SHAKESPEARE'S FANCIES AND BACON'S FACTS. 79 his "Study of Imagination," he surveys its extent, observes its inhabitants, and marks all their circumstances, conditions and occupations. This sort of solace seems too fanciful to be of much practical use. These fantastic dreams, we think, will surely melt away before genuine misfortune, we never expect to see any one, except in melodrama, "sit upon the ground and tell sad stories of the death of kings." And yet we find the fallen statesman, on whom Fortune has dealt her heaviest blows, sitting in his study and telling sad stories of the fall of statesmen, "bearing his own misfortunes on the back of such as have before endured the like." It is a striking and most unexpected commentary on the dramatic situation. The moral of it is, not to be too hasty in assuming that these dramatic scenes are only "high fantastical." Bacon's life puts new meaning into Shakespeare's art, and brings his most peculiar fancies into the hard highway of human experience. 80 CHAPTER VI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF WONDER. BACON'S "Philosophy of Wonder" is expounded in several of his works, and it is in its full expression something quite original and peculiar to himself, although its origin may be partly found in Plato. Dr. Martineau, in his "Types of Ethical Theory" (Vol. II. p. 140), affirms that the assumption of Plato` that Wonder is the primitive intellectual impulse, has perhaps its most emphatic expression in his Theætetus, 155 D: where he says, "Wonder is the special affection of a philosopher; for philosophy has no other starting point than this; and it is a happy genealogy which makes Iris the daughter of Thaumas,” 1.e. adds Martineau, "which treats the messenger of the gods, the winged thought that passes to and fro between heaven and earth, and brings them into communion, as the child of Wonder. Aristotle, in his more prosaic way, makes the same assumption in his 'Metaphysics,' I. 2." Bacon has nowhere given us a psychological system: there are numerous discussions on isolated psychologic questions scattered through his philosophical works, but no general scheme. Like Plato, he considers that philosophy starts from wonder. He has a Promus note (No. 227), super mirari cæperunt philosophari: after wondering, men began to philosophize: when wonder ceases, knowledge begins: a motto which is quoted, with humourous application, in a letter to Mr. Cawfielde: "Life," II. 373. So far as the knowlege of God is concerned, wonder never ceases, this knowledge cannot be attained by the contemplation of created things. "It is true that the contempla WONDER PRECEDES KNOWLEDge. 81 tion of the creatures of God hath for End (as to the natures of the creatures themselves) knowledge but as to the nature of God, no knowledge, but wonder, which is nothing else but contemplation broken off, or losing itself" Val. Ter. (Works, III. 218). In the “Advancement," he speaks in the same way, that "wonder is the seed of knowledge," "wonder is broken knowledge" (Works, III. 266, 267). So that wonder recedes, as knowledge advances, wonder is antecedent--the essential starting point, which is left behind when the start has been made. Bacon generally refers to admiration, or wonder-for the two words are identical, admiratio being the Latin for wonder,— as implying a suspension of intellectual activity under the spell of emotion. Thus he speaks of Queen Elizabeth's skill in languages, by which, "She is able to negotiate with divers ambassadors in their own languages: and that with no small disadvantage unto them, who, I think, cannot but have a great part of their wits distracted from their matters in hand, to the contemplation and admiration of such perfections" ("Life," I. 139). Knowledge, Bacon says, comes by comparison of similar things, "there is no proceeding in invention of knowledge but by similitude." Consequently wonder arises when the object contemplated cannot be brought into this relation with anything else; ex. gr., "God is only self-like, having nothing in common with any creature" (Works, III. 218). And from this follows an extension of the theory of wonder which is Bacon's most characteristic thought. The mere fact that anything is unique, not related by similitude to anything else, although this is the special occasion for wonder, yet it does not occasion wonder, unless it is also rare if it is familiar, wonder does not arise. As there are miracles of nature, so there are miracles of art of which "a collection or particular history" should be made. But not only of "such masterpieces and mysteries of any art which excite wonder." "For wonder is the child of rarity; and if a thing be rare, though in kind it be no way G extraordinary, yet it is wondered at. While, on the other hand, things which really call for wonder on account of the difference in species which they exhibit as compared with other species, yet if we have them by us in common use, are but slightly noticed.” 'Among the singularities of nature, I place the sun, the moon, the magnet, and the like, things in fact most familiar, but in nature almost unique" (Nov. Org. II. 31). 66 It is essential to observe that in Bacon's Latin, admiratio is the word for wonder: Admiratio est proles raritatis; and we see that as what is rare is the occasion for wonder, so what is common, or familiar, dispels it. Wonder is the sentiment appropriate to miracles, which are a species of monodica, singularities either of nature or art. And by the contemplation of "rare and extraordinary works of nature," or "excellent and wonderful works of art," "the mind is excited and raised to the investigation and discovery of Forms capable of including them," one of the principal aims of science being the investigation of Forms: when the Form of a thing is known, its cause is known. And, says Bacon, "Causarum explicatio tollit miraculum” (Nov. Org. I. 70): Explanation of causes takes off, or removes, the marvel. Miracles and wonders are, in Bacon's view, phenomena whose cause is not known. Thus, the Second Counsellor in the Gesta Grayorum concludes his speech as follows:-"When your Excellency shall have added depth of knowledge to the fineness of your spirits and greatness of your power, then indeed shall you be a Trismegistus; and then, when all other miracles and wonders shall cease, by reason that you shall have discovered their natural causes, yourself shall be left, the only miracle and wonder of the world." ("Life" I. 335). Bacon concludes one of his letters to King James with this courtly compliment :-" Miracles are ceased, though admiration will not cease while you live." ("Life" VI. 140). The whole of this philosophy of wonder is most curiously, most exactly reproduced in Shakespeare. The identity WONDER AND ADMIRATION EQUIVALENT. 83 between the two is at once suggested by the observation that Shakespeare habitually uses the Latin word admiratio, in its English form, as the synonym for wonder, as will be evident in many of the passages to be quoted. At present I may refer to such passages as the following:-In Cranmer's prophecy relating to Elizabeth and James, in Henry VIII., he uses the following singular language: Nor shall this peace sleep with her but as when As great in admiration as herself. (Hen. VIII. V. v. 40). A similar Note here that the bird of wonder is the unique bird, the rarity, the singularity of nature, the Phoenix. reference to the Phoenix occurs in Cymbeline: If she be furnished with a mind so rare, She is alone the Arabian bird. (Cymb. I. vi. 16). The discovery of Perdita is described with the same variation of language: "The changes I perceived in the King and Camillo were very notes of admiration a notable passion of wonder appeared in them." (Winter's Tale, V. ii. II). In Cymbeline "a mark of wonder" is used for purposes of identification; and the phrase can be so used, because the mark is something rare or unique : Guiderius had Upon his neck a mole, a sanguine star : It was a mark of wonder. (Cymb. V. v. 365'. Why a mole should be called a mark of wonder can only be explained by Bacon's philosophy. That wonder is the vestibule of knowledge—the sentiment that is left when we pass beyond the porch and enter the dwelling-is clearly, though not copiously, |