liaments and frequent general elections; but it is apparently the interest of Minifters, especially wicked Ministers, to have Parliaments as long, and general elections as feldom, as poffible; therefore I hope it will be granted, that annual Parliaments are more agreeable to the reason of things, and the nature of our Conftitution, than Parliaments of any longer duration; and of this we must be convinced even to demonftration, if we will but confider, that we are, properly speaking, the Attornies of the People. Is it prudent, is it reasonable, that any man should give a power of attorney irrevocable for a long term of years? Shall a whole people do what would be the height of foolishness in every individual? The People, or at least such of them as have any knowledge of public affairs, and by such the rest are generally governed; I fay, the People may guefs at what fort of bu finefs is to come before the next enfuing feffion of Parliament, and they may choose an attorney, who, they think. has capacity and integrity enough for tranfacting that fort of business for them; but they cannot so much as guefs at what may come before Parliament in a course of seven years, nor can they depend upon the continuance of any man's integrity for fuch a number of years. It is therefore most unnatural and unreasonable to force the People to give an irrevocable power of attorney for fuch a long term. The practice. was first introduced under the reign of Richard II. and was approved of by a Parliament that in every instance betrayed the liberties of the People they represented, and sacrificed the intereft of their country to the violent paffions of their Sovereign and the infatiable avarice of his Minifters. They concealed from him, or mifrepresented the discontents and murmurings of his People; and thereby led him into a deceitful fecurity, which foon ended in his ruin, and the advancement of the Duke of Hereford, or rather Lancafter, to the Throne, without any other title than that of hay, ing refcued the People from flavery,

This, Sir, was the fate of the Prince who firft introduced long Parliaments; and therefore from experience, as well as reafon, we may be convinced that fhort Parliaments, and frequent general elections, are moft for the intereft of the King; but unluckily the intereft of Ministers lies, as I have faid, upon the other fide of the queftion, not only for the fake of preventing the Members of this House from being affected with the cries and groans of the People, but for another reason, which is ftill more effectual for their wicked purposes; I mean, that of corruption. From the very principle adopted by all wicked Minifters, that every man has his price, it is evident to a demonstration, that a minifterial corruption may be more fuccefsful at elections when they are but rarely to happen, than when they occur annually; and that a Minifter may more probably obtain a corrupt majority in a long Parliament than a fhort one. To draw the comparison between annual and feptennial Parliaments, and firft with regard to elections, in every county, in every little borough of the kingdom, it must be granted that there are fome gentlemen who have a natural intereft; they are acquainted with and efteemed by the leading men in the county or borough; and many of the lower clafs, perhaps, fupport their families by the employment they have from fuch gentlemen and their friends. If elections were allowed to go in their natural courfe, fuch men only would be chofen who had the greatest natural intereft; but againft fuch an one a Court candidate, with the Treafury at his back, comes to fet up, and to fet up upon the ministerial principle, that every man has his price; which, for argument's fake, I fhall allow to be a true one, and I am forry it has of late years been fo much confirmed by experience. Suppofe then, that every one of the electors in this county or borough has his price, or that a man in tolerable circumftances will facrifice his country, his friends, and his character, or a tradefiman his employment, for what appears

appears to him to be a trifle; we must therefore suppose, that a man whofe price is feven guineas, will not sell his vote for one; nor will a man, whose price is seven hundred, fell his vote for one hundred. Now, fuppofe the Treasury could fecure a majority in this borough for seven guineas a man, this they may spare to give for a seven-years Parliament, but cannot spare to give fo much every year: therefore, in annual Parliaments, this borough will return to, and be governed in its election, by what we call the natural intereft; whereas in feptennial Parliaments it will always be governed by corruption.

