always to grow more impure the greater distance they run from the fountain head.

I am aware it may be faid, that frequent new Parliaments will produce frequent new expences; but I think quite the contrary. I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, especially as you have provided fo wholesome a law to co-operate upon thefe occafions.

As to bribery at elections, whence did it arife? Not from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being chofe without it; it was the invention of wicked and corrupt Minifters, who have from time to time led weak Princes into fuch deftructive measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural representation of the People. Long Parliaments first introduced bribery, because they were worth purchafing at any rate; country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely on, and have no mercenary ends to serve, are unable to oppose it, especially if at any time the public treasure shall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs. Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts, but as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the time of a fresh struggle is at so great a distance, they at last grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair. Defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of ftate understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections, They know that the spirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive by conftant action, that it is impoffible to enslave this nation, whilft it is perpetually upon its guard. Let country gentlemen then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themselves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good this will raife that zeal and indignation,

which will at last get the better of thofe undue influences, by which the Officers of the Crown, though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortunes, who live in their neighbourhood. I do not fay this upon idle fpeculation only. I live in a county where it is too well known, and I will appeal to many gentlemen in this Houfe, to more out of it (and who are fo for this very reason) for the truth of this affertion. It is a fore that has long been eating into the vitals of our Conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom; for if a Minifter should ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs, if he should keep a register of them in his closet, and by fending down his treasury mandates, fhould procure a spurious representation of the People, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the moft contradictory measures of his Administration, and even to vote every crude, indigefted dream of their Patron. into a law; if the maintenance of his power should become the fole object of their attention, and they should be guilty of the most violent breach of parliamentary truft, by giving the King a discretionary liberty of taxing the people without limitation or controul-the laft fatal compliment they can pay to the Crown-if this fhould ever be the unhappy circumstances of this nation, the People, indeed, may complain; but the doors of that place where their complaints should be heard, will for ever be shut against them.

The power of the Crown is very juftly apprehended to be growing to a monftrous, I should have faid, too great a fize, and feveral methods have been unfuccefsfully propofed for reftraining it within its proper bounds.

But our difcourfe, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this motion is wifely intended to remove the first and principal diforder, Give the People their antient right

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right of frequent new elections; they will restore the decayed authority of Parliaments, and will put our conftitu tion into a natural condition of working out her own cure.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that I cannot express a greater zeal for His Majefty, and for the liberties of the people, or the honor and dignity of this Houfe, than by feconding the motion which the honorable gentleman has made you.

Sir John Saint Aubyn, March 13, 1784.

What may now be the way of thinking with fome gentlemen amongst us, about the liberties of their country, I fhall not pretend to determine, Sir, but if people's way of thinking can be learned from their fpeeches and declarations, I am very certain, that their former way of thinking was, that the liberties of this country would not be preferved, unless fome proper methods thould speedily be taken for preventing the effect of minifterial corruption, both in Parliament and at elections; and that the most proper and ef fectual method for this purpose, was to make elections as frequent as poffible. This, I am fure, was formerly their way of thinking; I hope it is fo ftill; but whether it is fo or not, it is a right way of thinking; and therefore I fhall conclude what I have now to fay, with a motion for returning to our antient method, of having a new Parliament every year chofen. That this was our antient Conftitution cannot be difputed, because it is fo exprefly declared by two acts of parliament in Edward III.'s reign, that a Parliament fhall be annually holden; and every one knows that long prorogations or adjournments were not then introduced or known; fo that the meaning of both thefe laws must be, that a Parliament fhould be every year chofen as well as had, which is the opinion of all thofe that have wrote upon the fubje&t; and if we confider the nature and bufinefs of this Affembly, it is certainly agreeable to reafon it should be fo,

The

The Members of this Houfe, Sir, are the great and general inquifitors of the nation; we are to take notice of, and to take proper methods for redreffing all the grievances that occur, whether they be fuch as relate to the kingdom in general, or fuch as relate to the particular counties, cities, or boroughs we reprefent. Now, as grievances are almost annually occurring, and as fome grievances are the more difficult to be removed, the longer they continue; therefore it is neceffary we should vifit our Conftituents, at least, once a year, to know their fentiments, and to examine, upon the fpot, the grievances they complain of; but this is not to be expected, unless you make the elections annual; for we find by experience, that after gentlemen are once chosen for a long term of years, they fix their abode in this city, and seldom re-vifit their Conftituents, till it becomes neceffary for them to go down to folicit their votes at a new election. Nay, fince the establishment of feptennial Parliaments, we have often had gentlemen in this House, who never saw the borough that fent them hither, nor knew any thing of its Conftitution or intereft, perhaps could not recollect its name, till they looked into the printed lifts of Parliament, for their own name, and there found they represent such a borough.

Another part of our business, Sir, is to reprefent to our Sovereign the fentiments of our Conftituents, with regard to the measures he is advised by his Minifters to pursue, as well as with regard to the perfons he employs in the executive part of the government. If we ever think of doing this faithfully and fincerely, we muft vifit our Constituents at least once a year, because every year produces fome new measure, and every year fome new perfons are introduced into public business. This, I fay, is another part of our duty, and when it is faithfully or fincerely performed, it is of great advantage to the Prince upon the throne, because it prevents his being led on in a track of unpopular measures,

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till both he and his Minifters are overwhelmed in the torrent of popular refentment, which often happens in arbitrary countries, where the Prince is tumbled headlong from his throne, before he knows any thing of his having pursued unpopular or wrong measures; whereas, had he had timely information, he might have restored himself to the love and affection of his subjects, by making a just sacrifice of his wicked Counsellors to the refentment of his oppreffed people. As the Prince can have no interest separate from his People, his intereft if he rightly confiders it, must lead him to gain the love and efteem of his People, and to avoid every thing that may give them discontent: It is, therefore, his intereft to have always a House of Commons that knows, and will faithfully and fpeedily represent to him, the complaints and grievances of his People; but this is directly oppofite to the intereft of his Minifters. In all countries, and in this as much as any other, Ministers have an interest sepa rate from that of the People; they are for enriching themfelves, their families, tools, and fycophants, at the expence of the People; and it is their bufinefs to keep all the avenues to the Throne fhut up against the complaints of the People, left the Prince fhould, as every wife one will, facrifice them to his own fecurity. Minifters must, therefore, be for having always a House of Commons, that either does not know, or will not faithfully reprefent to their Sovereign the complaints and grievances of the People; and as we are much more affected with what we fee than with what we only hear of, it is the bufinefs of a Minister to prevent the Members of this Houfe, if poffible, from ever seeing their Conftituents; because, the lefs we are affected with, the more eafily we may be prevailed on, to conceal from our Sovereign, or even to mifrepresent to him, the complaints of the People.

Thus, Sir, it is apparently the intereft of the King, it is apparently the intereft of the Country, to have fhort Par

liaments