MARCH, 1826.]

On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.)

[SENATE.

understand an attack upon the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and that it is bad policy to send Ministers to this Congress, where the situation of those Islands is to be a subject of discussion and decision, provided we intend to act a part consistent with the interest and high character of the United States.

If we take away the established religion of the Catholics" projects and purposes originating in the war," we are to in Spanish America, could this be said of them? I do not know that it could, and, therefore, they may have been politically wise to establish religion by law. While these new States were colonies of Spain, the population were Roman Catholics, and of course much under the influence of their priests. Could the revolution have been effected without the agency of the priests? Would the priests have lent their influence to the revolution, save on the condition that their religion should be established by the new Governments? These questions, I apprehend, must be answered in the negative. If so, would it not be a hopeless mission, to endeavor to persuade them that this principle should be expunged from their Constitutions? Not only would it be hopeless, but, by them, it would be esteemed wicked, and were we anxious to secure their most inveterate hate, we could not easily devise so good a plan to secure it, as to establish this mission for such asurances of Spain, that she will not terminate the contest purpose.

The following is an exact copy of every word in the President's Message, to the Senate on this subject; I transcribe it, lest some might suppose I have designedly misrepresented this part of the Message, when nothing is farther from my wish.

The documents before us conclusively establish these facts, that the United States have, at all times, and to all nations, professed a wish, that the political condition of these Islands should not be changed; they have induced the new States to refrain from striking Spain through these her colonies, under an expectation raised, that, through the mediation of Russia, Spain would terminate the war, by an acknowledgment of the independence of her former colonies. That hope is now extinct by the death of the Emperor Alexander, and by the solemn and repeated asupon any such terms. We have only asked the new States to withhold the blow, until the effect of this mediation could be ascertained; and have stated, that if Spain would not terminate the contest, that the new States had the right to strike Spain in this vulnerable point, and that we could not interfere to avert, or farther suspend, the stroke. The new States have explicitly stated that, at this Congress, they will settle the plan, by which this blow will be made most effectual, and it appears most likely the plan will probably be, to induce a portion of the population to revolt, and assert their independence; and, with the aid to be furnished by the new States, endeavor to maintain that independence, and be thus severed from all political connexion with Spain.

Upon these facts we are to form an opinion, whether this mission would be useful.

"There is yet another subject, upon which, without "entering into any treaty, the moral influence of the they could take no part in the deliberations of the ConSuppose our Ministers there. If we act in good faith, "United States may, perhaps, be exerted with beneficial "consequences at such a meeting-the advancement of highly belligerent character. But it is said we could have gress upon this part of the subject, because it is of a "religious liberty. Some of the Southern nations are, an indirect influence upon the question. How? Could ❝even yet, so far under the dominion of prejudice, that our Ministers persuade them not to strike the blow? No; "they have incorporated with their political constitutions, because the time has arrived, when we have said our im“an exclusive church, without toleration of any other than portunities shall cease. Could we hold out any induce"the dominant sect. The abandonment of this last badgement for a suspension of the blow? No. The resources “of religious bigotry and oppression, may be pressed more of Spain are now at their ebb, and a change of her coneffectually by the united exertions of those who concur "in the principles of freedom of conscience, upon those "who are yet to be convinced of their justice and wisdom, "than by the solitary efforts of a Minister to any one of "the separate Governments."

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6th. Says the Message, "The indirect influence which "the United States may exercise upon any projects or purposes originating in the war, in which the Southern Republics are still engaged, which might seriously affect "the interests of this Union, and the good offices by which "the United States may ultimately contribute to bring "that war to a speedier termination, though among the "motives which have convinced me of the propriety of "complying with this invitation, are so far contingent and " eventual, that it would be improper to dwell upon them "more at large."

