a

It

appears to me, that the constitution of the United States ought to be so amended as to give authority to the senate to appoint their presiding officer, and abolish the cffice of vice-presi. dent,which approaches nearer to a sinecure than perhaps any other office in our government. Hence it is, that some men who have held this office appear

have considered it as created for them and not for the public benefit, and neglected the few duties it required. In four years, (the term for which a vice-president is elected ) ending the 3d of March, 1821, he did not attend the senate but little more than one fifth of the time it was in session. They sat during those four years, five hundred and twenty two days, and from inspecting the journals, it appears that he was present only one hundred and ten days. For that service, he received not only twenty thousand dollars more than one hundred and eighty dollars for each day's actual attendance, but subjected the nation to the additional expenditure of three thousand two hundred ninety-six dollars, the sum paid the president pro. tem. for presiding in the senate.

By abolishing the office of vice-president, a considerable sum of money would be annually saved, which is an object of importance to a nation, which in a time of peace is compelled to resort to loans to support the charges of government, and pay the interest of its public debt. But there is another and more important reason in favor of the measure. As our constitution is now formed, the election of the vice-president has a pernicious influence upon the election of the president. It not only occasions combinations between the candidates for the two offices and their friends and supporters, but the office of vice-president is virtually brought into the market, and tendered to the highest bidder, not indeed for money, but, what is worse, for votes for the presidency. When the friends of a candidate for the presidency find a large state hostile to him, or even hesitating, they too often select a candidate from such a state for vice-president, and have too often succeeded. These offers have been made to large, not small states, for small states have but few votes to give. No vice-president has ever been elected from a small state. No congressional caucus even thought of nominating a man for that office unless he belonged to a large state, except in one instance, and that of a man who was known to be too old and too infirm for that office, and who, for that reason, as was expected he would, to the gratification of all his real friends, positively declined being a candidate. If we judge of the future from the past, small states have no reason to expect a vice-president will be taken from them: for, in nine elections, a period of thirty-six years, the vice-president has been elected from the three great states of Massachusetts, Virginia, and New-York--and from the latter for twenty years, more than half of the whole time. Since Maine has become a state, the claim of Massachusetts, though powerful, must yield to some other State whose numbers are greater-such as Pennsylvania

.

a

But it is time to return to the consideration of executive power. The president of the United States, in every point of view, is pre-eminently our first and greatest executive officerhe is the head of the nation and of the government. The power and authority given to him by the people, and the laws made by their representatives, are very great. The nature of a great government, the state and condition of a vast continent, and a numerous and rapidly increasing population, with a great variety of conflicting interests, necessarily require that the president should be vested with great power and extensive authority.

The president has not only the right to recommend such measures to congress as he may judge necessary and expedient, but he has a qualified negative upon all their acts ; he has authority to execute the laws, and pardon those who violate them; to receive ambassadors; form treaties with foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, and with the assent of the senate, ratify and confirm them; appoint the officers in the national government; and command the

army

and
navy,

and the militia when in actual service. This power when properly executed is useful and salutary,but when abused is unjust,oppressive, and tyrannical. It may be transferred from the public interest to promote the unhallowed purposes of party and of faction, increase the interest of a selfish incumbent, and aggrandize and serve his friends and partisans. And, what is more, the president may assume authority not delegated to him: for such is the nature of man, that those who have most power, are most prone to increase it by usurpation. The remedy for these abuses is in the legislature judiciary, and the people; and if they are watchful, vigilant, and faithful, the president cannot materially injure the nation. The legislature may impeach, convict, and remove him from office; the judiciary may, when he infringes the rights of individuals, declare such of his acts illegal and void; and the people may withdraw their confidence and support, and withhold their suffrages from him at the next election.

The power and duties of the president, which we have enumerated, require a further and more particular consideration. They are intimately connected with, and have a powerful influence upon the peace, prosperity, and welfare of the nation,

and every individual in it.

His power in recommending, making, and executing the laws is important and ought to be exercised with sound judgment and great discretion. Considering the information he must necessarily have of the state of our foreign relations, as well as our internal affairs, and the great influence which the nature of his office will ever have upon Congress, his recommendations, though not obligatory upon them, are entitled to much respect, and usually have great effect. Those acquainted with the history of congressional proceedings know that some laws have been enacted and measures adopted, which, if he had not recommended, would never have taken place. Of these measures some havé proved useful, and others injurious to the nation. Can any man believe congress would have passed the law granting pensions to the soldiers of the revolutionary war, thirty-five years after that war terminated, if the president had not particularly recommended it? It is certain, congress did not contemplate such a law until after he advised it, and it is equally certain, that upon his recommendation, they did make liberal provision for the support of a class of paupers that neither justice or policy required, which has already cost the nation several millions of dollars, at a time when they were pressed for the want of money, and still continues a heavy claim upon the public treasury. The injustice, impropriety, and evil effects of that law, I intend to exhibit when I consider our system of pensions.