I know it may be faid, Sir, that a man who fells his vote for feven guineas to a feptennial-parliament candidate, will fell it for one to an annual-parliament candidate; because he knows he may fell it for the fame price yearly, and an annuity of one guinea yearly, is better than seven guineas every feven years; but this, I am convinced, will, by experience, be found to be falfe. It is the largeness of the fum that dazzles both the avaricious and luxurious, who feldom think of futurity; if they did, they would never fell their vote at any price; because they know that those who purchase must fell, and that by felling their votes at any price they render not only their liberties but their properties precarious. Befides, no man can be affured of having an opportunity to fell his vote the next enfuing year, and much less can he be fure of felling it yearly for feven years to come; he may die' before the next election; the Administration may be changed, and a new one fet up, that does not ftand in need of corruption a fpirit may arife in his borough that may render it impoffible for any man to hope for fuccefs by corruption; and without hopes of fuccefs no man will be at the expence of corrupting: Many other accidents may happen for disappointing him of ever having an opportunity to fell his vote at an election; and if so, for the fake of one guinea, or fome fuch paltry fum, he ftands branded as long

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as he lives, with the character of a venal betrayer of his country. I therefore think we may with great certainty conclude, that though a man may be tempted to fell his vote for feven guineas to a feptennial-parliament candidate, he will difdain to fell his vote for one guinea to an annual-parliament candidate; and confequently that it is much eafier for a Minister to get the command of a majority of our elections, when they occur but once in feven years, than it would be, if they were made to recur annually.

Now, Sir, with regard to Parliaments, by the fame way of arguing we must be convinced, that it is easier for a Minifter to gain a corrupt majority in a septennial than an annual Parliament. Here again it must be allowed, that different men have different prices, and that a man who will fell his vote in Parliament for 7000l. or even for 3500l. would difdain to fell his vote for 1000l. Suppofe then a Minister fhould not trouble his head with elections; but truft, as a late Minister (Sir Robert Walpole) wantonly faid, to the buying the Members after they were brought up to market, and that by this means a majority had been chofe upon the country interest in these circumftances, the Minister must presently apply himself towards buying off fuch a number of that majority as may be neceffary to throw the majority upon his fide of the question; and is it not evident, that in this attempt he may more probably fucceed in a feptennial than an annual Parliament? In the former, if he offers a penfion of 500l. or 1000l. a year, as long as the gentleman continues a Member, it is immediately confidered as a fum of 7000l. or 3500l. to be paid in feven years; but in the latter, it can be confidered only as a fingle thousand, or a fingle five hundred, because the gentleman who accepted of it, and upon that account deferted the intereft on which he was chofen, would certainly be thrown out upon the next general election.

Sir, if our feptennial Parliaments be longer continued, I shall not wonder to fee the Minifter's letters of recommendation,

dation, with refpect to the choice of any candidate, as im plicitly obeyed in all our counties, cities, and boroughs, as the King's Conge d'Elire is now in the cloyfters of our epifcopal cathedrals; and if this should ever come to be our cafe, I fhall look with indignation upon every man who pretends to be a free Briton. The very pretence would be an infult upon the understanding of him it was addreffed to. We fhould be all flaves: God knows to whom; but I hope it never will be to any Minister from Hanover. I fay, I hope, it never will be to any Minifter from Hanover; though it is hard to tell what a corrupt Parliament may not do, what a corrupt nation may not do, or fubmit to. But happen what will, I am refolved, while I live, to endeavour to prevent fuch a dismal catastrophe; and therefore I fhall conclude with moving for leave to bring in a bill to enforce the calling of a new Parliament every year, after the expiration of this prefent Parliament.

Thomas Carew, Efq; Jan. 29, 1744.

The House of Commons is a branch of the Conftitutution, that has been established by our own Saxon anceftors, at which time they were only annual. They were fet afide for one hundred and forty years by the Normans. On their revival they continued of fhort duration, being moftly annual, till the reign of Henry the VIIIth, where tyranny was never complete until established by that long Parliament. The next long Parliament was that commonly fo called in 1641, who, by establishing their form of fitting, brought the greatest deftruction on the Conftitution. The penfionary Parliament in the reign of Charles the IId was also productive of bad confequences to the Constitution; to remedy which the Triennial Bill was paffed, restraining them from fitting more than three years duration. This was overturned by that breach of the Conftitution in George the First's reign, the voting themfelves feptennial,

and