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ways have a due regard, though I have not the honour to reprefent them.

Mr. William Bromley, March 13, 1734.

The honourable gentleman who made this motion, has fup→ ported the neceffity of it by so many strong and forcible arguments, that there is hardly any thing new to be offered. I am very fenfible, therefore, of the difadvantages I muft lie under, in attempting to feek after him, and I fhould content myself with barely feconding him, if the fubject matter of this debate was not of fo great importance, that I fhould be ashamed to return to my electors, without endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publicly the reafons, which induced me to give my moft ready affent to this question.

It is evident from what has been faid, that the people have an unquestionable right to frequent new Parliaments by ancient ufage, and that this ufage has been confirmed by feveral laws, which has been progreffively made by our-ancestors, as often as they found it neceffary to infift on this effential privilege.

Parliaments were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He was a Prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every restraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice as they ftood in the way of his avarice, or disappointed his ambition: he therefore introduced long Parliaments, because he very well knew, that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a flavish obedience they paid to all his measures is fufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of Charles I. we muft acknowledge him to be a Prince of a contrary temper; he certainly had an innate love for religion and virtue, and of confequence for the liberty of his country. But here lay the misVOL. II. fortune

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fortune he was led from his natural difpofition by fyco phants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling frequent Parliaments; and therefore by not taking the conftant fenfe of the people in what he did, he was worked up into fo high a notion of prerogative, that the Commons, in order to reftrain it, obtained that independent fatal power, which at last unhappily brought him to a moft tragical end, and, at the fame time fubverted the whole Constitution; and I hope we shall learn this leffon from it, never to compliment the Crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the People those rights which by ancient ufuage they are entitled to; but to preserve that just and equal balance, from which they will derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our Conftitution the envy and admiration of the world.

King Charles II. naturally took a furfeit of Parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely defirous to lay them afide: but this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect he did fo; for he obtained a Parliament, which by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly difciplined to his own measures, that they knew no other command, but from that perfon who gave them their pay.

This was a fafe and moft ingenious way of enflaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here. The people were, therefore, amufed, with the fpecious form of their antient Conftitution: It exifted, indeed, in their fancy; but like a mere phantom, had no fubftance, or reality in it; for the power, the authority, the dignity of Parliament were wholly loft. This was that remarkable Parliament, which fo juftly obtained the opprobrious name of the Penfioners Parliament, and was the model from which, I believe, fome latter Parliaments have been exactly copied.

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At the time of the Revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges, and as they had fo lately experienced the misfortune of long and fervile Parliaments, it was then declared, that they should be held frequently. But it seems their full meaning was not understood by this declaration, and therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties fhould be specifically manifefted, the Parliament never ceased struggling with the Crown till the triennial law was obtained. The preamble of it, is extremely full and strong, and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which, I apprehend, that though this law did not immediately take place at the time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of the first meaning; and therefore ftands as part of that original contract, under which the Conftitution was then fettled. His Majefty's title to the Crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if, upon a review, there shall appear to be any deviation from it, we ought to hear them. as fo many injuries done to that title. And I dare fay, that this House, which has gone through fo long a series of fervices for His Majefty, will at last be willing to revert to thefe original stated measures of Government, to renew and ftrengthen that title.

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But I think the manner in which the feptennial law was first introduced, is a very strong reason why it should be repealed. People in their fears have very often recourfe to defperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in feason, will themselves prove fatal to that Conftitution which they were meant to fecure. Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconveniency: the inconveniency is removed, but the mifchievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the Conftitution of Parliaments, but it extended that fame Parliament beyond its natural duration; and therefore carries this moft unjuft implication with it, that you may at any

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time ufurp the most indubitable, the most effential privilege of the People, I mean that of choofing their own reprefentatives; a precedent of fuch a dangerous confequence, of so fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our Statute Book if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to posterity.

This is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit; let us take advantage of it, to repeal those laws which infringe on our liberties, and introduce fuch as may reftore the vigour of our ancient Conftitution.

Human nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed. Long Parliaments become therefore independent of the People; and when they do fo, there always happens a most dangerous dependence elsewhere..

It has of late been denied that the People have a right of remonftrating to us. It has been called on unjustifiable control upon our proceedings. But then let them have more frequent opportunities of varying the choice of their reprefentatives, that they may difmifs fuch who have unfaithfully withdrawn their attention from them.

The influencing powers of the Crown are daily increafing, and it is highly requifite that Parliaments should be frequent-ly refponfible to their Conftituents; that they should be kept under the constant awe of acting contrary to their interefts. Modern history, I believe, will inform us, that fome very dangerous attempts upon our liberties have been `difappointed; not fo much from the virtue of many in this House, as from the apprehenfions they may have had of an approaching election.

It is true there is a provifion against fuch whofe places. vacate their feats here, but this is no guard against secret Penfioners and place-holders. Give me leave to fay, that the laws, with refpect to them, are very infufficient, and as

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we are not allowed to make them effectual, the people have no other remedy but a new election.

I think that long Parliaments are a great hardship on those who may be excluded out of this Houfe, and ought reafonably to take their turn: but seven years is the purchase of a man's life. It is equally hard upon fuch, whose private for

tunes will not admit them to engage in fo long and painful a fervice. It must be so to those who mean no view or advantage by it.

I think too, that nothing can be of greater use to His Majefty than frequent new Parliaments; that he may often take the fresh fenfe of the nation, and not be partially advised. For his measures will always have a greater weight both at home and abroad, the more generally he refers himself to the opinion of the People.

A farther mifchief of long Parliaments is, that a Minister has time and opportunities of getting acquaintance with Members, and of practifing his several arts to win them into his fchemes. But this must be the work of time. Corruption is of fo base a nature, that at the first fight it is extremely fhocking. Hardly any one has fubmitted to it all at once. His difpofition must be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many struggles that he furrenders his virtue. Indeed, there are fome who plunge themselves head over ears into any bafe action; but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proced only by leifure degrees. One or two perhaps have deferted their colours the firft campaign, fome have done it a fecond. But a great many, who have not that eager difpofition to vice, will wait till a third.

For this reason, fhort Parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are obferved, like ftreams of water,

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