It is not only the duty of the president to recommend laws to be passed, but he has authority, and is bound to approve each bill and resolve which congress pass, or return it with his objections, and unless two thirds of the members of both houses afterwards consent, it cannot become a law. The objections must therefore be argumentative, and, as Hamilton observes, " are to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed.” This authority, as I observed on another occasion in a preceding number, (XCII) is very useful when duly exercised, in checking the disposition of congress to legislate too much, correcting their errors—and that the nation has really more danger to apprehend from this power not being used, than from its exercise. This qualified veto is a power of that nature which necessarily renders him who possesses it cautious how he exercises it. If the objections which a president makes to a

. bill or resolve are not sound in principle and true in fact, he has every reason to believe congress will not only reject them, but that his character as a statesman will suffer in the estimation of his constituents, and of the world. So cautious have our presidents been in the exercise of this authority, and so conclusive their reasoning, that I do not recollect the instance of a single bill or resolve becoming a law, to which they objected. And I verily believe,if they exercised their veto oftener, they would more effectually serve the public interest, as well as increase their own reputation and fame. The British king has an absolute negative upon the proceedings of parliament, and formerly exercised it freely, but it is a long time, perhaps a century, since he has exercised it at all. His disuse of that prerogative has not rendered parliament more free and independent; for since then, the king and his ministers check and eventually defeat every measure they dislike, by finesse and management, by bribing and corrupting the electors to elect members who are pensioners, placemen, office-seekers, and men devoted to the interest of the executive. If our presidents should disuse their authority to return their objections to the proceedings of congress, have we not too much reason to fear the same course will be adopted here as has been in Great-Britain ? But with this difference, instead of attempting to corrupt the great mass of electors, the members of

congress and their particular friends and dependants will be secured by being appointed to such offices as are in the disposal of the president. It is certain that even new members of congress are too often appointed to office.

The constitution enjoins it as a particular duty upon the president, to 6 take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” This is a charge which requires not only much time and attention, but great watchfulness, vigilance and fidelity. But if the president neglects this duty, the laws will become a dead letter and worse than useless; a monument of the weakness of the government,and of the disrespect and contempt of the people. The best of laws can afford no security to the people, if they are not executed; indeed they are worse than no laws, because they deceive those who trust in them. If we had few laws, and those strictly executed, we should enjoy more security.

CINCINNATUS. November 3, 1823.

Ecclesiastical History.

MEMORANDA: relating to the Churches and Clergy of New

Hampshire. (Continued from page 370, of the Collections for 1823.] In 1757, the Rev. John HOUSTON was ordained at Bedford; Rev. Josiah Bayley at Hampton-Falls; Rev. JAMES Scales at Hopkinton; and Rev. John Rand at Lyndeborough.

Mr. Houston was ordained at Bedford, the first minister of that town, Sept. 28, 1757. He was a Presbyterian, and a member of the “Boston Presbytery," until 1775, when a division was amicably agreed on, and Mr. Houston became a member of the Western Presbytery, called the “ Presbytery of Palmer," of which he was appointed moderator. He remained the minister of Bedford about 21 years, and was dismissed in 1778.

Mr. Bayley was the successor of Mr. Whipple, at Hampton-Falls; was graduated at Harvard College, in 1752; ordained Oct. 19, 1757; and died in 1762, aged 29.

Mr. Scales was graduated at Harvard College, in 1733. He was ordained the first minister of Hopkinton, Nov. 23, 1757, and was dismissed July 4, 1770. His son Stephen was graduated at Harvard College, in 1763; was a tutor in that institution, and much distinguished as a scholar. He died

at Chelmsford, in the practice of the law, Nov. 5, 1772, aged 31.*

Mr. Rand was the first minister of Lyndeborough. He was graduated at Harvard College in 1748, ordained Dec. 3, 1757, and dismissed April 8, 1762.

The Rev. JOSIAH STEARNS was ordained at Epping, March 8, 1758; and the Rev. BENJAMIN BUTLER was ordained at Nottingham the same year.

The ancestors of Mr. Stearns were among the early settlers of Watertown, Massachusetts; but the branch of the family from which he descended removed to Billerica, where he was born, in Jan. 1732. He was graduated at Harvard College, 1751. His annual salary at Epping was 601. sterling and 25 cords of wood. His first wife was Sarah Abbot, of Andover, whom he buried Nov. 5, 1766; and in September following he married Sarah Ruggles, of Billerica. By each of his wives he had three sons and three daughters, twelve in all. He died July 25, 1788, in his 57th year. His last wife survived him, and died at the house of her son, the Rev. Samuel Stearns, of Bedford, Massachusetts, April 2, 1808, aged 76. During Mr. Stearns' ministry, about 87 persons were added to the church in Epping. He published two sermons preached Jan. 29, 1777. on a public fast, appointed on account of the war with Great-Britain, from Judges xx. 26, 27, 28; a sermon at the ordination of the Rev. Nicholas Dudley, in Townsend, New-York, June 26, 1777, from Ezra vii. 10; a sermon from Psalm xc. 14, preached at Epping, Sept. 19, 1779; and two sermons on the Divine Character, delivered Nov. 4, 1787, from 1 John iv. 16.

Mr. Butler, at Nottingham, received a settlement of 20001. old tenor, equal to $333 33, and a salary of 351. sterling. He was graduated at Harvard, in 1752. After preaching about a dozen years, he became convinced that he was not calculated for usefulness in the ministry, and at his own request, was dismissed in 1770. He was afterwards a magistrate for the county, and died about the year 1805. The late General Henry Butler, of Nottingham, was his son. There has been no Congregational minister settled in Nottingham since Mr. Butler's dismission. The church has dwindled away; and although, about twenty years since, a new church was organized there, that too has become extinct, and there is not a male member of it left in the place. The town has

*To his memory there is a tomb-stone in Chelmsford, on which is a Latin inscription, bearing honorable testimony to the powers of his mind, and the good qualities of his head and heart.