particular statute arises. The purpose of such laws is to grant the right to lien to every person who performs any work or service, or furnishes any material of value in furtherance of the contract, and to create a preference or priority in property constructed, improved, altered, repaired or ornamented by the service, labor or material furnished or performed by those entitled to lien, thus affording the furnisher or performer a needed protection. The doctrine upon which such liens are founded is the consideration of natural justice, that the party who has enhanced the value of property by incorporating therein his labor or material, shall have a preferred claim, in a certain sense on such prop 2. The lien given by statute is no part of the contract. Without the statute creating the lien, the debtor was bound to pay the creditor the same as he would be with the lien. He had before this the common-law remedies to enforce the collection of his debt. The statute giving him a lien does not take away any remedy under the common law, but adds another, by fixing a lien upon the premises in case he sees fit to enforce it. This lien does not grow out of the contract, but depends entirely upon the statute for its existence. It derives its validity from positive enactment of the Legislature, and is liable always to be modified, altered, or repealed by the same power that created it. If it is true, one may contract to furnish the materials in view of the law as it exists at the time, but he furnishes the same, nevertheless, with notice that the law is subject to the will and control of the Legislature. The lien is but a means for enforcing the payment of the debt arising from the performance of the contract,-a remedy given by law, which remedy, not being of the essence of the contract, is entirely within the control of the law-making power by whose authority it was given life. The right to a particular remedy is not a vested right. Hanes & Co. v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 181, 41 N. W. 222. 3. Frohlich v. Klein, 160 Mich. 147, 125 N. W. 14; Scales v. Griffin, 2 Doug. 54 (58); Smalley v. Gearing, 121 Mich. 190 (198, 203), 79 N. 1114, 80 N. W. 797. It is the use of the materials furnished and labor expended by the contractor, whereby the building becomes a part of the freehold that gives the material man or laborer his lien under the statute. The object is not only to encourage building, but to afford the contractor, material man, or laborer security upon and against the property of the owner materially increased in value by the materials and labor wrought into it, and so rests upon the strongest equitable basis, for the building becomes a part of the realty, and it is the principal matter, to which the lien on the realty seems to be an incident, and without which the lien on the building would be fruitless or of little value. Goodman v. Baerlocher, 88 Wis. 287 (292), 60 N. W. 415. 43 Am. St. Rep. 893 (quoting Van Stone v. Stillwell, etc., Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128, (136), 12 S. Ct. 181, 35 L. Ed. 961); 27 Cyc. 17. erty for the value of such labor or material. Such laws have a salutary effect in encouraging building and in protecting those furnishing labor and material, and at the same time affording the safe extension of credit to those erecting new structures or improving or enhancing the value of existing structures or premises. They rest on broad grounds of natural equity and commercial necessity." The effect of the lien law, where it is applicable, is to create a species of statute mortgage, whether the contract is written or unwritten, even though the land-holder may not have intended in point of fact to charge his estate. § 2. Historical Review of the Michigan Law. The first mechanics' lien law of Michigan was adopted by the Legislative Council of the territory of Michigan and approved March 31, 1827. It consisted of but one section the provisions of which were applicable only "within the city of Detroit or county of Brown," in the Territory, but by a later act of the same Council, approved October 29, 1829, the provisions of the law were extended to the several counties of the Territory. On April 23, 1833, this act was repealed and a new act applying to the entire territory and consisting of three sections was approved. In 1838, when 8 4. The statute was intended to protect subcontractors, material men, and laborers, and its benefits should not be frittered away by construction, unless clearly unconstitutional. It does not impair the obligations of contracts, but provides a method for securing payment to those whose labor or material goes into the building, and at the same time protects the owner and contractor, if the provisions of the act are complied with. The doctrine upon which such liens are founded is the consideration of natural justice that the party who has enhanced the value of property by incorporating therein his labor or materials shall the first Revised Statutes of the state appeared, the act of 1833 was repealed1o and an act comprising thirty-five sections was adopted;" sections one and four of this act were amended in 1840 by Act 35, but the act as amended was repealed on May 18, 184612 and a new statute of thirtyfour sections was enacted.18 This statute with a few amendments" stood until 1879, when it was superseded by Act 258 of 187915 amending sections 1 to 6 inclusive, and 10 to 24 inclusive, and repealing sections 7 to 9 and 25 to 34 and also repealing Act 182 of the Laws of 1871, composed of eight sections.16 The act of 1879 was amended in section 6 by Act 102 of 1885 and again in sections 1 to 5 by Act 216 of 1885, but was, with all amendatory acts, repealed by Act 270 of 1887, which was a revision of the lien law of the state in fourteen sections. Section 1 of the act of 1887 was amended in Act 277 of 1889 in some unimportant details, and the act as then amended appeared in III Howell's Annotated Statutes (1883-1889) as Sections 8398a to 8398n. As the new matter incorporated in the statute of 1887 constituted "a gross perversion of all the essential rights of property," it was declared to be unconstitutional,1 thus leaving the lien law of the state "where it was before the law (act) of 1887 was passed." In 1891, the acts of 1879 and 1887 were repealed, the entire statute being revised and re-enacted in thirty-one sections.18 This statute, as 10. Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 693. 11. Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 537. 12. Rev. Stat. 1846, p. 727. 13. Rev. Stat. 1846, Chap. 126, p. 554; C. L. 1857 (5068)-(5101). See C. L. 1871, (6789-6822). 14. §§1-6 and 13 amended by Act 127 of the laws of 1869; §6 being again amended by Act 184 of 1873; and §2 being again amended by Act 151 of the Public Acts of 1877. 15. How. Ann. Stat. (1882), §§8377-8398. 17 16. An act to provide for the better security of mechanics and other persons furnishing labor or materials for the erection, altering, repairing, beautifying or ornamenting of buildings in the State of Michigan. 17. Spry Lumber Co. v. The Sault Savings Bank & Loan Trust Co., 77 Mich. 199 (202), 43 N W. 778. 18. Act 179 of 1891. amended from time to time,19 constitutes the present mechanics' lien law of our state. §3. Constitutionality of the Michigan Lien Statute. 21 The Michigan statute deals with the remedy only. It does not enlarge or restrict the contract rights of the parties, and is not open to the objections: that it impairs the obligation of contracts,20 that it invades or destroys vested property rights, or that it is class legislation.22 Act 394 of the Public Acts of 1913, amending section 10 of the statute, has been sustained against the objections that its object was not expressed in its title, 23 that its purpose was double, and that it was in violation of section 3 of Article II of the State Constitution insuring the right of trial by jury, etc.24 The Lien Law of 1887 was declared to be invalid25 while Act 216 of 1885 and the present law of 1891 have each been held to answer the constitutional tests.20 § 4. Principles and Rules Surrounding the Construction of the Michigan Lien Statute. The Michigan statute contains a declaration that it is intended to be remedial and to be construed liberally to se 19. Sections 1, 6 and 9 as amended by Act 199 of 1893; sections 1, 2, 7, 9, 12 and 27 as amended by Act 143 of 1897, C. L. 1915, (14796-14826); the title and sections 1 and 29 as amended by Act 17 of 1903; section 1 as amended by Act 121 of 1909, C. L. 1915 (14796) and section 10 as amended by Act 394 of 1913, C. L. 1915 (14796-14825) How. 2nd Ed. §§13766-13796, C. L. 1897 (10710-10739). 20. Smalley V. Gearing, 121 Mich. 193-198, 79 N. W. 1114, 80 N. W. 797. cure the beneficial results, intents and purposes thereof; it also provides that substantial compliance with its provisions shall be sufficient for the validity of the lien or liens provided for and to give jurisdiction to the courts to enforce them." The statute was intended to protect subcontractors, material men and laborers, and its benefits should not be frittered away by construction.28 Notwithstanding this provision and declaration, the Michigan Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly held that, as mechanics' liens are in derogation of common law and purely statutory, the law must be rigidly followed in all proceedings preceding or antedating the attaching of the lien, and that the statute and all proceedings to comply therewith and to acquire liens thereunder are to be subjected to a strict construction.29 In 135, 48 N. W. 869; Barnard v. McLeod, 114 Mich. 73, 72 N. W. 24; Smalley v. Gearing, 121 Mich. 193-198, 79 N. W. 1114, 80 N. W. 797. Upon the validity of Mechanics' Lien laws in general, see: Notes 4 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 620-622; 11 Id. 714-716; 20 L. R. A. 565; 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868, 36 Id. 574; Jones on Liens, 3rd Ed. §§1235, 1616a; Rockel on Mechanics' Liens, §4; Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, 8822-33; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 3rd Ed. $$26-34. 27. Section 27 of Act 179 ot 1891 as amended by Act 143 of 1897; C. L. 1915 (14822); How. 2nd Ed. §13792; C. L. 1897 (10736); Smalley v. Gearing, 121 Mich. 203, 79 N. W. 1114, 80 N. W. 797. Although mechanics' liens are the creation of statute, the legislation being remedial should be so construed as to effectuate its object. Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S. 545, 24 L. Ed. 283; Mining Co. v. Cullins, 104 U. S. 176, 26 L. Ed. 704. Substantial compliance, in good faith, with the requirements 29. Wildey v. Gillett, 171 Mich. 163 (158), 136 N. W. 1116; Smalley v. Northwestern TerraCotta Co., 113 Mich. 141 (148), 71 N. W. 466; Sheridan v. Cameron, 65 Mich. 680 (683), 32 N. W. 894; Lacy v. Piatt Power & Heat Co., 157 Mich. 544, 122 N. W. 112; Hall v. Erkfitz, 125 Mich. 335, 84 N. W. 310; Keister v. Donovan, 173 Mich. 328, 139 N. W. 74; Burman v. Ewald, 192 Mich. 293, 158 N. W. 853, 23 D. L. N. 449; Sterner v. Haas, 108 Mich. 488, 66 N. W. 348; it does not follow because a debtor is subject to judgment and execution that his property is subject to lien and a debtor's rights require the creditor to comply with the statute. Bat |