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CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

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should hold the office from the date of the appoint-
ment, subject to the condition that if they failed to
qualify, or perform some other act, the appointment
should go for naught. Ball v. Kenfield, Controller.
Opinion by McKinstry, J.
[Decided July 22, 1880.]

CORPORATION NOTICE - WHEN KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTOR NOT THAT OF CORPORATION.-The knowledge of the director of a corporation acquired incidentally and not while acting for the corporation is not the knowledge of the corporation so as to charge it. Accordingly where structures were erected upon lands belonging to an agricultural society which were in the possession of W., a director of the society, under a lease for the benefit of W., held, that a mechanic's lien could not be filed against such lands on the ground that the knowledge of W. of the erection of the structures was chargeable to the society. Unless the knowledge of a director of a corporation was acquired by him in the management and conduct of its business, notice of it is not attributable to the corporation. If the agent acquires his knowledge casually, or privately, or by rumor, and he does not inform the corporation or its agents of it, the corporation is not chargeable with it. "I agree,' solution says Nelson, C. J., in Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451, "that notice to a director, or knowledge derived by him while not engaged officially in the business of the bank, cannot and should not operate to the prejudice of the latter. This is clear from the ground and reason upon which the doctrine of notice to the principal through the agent rests. The principal is chargeable with this knowledge for the reason that the agent is substituted in his place, and represents him in the particular transaction; and as this relation, strictly speaking, exists only while the agent is acting in the business thus delegated to him, it is proper to limit it to such occasions." See, also, Fulton Bank v. New York, etc., Canal Co., 4 Pai. 127. So where a defective deed had been recorded purporting to convey certain land, and one of the directors of a corporation which had acquired an equity of redemption in the premises, not acting as agent of the corporation, and having no management of its business otherwise than as a director, went to the town records for the purpose of ascertaining the situation of the land, and there saw the record of the deed, but did not inform the corporation or any of its agents thereof, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the corporation was not, by reason of these facts, chargeable with knowledge of the deed. Farrel Foundry Co. v. Dart, 26 Conn. 376. Lothian v. Wood et al. Opinion by McKee, J. [Decided July 26, 1880.]

OFFICE WHEN OFFICIAL TERM COMMENCES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. — A statute of California provided that the governor should appoint commissioners "who shall hold office for the period of three years from and after their appointment," that they should "within twenty days after their appointment" meet and take an oath to faithfully perform their duties, etc. Held, that a commissioner appointed under the statute held office from the time of his appointment. This would not sometimes be the case. As was said by Field, J. (People v. Whitman, 10 Cal. 47): "To the complete investiture of an office, the acts of the appointing power and of the person appointed must, in some instances, concur. The appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the President; but it is competent for Congress to require the performance of certain acts by the appointee, such as the execution of security, the taking of an oath of office, and the like, before he can enter into the possession of the office. This has been done in relation to the office of surveyor-general. The performance of the acts are conditions precedent to the holding of the office." United States v. LeBaron, 19 How. 78. It is also competent for the Legislature to make the taking of the oath of office, etc., a condition subsequent, and to provide, as in the case at bar, that the appointees

CRIMINAL LAW.

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EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS-HOPE OF RECOVERY RENDERS INCOMPETENT,· An alleged dying statement of deceased set forth that "believing that I am very near death and realizing that I may not recover, I wish to make this, my dying statement," etc. She was then sick from the effect of an abortion. Held, that the statement was inadmissible. It is essential to the admissibility of such declarations that it appear that they were made under a sense of impending death. It is the impression of almost immediate disthat renders the testimony admissible. "Therefore," says Greenleaf, "where it appears that the deceased, at the time of the declaration, had any expectation or hope of recovery, however slight it may have been, and though death actually ensued in an hour afterward, the declaration is inadmissible. On the other hand, a belief that he will not recover is not in itself sufficient, unless there be also the prospect of almost immediate dissolution." 1 Greenl. Ev., § 158. This is the rule recognized and approved by all of the authorities. The only difficulty that arises comes from the application of the rule to the facts of the particular case. In the case before us, however, we think it appears upon the face of the paper itself that the deceased had not abandoned all hope of recovery. There is here a clear indication that the deceased at the time of making the declaration had not abandoned all hope of recovery. The declaration was therefore inadmissible. Wharton's Hom. 306-8; Rex v. Woodcox, 2 Leach's C. C. 267, 566; People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 24. In the last case cited this court said: "This species of testimony should always be received with the greatest caution, and too much care cannot be observed by the court in scrutinizing the primary facts upon which its admissibility is grounded. No person is entirely exempt from a disposition to excuse and justify his own conduct, or to inflict vengeance upon one at whose hands he has suffered a grievous wrong; and in the eye of the law this proclivity is presumed, in cases like the present, to be overcome and silenced only by the presence of almost immediate death. An undoubting belief existing in the mind of the declarant, at the time the declarations are made, that the finger of death is upon him, is indispensable to that sanction which the law exacts; and if it shall appear in any mode that there was a hope of recovery, however faint it may have been, still lingering in his breast, that sanction is not afforded, and his statement cannot be received." California Sup. Ct., June 7, 1880. People of California