Mr. President: I regret the obscurity of this paragraph, and shall esteem it a serious misfortune to the United States, that the day should ever arrive, when the President will be unwilling, in communicating with his constitutional advisers, to use language sufficiently explicit to enable them clearly to comprehend his meaning. For myself, I am free to declare, I have, at different times, been inclined to doubt the interpretation which ought to be put upon the language here employed. It ought to be our endeavor to relieve the subject from the obscurity in which it is enveloped, and to examine it, both freely and fairly, with the aid of such other passages as relate to the same point. I submit to the Senate an opinion, that, by

dition at home, and in these Islands, might prevent them from striking, with so much prospect of success, at any future period. Could our Ministers threaten them? No. This would be very inconsistent, after the assurances we have given them. What, then, could we do, that would induce them, probably, to desist from this enterprise? One thing, and one only: Guarantee their independence; this, I have no doubt, they would receive as a substitute for the projected attack. This we dare not do, because the People, whose servants we are, would never forgive so open a dereliction of our duty to them.

Again: If we send Ministers to this Congress of belligerents, we lose all influence with Spain. It is hardly possible that we could ever satisfy her that we were impartial in any question between her and her former colonies. We abandon all chance of benefiting either party by advising Spain: but if we do not send Ministers, we retain our neutral character, and with it every benefit, which friendly suggestions, or advice, could furnish, either directly, or through the agency of others.

We fear an attack on these Islands will disturb our repose, and affect our interests; would it not then be more wise to inform the new States directly, and without any disguise, that we could not, and would not, permit those Islands to be disturbed, because our peace and our interests would be jeopardized thereby?

If this were a Congress of neutrals, and about to assemble to devise a plan by which to secure the quiet of these Islands during the war, we would then have a deep inte

SENATE.]

On the Panama Mission—(in conclave. )

rest in sending Ministers to it; because we could lawfully confer with them on the subject, and because they, and we, would have an interest in attaining the same common object. Not so here; we cannot lawfully discuss this subject in this Congress; and they have an interest in changing the conditiou of these Islands, we in preventing such change.

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[MARCH, 1826.

international law, say we would have had a case to consider of a very different character from that now be fore us.

We have an invitation containing some propositions which I deem highly exceptionable, and intermingled with them, the proposition to create the mission "as a proof of our friendship." If this last inducement would, by itself, have been sufficient, it must cease to be so when blended with the other subjects. How easy would it be to give such an explanation as would satisfy them of our continued sympathy and friendship, without sanctioning a mission which, under many aspects, must be deemed very hazardous, and highly exceptionable. But let us consider this "as the main inducement to the mission," and see whether, for such a purpose, it is expedient to advise the appointment of the Minister.

Mr. President, there is another view of this subject, which, if correct, must place this mission on very unfavorable ground. This part of the Message deals more in vague and indefinite hints, than in satisfactory and clear statements, as to the views and intentions of our own Government. We see plainly that the plan of the new States is to produce a rebellion in these Islands; to induce them to declare their independence; they readily see this is to produce a most violent and protracted conflict between Spain and the inhabitants of those Islands, and that it may To give a proof of our friendship, we are called upon be long, very long, before Spain will be disposed to re-to sanction a perpetual mission of this kind. I insist this cognize their independence; hence the invitation that we ought not to be done. It is not the theory of our Governshall attend to settle the relations which "Hayti," and ment, and it ought not to be the practice of it, to multiply others, in the like condition, shall bear to us, and to the offices without necessity. If it does no other mischief, so new States. "Others in the like condition with Hayti," far as the compensation extends, it is heaping an unneces mean Cuba and Porto Rico, after they have been induced sary burthen upon the People. to revolt, and carry on an internal and cruel war, and before their independence is acknowledged. If any mannisters will have commissions to continue as long as the doubts this, let him carefully examine the publication referred to by the gentleman from South Carolina; compare what is there said, with the words in this invitation, and those words with this part of the Message, and then say what he believes to be the nature of this whole negotia-ceeding year, not less than from twenty to thirty thousand tion, as to this part of the subject.

Should this mission be sanctioned, I presume the Mi

Congress is to exist; and as we see the Congress is to be permanent, so must their offices be. By this means we create two offices, and more, that, for the first year, may cest from forty to fifty thousand dollars, and for each sucdollars; and the main inducement for this, "is to give a proof to these new States that we are friendly with them."

