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OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGE. (1) Decker, the owner of land, mortgaged the same to Vaughn; Vaughn assigned the mortgage to Viele. Both the mortgage and assignment were recorded. Thereafter Vaughn, without authority, discharged this mortgage. Ludlum, who acquired title to the land from Decker, knowing that the discharge was without right, executed a mortgage to Hubbard, who had like knowledge. Hubbard assigned this mortgage to Judson. Held, that the discharge of the first mortgage was invalid and that mortgage was prior to the second. The record of an assignment of a mortgage is not constructive notice to those claiming under the mortgagor but is to those claiming under the mortgagee. Campbell v. Vedder, 3 Keyes, 174; Gillig v. Maas, 28 N. Y. 199; Purdy v. Huntington, 42 id. 334; Green v. Warnick, 64 id. 220. But a recorded assignment is notice that the assignor has no right to discharge the mortgage. Belden v. Meeker, 47 N. Y. 308; Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige, 29. The record of the assignment is notice to others than those acquiring rights in the mortgage itself. It shows to all title out of the assignor and incapacity to discharge. An assignment which contains the name of the mortgagor and of the assignor, and the date of the mortgage, and a covenant as to the amount due, is sufficiently certain when there is no other mortgage to the assignor bearing the same date. There need not be a description of the lands to make it the duty of the clerk to record. It is not the duty of the clerk to note the record of an assignment in the margin of a mortgage. Moore v. Stevens, 50 Barb. 442, was not rightly decided. Judson got no greater rights than Hubbard, by the assignment. The doctrine is fully established that the assignee of a mortgage takes not only subject to the equities existing between the original parties, but also subject to the latent equities which exist in favor of third persons against the mortgagor. Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535; Schaeffer v. Reilly, 50 id. 61; Trustees of Union College v. Wheeler, 61 id 88; Green v. Warnick, 64 id. 220. In this case Judge Earl states the rule with accuracy in the terse phrase of Lord Thurlow in Davis v. Austin, 1 Ves. 247, that "a purchaser of a chose in action must abide by the case of the person from whom he buys." The case was not affected by the fact that the mortgage given to Hubbard was without consideration and never had inception until its assignment to Judson, who was a purchaser. (2) Viele knew of the discharge of Vaughn but took no steps to correct the record or to foreclose his mortgage. Held, that he was not estopped from asserting his mortgage against Judson. In the case of Cornish v. Abington, 4 Hurl. & Norm. 550, which was followed by the court below, the silence of one party, knowing facts, operated as a fraud and actually, itself, misled the other party. In this case all the facts was upon the record and Judson was not misled by the silence of Viele. A proper search of the record would have shown the invalidity of the assignment. Judgment of General and Special Term reversed and new trial ordered. Bryan, appellant, v. Judson. Opinion by Finch, J.

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judgment operates as an estoppel as to that question in any subsequent suit between the same parties, whether the second suit be upon the same or some other cause of action. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Campbell v. Cross, 39 Ind. 155-158; Bank of the U. S. v. Beverly, 1 How. 134, 135; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 423. So, when an issue is made in a case and decided, whether with or without trial, the judgment is conclusive between the same parties in any subsequent action for the same cause, and as to all questions which were or might have been raised upon the first trial. Stockton v. Ford, 18 How. 418; Mallony v. Horan, 49 N. Y. 111. But where a suit is tried and determined between parties, the mere fact that in that suit a question might have been raised, tried, and determined, does not prevent the raising of such question in a suit upon a different cause of action. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 356; Davis v. Brown, id. 423-428; Russell v. Rau, id. 602; Nims v. Vaughn, 40 Mich. 356-360; Jacobson v. Miller, 41 id. 90-92. In this case A began a suit in Iowa against B, to obtain his possession and quiet his title to certain lands standing in A's name. Pending this suit A conveyed a portion of the lands to C, who intervened as co-plaintiff, and asked that this portion might be set off to her. The case was tried and submitted. Before decision A was adjudicated a bankrupt, and his assignee was substituted as plaintiff, and the lands still standing in A's name were set off to his assignee, but no question was raised as to the validity of the conveyance from A to C. Subsequently A's assignee filed a bill against C to have the conveyance set aside as a fraud upon A's creditors. Held, that the proceedings in Iowa were not an estoppel. District, E. D. Michigan, June 14, 1880. Radford v. Folsom. Opinion by Brown, D. J.

