H. of R.] ers. rejection of this check must spring from his idea of the sition of amendment, to reform, but it was verified by inefficiency of checks. There is no safety in political in- the express authority of the commentary of the Federalist stitutions without checks and balances. Organized pow-in which it was explicitly asserted, that this election is to er can only be restrained by organized power. The want be made by the States in their "political character of an organized check was the reason of the submission But neither was this principle just, in its application to of Rome to the Neros and Caligulas. Let us look at ordinary representative system, or the expediency of n Roman history. A bad Emperor was put down. Did ferring every species of political agency directly to any benefit result? None. Things immediately relaps- People. It conduced neither to the security, the d ed into their former state. This was no action of restraint or the real efficiency of the People, to have agency fine which was regular or steady. The evil was aggravated, in- on them to this extent. The avowal of such a ha doct deed, rather than alleviated: for fear was rendered more might be unpopular; but he had no objection to th unsparing, and tyranny more implacable. The only insti- avowal of unpopular doctrine, if he knew it to be sat tutions which can alleviate despotism are organized pow- and just. He would not shrink from opposing a se What is the alleviation of despotism in Turkey? of error, because it approached him in a broad and firie Religion-an organized power. The press is this check torrent. The effect of this doctrine of the reference et in more enlightened countries. The historical evidence is perpetual and engrossing political agency to the Peop in favor of checks, and not against them. When Rome was, to make them tyrants first, and slaves afterwards was founded, Romulus instituted a Senate, a Popular As-What have we seen in the popular governments of Greec sembly, and a King. Here we have balanced powers. and Rome? The effect of this principle, in those case. Servius Tullius, the wisest of her Kings, added to these was, first a necessity for the distribution of oboli and the influence of property. This was another check and bread, then general venality, corruption, and violenc balance. The design of the Tribunes was to give greater throwing every thing into confusion. Had he lived the effect to these balances; but they destroyed the balances, he would have preferred despotism. The despotism and gave the ascendency to democracy. Then the rabble an individual would have been a relief. Representation introduced Cæsar. The State would not afterwards have the true safeguard of the People. a free Government, when some Emperor wished to reestablish it, because it knew that the monarch was better than the anarch: that any despotism was more tolerable than that of unbridled multitudes and confusion. All historical analogy exhibited the same results. The gentleman from South Carolina seemed to think that England has not a system of checks and balances. He maintained, on the contrary, that England flourished by her balanced Constitution. To that she owes her uncommon power. It was said that the corruption of the House of Commons had destroyed this balance. This corruption was, however, countervailed by another power. The apparent disturbance of the balance is corrected by the Press. Lord Coke said, Parliament was a place where the People speak their mind. England is represented fairly by her newspapers. These are, in effect, her Parliament, where the People speak their mind. These keep the House of Commons from entire subservience, and counteract the evils of the septennial system. This is the balance system. Melancholy, indeed, would it be for the human race, if there were no instance of balanced Government. If he were to define despotism, he would call it unbalanced Government. We have not only a Legislative, a Judiciary, and an Executive, but we add a second balance of two Governments; and a third, of two principles in one General Government—a Federal and a National. We have, therefore, carried this excellent doctrine of balances further than any other People. The assertion had no foundation, that representation necessary in large States only. It is as necessary as in a large State. Representation is better throug Members, although they are no wiser than the Pep Popular sentiment is fermentive in its first concoction requires to pass through a cooling medium, to rec make it fit for legislation. Popular opinion would be cor tinually liable to the influence of improper excee Representation changes its nature. The People, direct capacity, would not be responsible: they subject to no control. Representatives know thy an acting as agents, and under deep responsibilities The popular Assembly of Atliens was supener other which had ever existed, as respected a quic for the direct exercise of political power. legislative body, derived from this Assembly, have to expel Aristides and Anaxagorus from the St send Socrates and Phocion, and, on one occas, whole body of the Naval Commanders, for losing a bat without fault, to execution? Instead of doing everyth by their own agency, as is now proposed, be ad al them to do nothing by themselves, but cry thing agents, secured from misconduct by adequate guards responsibility. Those who overlook the game unders it best. Wock dual, who, instead of confining himself on his fam What would we think of the sanity of any ind exercise of a supervising authority, shoukl undered: perform all the offices himself? The true princips He put this discovery amongst the greatest which the popular efficiency are, to vote by large masses, and t world ever saw. It was next to those of Copernicus, by representation. Newton, and Columbus. Columbus gained his immortal-ple be distracted by vices and local interests, but i Let not the whole body of the ity by the discovery of a new World: we have discovered political action be depurated by representation. a new method of governing this World, by making it the seat of