This is to be an amphibious Congress-having a war side and a peace side; a day on which to discuss and settle Could not this object have been completely attained war plans, and a day on which to adjust peaceful subjects. without this expense? These new States have Ministers On the first our Ministers cannot attend, on the last they resident at this place; the necessary assurances and explamay. On the first it is settled that a rebellion shall be nation could very conveniently have been made to them, produced in Cuba and Porto Rico; and, on the second, it and they could have transmitted them to the Congress, is to be settled, with the advice of our Ministers, what re-and thus the benefit could be attained without the inconlation these rebels shall bear, politically, to the United veniences of this mission. States while this rebellion may happen to continue. this right? Will it comport with our character for candor and good faith, even towards wretched, degraded Spain? Suppose Russia, cr Great Britain, in place of Spain, would any man sanction such a project?

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Again: we have a resident Minister in Colombia, and, if more respectful, how easy would it have been, through him, to have made the necessary explanations, and to have given every suitable assurance of our continued friendship for them.

It may be easy for us to avoid being counselled by our Although the money which will be thus disposed of, may fears where Spain is concerned, but that will not change not, of itself, be a matter of any consequence, in a great the nature of right and wrong in the judgment of an en-nation, which must make vast expenditures; yet I consider lightened world. Brave men, and chivalrous nations, ne-this principle, avowed as the cause of the expenditure, to ver boast of their bravery, where the weak are concerned: be of immense consequence. We ought not to have in by acting candidly, openly, and justly, towards all, they our Government a single officer, whose services could be give the surest guarantee that, in the hour of trial, their dispensed with without injury; and those officers which efforts and firmness will preserve their rights unimpaired, we must employ should be fully paid. Upon this princiand their honor unsullied. ple, the People would have their business well done, without a swarm of officers, who may eventually devour their substance.

Sir, it must be always injurious to a nation to be found in such equivocal conduct as to require explanation. If we send these Ministers, even by Spain we will be called upon to explain, and must do so; and when given, I hope the explanation may be founded on truth, and such as no citizen need blush to read.

Reflect on the principle which is avowed, and see to what it may lead, if sanctioned. "The main inducement to this mission is to give a proof of our friendship." Sustain this principle of action, and your officers may be In the last place, we are informed by the President, that swelled to almost any extent. A patriot, who deserves well a decisive inducement to accept the invitation is, "to of the Executive, wants an office, and all existing offices "show, by this token of respect to the Southern Repub-are filled; a nomination of this gentleman is made to some lics, the interest that we take in their welfare, and our disposition to comply with their wishes," &c.

Had the President declined the invitation for every other purpose but this, a very different question would have been presented, from that which we are now to consider.

When the invitation was given, if the Ministers had been answered, that the subjects proposed for our discussion were deemed such as we could not act upon, with the exception of those confined exclusively to commerce, and to the settlement of disputed questions relative to

court where you already have a Minister; the reason is asked, why do you want another? The answer is " My main inducement is to give an additional proof of the friendship felt by the United States."

The avowal of this principle of action becomes the more alarming, when you see that, in the same message, the President maintains that he has the power to do this without consulting either branch of the Legislature. Sanction this doctrine, and there is at once an end of all limitation as to the creation of officers, and of course of public expenditure. It may do no mischief, while you have a

MARCH, 1826.]

On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.)

virtuous Chief Magistrate; but we ought not to sanction a principle, which might be productive of so much mischief when it comes to be practised upon by one of a different character.

Again, I say, there is no necessity for this mission as an evidence of our friendship; I cannot suppose the new States would exact it for any such reason.

[SENATE.

known to the laws of civilized nations: but, as to all other offices, they must be created by some statute of the United States, before any person is nominated to fill them. The sole question upon this point, then, is, are such Ministers as those now proposed, known to, and recognized by the law of nations? I deny that they are. The Congress is created by treaties, among the Spanish American States. It is contended, by gentlemen on the other side, that it has no attribute of sovereignty attached to it-if this be so, then you cannot, by the law of nations, send any Minister to transact businesss with such a body. If you do send them, it must be in virtue of some treaty, or by virtue of some statute of the United States. In this instance, there is neither the one nor the other; therefore, there is no office as yet created, and until one is created, neither the President alone, nor he, with the advice of the Senate, can, consistent with the Constitution, proceed to fill it. The fair way to have taken the sense of the Nation upon the expediency of this mission, would have been to have consulted Congress, in their legislative capacity, on the propriety of the mission, by asking an approWe must pause at once; this is a species of duress, to priation to defray the expense of it, and stating the obwhich we ought not to yield. Let us give to these newjects expected to be obtained by it. The subject would States every reasonable evidence of our good will; but we ought not to hazard the interest or honor of the United States, to please any other Nation upon earth.