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MUNICI

PATENT-INVENTION IN FORM OF A BOOK PAL CORPORATION LIABLE FOR INFRINGEMENT. —(1) A bond and coupon register, in the form of a book, with a page or pages spaced for each bond and its coupons of any series of coupon bonds, and with the spaces numbered and designated to show what bonds and coupons they are for, while any of them are outstanding, and for receiving them for safe-keeping as vouchers, or memoranda, when any of them are taken up or paid, held to be a legal subject for a patent. It is not a proper subject for copyright, as although the plan is the same for registers for different bonds of a series, and for different series of bonds, the registers are not copies of one another, and the right to multiply copies would afford no protection at all. A copyright is a right to copy merely, as the word imports, and covers only the multiplication of copies. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674: Baker v. Selden, S. C. U. S., Oct. 7, 1879, 20 Alb. L. J. 168. There is no difference because the contrivance is in the form of a book, although books are commonly copyrighted. Hawes v. Washburn, 5 (. G. 491. (2) A city is liable in its corporate capacity for the infringement of a patent. Circuit, S. D. New York, June 15, 1880. Munson v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Wheeler, D. J.

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PATENT LICENSE-BREACH OF COVENANT DOES NOT FORFEIT. — A breach of covenant by the licensee does not per se work a forfeiture of a patent license. A few patent cases beginning with Brooks v. Stolley, 3 McLean, 523, hold otherwise. But Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 547, overrules these. Until put an end to in a proper way the contract still exists. It cannot be treated as ended, as a legal consequence of a failure to pay royalties. To this effect are the authorities, even before the case of Hartell v. Tilghman. See Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How. 99; Hartshorn v. Day, 19 id. 211; Goodyear v. Union R. Co., 4 Blatchf. 63; Blanchard v. Sprague, 1 Cliff. 288; Merserole v. Union Paper Collar Co., 6 Blatchf. 356-7. Circuit, Massachusetts, July 24, 1880. White v. Lee. Opinion by Lowell, C. J.

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

LUNATIC-DEED OF, WHEN AVOIDED - RATIFICATION WHEN CONTRACT HELD VALID. - It is a general rule that a grantor in a deed may avoid his conveyance by proof that he was non compos mentis at the time of its execution. Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart. 371; 2 Kent's Com. 451; Gibson v. Loper, 6 Gray, 279. Like the deed of an infant, a lunatic's deed may be ratified and confirmed. Where there is no evidence of ratification after restoration to reason, it is impossible, upon legal principles, that the estate passed to the grantee in the deed. An insane person is incapable of making a valid deed for he wants the consenting mind. In Moulton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487, an action to recover money paid for annuities, it was held that when a person of apparently sound mind, and not known to be otherwise, enters into a contract for the purchase of property which is fair and bona fide, and which is executed and completed, and said property has been paid for and enjoyed, and cannot be restored so as to put the parties in statu quo, such contract cannot afterward be set aside, either by the alleged lunatic or those who represent him. A like doctrine prevailed in Beals v. Lee, 10 Barr, 56. The decision in Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Moore, 28 P. F. S. 407, rests on the same principle there was neither fraud nor knowledge of the insanity. Without inconsistency, in Moore v. Hershey, 36 Leg. Int. 412, it was ruled that it is competent in an action by an indorser of a note made by a lunatic, for the lunatic to defend, either by showing that the indorser had knowledge of the lunacy, or that the note was originally obtained fraudulently, or without proper consideration. Paxson, J., said: "I know of no case in which it has been held that a lunatic, when sued upon his contract, may not show want of consideration." After speaking of the rule which had been urged in favor of the plaintiff, he adds: "We place our ruling upon the broad ground that the principle of commercial law above referred to does not apply to the case of commercial paper made by a madman." In Elliott v. Ince, De G. M. & G. 475 (487), it is said that Moulton v. Camroux was called a decision of necessity, and it is suggested that the same principles might apply to sales of land or mortgages. But in this country the rule is not universally extended to sales of personalty, and is not applied to conveyances of real estate. Crawford v. Scovell. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided March 22, 1880.]

SURETYSHIP — FORBEARANCE DOES NOT DISCHARGE SURETY. Mere forbearance, however prejudicial to the surety, will not discharge him. This rule applies where a creditor suffers a judgment to lose its lien for want of revival against the principal debtor, and thereby subsequent creditors are enabled to take the land. United States v. Simpson, 3 P. & W. 437. Winton v. Little. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided May 3, 1880.]

