a marble hall, modelled upon some English nobleman's country seat, and he kept also a deer-park.” "Mr. Sullivan describes Mr. Gore as rather tall, and in middle age, of full person and erect; but he began to bend forward at an earlier age than common.' He was bald on the top of his head, and such hair as he had was tied behind and dressed with powder. His face was round and florid, his eyes black; his manners courteous and amiable. His eloquence was dignified and impressive. In all his relations and deportment he had the bearing of a polished and well-bred gentleman.''

To one who has read the memoirs of Parsons, Mr. Morse does not tell much news of him. "He belonged to a school widely different from that of Dexter and Gore, Otis and Sullivan. They were gentlemen of the old style, dignified, courteous in a stately fashion, of a grand bearing, as much as to say to all persons, 'We are the best.' Parsons, on the other hand, was far from impressive after this method; he was rather a wag in his way, slatternly in dress and appearance, slouching in figure, an able lawyer, indeed, and distinguished judge, and showing his ability in his countenance, but certainly with nothing of the aristocrat about him." “He injured his health in early youth by over-application to his legal studies; he grew thin, was ever afterward nervously anxious about his health, and became in short a hypochondriac. He was an incessant worker, and had other tastes and pursuits besides the law. He was six feet tall, with rather spindling legs, and in the latter part of his life he was of a full habit. He was very careless in his dress, often tying a colored silk handkerchief round his neck, outside of his coat, putting on his brown tie-wig so that it fell over his forehead to his eyebrows, and left his own hair standing out at the back of his head; then he used to tip his face down upon his breast and look out between his shaggy eyebrows at the person speaking to him." The following we do not remember having seen before: "The chief justice was to preside at the Hampshire Sessions; an old lawyer of that county, falling ill, gave his cases in charge to Mills, then a young man, advising him at the same time to engage senior counsel, and giving him a letter of introduction to the chief justice. Mills presented his letter and asked Parsons for some suggestions concerning the merits of the various seniors. 'I think on the whole,' replied the chief, 'that you had better employ no one. You and I can do the business about as well as any one.' Such a verbum sap. was not to be disregarded; and at the close of a not unsuccessful campaign through the session, Mills called to pay his respects to his powerful ally. While he sat with the chief a senior counsel came in - he had perhaps lost business by the arrangement between Mills and Parsons; after a few words of civility he rose to go, and Parsons said he should expect to see him at the next term. 'I'm not so sure of that, judge,' replied the old lawyer, I think some of sending my office-boy with my papers. You and he together will do the business full as well as I can.""

Jeremiah Mason was another great man in Web

ster's opinion the greatest of his time—a giant in body and in mind. The best thing told of him by Mr. Morse is the following: "While Mason was trying a case, the judge interposed with a question to a witness. Mason promptly checked the reply, and, turning to the court, said: 'On which side does your honor put that question? If for the other side, we object to it as inadmissible; and if for us, we don't want it.'" If we are not mistaken, Mason furnished the grounds and theory of Webster's great argument in the Dartmouth college cause.

In the instances of Lowell, Dana, and Dexter, we note the inheritance of intellect in those great New England families, noticeable also in the Adams family. In this connection Mr. Morse concludes: "The grandson of Judge Charles Jackson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., perpetuates the professional acquirements of that very learned judge, and is well known not only as a practicing lawyer, but as a profound student of the philosophy of the law. A son of Theophilus Parsons, who wrote the life of the chief justice, was a lawyer and writer by no means without ability and reputation in his day. Judge Story, one of the greatest lawyers not only of New England, but of the United States, who would have been chief justice of the Supreme Court had not President Jackson's ignorant and stubborn antipathy to the odious school of Story and Kent' stood in his way, was the father of William Story, lawyer, poet, and sculptor, whose fame needs no trumpeting. William Prescott also might properly have been mentioned among those famous at the bar in the early years of this century; and his son was William H. Prescott, the historian. What may be done by those still young in whom these same streams flow it is yet impossible to say. * * * * These examples are gathered at random, without research or inquiry, from a single calling only. But when one reflects how small was the population, and how few individuals could rise to prominence at the bar alone, it is a striking and inevitable reflection that transmission seems to have been rather the rule than the exception."

