less proof of the fact be produced in the positive rules of the founder. The "Triall of Witts," written by Huartes, a Spaniard, and translated into English in 1594, abounds in curious and instructive passages on this point, which could not fail to be subjects of reflection to our studious ancestors, when actually occupied in establishing schools. The advantages of writing a fine hand are spoken of in it, in terms equally strong with those of Quintilian; and we know how highly King James the First thought of this accomplishment, little disposed as he was to neglect solid learning. The art of penmanship was cultivated at that time by the greatest scholars. But a peculiar object of the book of Huartes is to shew the expediency of devoting boys of various tastes to various studies; and it is remarkable, that after his time, the founders of more and more schools so far agreed with him, as to direct the more promising students to be brought up to the deeper learning, whilst others "more fitted for trades" were to be instructed only in the elements useful in common occupations. This was expressly the case with the Charter House, founded in 1614 and 1627, which however has since been deprived of the benefit of so excellent a rule, and is reduced to the rigorous classical character, to the great injury of the poorer classes of people. When, and why, the change was made at the Charter House, seems uncertain. That it is an abuse, is clear.

The contemporanea expositio is a safe key to the meaning of deeds, and in Evelyn's Memoirs, written fourteen years after the complete establishment of the Charter House, we have a striking illustration of the original rule as he understood it; for being in Holland in 1641, he says, "I went to see the Weese House (at Amsterdam) a foundation like our Charter House, for the admission of decayed persons, orphans and poor children, where they are taught several occupations." As every body knows, the Charter House is now an exclusive classical school, in defiance of one of its articles "That it should be the master's care and the usher's charge to teach arithmetic to those most fitted for trades.”

So far from thinking the grammar-schools available as they

1 The game of chess is strongly recommended in it; and in 1614 we find the boys of Camberwell Grammar School directed to be taught that amusement. 2 Evelyn's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 15.

are now for bringing up the nobility, the Duke of Buckingham proposed in Parliament that a college should be erected for that purpose. Milton, Hartlib, and many others, were deeply occupied in devising plans of education, which no one then thought should be confined to the mere classical elements; and in the king's library there is preserved in Molnar's Syllecta Scholastica, a complete plan for the government of schools, drawn up in 1644, of which the 23d chapter is devoted to an explanation how to teach arithmetic.

Lord Hardwicke's doctrine in the court of Chancery, that the poor ought not to enjoy the benefits given to them by their ancestors, must be abandoned; and the decayed grammar-schools must not be altogether neglected amongst the greater objects which will for some years solicit the attention of Parliament. But whatever the legislature may do with the abundant materials which exist for reforming prudently what is amiss in this subject, Chancery is bound to administer justice to scholastic suitors, according to the full measure of which the records of the court can furnish frequent and good precedents.

ART. VI.-WHETHER GOODS CONSTITUTE A GOOD CONSIDERATION FOR AN ANNUITY GRANTED UNDER THE 53 G. 3. c. 141.

AMONG the very numerous cases that have been brought before the courts as to the construction of the statute 53 G. 3. c. 141. relating to the registration of grants of life annuities, the point now proposed for examination has never been directly raised. But by a comparison of this act with the 17 G. 3. c. 26. which it repealed, and from several incidental dicta of the judges, we may come to a satisfactory solution of the question.

The object of the statute of 17 G. 3. was not only to check the pernicious practice of granting life annuities at very inadequate prices, by making the whole transaction notorious, and to protect infants against such grants; but also to secure to the grantor the real value pretended to be given by way of consideration for the grant. For this purpose it was

enacted that money only should constitute a valid consideration n; money's worth was not sufficient. Thus in the third section it was provided that the consideration "shall be in money only ;" and in the fourth section, that it shall be lawful for the courts to order the securities to be cancelled, and judgment entered up to be vacated, "if the consideration or any part of it is paid in goods."

The present statute contains no such direct prohibition, though from the second section one would conclude that the legislature never contemplated the possibility of goods forming the whole or part of the consideration. Thus that section requires the "pecuniary consideration" to be stated in the memorial, and the seventh column of the schedule is headed "consideration, and how paid," and the instances given in that column are money, notes, and bills of exchange.

