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is worth in excess of $1,500.27 We cannot, however, regard the law upon this subject as settled, as the case stating the latter proposition was based upon prior cases28 which arose and were determined in the application of the provisions of the statute relating to estates by entireties rather than to cases of estates in homesteads; it may be fair to assume that the later case (Holland Furnace Co. v. Hartig) has the effect to overrule the earlier cases cited, and that the true rule when declared will be that no lien will attach to a homestead interest in real property even though it be worth more than $1,500 unless the statute is complied with and the contract is signed by or on behalf of both the husband and wife.

§ 15.

What Constitutes a Homestead.

Present intention of occupancy as a homestead, with present action to carry the intention into effect, constitutes a homestead in law. 20 A homestead can be claimed in premises used partly for business purposes and partly as a dwelling, if the owner has no other home at the time.30 Where the parties purchased the premises for a homestead before

27. Holland Furnace Co. V. Hartig, 181 Mich. 342 (346-347), 148 N. W. 169. In this case complainant installed a furnace in the homestead of defendants, the title to which was in the husband alone, under a contract signed by the wife only, she having no authority and not acting as her husband's agent, in signing the same, and he at no time recognizing the written agreement; it was held that no enforceable lien was acquired against the property, although it was worth in excess of the homestead exemption.

28. McMillin v. Schneider, 147 Mich. 258, 109 N. W. 661; Bauer v. Long, 147 Mich. 351, 110 N. W. 1059.

29. Mills v. Hobbs, 76 Mich. 122 (125-126), 42 N. W. 1084. In this

case a vacant and unimproved lot was purchased in March, 1887, by a woman with the intention of eventually occupying it as a homestead with her husband. A year later she caused some shade trees to be planted along the front of the lot, and about five months thereafter she made a verbal contract for the erection of the house. At the time neither she nor her husband had any other homestead. It was held that, under these circumstances, the premises constituted a homestead.

30. Lamont v. LeFevre, 96 Mich., 175 (178), 55 N. W. 687; Deville v. Widoe, 64 Mich. 593 (594-595), 32 N. W. 894; King v. Welborn, 83 Mich. 195 (197), 47 N. W. 106.

contracting for a building thereon, and later moved into a part of the building with the intention of making it their home, they thereby acquired a homestead. A homestead exemption may be claimed in land purchased as a homestead for the parties and moved onto by them with the design of making it their home.3

§ 16. Estates by Entireties.

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No lien can attach to land held by entireties, that is, held by husband and wife jointly, unless the contract for the improvements thereon is in writing and signed by both. Nei

31. Lamont v. LeFevre, 96 Mich. 175 (178), 55 N. W. 687. It has been held that where the lien attached before the homestead it might be enforced regardless of the homestead. Tuttle v. Howe, 14 Minn. 145, (reprint 113).

32. Lamont v. LeFevre, 96 Mich. 175 (178), 55 N. W. 687; Deville v. Widoe, 64 Mich. 593 (594-595), 32 N. W. 894. In the latter case the court held that a city lot, purchased with the intention of making it a homestead for the purchaser and his family, would be exempt from levy and sale on execution from the time of purchase, even though unimproved and without a dwelling thereon, if the purchaser enclosed it and used and occupied it with the constant purpose of making it his home, and used the proceeds thereof and such means as he could procure, within a reasonable time, to erect a house thereon for his family, provided it did not exceed quantity and value the constitutional limit, and that what would be regarded as a reasonable time must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. A homestead cannot be claimed in premises upon which a house is under construction for claimant when, at the time the contract was made and the work

in

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commenced, he owned and was occupying a house in another part of the same city. McMonegal v. Wilson, 103 Mich. 264 (267-268), 61 N. W. 495; Delray Lumber Co. v. Keohane, 132 Mich. 17 (19), 92 N. W. 489. In McMonegal v. Wilson, supra, the court said: "Whatever might be said if, at the time this lot was purchased and the labor commenced, the defendant had been without a homestead elsewhere, and the testimony showed that the lot in question was purchased for a homestead, no such liberality of construction of the homestead law is permissible as will entitle the party to two homesteads at the same time, -the one actual and the other potential."