LEGISLATIVE HUMORISTS.

T is a commonly accepted opinion that the laws enacted by the Legislature of this State are destitute of those attractions which are found in popular literature and cannot, therefore, be expected to take rank among the works of standard authors; and that though they may be calculated to further the interests of the State, they are not to be recommended to those who are in quest of amusement. This opinion is not only erroneous, but it does gross injustice to those delightful humorists who sit in our legislative halls. It is doubtless due to ignorance, and is one of those hastily formed opinions which are dispelled by careful investigation; but for this very reason, light should be thrown on the subject in order that justice may be done to a much-abused class of authors. To this end, I wish to call attention to a few of the laws of the State; and I shall confine my references to those cases in which legislators bave indulged their love of fun during the present year.

One of the favorite jokes of the Legislature is to amend a repealed law. This joke is, to be sure, rather

threadbare. It is to be found in the writings of nearly every Legislature for years past. But it has something practical about it, and this is perhaps the reason why it proves so fascinating to the fuuny men of the Legislature and is indulged in more and more frequently. The amendment treats the original law as if it was still in force, and if an investigator acts on this assumption and fails to discover that the original law has been previously repealed, he may suffer serious injury; and this is where the point of the joke comes in. Other instances of humorous writing will appear in the references hereafter made. Many of the extracts to which I shall refer have been before alluded to in the columns of the LAW JOURNAL; but they have been cited, singularly enough, as evidence that the Legislature is in the habit of making mistakes, and as deserving of blame rather than praise. It is however very apparent that no body of men could blunder so persistently and overwhelmingly, and that the explanation here given is the true one. The following instances, which are only a few of many, will give some idea of the efforts of the Legislature in the line of humor.

Title 2d, chapter 5, part 2d of the Revised Statutes was repealed by sub. 2, § 1, chapter 245 of the Laws of 1880. Section 23 of that title was then amended by chapter 423, Laws of 1880. Moreover, it is section 22 instead of 23 to which the amendment relates.

Section 1 of chapter 467 of the Laws of 1880 was repealed by chapter 417, Laws of 1877; chapter 467 was the wholly repealed by chapter 245, Laws of 1880, section 1, sub. 46; section 1 of chapter 467 was then amended by chapter 480, Laws of 1880..

Chapter 717 of the Laws of 1870 was repealed by sub. 46, section 1, chapter 245, Laws of 1880. Section 7 of chapter 717 was then amended by chapter 487, Laws of 1880.

Chapter 515 of the Laws of 1875 was re-enacted by chapter 398, Laws of 1880. Chapter 625, not 515, was the one which demanded re-enactment.

Chapter 436 of the Laws of 1877 was amended by chapter 233, Laws of 1880, by adding a section numbered 10, and changing section 10 of the original act to section 11. Section 10 of the original act was then amended by chapter 580, Laws of 1880.

Chapter 526 of the Laws of 1879 was amended by chapter 435, Laws of 1880. But chapter 526 was merely amendatory of chapter 161, Laws of 1872, which was repealed by sub. 48, section 1, chapter 245, Laws of 1880. It is true that in some of these cases the repeal did not take effect until after the amendment, since chapter 245 of the Laws of 1880 was not to go into operation prior to September first. But the Legislature evidently overlooked this fact and therefore are entitled to the credit of attempting to amend a repealed law.

The Legislature of 1880, having thus repeated all the old jokes of preceding Legislatures, determined to branch out into something new. One of their happiest efforts at originality will be found in chapter 486 of the Laws of 1880. That act relates to mechanics' liens in the cities of this State. It provides for the creation of liens in cities by the filing of a verified notice of lien at any time before or within thirty days after the completion of the work or the furnishing of the materials. It then requires that "the liens provided under this act shall be enforced by civil action commenced in any court of record in said city, having equitable jurisdiction," etc. Now, as only a very few cities in the State are favored with courts of record having equitable jurisdiction, it will be very amusing when those who have filed liens in the less favored cities, under this act, attempt to enforce them. They will have some difficulty in finding a court which answers the description. And if they endeavor to enforce their liens in the way provided by the former act, they will be met by the objection that that act has been super

seded, so far as it relates to cities. A perusal of this act of 1880 will afford enjoyment to mechanics and material-men.