v. Hodgdon. Opinion by Ross, J.

PLEADING

ATTEMPT TO STEAL. - In an indictment for an attempt to steal, it is not necessary to specify the particular articles intended to be stolen. In Whart. on Cr. Law, §§ 292 and 1282, it is said that in indictments for attempts to commit crimes in themselves indictable, it is not necessary to observe the same particularity as is required in indictments for the commission of the offense itself. And as illustrative of that position, he says an indictment for an assault with an intent to steal from the pocket is good without stating the goods or moneys intended to be stolen. In accordance with this statement of the rule, it has been decided in various States that the offense of attempts to commit larceny is complete by an intention to steal and an act done in pursuance thereof apparently effi

cient to carry out the purpose, and it is not necessary in the bill of indictment to aver the specific articles intended to be taken, as such fact is extrinsic and not essential to constitute a criminal attempt. State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500; Comm. v. McDonald, 5 Cush. 365; People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 133; Spencer v. Ohio, 13 Ohio, 401; Hunter v. State, 29 Ind. 80. North Carolina Sup. Ct., January Term, 1880. State of North Carolina v. Ulley. Opinion by Dillard, J.

PLEADING-INFANTICIDE-SEX OF CHILD NOT REQUIRED TO BE STATED. In an indictment for infanticide, although convenient and advisable when it can be safely done, it is not indispensable that the sex of the murdered child be stated even though its name be unknown or it has no name. The law requires that an indictment shall be so certain as to the party against whom the offense was committed, as to enable the prisoner to understand who the party is, and upon what charge he is called upon to answer, as to prevent the prisoner from being put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense, and as will authorize the court to give the appropriate judgment on conviction. What would it practically add, in these respects, to the rights and safety of the accused to have the sex alleged? In a criminal proceeding, the allegation of name is enough though there may be more than one person of the same name in the same place. State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171. It is enough to allege the name to be unknown, although the grand jury might have ascertained what the name was. Com. v. Stoddard, 9 Allen, 280. An indictment need not describe, by an addition, the person upon whom an offense is committed. Com. v. Varney, 10 Cush. 402. In Bac. Abr. (Indictment G.) it is said, "Sometimes it may be convenient, for distinction sake, to add it," but not essential, "for it is sufficient if the indictment be true, viz., that J. S. was killed or robbed, though there are many of the same name." The tendency of modern decisions is to less strictness than formerly in describing persons and properties in indictments. If it is sufficient to describe a man by his name alone without an addition, when there are many others of the same name, or allow the person to be nameless in a presentment of the grand jury because they do not know what the name is, although they could have ascertained it by some painstaking, it can be no stretch of legal principle, to say that in the case of an infant it is not essential that the sex should be stated. Com. v. Brettun, 100 Mass. 206; Com. v. Campbell, 103 id. 436; Com. v. Strangford, 112 id. 289. Maine Sup. Ct., Dec., 1879. State of Maine v. Morrisey. Opinion by Peters, J.

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TRIAL- EXCLUSION OF WITNESS FROM COURT-ROOM -FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER DOES NOT DISQUALIFY WITNESS. On a trial of a prisoner for receiving goods knowing them to be stolen, on the motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, without objection by the prisoner's counsel, the court directs the witnesses to leave the court-room; and they all leave but one, who was in the prisoner's box in the court-room, held on a requisition from the governor of another State, upon the charge of the larceny of the same goods. In the progress of the trial the attorney for the Commonwealth offers this man as a witness, and he is objected to by the prisoner, on the ground alone of his remaining in the court-room, after the order of the court, held, that he was a competent witness. Whero an order directing the exclusion of witnesses from the court-room during the trial is made, if a witness or the officer in charge willfully disobeys or violates such order, he is liable to be punished for his contempt, and at one time, according to the English practice, it was considered that the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, might even exclude the testimony of such a witness. But now it seems to be the practice to allow the witness to be examined, subject to observation as

