have great ambition, but, before he dares attempt to put it in execution, he must have some hopes of fuccefs. The ambition of our neighbours, Sir, is what we cannot prevent, but we may, by proper precautions feafonably taken, deprive them of all hopes of fuccefs; and by fo doing we fhall always prevent their attempting to put their defign in execution. From this maxim we may fee the wifdom of the measures taken last year; His Majesty did not find himself obliged to take any share in the war, but as the ambition of either of the parties engaged might at last involve this nation in the war; therefore he offered to interpofe his good offices for bringing about an accommodation, whatever might have been the views of the parties engaged at the beginning of the war: yet upon feeing this nation put itself in fuch posture of defence, they all thought proper to drop any ambitious views they might then entertain, by accepting of the good offices His Majesty has offered. Their ready compliance in this refpect can be attributed to nothing but the preparations we made last year, and the powers that were granted the last feffion of Parliament to His Majesty; by these we deprived them of all hopes of fucceeding in their ambitious views. It was this, Sir, that produced an acceptance of the good offices His Majefty had offered; and if we should flacken in our measures, if we fhould discontinue our preparations, it would render us despicable in the eyes of all the parties engaged in war, and would confequently disappoint the good effects we have reafon to expect from that acceptation. At the beginning of laft feffion, it was very well known that the French were fitting out a large fquadron at Breft, and were providing transports and a land army to be fent along with that fquadron, under pretence of relieving Dantzick. In fuch a fituation, Sir, I fhould have thought thofe who had the honour to advise the King very imprudent, or very unfaithful Counsellors, if they had not advised him to put the nation im→ mediately into a state of defence; for though it was probable that neither the French nor any other power would attack us

while we continue neutral; yet it is certain it was then, and always will be, very much the French interest to have this nation on its fide; and if they had then feen, or should upon any fuch occafion fee, that it would be easy to overturn our Government, by our not being fufficiently provided for defence, and could, by overturning our Government, get numbers of this nation to join with thein, it would then have been, and always will be, worth their while to make the attempt; therefore, in order to preferve the peace and quiet of the nation, we ought always to be upon our guard, and ought to make some additional provifion for our defence, when any of our neighbours. are fitting out large squadrons, which may poffibly be made use of to attack or invade this nation. This, Sir, was the reafon for His Majesty's defiring 20,000 men the last feffion of Parliament for fea fervice; but from what has fince happened, the reafon feems to have gathered a little more weight; for though there was no particular reason to fufpect that the French fqua. dron was defigned against us, yet there was no other place in the world for which it would be defigned, except Dantzick; and whether it was defigned for Dantzick or not, it is certain it did not go to Dantzick, for we all know it continued at Breit the whole Summer.

After the last feffion of Parliament had agreed to the 20,000 feamen defired by His Majesty, he had an account, that besides the fquadron fitting out at Breft, both the French and the Spaniards had given orders for fitting out all the fhips of war, lying in any of their ports, from Toulon round to Breft; from whence His Majesty, with great reason, thought it abfolutely neceffary to make a farther addition to his naval force; for which purpose he applied to his Parliament for a power to do fo; and in pursuance of the powers granted him upon that application, he has fince made an addition of 7,000 men to the fea fervice; fo that our present naval establishment confifts of 27,000 men; 7,000 of which muft be reduced, if we fhould agree to grant but 20,000 feamen for the enfuing year.

Having thus, Sir, laid the prefent ftate of our naval force before you, let us confider the present state of the affairs of Europe, the circumstances our neighbours are in, and the cir cumstances we are in ourselves. As to the affairs of Europe, it is certain they seem to be in no lefs dangerous ftate than they were last year; His Majefty's good offices are, indeed, accepted of; but that acceptation has not as yet produced the wifhed-for effect, nor can it be expected it should, if His Majefty fhould appear to be lefs powerful when he comes to offer terms of peace, than he was when he made the offer of his good offices: we cannot therefore, from the present state of the affairs of Europe, draw any argument for diminishing our naval force. Then as to the crcumftances of our neighbours, it is very certain, that not only all the fhips of war, fitted out either by the French or Spaniards, are continued in commiffion, but both these nations are with the utmost application rebuilding and repairing every fhip of force they have in their dominions, and are befides building new fhips of war as fast as they can; from whence I think it is evident, that instead of making any reduction of the naval force we had last year, we ought to make fome addition, and the addition propofed, which is properly 3,000 men, is, in my opinion, the least that can be thought of.