It would seem as if enough had been done to satisfy the desire of any reasonable Legislature to acquire a reputation for furnishing amusement to the people. But the wags of 1880 were not content. They longed to immortalize themselves by some gigantic and unparalleled outburst of fun, and when a magnificent opportunity was offered to them by the commissioners appointed to revise the statutes, they hastened to improve it. They presented to the people the remainder of the new Code. This book abounds in humorous paragraphs; but in that portion of it entitled, "Proceedings supplementary to an execution against property," the success of the legislators has exceeded the hopes of their most ardent admirers. A brief consideration of the portion of the act just mentioned will make this apparent.

"Proceedings supplementary to an execution against property" is the title of title XII, chapter 17 of the new Code. It provides for the examination of a judgment debtor and his debtor or bailee, at the instance of the judgment creditor. The former Code had also provided for such an examination; but there had been nothing laughable about its provisions. The authors of the new Code perceived this defect, and made the necessary changes. The first change occurs in section 2458, which provides that in order to entitle a judgment creditor to maintain either of the special proceedings authorized by this article, the judgment must have been rendered upon the judgment debtor's appearance, or personal service of the summons upon him, for a sum not less than twenty-five dollars, exclusive of costs; and the execution must have been issued out of a court of record," etc. So that if a person recovers judgment for costs only, in a court of record, whether his judgment is for $100 or $500, he cannot maintain supplementary proceedings.

The second change occurs in section 2460, and is much more striking than the first. I quote the entire section:

"Sec. 2460. A party or a witness, examined in a special proceeding, authorized by this article, is not excused from answering a question, on the ground that his examination will tend to convict him of the commission of a fraud; or to prove that he has been a party or privy to, or knowing of, a conveyance, assignment, transfer, or other disposition of property for any purpose; or that he or another person claims to be entitled, as against the judgment creditor, or a receiver appointed or to be appointed in the special proceeding, to hold property, derived from or through the judgment debtor, or to be discharged from the payment of a debt which was due to the judgment debtor, or to a person in his behalf. But an answer cannot be used as evidence against the person so answering, in a civil or criminal action, or in any other special proceeding, civil or criminal."

The beauties of title XII will now be seen. A judgment debtor may be examined; he may be compelled to answer questions touching the disposition of his property; he may plainly declare that he has disposed of it in order to defraud his creditor and avoid paying his debt; and he may then, in the language of the poet, "walk off, wagging pleasantly his fingers at his nose." Of course a creditor's suit would be entirely out of the question, since the debtor's examination could not be used in such a suit. Thus proceedings supplementary to execution lose all practical value. But they still have their use in affording the parties a little recreation and enabling them to indulge in social inter

course.

While this title is, as I have said, a nearly perfect specimen of humorous writing, I venture to suggest that it can be improved in one or two particulars. It would be well, for instance, to change the title, so that

it should read: "Proceedings for the amusement of judgment debtors." And I would advise the insertion, after section 2463, of some such section as the following: "The object of this article is the amusement of the judgment debtor; and it shall be the duty of the judge or referee, who takes the examination of a judgment debtor or other person, under the provisions of this article, to burn such examination immediately after the close of the proceedings. And in case the judgment debtor or other person so examined makes affidavit before one of the officers specified in section 2434, that his feelings were hurt or that he was not amused by such examination, it shall be the duty of such officer to punish the judgment creditor instituting such examination, by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for not less than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." By these proposed changes the subject of the act will be plainly expressed in the title, in compliance with the Constitution, and the interests of the judgment debtor

a cloud upon title, and the remedy of the owner is in a court of law.

