enough that the progrefs of defpotifm is checked, the very principles on which it is built muft be rooted out of the land, and all who have espoused them must be removed from all offices of honour, truft and profit in the ftate; or the noble efforts to restore this nation to its ancient state of freedom and public virtue, will fail of their full effect, and the favourite may return amongst us, and renew his pernicious influence with double force. Now therefore is the time to furround the -with the petitions, folicitations and remonftrances of an aggrieved people, and ftrenuously to urge an impartial enquiry into the conduct of all perfons, however dignified or diftinguished, who have had a hand in promoting the confumptive condition of the ftate, either by making a dishonourable, difadvantageous, and expenfive peace, by harraffing and vexing the fubject, by laying clogs and restraints on commerce, or by waiting and mifapplying the public revenue. If there be any fenfe of honour, any regard for the welfare of our country left amongst us, furely every county, every corporate town in England will follow the example of the freeholders of Middlesex, and of the livery of London, till the truth, and the whole truth, fhall force its way, in fpite of all oppofition, to the ear of our moft beloved f -. and then there can be no doubt, but a my will be formed, compofed of men of integrity and abilities, who will promote the true intereft of their f— by engaging him rather to place a confidence in the good difpofitions of his people, by enlarging their rights and privileges than to violate or abridge them, and thereby fhew a mistrust of their loyalty and affection. The point fteadily pursued of obtaining a redrefs of grievances, is the only way to prevent the return of an infulting minion, who will not dare to fet his foot in this kingdom, while the fons of freedom persist in their public fpirited measures. But if through fupineness, or any worfe impediment, the public caufe of the people is relinquifhed, and the example already fet is not generally followed, the prefent a- -n muft finally gain the victory, and then the D- of G will fend for his mafter home, who will exercise fresh vengeance, fuitable to the implacability of his temper, on all his enemies, and in that cafe, it is to be. feared all future attempts to recover the expiring liberty of this renowned empire, will prove abortive.

Nunc aut nunquam, is the proper motto of the times: fo fay July 18th, 1769. HARMODIUS and ARISTOGITON.

3

For the POLITICAL REGISTER.

An Analysis of the British Conftitution, in its genuine purity; from which is deduced the policy and expediency of adopting conciliatory measures with respect to our American Colonies.

TH

HE effects of the unhappy difputes, which at firft were foolishly raised, and have fince been as wifely continued, between us and our American brethren, are become of fo alarming a nature, as to merit the most serious attention. These effects are now paft being forefeen; they are actually felt, and, if not foon removed, will be felt in a much more fenfible manner by every landed gentleman in this kingdom.

I have no connection with America by trade, but fhould rejoice to see some attention paid to the revival of our mutual commerce, upon which most certainly the prosperity, and probably the very being, of this kingdom depends.

This can never be effected to any good purpose, without a reftoration of that mutual harmony between us and our American colonies, which had fubfifted without interruption from their firft eftablishment, until it was lately kicked out of doors by the bold rafhness of fome men, who laid claim to more wisdom than they were entitled to; and who profefled a mighty zeal for a conftitution, which, they either never understood, or never intended to fupport.

About thirty years ago, I was very happy in an acquaintance with a gentleman of a moft amiable temper. He often declared he was never drawn into a quarrel in his life, and was perfuaded no reasonable men could quarrel, if they had patience to underftand each other.

I fhould be glad to fee this experiment tried between us and our American brethren. The difpute has been hitherto unadvisedly managed with more warmth than prudence, until, at laft, the argument feems to be engaged on one fide, and the abuse on the other. Let us have patience to underftand each other, and then it will be no difficult matter to difcover on which fide the miftake lies.

Both fides appeal to the conftitution of Great Britain. It may, at firft fight, appear unaccountable that men fhould agree in the principle upon which they argue, and yet differ fo widely in their conclufions. This difficulty will foon vanish, when we reflect that nothing is more common than for men to agree in the words they make ufe of, when the ideas they annex to them are as oppofite as light to darknefs.

Therefore, before we can poffibly come to a good understanding, it is abfolutely neceffary to fettle, what we mean

by

by the conflitution of Great Britain. One would think this was no very difficult thing to do. We are always talking of our conftitution, we feem very fond of it; and make no fcruple of boafting that it is the beft civil conftitution of gevernment in the world; and yet I fear we too often amufe ourselves with the agreeable found of the words, without any determinate ideas annexed to them.

As my view is to recover the happiness of these once profperous kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, I hope to be allowed to speak fredly upon the fubject; and fhall endeavour to exprefs my fentiments with a decency, that can give no reasonable caufe of offence to any man. In order to be the better understood, I must beg the reader's indulgence in going a little way back to trace our conftitution from its firft fource, the law of nature.

Every man, in the ftate of nature, had an undoubted right to his property, that is, his life, liberty, and eftate. But, as mankind increafed, fraud and violence increased too. In time the poffeffion of this right was rendered very precarious; as the head of one of thefe little communities confined within the bounds of one family, had no power of defence against the encroachment and violence of unreafonable men, except his own perfonal ftrength, and that of his children and fervants, which too often was proved by experience to be infufficient; therefore, mankind very foon found it necefiary to enter into larger focieties, to unite their mutual ftrength in defence of their properties against the hoftile attempts of their neighbours, and to appoint fome perfon to lead and direct their united force.