WATER-COURSE

NATURAL

-WHEN ARTIFICIAL TREATED AS COMPENSATION FOR APPROPRIATION

EMINENT DOMAIN. - - A provision of statute that compensation shall be made for damages to owners of land upon which a spring or stream of water is situated, by reason of the permanent appropriation of the same under the power of eminent domain, held to apply to an artificial water-course of such long continuance "that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Such a stream, for all practical purposes, is a natural water-course prescriptively, and therefore legally it is so. The right to it could be no better were it natural. As was said by Gibson, C. J., in Seibert v. Levan, 8 Barr, 383: "Whilst the grantor was lord of the whole, he might assign a permanent channel to the stream, and as regards himself and those who claim

under him, impress it with any character he should see proper. There is no particular sanctity in the natural bed of a stream, which is perpetually changing its course from accidental causes." And in speaking of the rule, that water shall flow ubi currere solebat et consuevit, he says it applies rather to the duty of returning it than to the channel through which it flows. And so in Sutclife v. Booth, 32 L. J. Q. B. 136, it was held per Wightman, J., that a water-course, though artificial, may have been originally made under such circumstances, and have been so used as to give all the rights that the riparian proprietors would have had had it been a natural stream. Of like import is the case of Nuttall v. Bracewell, L. R., 2 Exchq. 1, in which the chancellor says: "I see no reason why the law applicable to ordinary running streams should not be applicable to such a stream as this, for it is a natural flow or stream of water, though flowing in an artificial channel." So, also, on a similar footing he puts the case where two adjoining riparian owners should by agreement so alter or divert a stream that it shall run in two channels instead of one. In such case he holds that a grantor of land on the new stream would have all the rights of a riparian owner. See, also, Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 32 L. J. Q. B. 136; City of Reading v. Althouse. Opinion by Gordon, J.

[Decided March 22, 1880.]

MASSACHUSETTS

SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT ABSTRACT.
JULY, 1880.

CONFLICT OF LAW JURISDICTION AS TO CLAIMS FOR MONEYS STOLEN FROM MAILS AND RECOVERED-TRUST DEED OF PROPERTY STOLEN.- Plaintiff executed a deed to defendant, Burt, who was postmaster at Boston, conveying certain real and personal property in trust, to apply the proceeds to pay all claims growing out of money and property stolen by the plaintiff from letters in the Boston post-office, and return any balance remaining to the grantor. It appeared that all the property was the proceeds of money and property stolen by plaintiff from the mails. By the United States statutes (U. S. R. S., §§ 4050, 4058), "all moneys taken from the mails of United States by robbery, theft or otherwise, which come into the possession or custody of any of the agents of the post-office department, or any other officers of the United States, or any other person, shall be paid to the order of the postmaster-general, to be kept by him as other moneys of the post-office department to and for the use and benefit of the rightful owner, to be paid whenever satisfactory proof thereof shall be made," etc. Held, that the trust in the deed could not be enforced. By the provisions referred to the postmaster-general has the ex clusive right to the custody of money or other property stolen from the mails and which comes into the possession of any officer of the United States or other person, and the exclusive jurisdiction to determine who are the rightful owners and to distribute it among them. No court and no individual by an agreement with the thief can take away this right or defeat this jurisdiction. The case is not altered by the fact that the deed did not convey the identical property or money stolen from the mails. When plaintiff's property was transferred to Burt the jurisdiction of the postmaster-general attached, and this court has no right to determine who is entitled to the property. Laws v. Burt. Opinion by Morton, J.

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certain words and figures to a genuine receipt so as to increase the amount, held, that there was no variance. The crime of forgery at common law is defined to be the fraudulent making or alteration of a written instrument to the prejudice of another's right. 4 Bl. Com. 247. It is not necessary to the offense that the whole instrument should be fictitious. A fraudulent insertion of additional words, or an alteration in a material part of a true document, by which another may be defrauded, is a forgery, and is well described as such. The Gen. Stats., ch. 162, § 1, imposes punishment upon any one who falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits certain written instruments therein named. When this statute was passed, it had been settled by the law of England under similar statutes, that a forgery of the whole instrument and a material alteration of it were not distinct offenses, and that the latter act was well charged in criminal proceedings as a forgery of the whole. There are several cases in which the English rule has been followed by the courts of this country, but none in which it appears to have been departed from. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 10 Gray, 478; Commonwealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass. 12; State v. Flye, 26 Me. 312; State v. Floyd, 5 Strobh. 58; State v. Weaver, 13 Ired. 491; State v. Maxwell, 47 Iowa, 454; State v. Marvels, 2 Harring. (Del.) 527. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Boutwell. Opinion by Colt, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS - CONTRACT INVALID BY, CAN ONLY BE AVOIDED BY PARTIES TO-MARINE INSUR