If a city ordinance imposes certain conditions which must be complied with in order to make a valid assessment or tax, the neglect or omission of the city's officers or agents to comply with any one of the conditions renders the tax void; and should the payment of an invalid tax be enforced by a threatened or actual sale of property, real or personal, the owner may pay the amount of the tax under protest and bring his action against the city to recover back the amount so paid, or he may have an action of trespass for the recovery of damages; or, where real estate has been sold under a tax levy, the owner may test the validity of the tax by an action of ejectment. Another remedy is by a writ of certiorari.

Equity will interpose to prevent a multiplicity of suits, but multiplicity does not mean multitude, and an injunction will not be granted where the object is to obtain a consolidation of actions, or to save the expense of separate actions.

in the Court of Chancery for Newcastle county by William A. Murphey and others against the Mayor and City Council of Wilmington and others. From a decision of the chancellor dismissing the bill, complainants appealed.

I cannot hope to do more than call attention, in this general way, to the writings of some of the greatest humorists of the present time; but if the attention of the public is once directed to their works, they will meet with a wide sale. And even if this should not be so; even if this hard and practical age should refuse to do homage to King Fun, our legislators may bide their time with confidence. Their fame is assured. For I am satisfied that future generations, more appreciative than our own, will not consider their libraries complete unless they contain the comic works of the Legislatures of the State of New York.

J. H. HOPKINS.

EMINENT DOMAIN DIVERSION OF PRIVATE WATER-COURSE BY CITY — ASSESSMENT - CLOUD ON TITLE ILLEGAL TAX PAID UNDER COMPULSION.

DELAWARE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS, JUNE TERM, 1880.

MURPHEY V. MAYOR, ETC., OF WILMINGTON. The diversion of a private water-course by a municipal corporation for the purposes of general drainage, at the instance and with the acquiescence of the owners, is not an exercise of the right of eminent domain, nor a taking of private property for public use without compensation.

When the power is expressly given to it by its charter, such corporation may levy the cost of local improvements by assessments, in whole or in part, on the property specially benefited.

The collection of such assessments will not be prohibited by injunction except under special circumstances, such as leave the complainant without any remedy at law and bring his case under some one of the recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, as of fraud, irreparable injury, clouding title to real estate, or the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.

A lien or incumbrance that clouds a title to real estate, so as to entitle the owner to relief in equity, is one that is regular and valid on the face of the proceedings, but is in fact irregular and void from circumstances which have to be proved by extrinsic evidence. If the invalidity of the assessment is apparent on the record of the proceedings by which it was laid, and requires no proof aliunde to show it, such assessment does not cast

Edward G. Bradford, for appellants.

Samuel A. MacAllister, for respondents.

WALES, J. The appellants, who were complainants below, obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant corporation from enforcing the payment of an assessment which had been laid on certain real estate belonging to complainants, on Monroe street, in the city of Wilmington, for the construction of a public sewer. After a hearing before the chancellor, on bill, answer and depositions, the bill was dismissed, and thereupon an appeal taken to this court. The transactions which led to the application for an injunction are fully set forth in the bill, but the material charges on which the complainants rely for equitable relief are that the city's officers and agents acted without lawful authority, both in the construction of the sewer and in the manner and mode of laying the assessment, and that the latter is therefore illegal and void. It is charged that the sewer was made for the purpose of diverting a small water-course which had previously flowed through a portion of the property now assessed, and not for the purpose of general drainage; that the diversion of the water-course was the exercise of the right of eminent domain without authority, the city government not being invested with legal power to divert the stream; and that, even admitting the possession of the power, the assessment was illegal and void by reason of the neglect or failure of an officer of the city to perform an essential duty in relation thereto, the performance of which duty was necessary to the making of a legal and valid assessment. It appears from the papers on file that the water-course was not only of no value to any of the complainants, or to the former owners of the assessed property, but by reason of its being an outlet for the refuse of factories and slaughter-houses located higher up the stream, was at times a positive nuisance, so that one or more of the complainants, with some sixty residents in the same neighborhood, signed a petition addressed to the city council, requesting that a culvert might be constructed to carry off by perfect drainage all the water coming from above, and thus prevent a continuance of what the petitioners represented to be a source of danger to the public health. The fact is not disputed that the petitioners contemplated the construction of the sewer in Monroe street as being the best and most effectual means of removing the difficulties and annoyances of which they complained. The sewer was made under and along Monroe street, from a point above to