33. §2 of Act 179 of 1891, amended by Act 143 of 1897, C. L. 1915 (14797), How. 2nd Ed. §13767, C. L. 1897, (10711). Estates by entirety or community property as subject to mechanics' lien for work under contract with one spouse only. Note 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 87-88; Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, §§128-129. It is only when land is owned by husband and wife, by entireties, or when the land is held and occupied as a homestead, that a contract for a building thereon is required to be in writing, and signed

ther husband nor wife has any interest in an estate by the entirety separable from that of the other, and no interest

by both the husband and wife, in order that a lien may attach to either land or building. In every other case the contract for the improvement may be written or unwritten, express or implied. Sheldon, Kamm & Co. v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578 (579, 583), 132 N. W. 117; Bauer v. Long, 147 Mich. 351, 110 N. W. 1059; McMillin v. Schneider, 147 Mich. 258 (263264), 109 N. W. 661; Frolich v. Blackstock, 155 Mich. 604, 119 N. W. 906; Restrick Lumber Co. v. Wyrembolski, 164 Mich. 71, 128 N. W. 1083; Burman v. Ewald, 192 Mich. 293, 23 D. L. N. 449, 158 N. W. 853. In Burman v. Ewald, 192 Mich. 293, 23 D. L. N. 449, 158 N. W. 853, the contract was signed by the wife alone, for herself and husband, for a building upon land owned by them jointly, and the husband had told the contractor that his wife was looking after the business and they must deal with her. He later joined with her in a mortgage to secure funds with which to pay for the structure. It was held that, as a lien must rest in strict right and not upon mere equities, the contractor was not entitled to a lien in the absence of the husband's signature. In Bauer v. Long, 147 Mich. 351, 110 N. W. 1059, the husband contracted for a structure upon land owned by himself and wife jointly as tenants in entirety. The court said: "The bill shows that complainant knew how the title was held; that the building was to be so constructed that it became a part of the realty, and could not be removed after its erection, without injury to the freehold, and that he has so constructed it. His bill is framed upon that theory, for it does not pray for a lien upon the building separate and apart from the land on which it is situated. This court has re

* *

The

peatedly held that one tenant by the entirety has no interest separable from that of the other. He has nothing to convey or mortgage or to which he can attach a lien. In view of this condition of the law, and to protect the rights of each, the legislature enacted that this lien might attach if the lienor secured the written contract of the husband and wife. To hold that either might contract for a lien without the assent of the other would be clear judicial legislation. complainant seems to concede that he has no lien upon the land, but claims the right to a lien upon the dwelling house, and to sell and remove it under his lien proceeding. This case does not fall within (14798) Michigan Comp. Laws, providing for a lien upon the building if the building is upon lands 'to which the person contracting for such erection has no legal title,' or within the decision of Holliday v. Mathewson (146 Mich. 336.)" It was conceded that the question was before the court for the first time, and it was held that no lien attached to either land or building, in the absence of the wife's signature. In McMillan v. Schneider, 147 Mich. 258, 109 N. W. 661, the husband alone contracted for improvements upon land owned by himself and wife jointly. It was held no lien could attach. In Frolich v. Blackstock, 155 Mich. 604, 119 N. W. 906, the husband alone signed the contract for improvements upon land held by himself and wife under an executory land contract running to them jointly. They later took a warranty deed of the premises. Lien was denied upon either land or buildings in the absence of the wife's signature. In Restrick Lumber Co. v. Wyrembolski, 164 Mich. 71, 128 N. W. 1083, the husband

that either can convey or mortgage or to which either can attach a lien.3

§ 17.

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What Constitutes.