to his conduct in disobeying the order. 2 Taylor on Ev. (7th ed.), §§ 1400, 1401, 1402; 3 Wharton's Crim Law. (7th ed.), § 3009a. In Cobbett v. Hudson, 72 Eng. C. L. 11 (decided by Queen's Bench in 1852), Lord Campbell, C. J., observed, that with respect to ordering witnesses out of court, although this is clearly within the power of the judge, and he may fine a witness for disobeying this order, the better opinion seems to have been that his power is limited to the infliction of the fine, and that he cannot lawfully refuse to permit the examination of the witness. Citing Cook v. Nethercote, 6 C. & P. 471; Rex v. Colley, 1 Mood. & Mal. 329; Thomas v. David, 7 C. & P. 350. And in Chandler v. Horne, 2 Mood. & R. N. P. 423, Erskine, J., said: "It used to be formerly supposed that it was in the discretion of the judge whether the witness should be examined. It is now settled and acted upon by all the judges that the judge has no right to exclude the witness; he may commit him for contempt, but he must be examined; and it is then matter of remark as to the value of his testimony, that he has willfully disobeyed the order. See, also, Nelson v. State, 2 Swan, 237. Virginia Ct. of Appeals, Nov. Term, 1879. Hey v. Commonwealth of Virginia. Opinion by Burks, J.

THE ENGLISH EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY BILL.

THE

HE following is the text of this bill, "to extend and regulate the liability of employers to make compensation for personal injuries suffered by workmen in their service, as amended in committee on recommitment and ou consideration as amended," and in the form in which it is presented to the House of Lords: "1. Amendment of Law. Where after the commencement of this act personal injury is caused to a workman (1) by reason of any defect in the ways, works, machinery, plant or stock-in-trade connected with or used in the business of the employer; or (2) by reason of the negligence of any person in the servico of the employer who has superintendence intrusted to him while in the exercise of such superintendence; or (3) by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman, at the time of the injury, was bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or (4) by reason of the act or omission of any such person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or by-laws of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that behalf; (5) by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the workman, and any persons entitled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work.

"2. Exceptions to Amendment of Law. A workman shall not be entitled under this act to any right of compensation or remedy against the employer in any of the following cases; that is to say, (1) under subsection 1 of section 1, unless the defect therein mentioned arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer, or of some person in the service of the employer, and intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, planks, or stock-in-trade were in proper condition. (2) Under sub-section 4 of section 1, unless the injury resulted from some impropriety or

defect in the rules, by-laws, or instructions therein mentioned; provided that where a rule or by-law has been approved or has been accepted as a proper rule or by-law by one of her majesty's principal secretaries of State or by the board of trade or any other department of the government, under or by virtue of any act of Parliament, it shall not be deemed for the purposes of this act to be an improper or defective rule or by-law. (3) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give, or cause to be given, information thereof to the employer or some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or such superior already knew of the said defect or negligence.

"3. Limit of sum recoverable as compensation. — The amount of compensation recoverable under this act shall not exceed such sum as may be found to be equivalent to the estimated earnings, during the three years preceding the injury of a person in the same grade employed during those years in the like employment and in the district in which the workman is employed at the time of the injury.

"4. Limit of time for recovery of compensation.— An action for the recovery under this act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained is given within six weeks, and the action is commenced within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or in case of death, within six months from the time of death; provided always that in case of death the want of such notice shall be no bar to the maintenance of such action if the judge shall be of opinion that there was reasonable excuse for such want of notice.

5. Money payable under penalty to be deducted from compensation under act.-There shall be deducted from any compensation awarded to any workman, or representatives of a workman, or persons claiming by, under, or through a workman in respect of any cause of action arising under this act, any penalty or part of a penalty which may have been paid in pursuance of any other act of Parliament to such workman, representatives, or persons in respect of the same cause of action, and where an action has been brought under this act by any workman, or the representatives of any workman, or any persons claiming by, under, or through such workman for compensation in respect of any cause of action arising under this act, and payment has not previously been made of any penalty or part of a penalty under any other act of Parliament in respect of the same cause of action, such workman, representatives, or person shall not be entitled thereafter to receive any penalty or part of a penalty under any other act of Parliament in respect of the same cause of action.