free principles, the influence of which is felt to the remotest corners of the Universe. Yet this admirable system is sought to be destroyed for the sake of a political abstraction-the abstraction which required the reference of all power to popular agency for its discharge But, allowing the justice of the abstract principle, it had no application in the present discussion; because the real import of the principle required the reference of power to the constituent body, whatever it might be: and the States, the People contemplated, and acting not in an aggregate capacity, but as members of political communities, were the constituent bodies contemplated by the Con-nate and blest of People. All the population We have reason to regard ourselves as the st stitution, in relation to the election of the President. This other quarter of the world have suffered from wished to retain every part of the Constitutive we can was not only apparent from the terms of the Constitution, while we, with all the elements of misrule in our be that, besire 1461 FEB. 24, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. can be brought into efficient operation, the People them- and times-so would our act redound, in effects incom- He could only consent to change the Constitution where experience and time, the great masters, have taught us it is defective; and that is in the reference of the election to the House of Representatives. The House then adjourned. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1826. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. Mr. THOMSON, of Pennsylvania, offered the following: Resolved, That, for the purpose of electing the Presi dent and Vice President of the United States, the Constitution ought to be so amended, that the citizens in each State, qualified to vote for the most numerous branch of the Legislature thereof, shall vote directly for the officers aforesaid. That returns shall be made to the Governor, of the whole number of votes given, who, with such persons as the Legislature shall appoint, shall cast them up, and ascertain what candidate has the greatest number of votes given in the State, who shall be thereupon declared to have received the number of Electoral votes, to which such State, on the principles at present contained in the Constitution, is, or shall be, entitled. Resolved, That, if, for either of the said offices, no candidate shall receive a majority of the Electoral votes of the United States, the matter shall be again referred to the People, in the same manner as before; except that the election shall then be made from the two candidates who have received the highest number of Electoral votes. The resolution was referred to a Committee of the Whole House. But it is said, we must adopt the district system, on the necessity of compromise with the small States. Compare the terms of compromise. The small States are asked to give up what threatens the general good: the large States, what is essential to the general good. Was a principle of malevolence to be imputed to the small States? If the small States desire a sacrifice from the large States, yet The value of the they ask no sacrifice from the People. It does not come until vote to the small States is none. It is not after the contingency which they would avert. then a general choice, but only a choice out of three persons. Suppose a small State votes as the majority would do, then the vote is supererogatory: suppose a small State votes against the majority, then the responsibility is to be deprecated. But the small States have a direct interest in the preservation of the power of the great States to consolidate. Their first interest is not in the election of an individual, but in the preservation of the Federation. The small States will, and ought to, surrender any rights, for the public good. They held power, not for the small States, but for the whole Union. What is the highest interest? Self preservation. How is the Federation to be preserved? How is the life of the small States to be preserved? If danger threatens the Federation, only the great States are adequate to give it protection. The Teucers must fight under the shield of the Ajaxes, in the day Mr. HEMPHILL offered the following resolution : of battle, for the rights or existence of Federation, if that Resolved, &c. two-thirds of both Houses concurring, It would be an act of madness in day should ever come. the small States, by stripping off its folds, or reducing its That the President and Vice President of the United verge, to bring the shield to the weight of their own arms. States shall be chosen as follows: The People of each They will, if wise, fight in the armor of Achilles. He State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature hoped no wily effort would be made to obtain this armor. thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal to the He trusted that wily influence and persuasion may not pre-whole number of Senators and Representatives to which vail, as of old, to the destruction of one of the bulwarks the State may be entitled in Congress; but no Senator or If they Representative, or person holding any office of trust or of the National Government, and of freedom. should, it would still be his consolation to have given his profit under the United States, shall be appointed an honest, though feeble counsels, to avert such an event. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, on We must have some form of But a few words more. General Government. We can have no security for our the first Thursday, and succeeding Friday, in the month freedom, but in the principle of States acting on the Ge- of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and neral Government, in a Federal capacity. It is impossible twenty-eight, and on the same days in every sixth year to separate this Federal principle from our institutions, thereafter, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom without opening the door to evils of the most fatal charac-one, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State But the divestiture of the House of Representatives with themselves, and they shall make lists of all the perof the power of election, he regarded as essential to the sons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; He believed the election of which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit, sealconservation of the Union. Chief Magistrate to be the vulnerable point in the Consti-ed, one to the Governor of the State, one to the President tution. It is there that the stability of the Government is of the United States, one to each of the members of the The Congress of the United most doubtful. This election is the Roman Gulf, into Senate in Congress from such State, and one to the which we should throw whatever is most precious to us, President of the Senate. He believed States shall be in session on the second Monday of Ocif it can only be closed by such a sacrifice. the whole human race interested in the experiment of free tober, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twengovernment we were conducting. We must not, then, ty-eight, and in every sixth year thereafter, and the Prepermit this source of danger to remain. Take this power sident of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate from the House of Representatives. Such was his object: and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, The interests of freedom, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having this he would do at all events. in all countries and ages, are tied up, bound, and incorpo- the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if rated in our experiment. No less, then, as a philanthro- such number be a majority of the whole number of Elecpist, than as a patriot, he was prepared for every sacrifice. tors appointed. And if there be more than one who have And, as the act of Curtius, supposing him to have saved a majority, and have an equal number of votes, or if no his country, exerted an influence on all other countries person have a majority, then the citizens of each State, ter. Elector. H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [FEB. 24, 1826 when the President has served out his term of four years, he shall not again be eligible to fill the office of President of the United States for six years. Resolved, That one uniform system of voting by Dis tricts should be established in all the States. Resolved, That the Electoral College, hereafter, da qualified to choose electors, shall hold a second election, on the first Thursday, and the succeeding Friday, in the month of December, then next ensuing, to vote directly between the persons having the two highest numbers for the office of President; which second election shall be conducted in such manner as the Legislature of each State may direct. And the judges of the elections, or per-elect the President and Vice President of the Unite sons finally ascertaining the number of votes in each States by a plurality of votes. State, shall transmit sealed lists to the persons aforesaid. And the certificates shall be opened and counted in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, in the manner aforesaid. But, in this second election, the votes shall be taken by States, each State to have one vote, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary for a choice; and the person having the majority of all the States, shall be the President of the United States, and the other person shall be the Vice President of the United States. And if it should happen at the first election that no person shall have a majority, and that more than two shall have an equal number of votes, or, if, at the second election, that the two persons shall have an equal number of votes, then, in each case, the choice of the President and Vice President shall be made according to the Constitution, as adopted on the 17th day of September, one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven. And if any person shall be elected President at the first election, then the Vice President shall be chosen according to the Constitution, as last mentioned. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States of America, who shall not have attained to the age of forty-five years; and the terms for which the President and Vice President shall hold their offices, shall be six years, and the President shall be ineligible forever after to hold the office of President of the United States of America. The resolution was referred to a Committee of the Whole. Mr. SLOANE offered the following: Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended, that the free white males of the several States, above the age of twenty-one years, by a general vote, per capita, throughout the United States, shall elect the President and Vice President thereof. The resolution was referred to a Committee of the Whole, Mr. WARD offered the following: Whereas it seems to be generally admitted that the Constitution of the United States ought to be amended, so far as it relates to the election of President and Vice President, and the only question to be determined is, in what manner it shall be done-some contending that it ought to be so amended, as that the choice may be made by electors, to be chosen by districts by the People, other that the electors should be chosen by the People by general ticket; whilst others maintain that the election should be submitted directly to the People: In order, therefore, to obviate the many difficulties which must inevitably result from the various plans, which have already been submitted to the House, it is Resolved, That a Committee be appointed on the part of this House, to join such Committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, if the honorable the Senate shall concur therein, to consider and report whether any amendments ought to be made to the Constitution of the United States, so far as it relates to the choice of President and Vice President, and, if so, then, that they report such amendments thereto, as to them may seem most likely to prove acceptable to the People, This resolution was laid on the table. Mr. WEEMS