To preferve peace and quiet at home, it was alfo neceffary to establish fome kind of civil government among themfelves, and to appoint a common judge to determine equitably and impartially any difputes that might arife about property between the members of the fociety. This power was generally intrufted by the community to the man, who was chofen by them to command their united force for the public defence.

The fettling thefe difputes at first was no very difficul bufinefs to a man of fenfe and probity. But, in procefs of time, as focieties increafed in number, the difputes about property became fo numerous and complicated, that it was found neceffary to eftablifh legiflators, with this truft, that they should enact fuch public ftanding laws for regulating the claims to property, as fhould appear moft equitable, and conducive to the peace and good order of the community; and which fhould fecure the juft rights of every member thereof, fo far as human prudence could poffibly contrive.

L

The

The legislature is the fupreme power in every commonwealth whatfoever. The conftitution, or, in other words, the form of government in every country depends upon the legislative authority; and therefore the refpective forms of government are diftinguifhed from each other, by a denomination founded upon the inveftiture of that truft.

In the infancy of legiflature, while the law of nature and reason, which was the foundation of it, was imprefled upon the minds of legiflators and the people, very few laws were neceffary to regulate internal difputes. Therefore the legislative authority was alfo generally intrufted with the perfon, whom the fociety had chofen to go in and out before them, to lead and direct the united force of the whole community in defence of their rights and properties against rapine and violence. Thus the legislative and executive authority came to be invested in one and the fame man.

But it too soon appeared that their leaders or kings were fubject to like paffions with other men; and, that those they had intrusted to defend their property against others, invaded it themselves. Here the private members of the community found themselves in a worfe condition than they were before their union. The very person they had placed their confidence in, became a rebel, and was fupported in his tyranny by the very power they had intrufted him with for their own

defence.

This, as might reafonably be expected, generally ended in anarchy, confufion and bloodfhed. When the people prevailed, the legislative authority was intrufted by them to fuch other hands, as they then judged might beft answer the end for which they entered into feciety, that is, the security of their properties. They tried Ariftocracy; they tried Democracy; but with no better fuccefs. The fame inconvenience and mifchief followed from both, at leaft to one part of the fociety. The lords, when uppermoft, oppreft the commons; and the commons, in their turn, oppreft the lords; as the abfolute monarch before had oppreft both.

In order to avoid thefe evils as much as poffible, the British conftitution was wifely formed upon a combination of all three. The legislature confifts of three eftates, which were instituted as checks upon each other, in order to fecure our liberties and properties againft all. Every new law proposed, is feparately confidered by the lords, and commons, and feparately agreed to by them in their respective places of affembly, before it can be enacted into a law. But even then it is no law, until the king has given his affent to it. This prerogative of the crown is fo peculiarly personal,

that

that the king executes it himself in his own perfon. This is not the cafe in the execution of other branches of the prerogative, which are subject to certain forms, to be executed by fpecial officers appointed for that purpose, who lie open to an impeachment for any unconftitutional or prejudicial act they advise, or concur in. To plead the king's command, is no juftification. It was their duty to have better advised him. By this regulation, it was expected that wisdom and a true public fpirit in any one of the estates, would effectually fecure us against the danger of oppreffion by bad laws.

If the queftion should here be put, What is all this for? This is no more than we knew before. I answer, I allow the reafon for the objection, but not the force of the objection itself. We know a great many things, which the thoughtless diffipation of the prefent age prevents our attention to the confequences of. For this reafon we find many conftitutional maxims univerfally allowed in theory, which are seldom to be met with in practice. We often fee it full as neceflary (and more useful) to be reminded of what we do know, as to be informed of what we do not know.

Now, let us here reflect upon the confequences, which naturally follow from the above univerfally allowed premises, which, to the misfortune of these kingdoms, have been much oftener agreed to, than regarded.

Firft, The boafted excellence of the British conftitution; that no members of the community are fubject to any laws but what they have given their affent to by themselves perfonally, or by their reprefentatives chofen by them for that purpose.

Secondly, That the independence of the three eftates of the legislature upon each other, is neceffary to preserve our conftitution inviolate. Otherwife, the civil balance, upon which our fafety depends, will be loft. For, if it fhould ever happen, that one of the eftates fhall become fubordinate to, or dependent upon the other two, we shall have but two eftates in the legislature inftead of three. If two of the eftates shall ever be brought in fubjection to, or dependence upon the third, we fhall have but one left; and, of course, muft fall, as the opportunity may serve, into an abfolute monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy; the very three evils our conftitution was intended to avoid. pendence, is no independence at all. eftates fhall ever come under fubjection to a ministry, we fhall lofe king, lords and commons, and fall into a new kind of government without a name; but which will approach very near to the curfe upon Canaan, the fon of Ham,-A fervant of fervants fhall he be.

L 2

A nominal indeBut, if the three

If