Where a husband and wife held land under an executory land contract running to them jointly when the contract was signed, later taking a warranty deed of the premises, this was held an estate by entireties, and lien was refused upon either the land or buildings thereon, where the wife

alone contracted for a building upon land of which he and his wife had given a deed to secure a loan and had taken a land contract; the deed and land contract to them were held to constitute a mortgage upon property owned by them jointly, and a lien was refused in the absence of the wife's signature. In Sheldon, Kamm & Co. v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578, 132 N. W. 117, the husband alone contracted for a building upon land which, at the time the complainant began to furnish the material for such building, was held jointly by the husband and wife, by entireties. The husband made the contract at a time when he had no title to the land. The premises also constituted the homestead of the parties. This proved the determining factor; lien was refused in the absence of the wife's signature. The case makes the important though perhaps unsound (§83 herein) distinction that it is the condition of the title at the time the particular furnishing is begun that proves the determining factor, and not the condition of the title at the time the original contractor began to furnish material or labor. Section 2 of Act 179 of 1891 originally provided that, where the title to the land was held jointly by husband and wife, the lien should attach to both the land and any improvements made thereon, if such improvements were made in pursuance of a con

tract either with both of them or "with one of them by and with the knowledge and consent of the other." In spite of this express statutory provision, in a case where the husband alone signed the contract by and with the wife's knowledge and consent, the land was nevertheless held immune from lien as a homestead under the constitution of 1850 (Art. XVI, Sec. 2) in the absence of the wife's signature. Under the peculiar language of another section of the act, however, (Sec. 9, Subd. 4) the lien was held to have attached to the building. Jossman v. Rice, 121 Mich. 270, (274-278), 80 N. W. 25. That part of Section 9 involved in the Jossman Case was amended and practically repealed by Act 143 of 1897, and by the same Act, section 2 was amended to its present form so as to provide that both husband and wife must sign the contract in order that a lien may attach to either lands or buildings held jointly by them or held and occupied by them as a homestead. Hence under the present law, where the wife fails to sign the contract for a building on their homestead or joint property, this failure will in general be held fatal to any claim of lien on either land or buildings thereSee cases cited above.

on.

34. Bauer v. Long, 147 Mich. 351 (353), 110 N. W. 1059.

did not sign the contract.35 Where a husband and wife had given a deed to secure a loan and had taken back a land contract, the transaction was held to be a mortgage not divesting the grantors of the legal title, and their estate was held to be one by entireties.30

§ 18. Lands of Married Women.

The present act contains no specific provision for liens upon the lands of married women. The general rule applies, therefore, and the contract for improvements thereon must be with such married woman or her agent in order to bind her land. 37 Where her husband or some other third party independently contracts for a new building upon her land, the lien will attach to such structure under section 3 of the law. The mere fact that a wife knows the work is being done and does not forbid it is not usually considered sufficient to subject her property to lien therefor. Naming the husband alone as the owner of land and not referring to the wife who actually owns the property gives no lien against her interest. The wife's dower interest is probably not affected or subjected to lien where she does not sign the contract, as the statute requires waiver or relinquishment of dower rights to be in writing.

35. Frohlich v. Blackstock, 155 Mich. 604, 119 N. W. 906.

36. Restrick Lumber Co. V. Wyrembolski, 164 Mich. 71, 128 N. W. 1083.

37. 27 Cyc. 62-66. Where the contract for the erection of a new building upon a married woman's land was made with her husband and in his name only, but the evidence showed that he was at the time only acting as her agent, that she knew the building was being built upon her land, used her own money and borrowed more in her own name to pay on the contract, the lien will attach to her land. Frohlich v. Carroll, 127 Mich. 561 (564-565), 86 N. W. 1034. The

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estate of a married woman may be subject to lien, where the contract was by or for her and the erection or improvement was upon her credit though not where she does not expressly or impliedly consent. Jones on Liens, 3rd Ed. S$1260-1271; Rockel on Mechanics' Liens, §§31, 37-39; Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, §§269-281, 441-442, 628; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 3rd Ed. 8894-107; Houck Law of Liens, §§80, 218-228; Kneeland on Mechanics' Liens, 2nd Ed. §§31-34. 38. 27 Cyc. 74.

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