"dication of contempts, and the punishment "thereof, in any manner, belongs exclusively,

and without interfering, to each respective 66 court. Infinite confusion and disorder would "follow, if courts could, by writ of Habeas "Corpus, examine and determine the contempts "of others. The judgment and commitment of "each respective court, as to contempts, must "be final, and without controul. It is a confi"dence that may, with perfect safety and secu

rity, be reposed in the judges and the Houses "of Parliament. The House of Commons have "this power, only, in common with all the "courts of Westminster Hall; and if any per"" sons may be safely trusted with this power,

they must surely be the Commons, who are "chosen by the people, for their privileges and powers are the privileges and powers of the people. The House of Commons is the only judge of its own proceedings. Holt differed from the other judges in this point; but we "must be governed by the eleven, and not by "the single one."

In this opinion Gould and Nares, the other two judges, agreed.

The same application was afterwards made

to

to the Court of Exchequer, which also unanimously rejected it.

The Court of King's Bench has likewise twice unanimously rejected similar motions, on behalf of persons committed for contempts by the House of Lords, viz. in the case of the Earl of Shaftesbury, in 1667,* and in that of Flower, in 1799.†

The supreme authority of that Chamber of Parliament, and its power to make and enforce regulations, necessary for the dignity of its own tribunal, is also fully recognized in the case of the printer, against whom Lord Erskine granted an injunction in chancery, to prevent his publishing proceedings in a trial before the House of Lords, a publication which would, in any other case, have been legal; but was restrained by a special order of that House, in exercise of its own peculiar privilege.

This detail of cases might have been greatly extended.

To those who understand the true grounds of legal decision, it must appear to have been

G 2

*2 State Trials, 615.

8 Term Reports.

already

already carried much further than was necessary, The question to which these cases are applied is simply, whether the House of Commons does, at this hour, possess the power of imprisoning those, who either insult its members for their parliamentary conduct, or degrade and vilify the character and proceedings of the House itself, and whether that power, if it be known to the laws, shall be enforced, by such methods as are necessary for its legal exercise. Until the whole foundations of our law be subverted, there is but one issue by which such a question can be tried. If such a power be now first claimed and exercised, its origin must be shewn in some legislative act, expressly introducing the innovation: if, on the contrary, its exercise has been uninterrupted for centuries, and the instances of its exertion are coeval with the records of Parliament itself, it is for those who contend against it to shew, by what act it has been abrogated. As well might a man be admitted to dispute the power of Parliament to make laws, as the privilege by which alone it is enabled to execute that function with dignity and independence.

The sovereignty of the Crown, the legis lative authority of Parliament, have, themselves,

no

no higher origin, no firmer foundation in law, than the privileges of the House of Commons.

I proceed, therefore, to the second part of the argument; and shall consider, whether the power of the House of Commons, being thus part of the law of the land, ought to be permitted so to continue, or whether it would be more expedient that this privilege should be surrendered, and, like that of the protection of members from suits at law, be abolished by statute, as prejudicial or unnecessay.

For this purpose, it may, in the first place, be proper to establish, that such a power is not repugnant to the general system and practice of the constitution, but, on the contrary, it has Been constantly exercised by the inferior courts; and, secondly, that, even if it were reasonable on such an occasion to divest the mind of all reverence for the authority of uninterrupted precedent, and the concurring wisdom of ages, to consider what the parliamentary constitution of England ought to be, and not what it is even then, it is not less clear that the possession of such a power is necessary to the existence of the House of Commons, and to the efficiency, purity, and independence of its proceedings.

The original of the commitment for coña tempt, appears to be coeval with the common law itself, nor is it easy to conceive the existence of a Court of Justice, without an inherent power of vindicating by summary process its own authority, not only from actual resistance, but also from insult or degradation."

Lord Gilbert in his History of the Common Pleas, does indeed, derive this power from the statute of Westminster, passed in the 13th year of King Edward the first; but he afterwards. more correctly adds: "notwithstanding the "statute of Magna Charta, that none are to be

imprisoned nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terræ, this is one part of the law of the land to commit for contempt, "and confirmed by this statute."

The contempts which are so punishable by commitment, are defined by Blackstone* to be such, as either openly insult or resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the "6 judges who preside there, or (without such gross insolence or direct opposition) plainly "tend to create an universál disregard of their authority."

* Vol. iv, p. 283.