To suppose,

complexion of the case, were pronounced. however, that the Duke is now the opponent, or even the lukewarm supporter, of his son, is not only to utter a foul calumny on his character, but, we hope and trust, to belie the true feelings of his heart. The whole and sole blame must rest with the ministry, who, having no private feelings to gratify, are probably actuated solely by an excess of caution, or a wish to stave off a new source of embarrassment. But they cannot help seeing that the question will force itself upon their attention ere long, and present circumstances afford no apology for omitting to procure, much less impeding, the formal examination of the clergyman.

The reader is now in possession of the whole history and incidental circumstances of this case. It is henceforth a pure question of law, and as such we shall recur to it so soon as the reform mania shall subside. Those who wish for more immediate information are referred to Sir John Dillon's Essay on the Royal Marriage Act, in which the validity of the marriage, as regards Hanover, is also ably discussed. "Since 1811," says Sir John, "the writer of this letter has devoted his attention very particularly to German law, as connected with the effect of that union. The result has been, that he is prepared to defend its validity against even any German jurist; having in his support the opinion of an entire and distinguished faculty (of Heidelberg, we believe) of Germany, on the principles applicable to the point." We ourselves have conversed with more than one German jurist of character upon the question, and it has been uniformly made to depend on the rank of Lady Augusta,-whether she be or be not of the highest order of English nobility, which (independently of her princely descent) an Earl's daughter undoubtedly is.1 In the 12 Geo. 3. c. 11, George the Second is made the propositus of the new exclusive system. Yet the mother of that king was the daughter of a private French gentlewoman.

H.

The circumstance pressed by Sir J. Dillon, that an earl is constructively the cousin of the king, is almost decisive as to this.

DIGEST OF CASES.

COMMON LAW.

[Containing 10 Barn. & Cresw. Part 4; 2 B. & Adol. Part 2; 8 Bingh. Part 2; 1 Tyr. Part 4; 2 Tyr. Part 1; 2 Moody & Malkin, Part 1; 5 Moore & Payne, Part 2; and a few cases from 5 Carrington and Payne, Part 1. All cases included in former Digests are as usual omitted.]

ADMINISTRATION.

1. (Duty.) The intestate had assigned all his property to the defendant, in consideration of his taking upon himself the payment of an annuity and other debts. The present action was brought by the administrator on a covenant by the defendant to indemnify the intestate against such annuity : Held, that the damages recoverable under this covenant were not to be treated as part of the estate, in computing the administration duty. (3 Taunt. 113.)—Carr v. Roberts, 2 M. & M. 45.

2. The administrator of a husband, who has not administered to his wife, cannot sue for her choses in action, but administration must be taken out to the wife. (Co. Litt. 351 a.)— Betts v. Kimpton, 2 B. & Adol. 200, 273.

3. Goods belonging to the intestate were taken possession of and used by the administrator as his own for three months: Held that the time was not sufficient to make the goods liable under an execution against the administrator in his personal capacity. (4 T. R. 621.)—Gaskell v. Marshall, 2 M. & M. 132.

AGREEMENT.

Assumpsit on two bills of exchange against the acceptor. After the bills became due, the plaintiff and three other creditors met, and agreed to receive payment by his covenanting to pay to a trustee, of their nomination, one-third of his annual income, to which the defendant assented. The creditors did not nominate a trustee, nor was the agreement acted upon, but the defendant was always ready to perform his part: Held, this agree

ment constituted a defence to the action on the bills.-Good v. Cheeseman, 2 B. & Adol. 328.

AFFIDAVIT (of Debt.)

An affidavit of debt, stating the defendant to be indebted to the plaintiff in £1000 and upwards on balance of account for money paid, laid out, and expended by the plaintiff to and for the defendant, &c. at his request, and for money had and received by the defendant for the plaintiff, and for interest of monies due by the defendant to the plaintiff, is not sufficiently certain. Lord Tenterden, C.J. observed, that the safest course was to conform to the ordinary forms.-Visger v. Delegal, 2 B. & Adol. 571.

AMENDMENT.

In an action for not obeying a subpoena, the declaration alleged that the plaintiff had caused to be left with the defendant a copy of the writ of subpæna: Held, that the judge had authority under 9 G. 4, c. 15, to order an amendment, by substituting the words, a copy of so much of the writ of subpana as related to the said defendant. After verdict in the above action, the Court refused to notice an objection, that the plaintiff had not alleged that he had a good cause of action.-Masterman v. Judson, 8 Bing. 224.

ANNUITY (Enrolment.)

Under 53 G. 3, c. 141, s. 10, enrolment is not necessary where the annuity is charged in lands equal to it in value, over and above any other annuity charged or secured on such lands: Held, that a direct charge is meant, and not a security indirectly affecting them, as a judgment. (7 T. R. 194; 12 East. 263.)- Walford v. Marchant, 2 B. & Adol. 315.

APPEAL. See MANDAMUS.

ARREST.

1. (Privilege from.) A petitioning creditor attending commissioners of bankrupt is privileged from arrest eundo, morando, et redeundo, (2 Marsh. 511); and to deprive him of the privilege, on the ground of his being out of the direct course to his own house, clear proof of the fact must be given. It was also objected, that the application for the discharge should be made to the Court of Chancery, but the Court of C. P. made the rule for the discharge absolute. (2 Rose; 4 T. R. 377)—Selby v. Hills, 8 Bing, 166.

2. (Ac etiam.) The defendant may be compelled to give bail to the amount of £40, on an attachment of privilege not containing an ac etiam clause. Collins v. Wright, 10 B. & C. 814.

ASSURANCE.