At a very early period, they were recognized, both by our Executive and by our Judiciary, as belligerents, and thereby their privateers secured against charges of piracy. We were the first to acknowledge their independencewe have sent Ministers among them-we have made treaties with them-we have interposed our good offices to procure an acknowledgment of their Independence, by other Nations, and even by Spain herself. Where are we to stop? If, from friendship, we must send Ministers to Panama, we must, from the same motives, discuss the different questions proposed, and, when discussed, we must conclude agreements upon them; and thus we go on, from step to step, until we are involved in war, by which the best interests of our country may be sacrificed.

ency of this mission, upon mere nominations to office, and if the nominations should be confirmed, then we are to

then have come fairly before the Representatives of the Nation, who would have discussed and decided upon its expediency, with open doors. If affirmatively decided, Mr. President: I have now examined each of the sub- the officers would have been created by statute, and then jects proposed by either of these new States, as fit for the President could have nominated characters, which he our decision, in common with them, and likewise those deemed suitable to fill them, and upon these nominations suggested by the President in addition, and think I see, the Senate would have acted in their executive capacity, that they are either improper for discussion and decision, and advised the President, whether, in their opinion, these or that they are not of sufficient importance to justify men were, or were not, suitable persons to fill these ofthis extraordinary mission. That, where proper, the fices. But here the order of things is reversed-the Setime is not propitious for their discussion and decision, ornate has been called upon to discuss and settle the expedithat they could most probably be attained in the ordinary mode. Other points of great moment are presented for deci-pass a law in the shape of an appropriation bill, by which sion, such as the character of this Congress, the manner in which it is to be organized, and the mode of its action. Upon many of these subjects we are very much in the dark; there is, of course, a variety of opinion, as we have no certain means of forming a correct one. Upon each of these I should have said something, but the arguments of the gentleman from South Carolina, and from New Hampshire, have been so full and satisfactory upon these points, that I am not a liberty, after having so long taxed your patience, to endeavor to add any thing. I rest for the present upon their arguments.

the offices will, for the first time, be created. The injustice of this course, to the minority on this question, and to the nation, is obvious. Upon the nominations we have been constrained to act with closed doors; the nation has no knowledge of the facts upon which our opinions rest, nor of the reasons in support of those opinions. Little do they expect that principles of such vital importance are involved in this decision.

I have again mentioned this point, not intending to argue it the second time. I mention it because, if a majority-thus irregularly, I might say-in my opinion, unI am now ready to hear, with patience and with plea-constitutionally-determine that this mission is expedient, sure, any additional arguments on the other side of this question; if in error, convince me of it, and my opinion is changed. If this is not done, I must record my vote against the expediency of this mission.

Another point, however, is not to be lost sight of. I have, Mr. President, upon this argument, been endeavoring to maintain that this mission is inexpedient. Upon one of the incidental questions which we have heretofore partially discussed, I had the honor of making to the Senate, some observations upon a question first suggested by a gentleman from Kentucky, and afterwards enlarged upon by the gentleman from Virginia. It is this-Is there, in truth, any vacant office to fill with the persons now nominated? I have insisted there is not; that we have begun this business at the wrong end. In our Government we can have but two sources from which offices can be created. The one is the Constitution, the other statutes made by Congress. These offices are not created by the one, or by the other. By the Constitution, the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, can appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers, &c.

Under this provision, the President has the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint an Ambassador, or any other public agent, recognized by, and

I must and will, entertaining the opinion I now do, vote against any man, who has been, or can be, nominated, because I will not agree to fill any office which I do not believe has the sanction of either the Constitution or law of the United States for its creation.

Mr. J. S. JOHNSTON, of Louisiana, said he regretted the necessity of deviating from the course he had prescribed to himself in this debate. I had determined, (said Mr. J.) to form my own judgment from a careful examination of the documents, with the aid of those reflections which my own mind suggested, and to pronounce that opinion, which should result, by my vote. But the indisposition of the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. MILLS,) leaves me no longer at liberty to decline the discussion, however unprofitable it may be, and at whatever waste of time. The report of the committee, it is said, must be taken for granted. The arguments that have been offered are called unanswerable, because unanswered. It becomes, therefore, my duty, I regret to say, to vindicate our opinions; to present to the Senate a full and fair view of this question; and, in doing so, to reply to the report and the arguments of the gentlemen who have preceded me.