a point below the complainant's land, at a cost of $7,266.35, being at the rate of $9.98 per lineal foot, and, the water-course being turned into it, the nuisance was entirely abated. There was some attempt to show that the city was in fault in causing the nuisance by not keeping that part of the water-course which was below the complainant's land open and unobstructed, and thus backing up the waters, but the evidence does not sustain this. The surface of some of the complainants' land was depressed below the banks of the stream and the grades of the surrounding streets, making a basin in which, during heavy rains, the flooded waters would collect and remain until carried off by absorption or evaporation. On the completion of the sewer a statement of its cost was presented to the city council, which body ordered that one-half of the said cost should be paid out of the city treasury, and directed that a portion of the remainder, amounting in all to $1,036.92, should be charged against "the estate of John Montgomery," a former owner of the land, now belonging to the complainants, and of which he had died seized and intestate. The property had descended to the children and heirs of John Montgomery, and had continued in their possession as coparceners until a short time before the entry of the assessment upon the lien book of the city. The description in the lien book is a general one, being for 257.8 feet on the west side of Monroe street, between Second and Front streets, and for 157.8 feet on the south-east corner of Second and Monroe streets. The complainants, by claiming ownership of the assessed property, have established its identity and thus removed any objection to the generality and indefiniteness of its description.

The answer, admitting property in the complainants, and the diversion of the water-course, claims that the latter was done at the instance and with the knowledge and approval of the complainants; that the sewer was made for general drainage, and that the assessment was regularly and legally imposed. The cost of the sewer was reported to the city council on May 29th, 1873, and the matter of the assessment appears to have been considered by that body at several subsequent meetings until September 11th, 1873, when it was finally approved and ordered to be entered on the lien book. In the meantime, in the month of June, in the same year, the assessed property was sold at public sale, by an agent duly appointed for that purpose by the heirs of John Montgomery. The land was divided into building lots and sold to sundry purchasers, now the complainants. The agent retained out of the proceeds of the sale a sufficient sum to pay the assessment, in fulfillment of a condition previously announced, that the assess..ent would be paid, and the land sold "clear." Part of the money so retained by the agent he afterward paid over to the heirs, who protested against the validity of the city's claim. One of the purchasers and a party to the bill deposed that the value of the property was increased $3,000 by the

sewer.

An amendment to the charter of Wilmington, passed January 30th, 1866, confers upon the city council the entire jurisdiction and control of the drainage of the city, with power to pass ordinances for the opening of gutters, drains and sewers, and for the regulating, maintaining, cleansing and keeping the same and the natural water-courses, runs and rivulets within the city limits, open, clear and unobstructed, and for the entry upon private land for such purposes, and by general regulations to prescribe the mode in which the work shall be done, and who shall bear the expense thereof, and in its discretion to assess the costs thereof upon the persons and property, real and personal, of those particularly benefited thereby, or of those holding lands through, or along which, said sewers, drains and water-courses shall flow or pass, and prescribe the

mode of collection thereof. The statute provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, but is silent as to the mode in which such compensation shall be ascertained. A city ordinance passed June 21st, 1866, by virtue of the authority thus given, sets out in detail the manner in which the cost of constructing sewers, etc., shall be assessed. It makes it the duty of the street commissioner to keep an accurate account of the cost of such construction, and through the street committee, to report the same to the council, together with a list of the persons and estates particularly benefited thereby, as well as of those holding lands through, or along which, said sewers shall pass, and an estimate of the value of the lands upon which said expense ought to be assessed, the said value to be estimated independently of buildings or improvements. The city council may, or may not, order any part of such expense to be paid out of the general fund, and the whole or remainder, as the case may be, shall be apportioned among those persons and estates particularly benefited, or among those holding lands, along which the sewer shall pass. If the owners be unknown, the assessment shall be generally against the lot or premises by particular or general description. The assessment, being approved by council, shall be entered on the lien book, and may be collected by warrant under the hand and seal of the mayor.

