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keeping with this, the Michigan Court has held that, as the lien in order to exist must rest in strict right and not upon mere equities, the claimant is entitled to a lien only where the statute in all essentials is followed and where every fact material to jurisdiction appears upon the record.30 Rights under the dien law cannot be extended beyond the statutory provisions,31 and the burden of proof of every prerequisite essential to establish a lien is held to be upon the lien claimant, 32 After the lien has once been perfected and has attached, however, a different rule is applied and a liberal construction should and will be put upon both the statute and the subsequent proceedings for the purpose of fulfilling its objects and declared purpose.33

tle Creek Lumber Co. v. Poland, 150 Mich. 690, 114 N. W. 671; Roberts v. Miller, 32 Mich. 289; Gibbs v. Hanchette, 90 Mich. 661, 51 N. W. 691; National Bank v. National Bank, 100 Mich. 495, 59 N. W. 231; Godfrey Lumber Co. v. Kline, 167 Mich. 629 (632), 133 N. W. 528; Wagar v. Briscoe, 38 Mich. 592; Clark v. Raymond, 27 Mich. 456 (458); Willard v. Magoon, 30 Mich. 273 (281); Lindsay v. Huth, 74 Mich. 712, 42 N. W. 358; Zilz v. Wilcox, 190 Mich. 486, 23 D. L. N. 24 (25, 27), 167 Ń. W. 77; in holding the statute provision regarding service of claim of lien to be strictly construed and personal service to be imperative where possible. Sheldon, Kamm & Co. v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578 (580, 583), 132 N. W. 117; See: Peninsular Electric Co. v. Norris, 100 Mich. 496, (502), 59 S. W. 151; J. W. McCausey & Co. v. Gittleman, 201 Mich. 8, 166 N. W. 896 (898).

30. Sheldon, Kamm & Co. v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578 (580), 132 N. W. 117; Kleinert v. Knoop,

147 Mich. 387, (389), 110 N. W. 941; Battle Creek Lumber Co. v. Poland, 150 Mich. 690, 114 N. W. 671 Wildey v. Gillett, 171 Mich. 157, 136 N. W. 1116; Godfrey Lumber Co. v. Kline, 167 Mich. 629 (635), 133 N. W. 528; Wagar v. Briscoe, 38 Mich. 592; Clark v. Raymond, 27 Mich. 456 (458)

31. Sterner v. Haas, 108 Mich. 488, 66 N. W. 348.

32. Roberts v. Miller, 32 Mich. 289; Clark v. Raymond, 2/ Mich. 462; Wagar v. Briscoe, 38 Mich. 592.

33. Godfrey Lumber Co. V. Kline, 167 Mich. 629 (632), 133 N. W. 528; Zilz v. Wilcox, 190 Mich. 486, 23 D. L. N. 24 (27), 167 N. W. 77; Burman v. Ewald, 192 Mich. 293 23 D. L. N. 449, 158 N. W. 853; Smalley v. Northwestern Terra-Cotta Co., 113 Mich. 141 (148), 71 N. W. 466; Sheridan v. Cameron, 65 Mich. 680 (683), 32 N. W. 894; Lacy v. Piatt Power & Heat Co., 157 Mich. 544, 122 N. W. 112; See: Kleinert v. Knoop, 147 Mich. 387, (389), 110 N. W. 941.

§ 5. Statutory Construction of Certain Terms.

The statutes construes certain of the terms which it uses, the provisions in that regard being substantially: The words "owner, part owner or lessee" shall be construed to include all the interest, legal or equitable, such person may have in the real estate upon which the improvements contemplated by this act are made, including the interest held by any person under contracts of purchase, whether in writing or otherwise. The word "material-man"35 shall be construed to include all persons by whom any materials are furnished in or for building, altering, improving, repairing, erecting, or ornamenting, or putting in any house, building, machinery, wharf or other structure or walk or walks. The word "laborer" shall be construed to include any mechanic, work

The most logical view appears to be that lien laws create both a right and a remedy and are subject to both rules of construction; that is, where the question is whether the particular case is within the statute a strict construction should be given, but where the circumstances are such that there is clearly a right to a lien under the statute and the question is whether the claimant has taken the proper course to establish his lien, the statute should be liberally construed. An application of this distinction to the facts of particular cases will reconcile most of the seemingly conflicting decisions. 27 Cyc. pp. 20, 21.

Upon principles and rules of construction of Mechanics' Lien laws in general. See: Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, §§34-45; Rockel on Mechanics' Liens, §8; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 3rd Ed. §§14-24; Houck on Law or Liens, $859-75.