On a question being raised under this act, as to whether a power of redemption should be stated in the memorial, as part of the consideration, Abbott C. J. said, "it is only necessary to read the schedule, the seventh column of which has these words, 'consideration and how paid.' It is obvious, therefore, that the consideration there spoken of is a consideration which can be paid." In another case, Bayley J. says, "The second section requires that the pecuniary consideration shall be enrolled according to a given form set out in the act. In that form, in the column headed consideration, and how paid,' are the words 'so much paid in money, so much paid in bank notes, or other notes, or bills of exchange.' It appears clearly, therefore, that that section contemplated a consideration paid in money, or promissory notes, or bills of exchange; and construing that section with the tenth, I am of opinion that the legislature intended an annuity, bought on the one hand, and sold on the other, for a consideration moving from the grantee to the grantor."

From reading the above section by itself, it would be difficult to come to the conclusion that goods in the whole, or in part, could form a valid consideration; the more so, when

1 Lewis v. Smith, 3 B. & A. 208.

2 Blake v. Attersoll, 2 B. & C. 881.

one compares it with the corresponding section in the former statute, for in that the word "pecuniary" is not used.

It is probable, however, that that word was introduced advisedly for the purpose of doing away with the necessity of including in the memorial provisoes that, legally speaking, constituted part of the consideration, though they had nothing to do with the price of the annuity, (thus under the 17 G. 3. c. 26. it was held necessary to set forth in the memorial the terms and conditions contained in a clause empowering the grantor to redeem)1 and the expression pecuniary, contrary to the custom of modern legislators, may have been used in its peculiar extent and signification, that is to say, as distinguishing pecunia from nummus.

Viewing, however, the second section with the 6th and the 10th, whatever may have been the intention of the legislature, there can be little doubt that goods may constitute a valid consideration under the 53 Geo. 3. c. 141.

The sixth section in enumerating the cases in which the courts may order the securities to be cancelled, amongst others that do not concern the present question, comprises those in which "the consideration is expressed to be paid in money, but the same or any part of it shall be paid in goods;" but omits the provision in the corresponding section of the preceding statute, which includes also cases in which "the consideration or any part of it is paid in goods.". From the omission of these words, it seems that goods may form the whole or part of the consideration, and that in those cases only can the securities be cancelled, in which the grantee misdescribes the real nature of the consideration; added to which, the expression "paid in goods," shews that goods may properly be entered in the memorial under the words "consideration and how paid.”

Again the tenth section enacts that the act shall not extend to any voluntary annuity or rent-charge granted without regard to pecuniary consideration or money's worth :" the words "money's worth" were not used in the corresponding section of the former act, so that from this section also, one would suppose, that all cases, not otherwise excepted, in Ex parte Ansell, 1 B. & P. 62.

which money's worth formed the consideration, would come within the statute. And such, with certain limitations, appears to be the opinion of the courts.

The application of the sixth section seems never to have been relied on, either by the judges or counsel; but in the case of James v. James,1 Dallas, C. J. in delivering the judgment of the court, says, "the tenth section declares that the act shall not extend (amongst other things) "to any voluntary annuity or rent-charge, granted without regard to pecuniary consideration or money's worth," and from these words it has been argued that the act applies to all cases where any thing valuable is given for the purchase of an annuity. It is here that these words import that "money's worth" may, in certain cases, be "a pecuniary consideration," within the meaning of the act, as where the grantee pays for the annuity in part or in whole, by goods or merchandize, with a nominal or perhaps real value imposed upon them, to be converted into money by the grantor; and where the object of the grantor was to raise money, and such appears to be the real nature of the transaction, however it may be disguised."

And in Blake v. Attersoll, before alluded to, Littledale J. says, "I am clearly of opinion that to bring a case within the 53 Geo 3. c. 141., there must be an actual sale for money, bills, or goods."

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Money's worth" is a very vague expression, but the construction that it must receive is obvious from the foregoing dicta. In the former case an action was brought on a bond, in the condition whereof it was recited, that the plaintiff was entitled to an interest in certain veins of coal for her life, and that she by indentures of even date with the bond had assigned such interest to the defendants, who in consideration thereof had agreed to pay her an annuity of 607., for the payment of which the bond was conditioned; and it was held that no memorial need be enrolled under the statute, for that the act does not extend to cases of fair and bonâ fide sale of landed property, whether freehold for life, or leasehold for term of years, where the consideration in part or in whole may be an

1 2 B. & B. 703.