The oral

ANCE-INSURABLE INTEREST. -- Machado, who had by a verbal contract agreed to purchase a vessel for $11,000, payable on the execution of a proper bill of sale, no part of the money being then paid, caused the vessel to be insured. Shortly after the bill of sale was executed to a third person in trust for Machado, and a part of the purchase-money paid. In an action upon the policy for a loss thereafter occurring, it was set up in defense that Machado had not, at the time of the insurance, an insurable interest in the vessel, the contract for its sale to him not being valid under the statute of frauds, and being incapable of enforcement. Held, that the defense would not avail. contract to purchase was not void or illegal by reason of the statute of frauds. Indeed, the statute presupposes an existing lawful contract; it affects the remedy only as between the parties, and not the validity of the contract itself; and, where the contract has actually been performed, even as between the parties themselves, it stands unaffected by the statute. It is therefore to be "treated as a valid subsisting contract when it comes in question between other parties for purposes other than a recovery upon it." Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325. Machado had, under his oral agreement, an interest in the vessel, and would have suffered a loss by her injury or destruction. Eastern Railroad v. Relief Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420. Amsink v. American Insurance Co. Opinion by Endicott, J.

USAGE AS TO SALE OF TOBACCO BY WEIGHT AT

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TIME OF PACKING INSTEAD OF AT THAT OF SALE-ONE

WITNESS MAY PROVE USAGE. —(1) Where tobacco was sold by sample and by weight, without more specific agreement, held, that evidence of a general usage was admissible to show that the weight was to be computed as previously ascertained at the time of packing and marked on the cases, and not by the actual weight at the time of the sale. Bottomley v. Forbes, 6 Scott, 866; Barry v. Bennett, 7 Metc. 354; Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518. (2) Notwithstanding the dictum in Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen, 353, 359, there can be no doubt, at the present day, that the circumstance that but one witness testifies to a usage is important only as bearing upon the credibility and satisfactoriness of his testimony in point of fact, and does not affect its com

petency or its sufficiency as matter of law. Parrott v. Thacher, 9 Pick. 426; Vail v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 155; Partridge v. Forsyth, 29 Ala. 200; Robinson v. United States, 13 Wall. 363. Jones v. Hoey. Opinion by Gray, C. J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

AGENCY-FRAUD OF AGENT, LIABILITY OF UNINCORPORATED SOCIETY FOR.- By the rules of an unincorporated building society the directors were authorized to borrow money for the purposes of the society, but the total amount borrowed was at no time to exceed a certain limited amount. The plaintiffs lent 100l. to the society, paying it in the ordinary course to the treasurer. At the time of the loan the amount authorized to be borrowed by the directors had been largely exceeded. The treasurer having embezzled the money, both the society and the directors denied their liability. The jury having found that the treasurer had been held out both by the directors and by tho society as a person authorized to receive the money, held, that the society as well as the directors were equally liable for the frauds committed by him in the course of his employment, and therefore both were liable to repay to the plaintiffs the amount advanced. Held, also, that the society were liable, although at the time the plaintiffs advanced the money the amount the directors were authorized by the rules to borrow had been largely exceeded. Barwick v. Joint Stock Bank, L.R., 2 Exch. 259; Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L. R., 5 P. C. 394. C. P. Div., April 24, 1880. Charles v. Brunswick Permanent Building Society. Opinion by Coleridge, C. J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 741.

