ence of the Crown, by reforming the representation of the people.

Mr. Beaufoy, June 17, 1784.

If the question to which I have the honour of calling your notice this day had not fo long engaged the attention of the House and the Public, its magnitude and importance are so obvious, that it would have been fufficient for me barely to have ftated it, in order to have drawn to it that serious confideration to which it ftands fo amply entitled. This House has, from its earliest infancy, imbibed a reverence for the Conftitution of the country; not a blind enthusiasm for the Constitution, that would not let it fee its few imperfections as well as its many excellent and glorious advantages, but a real regard for it, founded on good sense, and a just estimation of the value and importance of the bleffings derived under it, in confequence of the share the people have in their own government. This it is that conftitutes its chief excellence, fince it makes it the object of the general intereft of the people, and renders it peculiarly deferving of their veneration and watchfulness. It has engaged my attention and regard from the earliest period that I have been engaged in the politics of the country; and though the more I examined it, and the more I compared it with the conftitution of other countries, the more I was led to admire it, and to feel its fuperiority over that of every country in Europe; yet, fuperior as it was, I was obliged, upon conviction, to declare, that it was not altogether exempt from those imperfections to which all human inftitutions are more or lefs liable. Abfolute perfection, undoubtedly, is not to be. expected; but it ought to be the endeavour of every man who profeffes or feels the leaft love and reverence for that Conftitution, fo peculiarly favourable to the liberties of all who live under it, to carry it as near to perfection as from its nature it is capable of being rendered. Impreffed with this idea, and fincerely anxious for fecuring to the public that Conftitution

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to which we all ftand fo much indebted, I at a former period offered my thoughts on the neceffity of adopting fome propofition or other, by way of alteration and reform, with a view to keeping up the popular weight in the balance of the Conftitution, and of adapting it to the circumftances of the times, and the peculiar fituation of the moment. What I at that time felt, with regard to the neceffity for fome alteration, has been fince ftrengthened and confirmed by each day's experience, at a period not unfruitful in political events. The fubject has long engaged my mind; and the more I reflected upon it, the more I was convinced, an amendment on fober and deliberate grounds was neceffary to all the parts of the Conftitution; the balancing of which exactly is the circumstance which makes that glory and happiness Englishmen so much boaft of, and foreigners fo much admire, as the peculiar characteristic of the British Government. Formerly I have experienced the misfortune of failing in the different propofitions I have at different times urged; a failure that might easily be accounted for on a variety of grounds: I rife, however, with different hopes of fuccefs this day. With regard to the House, it is entirely a new queftion; nor is it only a new question to the House, but totally and completely a new question. The vote of last year has not been decifive upon the question that has been proposed; but the question I shall have the honour to move this day has never been rejected by any House of Commons, nor stated in any public affembly. It is not on general topics that the prefent queftion ought to be decided, but upon its own particular merits; all I have to beg therefore, and I do most earnestly implore, is, that they will lay out of their minds all previous prejudices, and all opinions formerly entertained upon the general topics of Parliamentary Reform. On those general topics, barely and nakedly flated, there could be no diverfity of opinion. That the Conftitution of this country ought not to be lightly touched, or experimentally altered, merely upon fpeculation and vifionary fancies, is an opinion

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that no man can contradict: as little is it to be denied, that if there are defects exifting in the prefent ftate of the Conftitution, and which might be amended without risk in the attempt, that they ought not to be deterred by imaginary and by loose and general alarms, founded on fuppofed designs of dangerous innovation and experiment. I am happy to say, that the outlines of the measure I fhall propofe give the fairest profpect of fuccefs. A House of Commons truly representing the People of England, is not a question of exact representation, or of the exact share which every individual has in the government of the country; but fuch a reprefentation of the People in Parliament as shall closely connect the representative body with all their conftituents, and preserve and secure the sympathy of the Conftitution. In effecting this, I do not expect abfolute and complete perfection; but it ought to be our endeavour to aim at obtaining the true end of the Conftitution, and restoring its spirit more completely. It is our duty to look at that object seriously and earneftly. With this view, let us turn our eyes back to the original principles of the Conftitution, and we shall see that its grand principle is, that the People shall have a fhare of the Government, by a just representation in Parliament. No man will difagree to thofe leading principles; nor will any man deny, that if the Constitution is to be framed anew, that the exifting mode of reprefentation is not the most likely mode of insuring the sympathy of the Constitution, or of preferving the interefts of the People. Undoubtedly, as it ftands at prefent, there are grofs and palpable defects in the mode of reprefentation, which call loudly for reform; but I am perfectly fure that fuch reform must be effected by some temperate and moderate alteration, gently administered. The great obftacles to an amendment in the mode of reprefentation, and the objections most insisted on by those who are the profeffed enemies of reform, I take to be thefe: First, an alteration in the number of members of the Houfe; fecondly, any attempt to alter the mode of reprefentation by disfarnchifeVOL. II