"6. Trial of actions.-1. Every action for recovery of compensation under this act shall be brought in a county court, but may, upon the application of either plaintiff or defendant, be removed into a superior court in like manner and upon the same conditions as an action commenced in a county court may by law be removed. 2. Upon the trial of any such action in a county court before the judge without a jury one or more assessors may be appointed for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of compensation. 3. For the purpose of regulating the conditions and mode of appointment and remuneration of such assessors, and all matters of procedure relating to their duties, and also for the purpose of consolidating any actions under this act in a county court, and otherwise preventing multiplicity of such actions, rules and regulations may be made, varied, and repealed from time to time in the same manner as rules and regulations for regulating the practice and procedure in other actions in county courts. 'County Court' shall, with respect to Scotland, mean the Sheriff's Court,' and shall,

with respect to Ireland, mean the Civil Bill Court.' In Scotland any action under this act may be removed to the Court of Session at the instance of either party, in the manner provided by, and subject to the conditions prescribed by, section 7 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) act, 1877. In Scotland the sheriff may conjoin actions arising out of the same occurrence or cause of action, though at the instance of different parties and in respect of different injuries.

"7. Mode of serving notice of injury.-Notice in respect of an injury under this act shall give the name and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the date at which it was sustained, and shall be served on the employer, or if there is more than one employer, upon one of such employers. The notice may be served by delivering the same to or at the residence or place of business of the person on whom it is to be served. The notice may also be served by post by a prepaid letter addressed to the person on whom it is to be served at his last known place of residence or place of business; and if served by post, shall be deemed to have been served at the time when a letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; and in proving the service of such notice, it shall be sufficient to prove that the notice was properly addressed and put into the post. Where the employer is a body of persons corporate or unincorporate, the notice shall be served by delivering the same at or by sending it by post in a prepaid letter addressed to the office, or if there be more than one office, any one of the offices of such body. A notice under this section shall not be deemed invalid by reason of any defect or inaccuracy therein, unless the judge who tries the action arising from the injury mentioned in the notice shall be of opinion that the defendant in the action is prejudiced in his defense by such defect or inaccuracy, and that the defect or inaccuracy was for the purpose of misleading.

"8. Definitions.-For the purpose of this act, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression 'person who has superintendence intrusted to him means a person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence and who is not ordinarily engaged in manual labor; the expression 'employer' includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate; the expression 'workman' means a railway servant and any person to whom the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, applies.

"9. Commencement of act. This act shall not come into operation until the first day of January, 1881, which date is in this act referred to as the commencement of this act.

"10. Short title.-This act may be cited as the Employers' Liability Act, 1880."

CORRESPONDENCE.

MORE "MIDSUMMER."

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

It may seem presumptuous for the writer to suggest

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that " Midsummer's problem has not been correctly

solved by any of your correspondents; especially as some of them are supported by the authority of very respectable courts. He is, however, prepared to take that responsibility.

The fallacy of the reasoning of "E. M. S.," "Subscriber" of Port Richmond, and "Sol. Kohn," must bo apparent when it is seen that it would serve to leave either A, B or C "out in the cold," as follows.

"E. M. S." starts with the proposition that C is to be paid in full, except as affected by B's mortgage; for the purposes of this argument we will number this proposition "1." The same reasoning which satisfies

"E. M. S." that C is to be paid in full except as affected by B's mortgage, would lead to the conclusion that B is to be paid in full, except as affected by A's mortgage, which is the only superior lien to B; this we will call proposition "2." And it would also lead to the conclusion that A is to be paid in full except as affected by C's mortgage, which is the only superior lien to A; and this we will call proposition "3." Starting with proposition "1," "E. M. S." uses a line of argument which leaves B "out in the cold." Now, if we start with proposition "2," using the same line of argument, we leave A out, and if we start with proposition "3" we leave C out. Substantially the same criticism may be made on the argument of "Subscriber" of Port Richmond, which in effect is that of "E. M. S."

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NEW YORK CITY, Sept. 23, 1880.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have read the several communications published by you in reply to "Midsummer's" problem as to priority among mortgages, at page 160 of vol. 22 of your JOURNAL.

"Sol. Kohn says that B takes $5,000, leaving an equal amount for A; but C intervenes and by reason of his priority causes the balance which B left for A to be paid to him, thus leaving A out. The same reasoning would permit us to say that C takes $5,000, leaving an equal amount for B; but A intervenes and by reason of his priority causes the balance which C left for B to be paid to him, thus leaving B "out in the cold." The fallacy of these arguments and of the decision in Bacon v. Van Schoonhoven, mentioned by "Sub-proceeds of sale of the mortgage premises, and insertscriber" of Troy, is that they assume that some one of the parties has a right to take the amount of his mortgage out of the fund, thus giving him that priority over the others which is tho very subject of dispute.