NOTICE -WHEN NOTICE OF MORTGAGE TO SOLICITOR NOT NOTICE TO CLIENT — EQUITABLE INTEREST.— A solicitor, who was the sole trustee of certain settled funds, advanced them to the tenant for life, and acted as his solicitor, on his purchasing therewith land, which was conveyed to the tenant for life, in his own name, in fee simple. There was no power under the settlement to invest the trust funds in the purchase of land. The land was subsequently mortgaged by the tenant for life, who received and appropriated the money advanced to C., the trustee of the settlement acting as solicitor for both mortgagor and mortgagee, and the mortgage containing absolute covenants for title in fee by the mortgagor. The land was subsequently mortgaged to several persons, subject to the prior mortgage or mortgages, but without notice of the trust. Held, that the circumstances were such as to repel the construction or imputation of notice to the solicitor-trustee being notice to C., and that he was entitled to his mortgage for the money intended to be thereby secured. Held, also (following Lewis v. Maddocks, 17 Ves. 48), that the interest of the person beneficially entitled in remainder under the settlement was an equitable estate or interest, that as such it was different from a mere equity, as distinguished in Phillips v. Phillips, 5 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 655; 4 D. F. & J. 208, and following the last-named case, that being prior in date to the equitable interests of the subsequent mortgagees, it prevailed over them, notwithstanding they were purchasers for value without notice of the trust. Ch. Div., April 27, 1880. Cave v. Cave. Opinion by Fry, J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 730.

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without hindrance of the plaintiff. Before any demand was made, the grantor fraudulently and not in the ordinary course of his business sold the whole of the stock-in-trade to the defendants, who purchased bona fide and without knowledge of the fraud. Held, that the defendants acquired no property in the goods, and that the fact that they purchased bona fide was immaterial. C. P. Div., May 3, 1880. Taylor v. Mc

reference in the instrument to the exact nature of the estate conveyed. We have looked at the cases cited by Scribner under this head, and find that they hold in substance nothing more than that there must be express words of release or of grant, in such a deed. The deed carries the interest of the wife in the premises. In addition to the case cited by our correKeand. Opinion by Coleridge, C. J., and Denman, J..spondent, this is the holding in Learned v. Cutler,

42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 833.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT DATA" EXPLAINED. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The cases of Armstrong v. Cummings, 20 Hun, 313, and People ex rel. Denhardt v. Kelly, id. 549, are entirely consistent with each other.

In the first case the premises were described as No. 149 West Forty-fifth street, and as all of West Fortyfifth street was contained in one judicial district, and as the names of the streets and parts of streets contained in the several wards and districts in the city of New York could be ascertained from the public laws, the court held that they would take judicial notice of the number of the district in which the premises were situated.

In the second case the premises were described as No. 341 Fifth avenue, and as Fifth avenue does not lie wholly within any one district, but extends through several, the court held that they could not from the number of the house determine upon what portion of the avenue it stood, and hence could not determine in which of the several districts through which that avenue extends it was located.

The difference between the two cases is clearly stated in the second paragraph of the head-note to The People

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In examining a title I have encountered a deed by a husband owning the fee in which the wife is joined, which contains the usual full covenants and is properly acknowledged, but the usual words, "dower and right of dower" are omitted, and there are no other words which might operate as a release eo nomine. I have been greatly surprised at the diversity of opinion among lawyers of the highest standing here, upon the question as to whether express words must be used to bar any claim for dower. I have exhausted authorities and treatises bearing upon the subject, and have found that there are decisions in point in many of the States except New York; notably among the many cases is that of Smith v. Handy, 16 Ohio, 191, which holds flatfooted in favor of the deed as stated. But I am unable to satisfy myself that the law in this State is the same, and while I am convinced that the law as laid down in the case cited is sound, yet I hesitate to pass upon the subject owing to the fact that so many of our best conveyancers here hold firmly to an opposite view.

If not too much trouble, will you kindly publish your views upon the subject, not only for my benefit, but for the information of many others who are greatly interested in a solution of the question, and oblige Very truly yours, F. L. M.

NEW YORK, Sept. 29, 1880.

[It would seem that the joining of the wife with the husband in a conveyance of the premises to a third person should bar her dower, without express

18 Pick. 9, and Dustin v. Steele, 27 N. H. 431. We think this principle is the universal one, and can find no case making any exception to it. -ED. ALB. L. J.]

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I wish to call your attention to section 1725 of the new Code, and also to subdivision 2 of section 1762. What is the policy of the former, or what benefit can arise to the defendant by reason of it?

In subdivision 2 of the latter section should not the words "former" and "latter" be transposed? Tho substitution of the words "defendant" and " plaintiff" for the "husband" and "wife" of the R. S. was an improvement; but may not the commissioners or engrossers have made an error in the latter part of the subdivision? J. H. N.

[1. Mr. Commissioner Throop states that this is a substitute for the practice of stating in the answer the disposition that has been made of the property and demanding a judgment for its return, such practice being inconsistent with the existing mode of procedure and the proper functions of an answer. 2. We think the language is correct as it stands, although perhaps the other way would be equally correct.ED. ALB. L. J.]

