PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

THE call of the Houfe being adjourned to a very remote day, upon a general opinion, which I hope is well founded, that no vote of credit will be propofed. I believe we can fcarcely expect a fuller House than this day produces. There cannot, therefore, be a better opportunity for making a motion, which I apprehend to be of such a national concernment, that I have long wished it undertaken by fome perfon better able to support it than myself: but I have this fatisfaction, that what I am going to offer will fo far fpeak for itself, as may supply any defects in my manner of laying it before you, and I cannot doubt the concurrence of this Houfe, when it comes to be maturely confidered.

I believe we are none of us unapprifed of the diflike the people in general have always had to long Parliaments; a diflike juftly founded on reason and experience; long Partliaments in former reigns having proved the unhappy cause of great calamities to this nation, and having been at all times declared an innovation upon our conftitution. I am con→ vinced there is no one that hears me, who does not believe the people thought themfelves highly aggrieved by the feptennial bill: that they even looked upon it as a dangerous infringement of their liberties, notwithstanding the cause alledged in the preamble to the acts which feemed at that time to carry fome weight with it.

That claufe being happily removed, they defire to revert, as near as may be, to their ancient conftitution, and furely there never can be a more favourable opportunity to effectuate it than at this juncture, when his Majefty, to the great joy of the nation, has been gracioufly pleased to declare. his fatisfaction, that the people are foon to have an opportunity of chufing a new Representation. The prefent Parlia

ment

ment draws near its diffolution; what can it do more for its own honour? How can it crown its many meritorious acts better, than by redreffing a grievance, which a fucceeding Parliament may poffibly have its reafons for not entering into?

Frequent Parliaments were early declared a fundamental part of the Conftitution. In the fourth of Edward the Third, an act paffed for holding them once a year, or oftener, if there fhould be occafion. In the 36th year of the fame reign, that ftatute was confirmed. In that Parlia ment, Magna Charta and Charta de Forefta, were confirmed, and feveral new privileges granted to the subject. Then comes the claufe relating to Parliament, which fufficiently fhews the intention and original inftitution of them was, for the redress of grievances: for the bill enacts, That for the maintenance of the faid articles and ftatutes; that is, the privileges before mentioned, and for redress of divers grievances and mischiefs, which daily happen, a new Parliament fhall be held once every year, as at another time was ordained. The 16th of Charles the Second recites, that by the ancient laws and ftatutes, Parliaments used to be held very often, and therefore enacts, that the fitting and holding of Parliaments fhall not be intermitted, or difcontinued, for more than three years.

In the early days when this prudent care was taken for frequent meeting of Parliaments, the Crown was poffeffed of revenues, which made application to the people for money, unless upon extraordinary emergencies, unneceffary. It therefore plainly appears, that redrefs of grievances, making falutary laws for the good of the community, and preferving the liberties of the people, by supporting a due balance between the power of the Crown and the rights of the fubjects, were the main ends for calling Parliaments. The power of calling them being the undoubted prerogative of the Crown, it became neceffary, for the safety of the subject,

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to oblige the Crown to call them frequently. I must confefs, a caution of this kind is no longer neceffary, nor can it ever be, fo long as we preserve to ourselves the power of granting money; the Crown revenues being funk, or wantonly granted away, the annual call for a supply must neceffarily produce an annual meeting of Parliament. But give me leave to obferve, the grievance now complained of is of a very different nature. It is not founded on discontinuance of Parliament; but on a too long and dangerous continuance of one and the fame Parliament: a practice unheard of in former times, when prerogations were not known: for when a Parliament was annually called together for the redrefs of grievances, as foon as the business of the feffion was over, it was diffolved, and a new one called the next year for the fame purpofe; by which means the country had a proper check upon their Respresentatives, and those who appeared to be too much under the influence of the Crown; those who were too much attached to the Minifter, had lefs opportunity of injuring their country; the people had it more frequently in their power to fhew a proper refentment, and remedy the evil, by fending others in their places next year.

This matter feems fully explained by 16 Car. II. which does not only prevent difcontinuance of Parliaments, but wifely provides against the too long continuance of one and the fame Parliament, by enacting it into a law, that a new Parliament fhall be called once in three years, or oftener, if there be occafion. The Bill of Rights in the fecond feffion of William and Mary, among many other privileges which we poffefs, enacts, that for redress of grievances, amending, ftrengthening, and preserving laws, Parliaments ought to be frequently held; and the fixth of the fame reign explains the true meaning of the clause, when it declares, that frequent and new Parliaments tend very much to the happy

union and good agreement between the King and the peo

ple;

ple; it confirms the 16th of Car. II. that Parliaments shall be held once in three years at least, and adds, that no Parliament fhall continue more than three years at fartheft. Between that and the firft of the late King, feveral Parliaments were held, and none continued longer than three years; fome held for one feffion, which feems to be the original conftitution, and best calculated for the good of the nation. That year the feptennial bill paffed, the repeal of which I am going to move, but believe it more agreeable to the rules of the Houfe, that the act itself should be first read. [Here the Clerk read the act] The preamble to the bill, which is the foundation of it, will, I think, admit a very easy anfwer; as to the first point, that triennial Parliaments have proved more grievous, burdenfome, and expensive, than they were ever known before that law was paffed, I readily agree; but let us confider the caufe; the lengthening the term occafioned the expence. I fear I might add, the multiplicity of places enjoyed by the Members of this House, may be too justly alledged another caufe; but I would willingly confine myself to the particular point, how far the time or duration of Parliaments might increase or leffen the expence, might add to, or diminish the grievance complained of? and will confider it only in this light, by fubmitting it to every gentleman who hears me, whether he would not give more for an annuity of three years than for a grant determinable at the end of one? and by the fame parity of reasoning, whether feptennial Parliaments must not prove more grievous, burdenfome, and expensive, than triennial, at least, in fuch a degree as an annuity for seven years deferves a better confideration than one for three?

But fuppofing I should be out in this point, which I can never give up without due conviction, this argument in the preamble is, I hope, entirely at an end. The act against Bribery and Corruption, which must ever redound

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to the honour of this Parliament, will neceffarily remedy this evil: that glorious act will prevent corruption in the electors. Nothing but frequent new Parliaments can remedy it in the elected.

The other reafon upon which that act was founded, namely, a fufpicion that designs were carrying on to renew the rebellion, and an invafion from abroad, was, in my humble opinion, the only justifiable pretence for enacting it into a law, and might poffibly have induced fome gentlemen of very great honour and integrity to give their votes for the bill at that jun&ture, whose affiftance, I flatter myfelf, I fhall have now in repealing it. For those who voted for it from that view, could never intend it fhould be made perpetual, or that it should continue longer than that misfortune fubfifted.

I must beg pardon of you, Sir, and of the House, for the trouble I have given you. The nature of the motion, I am going to make you, has unavoidably drawn me into a length as difagreeable to myself, as it must have been to those that hear me. Numberlefs arguments will occur to every gentleman in favour of it, I will therefore conclude with this motion, viz.

That leave be given to bring in a bill for repealing the Septennial Act, and for the more frequent meeting and call, ing of Parliaments.

In this, Sir, I hope I fhall be justified, as it cannot proceed from any indirect or private views; but from a real conviction that the happiness and safety of this nation des pends upon it, in which I am fupported by the common voice of the people, and have it particularly recommended to me by a great majority of those I have the honour of representing in Parliament, as well as from my neighbours of the city of Coventry, for whofe recommendation I shall al

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