The unsoundness, too, of the decision in Manufacturers' Bank v. Bank of Pennsylvania, mentioned by "S. T. N.," we think is apparent. The reasoning there is that the first purchaser will have priority over the third, because the third cannot hold his ground against the second, who must in turn yield to the first. The court ignores the fact that the third though unable to hold his ground against the second can nevertheless compel the first to yield to him. For instance: In the case there presented of the purchaser of an entire estate, we may suppose that A obtains possession after the delivery and record of the conveyances; C then sues in ejectment, and recovers against A; for, as between A and C, the priorities are C, A, B, C having thus obtained possession is in turn liable to be ousted by B, for as between B and C the priorities are B, C, A. B may then be ousted by A, for, as between A and B the priorities are A, B. C. And C may again oust A, and the parties might thus "swing around the circle' indefinitely, there being no ground upon which the doctrine of estoppel could be invoked against either.

As to the arguments which go to leave one or the other out on the ground of subrogation or substitution, as it is termed by some, we think the error is evident. They all assume that one of the parties has an absolute right to the amount of his mortgage (the fallacy above pointed out) and then applying the doctrine of equitable (?) subrogation between the other two only deny one of them any interest; forgetting that in each case the victim of their system of subrogation has (if subrogation be applicable to the case at all) a right in turn to be subrogated to the position of the very one to whom they gave the amount of his mortgage by indisputable right. For instance, those who give C the amount of his mortgage and by subrogation give A the hare left for B, forget that B is really entitled to be subrogated to C's rights. The truth is that the doctrine of subrogation can lend us no assistance to the solution of "Midsummer's" problem, for the simple reason that if C can be subrogated to A's rights, B may be to C's, and A to B's, and so on. From what has been stated it will be seen that the writer claims that there is no priority in the case put by "Midsummer," but that A, B and C are entitled to share equally in the proceeds of the sale. He deems this capable of mathematical demonstration as follows:

Let me change the problem by striking out $10,000 as

ing $5,000 in lieu thereof.

Question. Upon which one of the three mortgages mentioned by "Midsummer," should the money be applied?

Answer. As between A and B the $5,000 belongs to A, for B had notice of A's prior unrecorded mortgage, and B has therefore no claim upon the $5,000.

As between A and C, C takes the money, for the reason that C had not notice of A's prior but unrecorded mortgage.

It may be said that C stands behind B and that therefore B's claim should precede C's. Why so?

If the mortgage of C did not exist, B would not take the $5,000. Now, since C's mortgage is in esse does it make or operate a right in B to the money? If so, then B gets the money by virtue of C's mortgage, who, as between B and C, stands behind B, and this would be simply absurd, and is not demonstrable. C, there

fore, must have the $5,000.

If the proceeds of the sale were $10,000, as mentioned by "Midsummer," the remaining $5,000 must go to B, as heretofore stated by me, and as sufficiently shown by Mr. Sol. Kohn, at page 238 of this volume.

Never mind the adjudication of courts in other cases. We have examined the reasons upon which the answer to the question hinges.

C takes the first $5,000; B takes the remaining $5,000; A is "out in the cold" with his first mortgage unsatisfied, on the same footing, in this respect, as your correspondents, without compensation for their services in thinking out "Midsummer's" problem. Yours again,

EGBERT WHITAKER.

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I read with much interest the account in your issue of September 18, of an incident mentioned in the London Law Times that occurred in the Bristol County Court where one of the counsellors objected to proceeding with the trial of the case because the judge was father to the opposing counsel, because of the interest I felt in the subject-matter, which has been greatly increased by the conduct of a trial justice in this State. Our statute provides that the town councils of the several towns shall elect a trial justice from the qualified justices of the peace, his court being designated the justice court of that town, which has exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases in which the amount claimed does not exceed one hundred dollars, excepting actions commenced by attaching real estate and certain cases where the title to real estate or some easement therein is the subject-matter in dispute. The town council of the town to which I refer elected one of its members trial justice, and also elected him constable.

This same trial justice issues writs under his official hand and seal, serves them as constable by attaching the defendant's personal property or otherwise, as the case may be, renders judgment in the same case, charges fees both as officer and court, issues executions and by virtue of them sells the property originally attached or levies upon other property. In fact, performs all the functions both of officer and trial justice of the same court.