34. Section 29 of Act 179 of 1891 as amended by Act 17 of 1903; C. L. 1915 (14824); How. 2nd Ed. §13794; C. L. 1897

men

(10738).
35. A contractor who furn-
ished material was, for the pur-
pose of distribution of payments,
considered a material man.
Smalley v. Gearing, 121 Mich.
191, 79 N. W. 1114, 80 N. W. 797.
Manufacturers of window
frames, sash, doors and such ma-
terial in their own shops selling
same for use in a building under
construction, are material
rather than contractors, and need
not furnish contractor's state-
ment
lien.
as prerequisite to
Kerr-Murray Mfg. Co. v. Kala-
mazoo Heat, Light & Power Co.,
124 Mich. 111 (114), 82 N. W.
801. Plaintiffs furnishing lockers
for a building consigned to con-
tractor "knocked down and on
board cars" at destination, were
held material men. People v.
Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 154
Mich. 614, 118 N. W. 586. Plaint-
iffs who after contracting with
the contractor engaged in con-
structing a city sewer to man-
ufacture and furnish cement
blocks, made the same with ma-
chines furnished by the general
contractor delivering them on the

man, artisan or laborer, employed in or about any such work. The word "improvements" shall be construed to include sidewalks.

36

§ 6. Operation as Being Prospective or Retrospective. The general rule may be stated to be that statutes will be construed to operate prospectively except where a contrary intention is expressed. A lien claimant does not however acquire a vested right in the existing statute or remedy," so as to be entitled to the benefit of its provisions in the enforcement of his lien unchanged. In sections 30 and 3138 of the lien law, the act was limited in operation to liens under future contracts, and in the provision for the repeal of the previously existing law a clause was inserted. saving rights under existing contracts and in pending proceedings and continuing the previous law in force to effectuate that purpose. While that reservation and saving clause would, in view of the general rule above stated and the rule that an act after amendment is as amended to be treated as a single enactment, appear to apply to amendments and render them prospective only in operation, the Supreme Court in a recent case3 has taken the opposite view. It therein held that, as the amendment to section 10 of the lien law40 by Act 394 of the Public Acts of 1913, permitting sureties on contractors' bonds given to protect owners against liens, to be made parties to suits to foreclose

line of the sewer though never undertaking to perform any part of the original contract, with the city, were held material men. Keunzel v. Nat'l Constr'n Co. 159 Mich. 133, 123 N. W. 801. On the other hand, a plumber and gas fitter furnishing material and labor for plumbing, roofing, steam heating and electric wiring in a building, is not a material man but a contractor, though no aggregate price for the work was agreed upon. Sterner v. Haas, 108 Mich. 488, 66 N. W. 348. For further cases upon who are subcontractors and

who are material men, see note to $136.

36. 27 Cyc. 22.

37. Hanes & Co. v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 180-181, 41 N. W. 222.

38. C. L. 1915 (14825-14826), How. 2nd Ed. §§13795-13796, C. L. 1897, (10739).

39. C. H. Little Co. v. L. P. Hazen Co., 185 Mich. 316, (321), 152 N. W. 95; see, also Hanes Co. v. Wadey, 73 Mich. 178, 41 N. W. 222.

40. C. L. 1915 (14805), How 2nd Ed. §13775, C. L. 1897 (10719).

liens and requiring the court to determine the rights of all parties to the time of entry of the decree, related only to the remedy and not to the established rights of the parties, it applied and could constitutionally apply to proceedings already commenced and in which an order sustaining a demurrer had been entered before the amendment took effect. It may therefore be apprehended that future amendments relating to the remedy only will be held to apply to all existing contracts and liens though made or perfected previous to the passage of the amendment, unless a contrary intent is expressed."1

41. As to those matters which pertain to the substantial property rights of the parties, the statute in force when the contract was entered into governs while as to matters pertaining to the remedy or procedure only, the law as it stands at the time of enforcement will govern, in the absence of saving clauses retaining the former law in force as

to accrued liens. Jones on Liens, 3rd Ed. §1184a.

Effect of changes in or repeals of Mechanics' Lien laws and whether restrospective in operation. Jones on Liens, 3rd Ed. 88108-109; Rockel on Mechanics' Liens, 885-7; Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, §§46-49; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, 3rd Ed. §§22-25.

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CHAPTER II.

PERSONS, PROPERTY, INTERESTS,
STRUCTURES OR IMPROVE-
MENTS SUBJECT TO LIEN.*

7. In General as to Persons Reached.

8. In General as to the Interest Reached.

9. Extent of Description Affected by Right to Lien.

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14.

15.

Homesteads.

Attaching of Lien to Excess over Exemption.
What Constitutes a Homestead.

16. Estates by Entireties.

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§ 7. In General as to Persons Reached.

In general, the statute extends the right to claim liens for the furnishing of material and labor, to all furnishing under contract, written or unwritten, express or implied, and no exceptions as such are stated in the statute.1 The right to lien exists against every owner, part owner or lessee, including purchasers of land under contracts in writing or otherwise, and extends to their full interest, legal or equitable, presently held or acquired subsequent to the time of filing the claim of lien.2 Corporations as well as natural persons are reached by the lien law and practically all who

*In general as to the subjects comprehended in Chapter II, see title, "Mechanics' Liens," 34 Cent. Dig. §§ 16-22, 64-67, 309-335, and 13 Dec. Dig. §§ 10-14, 15-21, 5673, 180-193.

1. See, however, section 2 of the statute. 27 Cyc. 24.

2. Sheldon, Kamm & Co. v. Bremer, 166 Mich. 578 (579), 132 N. W. 117.

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