The bill denies the authority of the city to lay a special tax for the payment of the sewer, and assumes that the expense should be wholly defrayed out of the funds produced by general taxation. But the position most earnestly contended for by the complainants is, that the city having constructed a work partly for an unlawful object, namely, the diversion of a natural water-course without license from the owners thereof, such unlicensed act of diversion, being outside of its chartered powers, taints the entire work with illegality, and no portion of the expense can be lawfully assessed on the property holders, notwithstanding that another and a lawful end may have been intended at the same time. The doctrine insisted on is, that where a tax or assessment is laid partly for a legal and partly for an illegal purpose, and such tax or assessment is entire and indivisible, the whole tax or assessment is illegal and void. The evidence, however, does not warrant the application of this principle to the present case. The city had the power, under the statute of 1866, to regulate and change the flow or direction of the natural drains and water-courses within its limits, to construct sewers and to assess the cost upon the owners of property specially benefited. No authority is given to invade or appropriate private property without compensation; this is expressly prohibited. It is true, the statute does not point out any way of fixing the compensation, but in this instance there was no necessity for ascertaining what might be due for taking for public use a property which was worthless and detrimental to its owners who asked for its removal as a boon and have derived a profit from its loss. These owners, and their privies in estate, stood by and saw the preparations made for depriving them of their property, without remonstrance or objection. The building and completion of the sewer occupied several months, and its uses and objects were well known. No attempt was made to interfere with the work, nor was the diversion of the water-course objected to. Some of the complainants requested the city council to carry off by perfect drainage the waters coming from above, and no word of disapproval was heard until the parties benefited were called upon to contribute to the payment of the expense. These facts admit of but one interpretation. The diversion having been made with the consent and approval, and to the evident advantage of the property owners, the action of the defendant corporation was not illegal or ultra

vires. The water-course had no existing or prospective value for the driving of machinery or for domestic uses, and by its continuance in its old channel rendered the lots through which it flowed unsalable. Its appropriation by the city was more of a public burden than a public benefit, while it afforded a special and advantageous relief to the lot-owners. Such an appropria- | tion, under all circumstances, does not fall within the definition of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. We may therefore dismiss the further consideration of the want of power in the city, under the statute of 1866, to make the diversion complained of, and direct our attention to the other points presented on behalf of the complainants.

That the expense of local improvements, in a town or city, may be met by local assessments, in whole or in part, appears to be so well established as to require no discussion. Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255; 2 Dill. on Mun. Corp. 596 and notes. But when, under what conditions, and to what extent, a court of equity should interfere to prevent the collection of such assessments, are questions which have not been uniformly decided. The inconvenience and confusion which might be caused by an indefinite delay in the receipt of municipal or other public revenues, and the serious embarrassments that might follow such delay, are obvious, and courts of equity have therefore been disinclined to put any obstacle in the way of their prompt collection, except under special circumstances, such as left the complainant without any remedy at law, or where it was clear that the tax had been imposed without authority and was absolutely void. Even in the latter case, where the only question is one of excess of authority, depending on purely legal principles, it is doubtful whether equity should interpose. Those courts which most closely adhere to the distinctions between legal and equitable jurisdiction have generally refused to interfere by injunction with municipal assessments, except in cases which come under some one of the recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, and the doctrine is universally accepted that the collection of a tax will not be enjoined except upon the clearest grounds. The most important question, therefore, to be considered, is that of jurisdiction; for although the arguments addressed to us by counsel were chiefly directed to other matters, this question was not waived, but it was expressly contended on the part of the city that the complainants, whatever might be their rights in a court of law, were not entitled to redress in a court of equity.

