The power of levying money never was, nor ever can, in a free government, be with fafety placed in the hands of the fupreme executive, unless mankind, in general, had fewer paffions and more wisdom than by experience appears to have fallen to their fhare. As the fupreme executive has neceffarily at his command the united force of the whole community, for the purpofes of peace and order at home, and defence against foreign enemies; if the power of raising money alfo, was put into the fame hands, I fhould be glad to know what can fecure that community, under a bold minilter, against the fevere fcourge of defpotifm. That favorite inftrument for this purpose, a ftanding army, would be. in his own power to keep, or not, as he might fee occafion.

This mifchief has been moft wifely provided against by that mixed legiflature, of which the happy conftitution of Great Britain is compofed. But, (if I may be allowed to repeat what has before been taken notice of) the continuance of this bleffing depends upon preferving the due balance of the three eftates; which cannot be done, without preferving entire and untouched the refpective privileges of each.

The great, perhaps only, privilege the commons have to fupport. their independence, is (as I obferved) the power of raifing money, when they find it neceffary, or ufeful. If this should once be gone, all muft go with it, and a diffolution of the government enfue. For this reafon it is, that the house of commons have always guarded this privilege with fo jealous and judicious a watchfulness as never to fuffer the house of lords to add even an amendment to a money-bill. And we are encouraged by experience to truft with confidence in both houfes of parliament, that they will never fuffer fuch a power to invest in the crown, which would be equally dangerous to both, as it must in time render the crown entirely independent on both.

This is a cafe, which moft properly falls under their cognizance, and therefore, Sir, we will, with all humility, leave it to their enquiry, wisdom and care. And there may it reft in peace, and fecurity that all will be done that may appear neceffary, or expedient for the prefervation of our excellent conftitution.

I will conclude with mentioning fome facts, which I suspect have been unattended to, or mistaken; and from that mistake, perhaps this blunder of the miniftry has happened.

On the twelfth of September 1663, the affembly of the island of Barbadoes granted a duty of four and a half per cent. in fpecie on all dead commodities, of the growth or produce of the faid ifland, exported from the fame; and granted it for the support of the government in the island, and for building and repairing forts, &c. neceffary for the defence of the island.

In the year 1664, the several islands of Nevis, Montferrat, and St. Chriftophers did the fame.

And the affembly of the Ifland of Antigua on the 19th of May 1668, granted it alfo in that ifland. And these are the only iflands which have ever yet been fubject to it.

It is very clear that thus far there was no claim of a prerogative of the crown in the cafe. All was done by acts of their own af- ̈ femblies, the reprefentatives of the commons there.

The reader must have taken notice that thefe duties were granted in Charles the fecond's reign. And it is very remarkable that, though the island of Jamaica (which was a conquered island) stood out, and would not confent to this duty there, yet the ministry of thofe times had more wisdom than to claim a power to do it for them, by virtue of the prerogative royal. The fatal confequences of fuch a measure was not yet out of their memory. Therefore that ifland has been exempt from it to this day.

It must be acknowledged, that the miniftry of a future reign, had a view of this kind, with respect to Jamaica, about the year 1717. But, whilft it was under confideration, the attorney-genral (who was afterwards lord Lechmere) was confulted upon the cafe; and gave it as his opinion, that any perfon who should advife his majesty to fuch a measure, would be guilty of high treafon. The confequence was, the miniftry wifely dropt, what they had weakly defigned. This opinion, if I am not misinformed, is now in being in Mr. Lechmere's hand-writing.

With regard to the capitulations of those which were conquered islands, all I have to fay, is, the capitulations agreed to, could bind the respective contractors no longer than during the interregnum (if I may fo call it) of the capitulation. When they were annexed to the British crown, they became intitled to the privileges of a British government.- But when Tobago was conquered, or by what general or admiral, or what the capitulation was, or in what gazette it was published, are now fo intirely out of my memory, that I muft leave thofe circumftances to be more particularly enquired into by my fuperiors.

