Committee Prints

Soviets protested against alleged non-fulfillment of the armistice

terms.

The second Sanatescu coalition government was then formed, but, unlike the first, it contained all politicians: 4 National Peasants, 4 Liberals, 3 Socialists, and 1 Communist. As before, the party leaders were Ministers without Portfolio. However, the second Sanatescu government lasted only a month.19 Communist agitators, spurred on by the Soviets, staged demonstrations throughout the country, directing their criticism especially at N. Penescu, a National Peasant Party leader and Minister of Interior. All police authority was vested in this Ministry, and hence this post became a prime Communist target throughout all countries of Eastern Europe. A crisis developed at the end of November when Penescu used troops to insure peace and order. The Communists vociferously attacked Penescu as a protector of Fascists. In the face of mounting pressure, Sanatescu was forced to resign.20

On December 2, 1944, the King appointed General R. Radescu to head a new coalition government. An elderly officer known for his anti-German views during the war, Radescu had the approval of Soviet authorities. Upon his appointment Radescu, acting under Soviet pressure, made what was termed "an important concession to the Communists," by rejecting a Minister of Interior from either the National Peasant, Liberal, or Socialist parties, and by assigning the office to himself. Moreover, Radescu appointed Teohari Georgescu, a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, as Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior. According to Ghita Ionescu a specialist on Rumanian affairs, the Communists used this post to introduce into the police and security forces "as many as possible of the agents trained in the 'patriotic guards' in the last three months by Bodnaras and the Soviet NKVD supervisors." In commenting on this government, Prof. Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, also a specialist on Rumanian affairs, wrote: "The composition of this government showed an increase in the number of Communist and pro-Communist members. Under instructions from Mocsow, the Communist members of the Radescu cabinet sabotaged its operations by promoting antigovernment demonstrations." 22

Thus, Radescu was faced with an increasingly critical situation, brought on by internal subversion and external agitation. Georgescu actively undermined Radescu's authority in the Interior Ministry by giving orders to his supporters contrary to those of his chief, and he refused to resign his post when ordered. Communist agitation continued throughout the country, reaching a climax in a battle between National Peasant and Communist workers at the Malaxa industrial plant in Bucharest. On February 24, 1945, the Communists through their National Democratic Front organized a mass demonstration in the Palace square in which some shooting occurred. The Communists denounced Radescu as a reactionary. And in response,

Radescu bitterly attacked the Communist leadership as being "hyenas" and "foreigners without God or country." The Commu

19 Ibid., p. 65. See also, Ionescu, Ghita. Communism in Rumania, 1944-1962. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, Oxford University Press, 1964. p. 99. 20 Ibid., p. 103.

21 Ibid., p. 103.

22 Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 65.

nists demanded Radescu's arrest, but after a week of turmoil, he sought and was granted asylum in the British mission.

On February 27, 1945, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky arrived in Bucharest from Moscow, ordered King Michael to dismiss Radescu and appoint a government of the Communist-led National Democratic Front. When the King temporized in what was called a "stormy interview," Vishinsky gave him a 2-hour ultimatum, insisting that Petru Groza, a leftist leader of the radical Ploughmen's Front, was the only acceptable Soviet choice or Rumania would cease to exist as a sovereign state. Soviet authorities ordered Rumanian troops from Bucharest as a protective measure against their intervention on behalf of the King and surrounded the capital and palace with Soviet troops and tanks. Under duress, the King yielded, and on March 6, 1945, he formed a coalition government under the premiership of Groza. In this new Communist coalition government, Communists held the Ministries of the Interior (Georgescu), Justice (Patrascanu), and National Economy (Gheorghiu-Dei).23

Amid protests from the United States and Great Britain against Soviet violations of agreements, Communist authority was now firmly established in Rumania, and though the Communists, later yielding to pressure from the Western Allies, allowed representatives of other parties in the cabinet and promised "free" elections, their progress toward achieving total power was unimpeded. In a matter of time the opposition was effectively destroyed by measures already described above; on December 30, 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate and leave the country; on the next day a "People's Republic" was proclaimed." According to Rumanian Communist historians and political theorists, the advent of the Groza Government on March 6, 1945, signified the installation of the "popular democratic" regime in Rumania, to be followed by the second phase of conquest, the dictatorship of the proletariat starting on December 31, 1947.25

In summarizing the seven-month experience of Rumania with coalition governments in which Communists participated, Ionescu declared:

From the day on which King Michael dismissed Antonescu to that on which Soviet Russia imposed the Groza government on him, there were three Rumanian governments. All tried to solve the problem of genuine collaboration between an independent Rumania and Soviet Russia. The first two were under the presidency of General Sanatescu; the third under that of General Radescu. All three failed because of the direct and indirect refusals of Soviet Russia to deal with any but a communist-controlled government.26

C. BULGARIA

In a strictly technical sense coalition government was the instrumentality used for bringing Bulgaria under total Communist control; but this parliamentary device was only incidental to the larger, predominating reality manifested in the presence of Soviet power employed to achieve political ends. In Bulgaria, the fiction of parliamentary democracy lasted somewhat longer than in Rumania: more time was, apparently, needed to bring to bear the full weight

a Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 105-106 and Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 206.

