a view of the enemy's vessels, from a height near the river, below Benedict creek, by which I made them

*Papers of Brigadier-General Wm. H. Winder. Johns Hopkins University. +Mahan: Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812. Vol. II. pp. 330-1, Roosevelt: Naval War of 1812, p. 284.

Adams: History of the United States. Vol. VIII, pp. 127-8.

amount to 23 sq: rigged, and scarcely any, bay craft, or barges Iwere to be seen. I inferrd from the latter circumstance that a force have been detached, either against the flotilla, or on some more important expedn. & in consequence hastened back, to observe the movement in this quarter. I am now on the main road, (5 miles above aquasco mills) leading from Benedict to Washington, & find that no troops have passed in this direction. From what I hear it is probable a movement up the river, in column, as well as by the barques. I shall proceed immediately to Nottingham, whence I shall write you again.

"I know nothing to be relied on of the force on the Potomac." "P. S. I think it wod. not be prudent to estimate the enemy's force on this river six thousand-the gen'l opinion carries it much higher."*

Hardly had the above letter been written when Monroe, with haste and excitement which is betrayed in his handwriting, wrote from "Nottingham" to "Genl Winder or other officer commanding at the woodyard:"

"The enemy are now within two hundred yards of the shore. There are but 3 barges at hand, & the force in view is not considerable you will send five or six hundred; if you could not save the camp, you may perhaps cut off their retreat, or rear

"Jas Monroe

"10 or 12 more barges are in view-There are but two muskets in town-& only a few scattering unarmed militia

1/2 after 5 oclock

5. o clock 30 or 40 barges are in view"

While the enemy were slowly marching on Washington the utmost confusion and uncertainty prevailed there. The Virginia troops, under the command of Colonel George Minor of the 10th regiment of Virginia militia were ordered to Washington when they might have been used to hinder the enemy's progress. Of this movement Colonel Minor said:

"On the afternoon of the 23d. August 1814, I received by Mr. Graham an order from the President through Genl Winder in

*Papers of Brigadier-General Wm. H. Winder. Johns Hopkins University. Compare Monroe to Madison: Horse Road, August 21, 1814. Writings of James Monroe, Vol. V., pp. 287-290.

+Papers of Brigadier-General Wm. H. Winder. Johns Hopkins University.

reply to a communication I had made early in the morning of that day by the same Gentleman addressed to Genl Winder to march with my whole force to the City of Washington. I immediately took my line of march and reached the City some time before sunset & at the earliest moment waited upon the President, who received me most cordially & expressed great gratification that I had obeyed his summons so promptly. After stating the want of Arms etc for my men, he directed me to Genl Armstrong, whom he said would have everything promptly arranged to my satisfaction. I lost no time in calling upon the Secretary of War. I stated to him our wants and anxiety to join our brethren in arms. He replied that I must call on Col Carberry who would do what was necessary. Upon my stating that my men were in high spirits and not at all fatigued & expressing our anxiety to be equipped at once he said that was out of the question, that it would be time enough in the morning when it would be attended to. I retired much disappointed & chagrined and went after making several ineffectual efforts to find Col Carberry, to take lodging. *

Whether the result of the conflict at Bladensburgh would have been different if I had been allowed to participate therein with seven or eight hundred fresh Virginia troops is not for me to say so you must take the following statement for what it is worth. Some time after, upon my calling upon Col Monroe's then Secretary of War I found Comodore Barney in the Ante Chamber speaking to several gentlemen as to the Battle of Bladensburgh. in the course of his remarks (not knowing me) he said "if Minor with his Virginia regiment could have been allowed to come up in time, so as to support my Artillery for a few minutes longer, the British never would have reached Washington."

The action of Secretary Armstrong in this case was extremely characteristic.

After the rout of the American forces at Bladensburg on August 24, the British entered Washington that night. Before their arrival the President had left the city. Secretary Monroe had

*Geo. Minor to Col. Thos. L. McKenny: Mount Air, County of Fairfax, Virginia, 10 April, 1847. Papers of Brigadier-General Wm. H. Winder. Johns Hopkins University.