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In reply to the wish expressed by you in the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL of 18th inst., "that some of our London contemporaries would supply us with statistics showing the number of judicial officers and the amount of litigated business in England," I, though not a London contemporary, have endeavored to comply with the first part of your requisition. I have no means of ascertaining "the amount of litigated business in England," but judging from the statistics contained in the current number of the Law Magazine and Review, to which I used to be a contributor, relating to the county courts during the year 1877, and taking into account my own experience as a practicing barrister in England so late as the year 1874, and the accounts which I receive still from professional friends there, I should say that the cases tried in the Superior Courts and at the Assizes, and in sundry local courts, would amount to double the number tried in the

county courts alone. This, however, is mere conjecture, as I have no means at hand to test such belief, but the difficulty experienced by the judges, so late as last year, in reducing the arrears, confirms my view. I have, however, much pleasure in furnishing you with the inclosed. It is an abstract of the approximate cost of all judicial officers in England and Wales:

SUPERIOR COURTS,

About forty judges, including the ex-chancellors and retired judges (who give good valuo for their pensions by rendering their services and matured experience available in the House of Lords, if peers, and in the judicial committee of the Privy Council) discharge the law business of the Superior Courts of England and Wales at an aggregate cost somewhat exceeding $1,000,000.

The statistics are as follows:

INFERIOR COURTS.

There are also fifty-eight judges of county courts, at a salary of £1,500 each, aggregating therefor....

The registrars of these county courts, having judicial duties in undefended causes, number upward of 500, and their aggregate remuneration cannot amount to less than.... The recorders of cities and boroughs number 112, some of them having a civil jurisdiction for the trial of causes, and all possessing a quasi civil jurisdiction in matters of appeal in rating, assessments, granting or refusing licenses, bastardy cases, and appeals against summary convictions; their aggregate cost may be set down at about...

Magistrates of the Metropolitan Police
Courts.

£87,000

250,000

17,000

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Master of the Rolls

22,000 6,000

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Four Judges of Chancery Division, one of whom is also Chief Judge of Bankruptcy Court.....

Four Puisne Judges of Court of Q. B....

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C. P.. Exch..

Two Judges of the Probate, Divorce and Ad-
miralty Courts, aggregating..
Judge of the Arches and Church Discipline
Court.....

20,000

20,000 20,000 20,000

10,000

5,000

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If to these are added Registrars of the Court of Bankruptcy, who sit judicially and as connected with the above courts, the Queen's Remembrancer - the Masters of the Courts of Q. B.-C. P. and Exch., who exercise judicial duties as referees, a further sum must be computed, aggregating.. And if, in addition, the chief clerks of the Judges of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, who sit judicially to take evidence and report the result to the court, are taken into account, a further sum must be computed of at least.......

Total extra cost of Superior Courts......
Or......

Assistant Commissioners of Assize, engaged on circuit trials and appointed pro hac vice as circumstances require, to supplement the Judges of the Superior Courts, at a probable aggregate cost of.......

Additional cost of the same..
Or.....

25,000 £211,000 $1,055,000

£24,000

6,000 £30.000 $150.000

Other judicial officers, such as the common serjeant, commissioner and judge of sheriff's court in the city of London, assistant judge and deputy assistant judge of the Middlesex Sessions (having a like civil jurisdiction with all courts of quarter ses sions)....

Two Masters in Lunacy, aggregating..

Total Or.....

This estimate does not embrace clerks of the peace for counties and boroughs, numbering at least 200 or 250, high sheriffs or sheriffs and their deputies, though the latter exercise judicial duties in trying certain cases where damages alone have to be assessed, and also compensation cases. Neither does it include such judicial officers as vice-chancellors of the Duchy of Lancaster, of the county Palatine of Durham, the judge of the Hundred of Salford; the passage court of Liverpool; the vicewarden of Stannaries, and other local courts; nor yet the judges of the courts of survey; the wreck commissioners, nor the forty-three district registrars of the probate court, most of whom are paid by fees not easily ascertainable.

Barristers appointed to revise the list of voters for Parliamentary elections, and numbering about 100, exercise judicial functions in investigating disputed property qualifications, and an appeal lies from their decisions to one of the Superior Courts. Their aggregate cost, together with two commissiouers for the trial of municipal election petitions, amounts to about

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£6,000 £6,000 $30,000

HUGH WEIGHTMAN.

NEW YORK, Sept. 25, 1880.

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