HAMPDEN.

This letter was first published on Saturday the 2d February 1765. And on Monday the 11th of the fame month, a motion was made by Mr. Dempfter in the houfe of commons; upon which, the house agreed, nemine contradicente, to the following refolution:

"Refolved,

That an humble addrefs be prefented to his majefty, that he, will be graciously pleafed to give directions that there be laid before this houfe, copies of all inftructions under the great feal, autho-, rifing the levying a duty of four and an half per cent, or any other duty whatsoever, upon certain commodities in the islands and provinces ceded to Great Britain by the laft peace, together with copies of all reprefentations from the commiffioners of the cuftoms, memorials from the treafury, and orders of council relating thereto."

Pursuant to this addrefs the feveral copies were prefented to the houfe on Monday the 18th, and Tuefday the 19th of the fame month (the titles of which may be seen in the printed votes) and were ordered to lie upon the table to be perufed by the members of the houfe.

66

Philo Britanniæ! anfwer me ingenuously. Is not this (what you called for)" Coming to fair argument"? What is now your opinion of the eighth article of the livery of London's complaint?- If, as you defire, Victory fhall declare on the fide of truth, juftice, and Public Good," On which fide do you believe the will declare? On the fide of the ministry, or, on the fide of the petitioners?

Notwithstanding what is here undeniably proved, it is very probable, the miniftry's faithful echoes will continue repeating,

The petition of the Livery of London is ridiculous, and the complaint ill-founded.”. -If so, we must be content to let them take their own way, and fay they know not what, and they know not why. Such barefaced falfhoods cannot impofe upon any man, who is not willing to be deceived Qui vult decipi decipi

atur.

After returning my thanks to Philo Britanniæ for this favourable opportunity of reviving our attention to fo interefting a fact, which, by this time, may poffibly have flipt the memory of fome of our worthy reprefentatives in parliament, I must leave him to enjoy the triumph for his victory over his own fagacity. HAMPDEN.

P. S. The legality of this impofition of four and an half per cent, was contefted with the crown in the Ifland of St. Vincent, by Mr. Otley a planter; and the iffue was tried there. The jury delivered in a special verdict, which was argued before the judges of the courts of law, who gave judgment in favour of Mr. Otley. An appeal from the courts of law, was then brought before the governor and council of the island. The governor and council, after a full hearing, confirmed the judgment of the courts of law. This laft determination was about July 1768. Upon this, an appeal was brought before the king in council here. The cafe, as I am informed, now ftands referred to council learned in the law for their opinion, and there it refts*. During this neceffary fufpenfion of juftice, the duties continue to be levied by authority of the letters patent. How long we are to proceed in this illegal method of levying money by pretence of prerogative, we hope will not be left to the difcretion of a miniftry, who feem fo fond of the novelty. We rather hope, it will not be fuffered to escape the serious attention of our worthy representatives in parliament, at their next meeting.

We hear that Mr. Otley is juft arrived in England, in order to pursue this business, which will foon come to a hearing at the Cockpit.

SIR,

To the Printer of the Political Regifier.

BY inferting in your ufeful work, the following political maxms you will oblige an old correfpondent, and perhaps render ian effential service to your countrymen who seem to have imbibed VOL. V.

Cc

very

1

very vague and indeterminate ideas on the fubjects of government and public liberty, in this kingdom, the former they feem generally todefine to be tyranny and oppreffion; and the latter unbounded licentioufnefs. Right notions therefore of each may serve to regulate our judgments and cool our paffions.

Cambridge, September 7th, 1769.

IN

Political Maxims.

QUIETAS.

N all monarchical governments it is abfolutely neceffary, for the common good to 'preferve a right understanding between the King and the people.

It is therefore neceffary that in all fuch governments, whatever mifmanagements may happen, no blame or wrong be imputed to the King.

And it is as neceffary to take care that no wrong be done to the people-for which reafon when any wrong is done, the people ought to have a legal remedy for redrefs thereof.