offered the following: Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States ought to be amended, so that, after the next election, Resolved, That, in the event of the election of the Pre sident or Vice President devolving on Congress, the voi shall be given viva voce. Resolved, That all such Members of Congress as sha? stand recorded, as having voted upon the election x President and Vice President, shall be thereby disqual fied from holding any office within the gift of, or Const tutionally requiring the nomination by, the President, for four years. The resolutions were referred to a Committee of the Whole. Mr. LIVINGSTON observed, that the table of the House was already loaded with various propositions for amending the Constitution, and if he had seen among them all, one which touched the point contained in that which he now held in his hand, he would not have offered it to the House; but there was not one of the which proposed to carry the Presidential election directly to the People, and let them do that for themselves, which they are now compelled to do by attorney. He, there fore, submitted the following: Resolved, That the Constitution of the United State ought to be so amended, as to vest the choice of the Pre sident and Vice President directly in the People, witho the intervention of Electors. The resolution was referred to a Committee of the whole House. Mr. MINER offered the following: It is unwise frequently to change the fundamemal principles of Government. The Constitution of the United States being perda in its structure, founded in compromise, and compat ed of Federative and popular principles, of delicate m difficult adjustment, it should only be altered in cases i obvious and imperious necessity, Any change would be unwise which should minish the relative power of the States, to the af ed States. The present mode of electing the President and Vice President, is based on the master principle which our Republican institutions are founded, namely: That the People are intelligent and virtuous; that their Represe tatives are worthy of confidence; that the security of the People lics, not in refusing to delegate power, but in 5acting from their Delegates a rigid responsibility. Therefore, resolved, That it is inexpedient to a the Constitution of the United States, in th which relates to the election of President and Ver President. In introducing the resolution, Mr. MINER od that a great many propositions to amend the Const had been laid upon the table; and he was not w some fear the People would be led to believe, that universally conceded here, that the Constitution fective, and needed amendment. 1, for one, M. make no such concession. I am satisfied wit Constitution in its present form, and am willing to and keep it, word for word, and letter for letter, any change whatever. I am desirous of saving s placing a resolution to that effect on your table, a the numerous propositions to alter it. have, upon this paper, placed three or four, what sider sound political axioms, in relation to the pri of our Government; and deduced, as a corollary from, a resolution, which I beg leave to submit to With this [H. of R. volution which gave birth to this Government, was commenced, prosecuted, and terminated, by the People. That the great object of this Government is what is merely professed by the Governments of the old world-the political happiness of its People. For, whilst they profess the same object, the real problem with them is, what form of Government will most effectually enslave the subject, without disclosing the chains that bind, or the hands which impose them. These are cardinal truths in our political faith, which should be borne in mind, whenever we approach that instrument, which secures and perpetuates their enjoyment. Mr. SAUNDERS addressed the Committee as follows: In examining this particular provision of the ConstituAs the change sought to be effected by one of the pro- tion, it may not be amiss to turn to the records of that positions now under consideration, originated with the Convention which gave it birth; and, though composed of Legislature of my own State, some years since, and as it some of the purest spirits of our Revolutionary Fathers, has always had my support, I will be pardoned for asking with the Father of his Country at their head, we shall find, the indulgence of this committee, for a short time, in ex- that, upon this subject, "involved in mazes, and perplexed pressing my views upon the subject. It is with some, with doubts"-there existed great division of sentiment: a matter of objection, that amendments of any kind, should for, on this point alone, there were eight or ten distinct be made to the Constitution, viewing all propositions as propositions. It originated with the celebrated resolu alike calculated to impair, rather than improve that sa- tions of a member from Virginia, (Governor RANDOLPH) cred instrument: whilst others seem disposed to amend, declaring in favor of a “National Executive," its prowherever experience shall have pointed out the small-gress was, that he should be chosen by the "National Leest defect, without considering the consequences like- gislature," and its termination in favor of his choice by the ly to arise from the remedy. I am willing, sir, to People, through the agency of electors. The division of yield to no man, in an attachment to the Constitu- opinion was, as to the time of his service, whether for the tion, in my belief of its exhibiting one of the brightest sam-term of good behavior, for a greater or less number of ples of the refinement of man; nor am I second to any one, years; and, as to the manner of electing him, whether by in a proper and becoming respect for the memory of the National Legislature, or the People. Fortunately those, to whom we are indebted for its formation; yet I for the country, the democratic principle prevailed in cannot, like the gentleman from New York, (Mr. STORRS) both cases; the term of service was fixed at four years, or my friend from Virginia, (Mr. ARCHER) carry this vene- and the election was