The complainants insist upon their right to an injunction for the reason, that the assessment being illegal and void, a threatened sale thereunder for its collection casts a cloud upon their titles which they have no adequate legal remedy to remove; that such sale would cause them an irreparable injury; that some of the complainants having only an equitable title are absolutely without any remedy at law; and that to refuse the writ would lead to circuity of action and a multiplicity of suits. These are recognized heads of equity jurisdiction and we are to inquire whether the complainants' case falls under any one of them.

Is this assessment a cloud upon their titles? It is not every irregular or even void assessment that clouds a title. A lien or incumbrance, to throw a shadow upon title to real property so as to give the owner a right to relief in equity, must be one that is regular and valid on its face, but is in fact irregular and void from circumstances which have to be proved by extrinsic evidence. The test is well defined in Heywood v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 539, to be where there is an apparent validity in the incumbrance and a total invalidity in fact which can only be proved by evidence aliunde. If the authority under which the assessment was made is unconstitutional, or if the power to tax is conceded,

and the officers intrusted with the duty of fixing the tax rate have exceeded their authority, or if from any other cause, appearing on the face of the proceedings, the tax is irregular and void, it will not affect the title, the defect being visible and undoubted. But a tax may be, from all that appears to the contrary, entirely regular and valid, the authority to levy it may be undisputed, and every preliminary step necessary to be taken by way of notice to the owners of property and its valuation, the amount of revenue to be raised and the final apportionment, may have been, on the face of the record, in strict compliance with the requirements of the law, and yet by reason of fraud, corruption or neglect on the part of the officer making the assessment the tax is void. The record may be false. Notice to owners and valuation of property may not, in fact, have been made, or the assessing officer may have conspired to make an unjust and partial assessment. An assessment or tax made and levied in the manner supposed, being apparently regular and legal, and in reality arbitrary and corrupt, but requiring extrinsic evidence to establish the fact, casts a cloud upon title. The contention here is, that the statute of 1866, which grants power to the city to regulate or change, within its limits, the course of natural rivulets, to construct sewers and assess the costs upon the parties specially benefited by the improvement, is unconstitutional, in so far as it undertakes to give the right of taking private property without providing any mode of ascertaining the amount of compensation to be paid to the owner; and that waiving this objection, and admitting the statute to be valid, certain conditions precedent, prescribed by the city ordinance, and which must be observed in order to make a legal assessment, have not been complied with. It is the duty of the street commissioner, under the ordinance, when he reports to the city council the cost of constructing a sewer, to present at the same time an estimate of the value of the lauds upon which said expense ought to be assessed, the value of such lands to be estimated independently of any buildings or improvements thereon. It is charged that the commissioner failed to perform his duty in this respect, and that the records and proceedings of the city council do not show, nor does it appear from any other source, that the required estimate of value was made or presented. The only answer to this is the presumption that official duties have been regularly fulfilled. Without entering into any inquiry as to the effect of this alleged omission of duty by the commissioner, it is sufficient to know that the omission appears on the face of the proceedings. Conceding, then, all that is claimed by the counsel for the complainants, the assessment is void by reason of its inherent defects. An unconstitutional law confers no authority, and if a city ordinance imposes certain conditions which must be complied with in order to make a legal tax, the failure to comply with any one of the conditions renders the tax void, so that on one hand, the city council having acted without authority, and on the other, in violation of its own self-imposed restrictions, the assessment is not binding, creates no lawful lien, and does not cloud the titles of the complainants. But all these matters are wholly within the jurisdiction of a court of law, to be determined by an examination of the statute, an inspection of the journals and records of the city government connected with this particular assessment, and do not call for any outside evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of the tax. Authority in support of this view of what makes a clouded title may be found in the opinion of Chancellor Walworth, in Wiggin v. Mayor of New York, 9 Paige, 23, a case involving the validity of an assessment for the opening of a street. "If the whole proceedings," says the chancellor, "in relation to the opening were absolutely void in law, and that fact appears upon the face of the ordinance