24 Political Handbook, 1965, p. 222.

"Ionescu, op. cit., p. 107.

* Ibid., p. 94.

Soviets protested against alleged non-fulfillment of the armistice

terms.

21 Ibid., p. 103.

22 Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 65.

nists demanded Radescu's arrest, but after a week of turmoil, he sought and was granted asylum in the British mission.

Amid protests from the United States and Great Britain against Soviet violations of agreements, Communist authority was now firmly established in Rumania, and though the Communists, later yielding to pressure from the Western Allies, allowed representatives of other parties in the cabinet and promised "free" elections, their progress toward achieving total power was unimpeded. In a matter of time the opposition was effectively destroyed by measures already described above; on December 30, 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate and leave the country; on the next day a "People's Republic" was proclaimed. According to Rumanian Communist historians and political theorists, the advent of the Groza Government on March 6, 1945, signified the installation of the "popular democratic" regime in Rumania, to be followed by the second phase of conquest, the dictatorship of the proletariat starting on December 31, 1947.25

In summarizing the seven-month experience of Rumania with coalition governments in which Communists participated, Ionescu declared:

C. BULGARIA

a Ionescu, op. cit., pp. 105-106 and Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 206.

Political Handbook, 1965, p. 222.

25 Ionescu, op. cit., p. 107.

■ Ibid., p. 94.

of Communist power and to effectively destroy the political opposition within the established policy framework of conquest through gradualism. However, uneven events may have been paced in both countries, the end results were still the same: the establishment of a totalitarian state on the Soviet model.

During World War II Bulgaria's policy toward the Allies was ambiguous: as a Nazi satellite it supported Germany but did not join its military forces; it neither declared war on Soviet Russia nor sent troops to the Eastern Front; but it adhered to the anti-Comintern pact, conducted violent anti-Communist propaganda campaigns and declared war against the United States and Great Britain.27 German fortunes waned and Soviet armies approached Eastern Europe Bulgarian leaders sought ways to break out of their Axis relationship and make peace with the United States and Britain. On August 17, 1944, Ivan Bagrianov, head of a new nonparty government, denounced the pro-German policies of his predecessor and officially proclaimed Bulgarian intentions of ending the war with the Western Allies. Meanwhile, Soviet armies crossed into Rumania, and on August 23 King Michael staged a coup and initiated steps that led to an armistice. On August 26, Bagrianov announced Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war, proclaimed its regained neutrality, requested withdrawal of all German troops, and directed Bulgarian diplomats, then negotiating with the Western Allies in Cairo, to conclude an armistice immediately. In Cairo, the Allies delayed; the Russians refused to recognize the neutrality declaration. Interpreting this action as a lack of confidence in his government and policies, Bagrianov resigned.28

On September 2, 1944, a new government, uniting pro-Western political parties, was formed, headed by Konstantin Muraviev, a leader of the Agrarian Union, and including leaders of the Democratic Party, the Agrarian Union, and National Party. The Communistled Fatherland Front was invited to join the new government, but refused. The Fatherland Front, a coalition of 5 independent parties, was formed in Moscow by Georgi Dimitrov, Bulgaria's leading Communist. In the course of time, Communists dominated the entire front, suppressed all opposition parties within the coalition, and forged the Front into an instrument for achieving total Communist political control over the country.29

On the morning of September 5, 1944, the Muraviev government broke off relations with Berlin and decided to declare war on Germany. But, it delayed action for 72 hours on advice from the War Minister, the alleged reason being to withdraw Bulgarian troops from Macedonia to avoid capture by the Germans, though the question has been raised whether the Minister was acting in collusion with the Fatherland Front. Shortly thereafter and before the Sofia government could act, the Soviet government declared war on Bulgaria on grounds that Bulgaria had not broken with Germany. The Muraviev government had, of course, done so. "It is evident," wrote L. A. D. Dellin, specialist on Bulgarian affairs, "that the real motive behind this move was the Soviet aim to attain control of Bulgaria with the Red Army." 30

27 The principal source for this section is, Dellin, L.A.D. Politics and political organizations. In Dellin, L.A.D., ed. Bulgaria. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Chapter 5.

28 Ibid., pp. 115-117.

29 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 118.

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