intended to have been given to the ration so far, as to suppose them divinely inspired, and People. that the humblest individual of that body possessed more information upon this subject, than all the politicians of the present day. The infirmities of human nature forbid the idea of perfection in the Constitution, and that it is beyond the reach of all amendment. It may be true, that it has thus far stood the test of experience, and though in operation near forty years, affording few grounds of just complaint. That, under it, the nation has advanced, in the full tide of successful experiment-that, under it, the citizen has enjoyed It is, sir, however, a melancholy fact, that what was expressly negatived by the wise framers of the Constitution, themselves, has, in practice, become a part of it. It cannot now be questioned, that the election of President must, and will, hereafter, most usually devolve upon this House. It is useless to inquire into the cause that shall produce this result. Whether it be that the sages of the Revolution are no more, from sectional prejudices, or the ambition of individuals, we cannot shut our eyes to the certainty, that the number of candidates will so distract "Health in the breeze, and shelter in the storm"public sentiment, as to defeat an election in the primary colleges. Is it then consistent with the character of our still, in the particular provision now under consideration, Representative Government, or with the future welfare of embracing an important branch of the Government, if the the country, that Congress should choose its highest offivoice of the whole community is to be credited, it de- cers? The distinguishing characteristic of our form of mands some amendment. For, if any can doubt the una- Government is its representation. Great Britain may boast nimity with which this demand is made, none can hesitate of her representation, but none will pretend that the Exin believing, that a majority of the American People re-ecutive power there rests upon representative principles. quire some modification, and this, in my view, ought to be sufficient to induce us to lend our aid in effecting it. What, sir, are the evils complained of, as incident to the existing provisions of the Constitution? They are, first, a want of uniformity in the choice of Electors for President and Vice President, and that this choice is not made by the American People. Secondly, that the election is not sufficiently guarded against devolving upon the respective Houses of Congress, in the last resort. I shall consider the propositions under this arrangement, and it will be my purpose to assist in showing, that the evils are not chimerical, but well founded, and that the remedy now sought, would lessen, if not remove them. There the King reigns by divine right or hereditary suc cession: here the Chief Magistrate is intended to be elevated to his high estate by the voice of the People. This principle of representation, which has the People for its basis, is defeated, in taking from them the power of choosing, and the intention of the framers of the Constitution is defeated: otherwise, it would have been useless for them to have changed the election from the National Legislature to the People. And, though they provided for the contingency under which this House was to choose, it must have been in that spirit with which all contingencies are provided for, as a dernier resort. It is, to me, sir, apparent, from what transpired in the In other countries, sir, it may be difficult for the histo- Convention, that it was intended to have given this elecrian to trace the origin of their Governments to their true tion to the People; and this is the more manifest from the foundation, as they have most usually sprung from fraud, expositions of that day. In that celebrated work, the corruption, or violence, in which the object has been a Federalist—which, if for nothing else, would be entitled change of one dynasty for another. But, with us, every to the highest respect from the fact of having been writthing is easily traced to its source. We know ours is a ten pending the discussion of the ratification of the Conwritten compact, entered into by the agents of the Peo-stitution before the People-it is said: "It was desirable ple, ratified and confirmed by their assent. That the Re- that the sense of the People should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any pre-established body, but to men chosen by the People for the special purpose, and at a particular conjuncture." Again-"They have not made the appointment of President to depend on pre-existing bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it, in the first instance, to an immediate act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment." [FEB. 24, 1825. time and experience, which are admitted as supener to the divine wisdom of those who framed the Constation, have pointed out various considerations in favor of the amendment. The question is not alone, what systea of voting is best, but whether any system be good, and expedient to be rendered uniform? It is now contende against the present state of things, that you have no ruit, that all is uncertainty, dependent upon every whim or caprice of your State Legislatures, changed and altered agreeable to their notions of policy or of party, and that the People have no agency in the change, but are mere ly to hear the reasons and excuses of those who may have produced it, and to submit quietly to the evil after States voted by General Ticket, six by the Legislature, four by Districts, and two in a compound of Districts and General Ticket. In this there has been nothing like uniformity, because in several States the system was altered to accommodate the ruling party. The State from whence I have the honor to come, has afforded a strong illustration of the want of some uniformity in this elecBut, Sir, we have been told in substance, if not in tion. And here I may be pardoned for expressing my words, that this was an election with which it was not in- acknowledgment to the gentleman from South Carolina