The defendant sold by auction a policy of assurance, described as effected on the life of a person then living, subject to an annual payment. The vender had, in fact, only a redeemable interest in the life, which interest was afterwards redeemed: Held, that the sale was good notwithstanding, it being the practice of the office to pay in such cases, and there being no

intention to deceive: Held also, that evidence of such practice was admissible.—Barber v. Morris, 2 M. & M. 62.

ATTORNEY.

1. (Delivery of bill.) A bill for agency business done by one attorney for another, need not be delivered under 3 Jac. 1, c. 7. (1 M. & M. 529.)— Sandys v. Hornby, 2 M. & M. 33.

2. The statute 3 Jac. 1, c. 7, s. 1, requiring the delivery of an attorney's bill before action, is confined to business in the superior courts at Westminster. (5 T. R. 694; 4 B. & C. 364.)—Reynel v. Smith, 2 B. & Adol.

469.

3. (Privileged communication.) A communication made to an attorney with reference to a dispute, is privileged, though no cause be actually pending. (See 5 L. M. 35.)—Clark v. Clark, 2 M. & M. 3.

4. (Taxing bill.) An application having been made to the Court to refer a bill containing no item taxable within 2 G. 2, c. 23, to be taxed, by exercising the paramount jurisdiction supposed to be possessed by it, independently of the statute, Lord Tenterden, C.J. took time to consult, and subsequently declared, that on conferring with the other judges, he found so much doubt on the point, that the Court could not grant the application. (3 B. & C. 157; 9 Price, 340; 2 Chit, R. 155.)—Dagley v. Kentish, 2 B. & Adol. 511.

AWARD.

1. (Action on.) A reference was made by a judge's order, and the defendant attended at the first meeting: Held, that an action was maintainable on an award subsequently made.—Wharton v. King, 2 M. & M. 96. 2. (Where final and certain.) Held that an award was sufficient when the arbitrator had awarded general releases, although a claim for a bill of exchange was notified to him, and not specifically arbitrated on, (1 Saund. 32): Held, also, that an award was good, although it directed what it was not in the power of the party to perform, he having the alternative of paying a sum of money.-Wharton v. King, 2 B. & Adol. 528.

BAIL.

1. (Costs.) The plaintiff's costs of inquiries after the sufficiency of the bail, who had filed an affidavit according to Reg. Gen. Trin. 1 W. 4, were made costs in the cause.-Paine v. Munton, 2 Tyr. 162.

2. (Justification.) Bail, who had sworn the affidavit of justification pointed out by Reg. Gen. Trin., but had omitted to state in it that they were housekeepers, were allowed to justify, the application not being opposed. -Martin v. Gell, 2 Tyr. 166.

3. (Money deposited.) Where money has been deposited in lieu of bail, and paid into Court, and the defendant does not perfect bail in time, the plaintiff will be allowed to take the money out of Court, though the defendant have since rendered, if there be no affidavit of merits on his behalf, (2 Chit. R. 71.)-Newman v. Hodgson, 2 B. & Adol. 422.

4. A bail was rejected on a cross affidavit by plaintiff's attorney that he was the holder of an unpaid promissory note, of which the proposed bail was

maker. No excuse for the dishonour of the note was offered. Cross v. Williams, 1 Tyr. 531.

BANKRUPT.

1. (Set-off.) To a claim to set off a bill of exchange, under 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 56, it was objected, that, at the time of the commission, the defendant was not the holder, but that it was in the hands of a third person, to whom he had passed it, namely, his banker: but held, that when the bill of exchange was taken up by him he stood in the same situation as if he had never parted with it, and was remitted to his former right of set-off. (8 B. & C. 105.)—Collins v. Jones, 10 B. & C. 777.

2. (Certificate for costs.) Under 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 90, enabling the judge to certify the admission or proof of a disputed commission, to entitle the person proving or admitting it to costs, the judge cannot certify unless he tries the whole cause. Thus where the cause was referred by an order of Nisi Prius, containing an admission of the bankruptcy, it was held that the judge could not certify.—Barthop v. Anderton, 8 Bing. 268.

BILL OF LADING.

As between the original parties, the bill of lading is merely a receipt, liable to be opened by evidence of the real facts.-Bates v. Todd, 2 M. & M. 106. BILL OF EXCHANGE.

1. (Form of acceptance.) The drawee of a bill of exchange wrote across it: accepted, payable at Messrs. S. and Co., without any signature: Held, that a written acceptance might be valid, since 1 and 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, without signature, but that it was a question for the jury whether it was intended to operate as an acceptance in its present state.-Dufaur v. Oxenden, 2 M. & M. 90.

2. (Presentment-Notice.) The holder of a bill called to present it at half past seven o'clock in the morning at the house (a private dwelling-house) of the drawer, and knocked and rung, but received no answer: Held a sufficient presentment. (2 Camp. 527.) The defendant having sent a person to the plaintiff two days after maturity of the bill, to say that he had been defrauded of the bill and should defend any action upon it: Held,' that further proof of notice of dishonour was unnecessary.— Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 M. & M. 41.

3. (What Inland.) A bill drawn in Ireland on a person in England, is not an inland bill within 1 and 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 2, and the acceptance need not be in writing. But the statute, as also 9 Geo. 4, c. 24, s. 8, applies to bills drawn in Ireland upon persons there.-Mahoney v. Ashlin, 2 B. & Adol. 478.

4. (Special presentment.) A bill of exchange made payable in London in the body of it, is accepted at Messrs. J. & Co., London. In an action against the drawer, presentment in London must be proved. (6 B. & C. 531.)-(In the Exchequer Chamber.) -Gibb v. Mather, 8 Bing. 214. 5. (Consideration.) Indorsee against acceptor of a bill of exchange accepted in part payment of an apprentice fee. The stamp of the indenture was