We have been invited by the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, and Guatemala, to send Ministers to the Con

SENATE.]

On the Panama Mission—(in conclave.)

[MARCH, 1826.

gress of Panama. The President has expressed a willing- the continent will form a basis of operations on which to ness to accept the invitation, with the advice and consent act against all the rest; as it will become the rallying point of the Senate; and we are now to give that advice. The of all her adherents, and enable them to prolong the war-it respect and courtesy which distinguish the intercourse of became necessary to unite for the common defence of all, and nations-which ought especially to belong to the existing mutually to guaranty peace, security, and independence. relations with them-would seem to require that the invi- In such a compact, it was not our duty, our policy, or tation should be met in the amicable spirit in which it is inclination, to engage; and, accordingly, we find that no offered, unless it involves a departure from our duty or proposition was made to us to become a party, and all the our policy. But I do not place the argument on that communications speak with the most guarded precauground. There are objects of great and pressing concern tions, and the most explicit avowals. To believe that they to this country, and of deep and vital interest to that por-intended to unite us in their councils, or to draw us into tion which I represent, which call for the immediate in- their measures, would be to arrive at this conclusion, not terposition of this Government. I regret to differ with only without evidence, but against all evidence, and in the the Representatives of that interest here, with regard to face of the most solemn assurances. This alliance of Spathe mode of obtaining our object; while there is no differ-nish American States is already formed. The parties that ence of opinion with regard to the extent of the evil or compose it, the principles on which it is based, the obligathe magnitude of the danger. There are other objects, tions it imposes, and the means to be employed, are fully of a general nature, which recommend this mission to us, set forth in the Convention before us; to which I confito which it will be my duty to advert in the course of my dently refer. remarks.

But it has been called a belligerent Congress. All the It has been assumed in debate, that the acceptance will objects of this league are either international regulations involve a violation of our neutrality, and that all the ob- of a peaceful character, or an alliance for defence against jects are either dangerous, inexpedient, or unnecessary. the invasion of Spain or her adherents. It is, in this last I mean to meet this argument fairly. The question turns case, but an union to provide for peace and security. It upon it. I freely admit that, if, as it has been strongly is but a common guaranty for mutual succor and defence, urged by both the gentlemen who preceded me, (Mr. when war shall be carried into their country. There is WHITE and Mr. HAYNE,) this was a Confederacy of Ame- no power to direct foreign war or offensive measures rican States, of which we should form a part; if this was against any nation: "The parties voluntarily promise and a belligerent Congress, and we should sit in council with "contraet a league of close alliance, and firm and conthem, to deliberate on those belligerent questions, vote "stant friendship, for the common defence, for the secuwith them, and be bound by them, there is no doubt of "rity of their independence and liberty, for their reciprothe manner it would affect our neutrality, and the conse- "cal and general good, and for the internal tranquillity, quences to which it would lead. But, if these facts are" obliging themselves to succor each other, and to repel not true, but assumed-if they are not warranted by the" in common ever attack or invasion which may in any documents, but inferred-it will as clearly follow, that "manner threaten their political existence." To carry there is no ground for the argument, and the whole of the superstructure will fall with it; and to this issue I bring the debate.

this defensive alliance into effect, an assembly should be formed, composed of two Plenipotentiaries from each party, on the same terms, and with the same formalities, which, in conformity with established usage, ought to be observed for the appointment of Ministers of equal class near the Government of Foreign Nations.

