shall be a conftant, active principle, that fhall maintain the Conftitution the fame at all periods; and I will boldly appeal to the House, whether those who argue for names and fhadows, or for the fubftance and vital principles of the Conftitution, argue moft in favour of the Conftitution? I beg the patience of the House to hear me state a principle limited and final, complete and adapted to all times; a principle that will ferve as a barrier against any indefinite and arbitrary alteration of the Conftitution. Adapting the ftate of reprefentation to the circumstances of the country, I contend, is not contrary to the principles of the Conftitution; my intention therefore is, fo to model the representation of the People in future. The particular statute that disables the King from altering the exifting mode of representation, I ftate to be the Act of Union, which fixes the respective number of representatives between the different parts of the country, and so they have remained ever fince the ftatute paffed, although the circumstances of the times are extremely varied. To give a full fecurity to all the intereft of the country, is the firft principle of that part of the Conftitution, and it is wifely adapted to the purpose; but there are nevertheless feeds of future abufe in the Conftitution as it ftands, without the poffibility of a future remedy; but though this is undeniable, ftill the enemies of reform will not listen to any pofitions to apply a remedy. Let us not, fay they, endeavour to improve nor to endanger the Constitution; neither let us try to make it better, for fear we should make it worse generally viewed, it might be a wife confideration, but if deeper examined, it will be found to be far otherwife: if we can feparate the defects of the Conftitution from its perfections, fo as to take away the former without injury to the , latter, it is undoubtedly our duty to do it; for however wife our ancestors have been, they have still left much for the virtue of their defcendant's. Let us endeavour to give folidity, confiftency, and uniformity to the Conftitution. Its merit has not fhone forth at once, but has been the refult of gradual im

provements.

provements. The fterling excellence of it has furvived the corruption of the most corrupt times, and kept alive the true flame of liberty in the country. In confequence of the alterations that have been at different times made in the Conftitution, thefe effential advantages have been obtained, viz. that Parliament fhall be affembled as often as the exigencies of the country fhall require, and that Parliament fhall meet every year, to hear and redrefs the grievances of the People, before they vote fupplies. To obtain thefe, there have been long ftruggles, and many difficulties. The good fenfe and the reafon of the subject had been early apparent. Let us look to James I., a prince who mounted the throne with high ideas of prerogative, and who was not to be fufpected of being too partial to the liberties of the subject. Yet even to that Prince did the danger of fummoning a Parliament, at the difcretion of the Crown, appear to be fo unfit to continue, that measures were taken refpecting it, though they were not afterwards car. ried fully into effect. Again, in the time of the Protectorate, Lord Clarendon, the great hiftorian of those days, stated, that the number of Knights was propofed to be made greater, and number of burgeffes fmaller. In the reign of Charles the First, the principles of Freedom gave rife to the Oppofition against that Monarch; the Oppofition degenerated first into licentiousness, and next into tyranny; a natural confequence. I do not quote from those reigns as reigns affording any authority or precedent, but as an illustration of my principle of correcting the Conftitution, and with a view to fhew that the feeds of fome of the most effential benefits and advantages this country enjoys, have been fown in the worst of times. The defects of our Constitution have existed from its infancy; I wish therefore to provide against a return of the mischiefs thofe defects have produced, and gradually to bring together all the perfection the cafe is capable of.

I fhall now ftate the outline of my plan, which confists of two parts; the first, the most prefing and moft immediate;

the fecond, without the introduction of any new principle, to rectify it hereafter. The House I mean to propose shall confift, as it does now, of 558 members, but to have a larger number of representatives for the more populous and opulent diftricts, as a general principle. The firft feature of the bill is to provide for a transfer of about feventy, or seventy-two reprefentatives from boroughs, which either have fallen to decay, or are likely to do fo; and the criterion to decide by to be the number of houses, which will be extremely easy; this addition to be diftributed among the different counties and the metropolis, as they may ftand in need of them; the number to be limited by the nature of the thing, and not ascertained by any arbitrary line. If too many were added to counties, they would be liable to two objections, which are thefe: 1. It might be objected, that too many would be chosen for each; or 2. That if counties were fubdivided, there would be too few electors to chufe the members. The thirty-fix boroughs are to be disfranchised on their own voluntary application to be disfrancifed, two ways, either as an act of power, or to make it their own act, by fome compenfation offered to them.