tended that the People should have any direct agency (Mr. MCDUFFIE) for his tribute of respect to the Repubthat it was to be a Federal, and not a National appoint-lican principles of that State. I do not mean to boast, ment. I at all times listen with pride and pleasure to all but modesty does not always receive its merited reward, arguments in support of State rights; and though I may and hence, I suppose, so little regard has been paid to the not consider them as endangered, still I am pleased to just claims of that State. She has been steady in her witness volunteers in their defence. I would now ask of principles, firm in her attachment to the Union, askig those who contend for this exclusive Federal power little, and willing in times of need to contribute, without against popular right, in the election of President and a murmur. Yes, Sir; since I have had the honor of beng Vice President, if they are prepared to go the full length a member on this floor, I have never offered a petition, to which the principle of their argument will carrry them? or claimed any thing at the hands of the General Gouth If they are, then the Constitution should be so amended ment, save only a post route, or something connecti as to abolish the electoral college altogether, and to give with your post office regulations. I am happy in bong to the States, in their sovereign and independent capaci- the Representative of such a People: for of all offices, i ty, the power of making this election. If it is admitted should dislike that most of "knocking as a shivering begthat this is going too far, and that the States ought not, asgar at a bolted door." To return to the history of tas distinct sovereignties, without regard to wealth or popu-system, if system it may be called, in my own State: At lation, to have an equal influence, then it seems to me, the outset, the State was divided into districts, in con the question is given up-that we are left to consider this formity, no doubt, with the supposed injunctions of the feature of the Constitution as a compound, in which the Constitution. In the celebrated contest between Mr. popular principle should prevail to the fullest practicable Adams and Mr. Jefferson, the vote of the State was &extent. If it was proposed to break down your State vided, though given by her delegation here for Mr. Jeflimits, to disturb the qualification of the voter, and the ferson. When Mr. Madison was brought forward in that manner of voting as designated by the Constitutions or way by the Republican party, which has since been so Laws of the several States, to say that the freehold quali- much abused in public, and practised upon in private, fication of Virginia should no longer exist, nor her viva the Legislature of the State, desirous of giving an effecvoce mode of voting be practised-that the People of tive vote, assumed to themselves the responsibility of spthese States should be thrown into one common mass-pointing the electors. The vote was in conformity, no then I admit we should not only be approaching, but doubt, with the wishes of a large majority of the State; thrown into the "vortex," yea, into the very gulf of yet the People, who had before been somewhat indiffer consolidation. Yet, nothing of this kind is proposed: soent to this election, was roused from their apathy at what that the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. ARCHER) who prizes they considered so daring an usurpation of their elective his freehold so highly, and the oral mode of voting of franchise--the whole State was thrown into the most vio such importance, may rest contented in the land of his lent commotion, and this act was well nigh changing the fathers, and not banish himself to the "benighted re- power of the two great political parties of the State. St gions of Africa." It was to this extent, alone, that it that, before the next Presidential election, the domina was intended to carry the federative principle in the elec-party was compelled to compromise between the instr tion of the Chief Magistrate :-that the States should re-system, and the appointment by the Legislature, tain the power of prescribing the mode in which the Peo- adopt the general ticket. Thus has stood the thing sax ple should vote, which is now proposed to be fixed and the People have acquiesced, not through choice, but be rendered uniform by Districts; of saying who should cause they have been taught to believe it was necesse vote, and in what manner. Preserve this, and you retain for the preservation of the relative influence of the Str all the power that is necessary or proper for the States. In other States, there has been as great a contrariety. Again, Sir, if this proposition should prevail by the con- the mode of choice, and in some much greater abuse stitutional majority, still it will have to be submitted to where the Legislature, though unwilling to assette the People of the States, who will have to sanction and responsibility of appointing themselves, have laid to ratify, through their Legislatures, "three-fourths" ap- State out into districts, not of contiguous territory, proving. This, too, may be added to the calculation of securing the end of the majority, whilst they professed Federal powers. But, Sir, if we are not disposed to re-to regard the rights of the minority. Again, Sir, tare gard the supposed intention of the framers of the Con- we not witnessed the excitement and unnecessary of stitution, or if we differ as to what that intention was, still, sumption of time by several of the Legislatures of the The reference of the choice of Electors to the immediate act of the People, precludes the idea of their ap-it has been consummated. At the late election twelve pointment by any other body; and if it is to be their immediate act, this can only be effected, as I shall attempt hereafter to shew, through the means of Districts. It is idle to talk of the immediate act of the People, unless they are to vote directly for the President themselves, or for persons, as Electors, whom they know, and in whom they have confidence. 66 |