The King and the people are like the head and the body, and muft mutually depend on each other.The people on the Prince for protection, equity, found policy and clemency. The prince on the people for affection, obedience and fupport: it is therefore the true intereft of the King to govern in fuch a manner as is confiftent with reason, and with the rights and privileges of the people.

And to that end, as well as to prevent mistakes, it is requifite that the prerogatives of the King, and the rights of the people be full afcertained and declared. After fuch declaration it is equally neceffary for the common fafety, that both be fecured and confirmed by the moft folemn compact between the prince and the people.

This once done, and interwoven into the frame and conftitution of the government as it is in Great Britain, the smallest infringements of either, fhould be narrowly watched by the prince on the one hand, and by the people on the other-but when open violations tending to fubvert this original compact on either fide are manifeft, it then becomes abfolutely neceffary for condign punishment to take place, in order to restore that peace and harmo. ny between the prince and the people, which, a just distribution of power to each, agreeable to the original compact, can alone fecure.

If the people are the aggreffors, the King will eafily find his remedy in his common courts of law, and it will hardly be poffible for the people to bribe the King's judges or other officers of juftice in their favour, or to avoid the heavy fentences which they will generally pronounce in favour of the King, by whom they are appointed.

But if the rights of the people are notoriously invaded, as by . our first maxim we have agreed, that is neceffary, no wrong fhould be imputed to the King-it is no lefs neceffary that his fervants whom he employs in the executive duties of his office, fhould be anfwerable to the people for every mifdemeanour, as

well

well as for high crimes and treafons. It is therefore an indif. penfable obligation on the part of the prince, both for the sake of thofe on whom he thinks proper to confer his beft favours, by putting them in places of the highest truft and confidence; and out of regard to his people, whom he ought to wish better em ployed than in finding fault with his government, to take efpecial care whom he fixes on for his great officers of state, and if he unhappily makes a bad choice, it is necessary he should convince the people that he is not directly nor indirectly concerned in any oppreffions or wrongs they may be guilty of, by difcarding them on the first well-founded complaint against them, and by ufing every means which his fuperior station affords him to bring them to condign punishment, in juftice not only to an injured people, but in mercy to himself. That the wholesome feverity of the law being exercised on one set of offenders, no future combinations of ambitious, or debauched, or venal scoundrels, may prefume to feize on the cabinet in virtue of family intereft, p-y connections, or which is worfe, female favouritifm, and

the King and his people in the ignoble fetters of defpotifm. The conftitution of Great Britain has happily lodged in the representatives of the people a power of impeaching and profecuting corrupt minifters, but this power is not likely ever to be exerted, as in former times, if guilty minifters should happen to be fecured by the prince, from a fecret approbation of their measures. For the circumftances of Great Britain are changed, fhe is involved in a heavy debt, she has increased her territories, and ' with them, the dependants on the miniftry, we will not say on the crown, because our kings have voluntarily parted with their best prerogative: the appointment of all inferior officers, under the great officeers of ftate, from an idle apprehenfion that government cannot be carried on unless the King's head fervants have the difpofal of all employments in the ftate, whether ecclefiaftical, civil or military: Thus the ftaff is given out of the. King's hand, and let the minifters act as they please, they will always think themselves infured from punishment, as the reprefen tatives of the people with whom the power of impeachment is lodged, may be brought over, the majority if not the whole, to the interefts of the miniftry, by the application of well-timed douceurs.

Whenever this is the cafe, there are but two more remedies at hand for the redrefs of the complaints of the people warranted by the original compact between the prince and the peopleand thofe are petitions, and remonftrances to the King. The firft has been most in use, and stands in the rank of the most humble attempt that can be made to open the eyes of a deluded prince, and it is remarkable in history, that the people have feldom or ever mortified the prince fo much as to carry their complaints against his ruling fervants directly to the throne, till they had found means to render ineffectual the more regular method of impeachment, by fuch a lavish diftribution of their favours among the reprefentatives of the people, as made it ridiculous to think of profecuting