A Confederacy, for certain specified objects, has been formed by the Spanish American States. It is expressly declared to be composed "of the States of America formerly Spanish"-"of the ci-devant Spanish American Those Ministers will compose a sort of Diplomatic States." This Confederacy is already formed by mutual Council, "whose object will be to confirm and establish Conventions, which are now before us; for objects pecu-" intimate relations between the whole and each one of liar to themselves. To this league we are not parties, "the States. It will serve as a point of union in common even in contemplation. The purpose of it is foreign to “danger, a faithful interpreter of public treaties, and as us; we have no war; we are not threatened with invasion; "an arbitrator and conciliator of disputes and differwe want no alliance; we require no rallying point; we "ences." This description confers no express powers on have no motive to change our present happy and peace- this Congress-they will have no powers but those, like ful relations. Although we have recently formed treaties all other Ministers, specially delegated under their rewith each of them, there has been no such Convention spective instructions. This Confederacy is already formproposed to us; nor is it any where suggested, but in de-ed; all the engagements are made; nothing now remains bate, that we are to form a part of the league. As we to give it effect, but to fix the amount of naval and militawere not originally a part of the Confederacy, we could not now be admitted without a new compact, and without violating the commercial rights and interest of the parties under it. This compact could not be formed, certainly, without a treaty, which would require the ratification of this body. There is no provision for the admission of new States. The union is limited to those who had a common interest. We have been invited with peculiar caution and delicacy, not as a member of the family, but as a guest; not to a Congress of which we were a party, but as a friend and visiter; to afford them an opportunity of manifesting to us the sentiments of kindness and friendship with which they are animated.

ry force which the parties are to furnish, to repel the invasion when made; and this, by the third and fourth articles of the treaty between Colombia and Mexico, is to be fixed by special Conventions. One year after the war, certain incidental expenses will be paid, that shall be settled by separate Conventions. The only duty they have to perform of a belligerent character, must wait for a renewal of the war by Spain, and then to be adjusted by special Convention-fifth article. There is nothing in the powers and duties of this body which imports hostility to any nation. They are defensive and conservatory. This diplomatic assembly, called a Congress, can do no act touching the laws, or sovereignty, or foreign relations These Spanish American States have been engaged in of the respective States. They can neither regulate coma war of Revolution. They have achieved their Indepen-merce, negotiate treaties, make war or peace, under these dence; all the force of Spain has been driven from the continent. But, as Spain refuses all terms with them, and may renew the war upon either, the most exposed or the most feeble; as she will concentrate all her power upon a given point; as the occupation of any position on

Conventions; and, if such powers are to be exercised by them in time of war, it will be under the authority of graduated instructions. In all its aspects, it looks more like a committee of public safety, or of general welfare, than a belligerent council.

But, if in this view it is considered belligerent, it is so only in one point, while all the others are peaceful. But, if it was, an acceptance of the invitation would not, according to the laws and usages of nations, affect our neutral relations. Even in the midst of war, the ordinary intercourse of nations is not interrupted. The neutral continues to trade and to treat, to be faithful to its friendship, and constant to its principles and its connexions, without giving just cause of offence to any party in the war.

[SENATE.

delicacy, that we cannot hold public intercourse with the Republics, without the apprehension of offence to Spain or the Holy Alliance.

We have become suddenly alive to the claims of Spain. We have more than once invaded her territories. We have, during the whole contest, received the flags of the revolting Colonies in our ports. We have recognized their independence. We have recommended to Spain to do the last act of national humiliation, by consenting to the separation. We have mediated for the interposition and influence of the Powers of Europe, to terminate this unnatural war. But now, taking lessons from prudence, and counsel from our fears, we cannot send Ministers to Panama, without violating the delicate relations of neuAdmitting this was a belligerent Congress-sitting in council on the means of making war upon Spain-we are not to take part in the discussion of those measures; and, for which, I again refer to the documents:

Neutrality requires only "not to furnish troops, arms, " ammunition, or any thing of direct use in war"-"not "to refuse to one party, what it grants to another. This "does not trespass on its liberty in negotiation, connexions "of friendship, its trade, or of governing itself by what is "most advantageous to the State. When this reason in-trality. "duces it to preferences in things of which every one has "the free disposal, it only makes use of its right, and is "not chargeable with partiality.”—Vattel, b. iii. ch. vii. § 104, p. 399.

A violation of neutrality imports some act of hostility; like treason, to which it has been, not inaptly, compared, it requires some overt act to consummate it.

Congress, under the Confederation, sent Ministers to Berlin, Vienna, Tuscany, and other courts, without violat-" ing their neutrality.