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ment of boroughs as an act of power; and, thirdly, the ge neral dread of Innovation and experiment. And these three I confider as including all the principal objections to an alteration in the mode of reprefentation; but the latter I take to be the strongest objection of all; the danger of innovating upon a fabric built with fo much wisdom, and under which so many bleffings have been experienced, having been laid most stress upon by the enemies of reform; who have contended, that the making one amendment will unfettle the foundation of the Conftitution, open a door to more amendments, and that there will be no end to alterations in future. [A cry of Hear! Hear!] The measure which I fhall propofe has a tendency to extinguish thefe objections, to give the Conftitution an uniformity, to render future alterations wholly unneceffary, and, as far as in the nature of things is poffible, to make our free Conftitution immortal. This, I truft, will appear, when I shall state to the Houfe the detail of the plan I have in contemplation to propose. It is only neceffary for me to declare that I fhall neither propofe to alter the number of the members, nor to disfranchise by an act of power any one man in the country, nor to fhake the foundation on which the Conftitution ftands; nor, in fine, to make any innovation whatever, but merely to recur to the original principles of the Constitution, and restore them. There is one leading principle in our Conftitution that has exifted from the earliest periods, viz. that no intereft in the country is unrepresented, Upon referring to the hiftory of Parliaments and the Conftitution, it will be found, that when Parliaments first began, the representation confifted of a reprefentation of the landed interefts, and a reprefentation of certain cities, towns, and boroughs, of the kingdom. The earliest period when Parliaments took any precife form, or became in any fort respectable, was in the reign of Edward the Firft, from which time to the reign of Charles the Second, there have been various additions and diminutions made. It is evident therefore, that

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what I fhall propofe, fo far from its being unprecedented, is warranted by precedents in all periods of our history. It has been an original principle, to lodge a discretion in the executive authority to fummon to Parliament. That discretion now no longer exifts: perhaps it has not been always well exercifed, but it is in principle to be exercised on public grounds and for public objects. It remains for us to inquire into two circumftances: First, if it has been exercised otherwise than discreetly; and fecondly, if alterations that have taken place fince the period in which it has been exercised by the Crown have made it inapplicable. Gentlemen have undoubtedly read, that of the boroughs which used formerly to fend members to Parliament, Seventy-two have been disfranchifed'; that is to fay, that the Crown has ceased to summon them at general elections to return burgeffes to the Houfe of Commons. After the restoration, thirty-fix of these boroughs petitioned Parliament to be restored to the exercise of their ancient franchise; their prayer was granted; and to this day they continue to enjoy it. But the other thirty-fix not having prefented any petition on the fubject, have not recovered their loft franchise. Various alterations have been made at different times. At one time the boroughs were added, but the counties were nearly ftationary. The laft addition to them were the two Counties Palatine. In that manner they continued for a confiderable time, till the principality of Wales was added. Then came the Revolution; and fince that, the whole kingdom of Scotland was added by the Act of Union. So that the prefent alteration is no new meafure. Nay, fo long ago as the reign of Edward the First, one hundred or more boroughs were added. It is therefore juft as fair to contend, that the present is not more the true Conftitution of this country than that was which exifted in the time of Edward the First, or at any other period fubfequent to that reign. My wish on the prefent occafion is, to lay down a principle in one inftance that shall not be left to caprice or uncertainty, but fhall

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