This, Sir, must be thought ftill more reasonable, if we confider our own particular circumstances, and the difficulty there is of getting our feamen together after they are once' dispersed. In countries where abfolute and arbitrary government prevails, all their feamen are registered, and they always know where they may find them when they have occafion for them. Their feamen, as well as all their other fubjects, are under a fort of military difcipline; they cannot abfent themselves without a furlough, and they must remain absent no longer than their furlough gives them leave; by which means the Government always know what number they may depend on upon any emergency. But in this happy country, where every private

man,

man enjoys his full liberty, we cannot command our feamen to stay at home, nor can we call them home when we have a mind; for, notwithstanding the difficulties which every one knows we found laft Summer to man the fleet then fitted out, yet it was computed there were at least 11,000 British failors employed all last Summer on board of British ships in the fervice of foreigners, either as tranfports, or as trading fhips. In this country we have no method of providing failors employed upon any fudden emergency, but by preffing those seamen we find by chance at home, or upon our own coafts; and this method is always attended with fo many inconveniences, is accompanied with circumstances so galling to the feelings of British feamen, and fo diftreffing to the families and relatives of these brave men, that in order to prevent our being at any time reduced to that neceffity, every man who has a due regard to the liberty and the happiness of the subject must agree, that we ought, upon every occafion, to begin early to provide against any danger we think we have reason to apprehend.

In all the measures we have hitherto taken relating to the prefent war, our ancient and natural allies, the Dutch, have cordially joined with us in every thing: they joined heartily with His Majesty in offering their good offices for compofing the present unhappy differences in Europe; and they have likewife joined with His Majefty in concerting a proper plan for a pacification. It may, perhaps, be infinuated, that they have put themselves to no expence on account of the present war; but this is neither a juft nor a true infinuation; for it is very well known, that before the war broke out they had refolved to have made a very confiderable reduction of their land forces. Every one knows, that foon after the peace of Utrecht they reduced their army to 32,000 men, and for feveral years after they kept it at that number; but upon a change which happened in the affairs of Europe, they augmented it again to 52,000 men; and at that time we likewife found it neceffary

to increase our army to 26,000 men. The war with which Europe was then threatened was happily prevented; and as foon as it was, we immediately began to reduce our army; we reduced it at firft 5,000, and foon after 3,000, of the number we had increased it to: but the Dutch made at that time no reduction; they never thought of making any reduction till the very year before the prefent war broke out; then indeed a refolution was actually taken in some of the provinces to reduce 10,000, and that was foon to have been followed by the reduction of another 10,000, in order to have brought their army to its former standard of 32,000 men; and both these reductions have been put off, merely on account of the prefent war; fo that, to fpeak properly, they have put themselves to the expence of maintaining 20,000 men ever fince the war began; and therefore it is not to be wondered if they made no addition to their fleet, especially if we confider that they are in no danger of being attacked by fea; and the bad condition their navy happens to be in at present, which is occafioned by the vast expence they were put to during the war, in which they were obliged to maintain a much greater number of land forces than we maintained, and were farther obliged to be at the expence of all the fieges that were undertaken during the

war.

The Dutch, 'tis true, Sir, concluded a treaty of neutrality with France, with regard to the Austrian Netherlands; but it is not from thence to be concluded, that they are engaged in any intereft feparate from us. They were no way concerned in the affair of Poland, no more than we; if their barrier was fecured, and the balance of power not brought in any danger, they had good reason to think themfelves no way concerned in the war; the first they provided for by their neutrality, and the laft would be in no danger, as long as the parties engaged in war confined their views to what they then publicly declared; but if either of them fhould begin to extend their views, and thereby bring the balance of power into danger, the

Dutch