DOCUMENTS.-Panama Message, 26th Dec. 1825. The President says, [page 1]-"The United States do "not intend, nor are expected, to take part in any delibe"rations of a belligerent character; that the motive of their attendance is neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility The British Government was represented at the Con- "to any other nation." gress of the Allied Sovereigns, although, from the charac- III. Mr. Clay says, [page 3]-"It was also stated, by ter of that league, and the nature of her Constitution, she" each of those Ministers, that his Government did not could not be a member of that Confederacy; her Minister" expect that the United States would change their premet the Congress at Verona, represented the opinions and sent neutral policy; nor was it desired that they should views of the Ministry, in regard to the great questions of "take part in such of the deliberations of the proposed war about to be settled there. That Minister dissented;"Congress, as might relate to the prosecution of the preand remonstrated against the principles upon which that" sent war.

V. [Page 5]-Mexican Minister did not wish nor desire the United States to take part.

alliance determined to act in relation to Spain; and yet IV. Mr. Clay stated, they could not make themselves a England did not depart from her neutrality; on the con-party to the existing war with Spain: nor to councils for trary, she was in the discharge of a high public duty, and deliberating on the means of its further prosecution. her Minister, while there, though not a member, proposed to declare the slave trade piracy by the Laws of Nations. The French Convention was a belligerent Congress. VII. [Page 6, 7]-Salazar suggests merely two classes France was actually engaged in war, not only of revolu- of subjects:-1st. Matters peculiarly and exclusively contion, but a general war. That body received the Ameri- cerning the belligerents. 2d. Matters between bellige can Minister, who publicly expressed towards them the rents and neutrals. He expressly states we are not to take deep interest and sympathy which this country felt in the part in the first. In regard to the second, he clearly indigreat cause of public liberty, in which she was straggling. cates the intention of establishing some principles of inWe had then our neutrality to maintain; we were pecu-ternational law, relating to the rights of neutrals and belliarly and delicately situated with regard to England and ligerents. the other Powers at war. But, notwithstanding, we fear- Mr. Clay says: "Whilst they will not be authorized to lessly said to them, in the face of all Europe, then in arms, "enter upon any deliberations, or to concur in any acts, "Republics should approach near each other; in many "inconsistent with the present neutral position of the "respects they have the same interest; their Governments"United States, and its obligations, they will be fully emare similar; they both cherish the same principles, and "powered and instructed upon all questions likely to "rest on the same basis."—"America is not an unfeeling" arise in the Congress on subjects in which the nations "spectator of your affairs at the present crisis."-"The" of America have a common interest." "recollection of common dangers and difficulties will in- Mr. Canas says:-" And which will not require that the "crease the harmony and cement the union."-"America" Representatives of the United States should, in the "has had her day of oppression, difficulty, and war, but "least, compromit their present neutrality, harmony, and "her sons were virtuous and brave; the storm has passed "good intelligence, with other nations." 'away, and left them in the enjoyment of peace, liberty, "and independence."-" France, our ally and our friend, "who aided us in the cause, has now embarked in the "same noble career."-(Mr. Monroe's Address.)-Every branch of this Government expressed the most sincere attachment to the liberty, prosperity, and happiness, of the French Republic. These were the manly sentiments we then uttered to the World. They were not then deemed inconsistent with our neutral character; they did not give Mr. Salazar invites us to meet those Ministers at Panaoffence by any supposed violation of our duties and obli-ma, to propose certain subjects of a general interest to this gations. hemisphere, for discussion; but not take part in any belBut now, no feeling towards our Spanish neighbors can ligerent measure. The President will neither contract be indulged, though no actual war exists; no public sym- alliances, nor engage in any project importing hostility to pathy can be expressed. Republics dare not now ap-any nation; Mr. Clay will not change the present neutral proach near each other. We must now stand unfeeling policy; nor make themselves a party to councils for delispectators of events. Such is our extreme sensibility and berating on the means of prosecuting the war.

Is it not extraordinary, after all this, we hear it repeated that we must sit in this council-take part in the discussion and decision of these military operations? We must, say those gentlemen, become a part of the Confederacyjoin in their deliberations-vote by States-be bound by a majority-furnish our quota-and even invade Cubaand do all acts as if we were in a state of actual war with Spain.

These