In one particular case the trial justice served the writ in which case his brother was the plaintiff, and rendered judgment for plaintiff for the amount claimed and costs, notwithstanding the defendant appeared by counsel and by proper pleas objected to the proceeding.

In another (criminal) case, the trial justice issues his warrant against the boy over whom he is guardian, alleging the offense of larceny; arrests his ward; finds him guilty; sentences him to the State reform school for two years, and to pay all costs of prosecution, which costs all go to the guardian as court and officer, and which bill it is reasonable to presume will be presented in the guardian's next account to the Court of Probate for allowance.

Quere, Is there any law outside the statute which prohibits a judge from officiating as officer of and in his own court, or which prohibits a judge from sitting in a case in which he may have an interest except an immediate pecuniary interest? LAWYER.

PROVIDENCE, R. I., Sept. 20, 1880.

LOOSE LEGISLATION.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Permit me to call your attention, and that of the profession and public generally, to some examples of loose legislation by the Legislature of 1880.

Without referring to chapter 480, to which attention has already been directed in your columns, the provisions of chapters 416, 423, 437 and 517 may be pointed to.

Chapter 416 amends sections 197 and 198 of title 3, ch. 3, part 4 of the Revised Statutes. By chapter 460 of Laws 1847, title three chapter 3 of part 4 of the Revised Statutes was repealed from January 1, 1848, and

chapter 460, Laws 1847, was substituted and directed to be published as chapter third of part fourth. Said chapter 460 is divided into titles, subdivided into articles, and the sections numbered. In such chapter sections 155, 156 are the ones no doubt intended to be amended by chapter 416, Laws 1880. After 1847 various laws were passed bearing upon the subject-matter of chapter 3, part 4, of tho Revised Statutes, both amending and changing the same; but not all laws passed were made amendments; nor has there been any change made by such laws in the numbering of the sections of the Revised Statutes. In the fifth edition of the Revised Statutes the compilers inserted such changes and assumed to renumber the sections of chapter 3, part 4, and in such editions the sections in question are numbered 178 and 179. But the change is that of the compilers and not of the Legislature. Under these circumstances can the Laws of 1880 be of any effect, there being no sections 197 and 198 of the Revised Statutes proper?

So chapter 517, Laws 1880, amends section 20, title 14, chapter 9 of part 1 of the Revised Statutes. There is no such title. But the compilers of the fifth edition inserted as title 14, chap. 150, of the Laws of 1837, of which chapter section 18 is probably the one sought to be amended.

Chapter 423, Laws 1880, amends section 23 of title 2, chap. 5, part 2 of the Revised Statutes. By chap. 245, Laws 1880, the whole of title 2, chap. 5 of part 2 is repealed from September 1, 1880.

Chapter 437 of Laws 1880 amends section 16 of article 3, chapter 6 of part 1 of the Revised Statutes. The law probably intended to amend section 16 of article 3 of title III of chapter 6. The chapter is divided into eight titles, in four of which there is an article III. Though the subjects may not be of great importance the carelessness of the Legislature is, and suggests that perhaps it may be well in the future for some committee of the bar to examine bills introduced, and where there are errors like the ones noted above, have them rectified. Very truly yours, NEW YORK, Sept. 1, 1880. LAWYER.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

XIX AMERICAN DECISIONS.

HIS volume contains cases from 2 Stewart; 1, 2, 3, J. J. Marshall; 8 Martin N. S.; 6 Greenleaf; 1, 2, Gill & Johnson; 7, 8, 9 Pickering; 6 Halsted; 1 Paige; 1, 2 Wendell; 4 Ohio; 2 Rawle; 1 Rhode Island; 1 Bailey; 2 Vermont; 1 Leigh; with important notes on who are officers de facto; judgment at law based on false return of process; power of equity to perfect or enforce defective execution or acknowledgment of instrument by married woman; quantum meruit under special contract; special deposit in bank; arrest; power of equity to relieve against judgment at law; crops on execution sale of land.

VI BRADWELL'S REPORTS.

Reports of the Decisions of the appellate courts of the State of Illinois. By James B. Bradwell. Volume VI. Containing all the remaining opinions of the first, second, third and fourth districts, up to August 12, 1880. Chicago: Chicago Legal News Company, 1880. Pp. 698.

Wo have noted the following cases in this volume as of special interest: Morrison v. Jones, p. 89. —On liability to pay for services by accepting them without express contract. Combs v. Bradshaw, p. 115. - Parol evidence is admissible to show that the consideration for an indorsement on a note, that the interest should be at the rate of ten per cent until paid, was an exten

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