and the aldermen, thus again complying with the provisions of the charter of Anne.

We find, then, in these precedents no trace of recognition by the government of any exclusive jurisdiction belonging to the magistracy of Bristol, but we must again urge the fact that they were either anterior to the grant of Henry and Elizabeth, or subsequent to its supposed extinction. Still, as showing what the regular usage, whether correct or not, has been, they must be allowed importance, and may by many be judged to reduce the question we have been hitherto discussing, viz. whether the king has co-ordinate jurisdiction with the local magistrates or not? to this, whether he has not something more; in other words, whether his power does not extend to an exclusion of the magistracy altogether, as was done in the recent commission. We are not aware of any law, scarcely of any precedent to guide us here. Of the latter, however, one very remarkable does exist; and we present the best account of it we have been able to procure.

In the year 1768, when the celebrated Dunning was recorder of Bristol, one Shapland forged a promissory note in his name to the following effect:

"Inner Temple, London, July 8, 1768.

"I promise to pay unto Henry Dampier, Esq. or order, twenty-two pounds. J. DUNNING."

This Henry Dampier was an alderman. An indictment was found at the ordinary gaol delivery for the forgery of this note, but nothing farther was done, the recorder and alderman doubtless feeling that they could not sit as judges in a case where they had such a personal interest. Under these circumstances there seemed no alternative but a special commission, and one was accordingly issued; but the preamble shows how carefully the privileges of the corporation were respected. It recites that Shapland was a prisoner, that Dunning was recorder of Bristol, and a justice of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery, and without whom no sessions of the peace, oyer and terminer, or gaol delivery, can be held within our city of Bristol, by virtue of the letters patent; also that H. Dampier was an alderman, and another justice of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery,

without whom, &c. ; yet, under the circumstances, a special commission is appointed without them to deliver the gaol of Shapland, of the judges and the mayor, two to be a quorum. Unfortunately, no farther record of this transaction is to be found. Whether the commission ever went down, or whether Shapland escaped or died in prison, it is impossible to say, but the probability is, from the absence of further information, that nothing more took place. The language of the recital shows, however, pretty clearly what was the opinion of those times as to the power of the Crown to act independently of the magistrates within the city; and so the exception is a strong argument for the strictness of the rule itself..

If we turn from Bristol to other places possessing corporations endowed with the same judicial privileges, we shall find, as far as precedents go, considerable evidence that the local power of exclusive jurisdiction conferred by charters containing non-intromittant clauses, is a name and nothing more. In London, for example, it has been the custom from all time to employ special commissions when expedient; it has certainly been also the custom to include invariably the chief magistrate or magistrates of the city. Thus as early as the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, April 17, 1554, we find the name of the mayor, White, inserted at the head of the commission, the rest being nobles, privy counsellors, and judges. But a more remarkable example is found in the proceedings that followed Lord George Gordon's riots, where Sir Brackley Kennett, the Lord Mayor, as appears from the Old Bailey papers, was included in the special commission, although charged himself as an accessory, or at least an approver of that tumult, and afterwards fined a thousand pounds for his remissness and inactivity in quelling it. How much the circumstances on that occasion resembled the recent case at Bristol, at least as far as the magistracy's conduct was concerned, will best appear from the remarks of Abbott, C. J., in Redford v. Birley and others, 3 Stark. N. P. 76, (the Manchester Riot case.) Many of us," says he, "are old enough to remember what mischiefs were created in this metropolis while the hands of justice were paralysed: lest I should be misunderstood, I wish to say that I am alluding to the riots in 1780. I have no hesitation in saying that if a

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hundredth part of that which was done on the sixth or seventh day of those riots had been done in the first instance, nothing of the kind would have occurred which was afterwards so much to be deplored." Holroyd, J., in trying the cause, also alluded to the same events, and the punishment of the Lord Mayor, Sir Brackley Kennett, "for not being on the alert and putting a stop to the riots, by undergoing the disgrace of a judgment, and being fined a thousand pounds.'