I shall now open the fecond head of the first part of my plan, by ftating, that the only method of carrying this into execution is, by providing a fund for the purpose of giving to the owners and holders of fuch boroughs as shall apply to be disfranchifed, a compenfation for their property. Even confidering the burdens that the People always labour under, I declare I fhall not think it difficult to find a fund for this purpofe, as the fituation of the country is lefs gloomy than many men imagine. I mean not to have the boroughs estimated, but appreciated; for as it is well known the holders of them have found a way to convert them into a fource of profit, as well as the other parts of their eftate, I may venture, without any affectation of extraordinary delicacy, to speak out at once upon the subject. This being a fact, and the ieprefentations

of

of the boroughs in queftion not being exercifed as a truft, they certainly ought not to be fuffered to remain in the hands of their prefent owners any longer. I flate farther, that the compenfation is to be taken without difcontent or diffatisfaction, by acquiefcence and consent, and not by force and compulfion. Such is the mede by which I hope to attain my object. I fpeak of the laws that tend to correct the criminal laws against bribery and corruption. The boroughs might be transferred, in fact, as any other estate, without bribery or immorality; declaring I am ready to throw a veil over the fact, if I could be free from the inconvenience. I fpeak of the different burgage tenures, on a lefs fcale, poffeffed between an individual and a species of electors in fhares; and there is a reasonable probability that there might be a compenfation that it would behove the country to offer, which might be accepted; but the rule fhould be general, and the fame condition given to one fort as another; all the inconfiderable boroughs to be put on a footing. The manner of carrying this plan into execution I ftate as follows: If a majority of electors should offer to relinquifh, the natural queftion that would arife would be, who are the electors? Let that question be referred to the Committee fworn under Mr. Grenville's bill to try the queftion of right to a feat. I contend that there ought to be no difcretion in the fum to be offered; but then it ought not to be exactly equal to each borough-holder, because there are different claffes of borough-holders; fome hold in perpetuity, others have only a life interest in a borough, and others again are in expectancy of a reverfion. The number of boroughs that would be to purchase are thirty-fix; I mean therefore to fet apart the money for each, to let it accumulate at compound intereft. Thus, if the fum set apart is not a fufficient compenfation, it will become one by laying by, as it will increase till it becomes irrefiftible.

This is the first part of my plan, by which much is gained by the Constitution of the country. Another part I will

ftate, to fhew the extent of the scheme, and to prove it to be as comprehenfive and as complete as poffible. When all that ought to be added to counties are added, the number must either be added to the number of the whole House, or transferred from those boroughs which are still small and inconfiderable, within a certain fize, to cities and great towns, which from time to time shall best deserve them. As the fources of representation are, firft, to give to counties which have not their share; fecondly, to allot to the towns and cities which fhall be confiderable enough, and defirous of receiving more, or who from their population fhall be beft entitled to it; and this rule to remain to operate, in perpetuo, as boroughs fall into decay. This fhews at once the extent of the system; and will, I flatter myself, remove the alarms that prevail upon the subject, by establishing a consistent and complete system, and a final one, as far as the principle goes. There is an end therefore to the objection, that this will lead to danger, and to perpetual alteration: on the contrary, it will lay that important question at rest; a point so defirable, that I hope it will induce the House to go the length, at least, of confidering the bill I fhall have the honour to bring in, in cafe I fhall have the good fortune to be permitted to bring one in: and I truft the House will confider it with partiality, as a matter which the People of England have called for at different periods, fometimes more and fometimes lefs.

Having thus gone through the two parts of my plan, I shall proceed to answer the probable objections that will be made against my propofitions; and first, I mention the expence it will load the public with. If the measure is a good one, and it is agreed to be an important one, the money, in my mind, that it would coft, would be well applied. It would give fecurity to the Conftitution, to the liberties of the country, the dearest rights of the People at large, and to their freedom, which is truly invaluable. Let us be œconomical, and we cannot be too much so, in fome other inftance, but in carrying the propo✩