We have thus hastily endeavoured to give a view of what little law and precedent there exists on a very important question. Although it may, perhaps, be regarded as settled, so far as Bristol is concerned, by the commission of last January passing unchallenged and disputed, it may hereafter arise in other places similarly privileged. Although the cases seem rather to incline to a strict and literal interpretation of those clauses in charters which grant exclusive jurisdiction to the local magistrates, yet the precedents are perhaps too many to allow of a few scattered dicta negativing the strong natural presumption which must always exist in favour of the king's claim to concurrent authority when he chooses to lay it. Whether the same power which can overrule the meaning of express words of exclusion, cannot also act counter to those provisions of former charters which made the cooperation of the local judges indispensable, is a speculation of some difficulty on which we offer no opinion. Indeed we trust that it has been throughout our manifest object to do no more than indicate the true bearings of this question, to explain that which has been misconceived, and abstract that which is irrelevant, without presuming to decide on a point of such manifold uncertainty.

S.

ART. VII.-WORKS ON CONVEYANCING.

1. The Practice of Conveyancing, (vol. iii.) relating to Abstracts of Title, and Evidence connected with Real and Personal Property. By James Stewart, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. Saunders and Benning.

1831. 2. On Conveyancers' Evidence. By Thomas Coventry, Esq. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law. London. Clarke. 1832. IN the course of the Reforms, political and legal (and we might add, moral), which are now going forward, it has often been made a question to what extent it is desirable to make alterations in general principles; but few doubt the propriety of alterations in practice where that practice is confessedly bad. In conveyancing, however, the practice and the principles are very much interwoven, and the practical part differs very widely in its objects as well as in its consequences from that practice which is connected with the Courts. The rules of pleading, the proceedings of the Courts, and the criminal code of the country, may perhaps be readily altered, and no great inconvenience sustained; but upon some points of practice in conveyancing rest titles to valuable properties and rights of every description. Much caution and circumspection are therefore required in altering that practice, or some of the most important rights of property may be confused and subverted. It is upon this ground that the practice of conveyancers (involving as it does principles as well as practice) has so far obtained sanction and authority in the Courts, as to have often swayed the decisions of the bench.1

This practice, however, is no where clearly laid down; every practitioner has doubts what is it, and we have conflicting testimony and differing opinions as to what it ought to be. It is really-what the Common Law of the land is constructively-all unwritten, and the student in vain inquires where it is to be read. It can only be learnt in the conveyancer's

1 Maundrell v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 246. Cholmondely v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 1. Howard v. Ducane, Turn. & R. 81.

chambers, and by mixing with those members of the profession who lead the way through this labyrinth of traditional lore.

It might be of considerable advantage to the profession and to the public, if in addition to a correct digest of the established rules of practice, some intelligent body, similar to the present body of commissioners, could meet at stated times and discuss and establish rules, which might guide the members of the profession, upon doubtful and disputed points of practice.1 For, unfortunately, practitioners in the country have but very imperfect means of ascertaining what the rules of practice are, and it is next to impossible for them to keep up with the progressive improvements of the times. They are invariably found nearly twenty years behind those who take the lead in town practice. To add to the inconvenience of the system, rules of practice are now perpetually laid down or modified by the Courts, without that thorough knowledge of the subject and that regard to consequences which should guide all in matters of legislation and general law.

The cases often referred to as to the presumed surrender of terms, afford an instance of the kind. In one of those cases, the Judge who decided the question observed, that although a settlement upon marriage had been made of the property, no assignment had been made, or notice had been taken, of the term in question; when in fact every practitioner must be aware that to assign terms to attend the inheritance upon a marriage settlement, is a very unusual proceeding. Although we have stated the want of some well-digested rules of practice on the subject of conveyancing, we admit that, to a considerable extent, Mr. Preston's Book upon Abstracts has aided much in fixing the practice, as well as the law, upon this subject. We have also been lately favoured with two new works on this branch of law: the one a Treatise by Mr. J. Stewart, upon Abstracts of Title generally, and the evidence connected therewith, forming part of a Collection of Conveyancing Precedents; and the other, a Treatise by Mr. Coventry upon Conveyancers' Evidence. The first of these works is a work of considerable merit, and we may say the same of the two volumes of Precedents, to

The Conveyancers Club, we believe, do something of the sort, but unfortunately not systematically, and their opinions are not published.