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and this maxim has been confirmed and enforced by most of the great Kings that ever reigned in this kingdom. Under our glorious King Edward the First was that ftatute made, which is called, The First of Weftminfter; and, by the fifth chapter of that ftatute, it is exprefly ordained, "That no great man, or any other perfon, fhall, by force, by malice, or by threats, any way difpute the freedom of election, under the pain of grievous forfeiture;" which is a law ftill in force, and a law that relates to all elections made, or to be made, within this kingdom; and fo careful were our ancestors of preserving this freedom of election, that even requests and earneft folicitations were, in fuch cafes, deemed unlawful, as may appear from that ftatute which was made in the feventh of Henry the Fourth, and from the fourteenth chapter of the ftatute called articuli cleri, which was made in the reign of Edward the Second; for it was by them moft reasonably concluded, that if any great or powerful man was allowed but to requeft or folicit a man for his vote at any election, that request or folicitation would have the fame effect as if he had actually threatened that man, or made promises to him for giving his vote as directed; because every man would naturally prefume, that if he complied with the great man's requeft he might expect his favour, and if he denied his request he must expect his malice.

From hence it is plain, my Lords, that by the very nature of the thing, as well as by the ftatute and common law of the dingdom, it is highly criminal in any great man to request or folicit votes at any election; but it must be ftill more criminal in any man actually to give or to promise any money, or other reward, upon fuch an occafion, efpecially in any thing that relates to a right of fitting in the Houfe. And what appears to be the undoubted law of this kingdom, is so far from being derogated from by the union between the two nations, that it is in the particular cafe, now before us, expreffly confirmed by that act which was made by the Parliament of Scotland, for fettling the manner of electing the fixteen Peers; and

which act is, by the Parliament of both nations, declared to be as valid as if the fame had been part of the articles of union.

Since then it appears, that the refolution now propofed, namely, “That it is the opinion of this House, that any perfon or perfons taking upon him or them to engage any Peers of Scotland, by threets, promife of place or penfion, or any reward or gratuity whatfoever from the Crown, to vote for any Peer, or lift of Peers, to reprefent the Peerage of Scotland in Parliament, is an high infult on the juftice of the Crown, an incroachment on the freedom of elections, and highly injurious to the honour of the Peerage," is nothing but a declaration of what is now the law of Great Britain, I can fee no reason for our not complying with the motion which the noble Duke has been pleased to make us; but, on the contrary, I fee many and ftrong reasons for our agreeing to it, for it certainly will inforce the laws now in being; it will put people in mind that there are fuch laws, and will contribute greatly towards terrifying those who may hereafter have evil intentions from being guilty of thofe practices which they know to have been so totally condemned by this Houfe; and fuch a refolution is at prefent the more neceffary, because of the great complaints now fo generally made over the whole nation against such practices. Bribery and corruption, in elections of all kinds, is now fo univerfally complained of, that it is become highly neceffary for this House to come to fome vigorous refolutions against it, in order to convince the world, that it has not as yet got within thefe walls. It has already, I am afraid, got too firm a footing in fome other parts of our Conftitution; what is now propofed will not, I am afraid, Le a fufficient barrier, but I am very fure, if fomething is not very speedily done, if fome effectual measures are not foon taken against that deadly foe to our Conftitution; I fay, I am very fure, that in a fhort time corruption will become fo general, that no man will be afraid to corrupt, no man will be afhamed of being corrupted.

Though

any

Though it cannot be affirmed, my Lords, that any undue influence has as yet been made ufe of in the election of the fixteen Peers of Scotland, though it cannot be suspected, that fuch influence will ever be allowed of, much less approved of by His prefent Majefty, yet no man can tell how foon fuch a thing may be attempted; and the circumstances of many of the Peers of that nation give us great reason to be jealous of fuch attempts. It must be allowed, that there are many of them who have the misfortune of having but small estates ;' it is well known, that many of them have commiffions in the army, or places in the Government, depending upon the pleafure of the Crown; and it must be granted, that fome of them cannot well support the dignity of their titles, and the ancient grandeur of their families, without fuch commiffion in the army, or poft in the Government. If, then, any future ambitious Prince fhould think of fecuring, by illegal means, a majority in this Houfe, in order to deftroy the liberties of his people; or if any wicked Minifter, who had got the leading. of a weak Prince, fhould think of getting a corrupt majority in this House, in order to fecure him against an impeachment from the other, are not we naturally to conclude, that the first attempt of fuch a King, or fuch a Minifter, would be to fecure the fixteen Peers from Scotland.

In fuch a cafe, a Court lift, or rather a Ministerial lift, would certainly be fent down, and every Peer of Scotland that did not vote plump for that lift, would be under-hand threatened with being turned out of his commiffion in the army or navy, or out of his employinent under the Government; and others would be induced to vote for it by fecret promifes of preferment, or of being provided for. The noble families of Scotland are, my Lords, as ancient, and have always behaved with as much honour, as the nobility of any nation under the fun; but, in fuch cafes, how hard might be the fate of fome of the representatives of the noble families of that kingdom? They muft ungratefully vote against thofe who, perhaps, procured

them

them their commiffions, or the posts they enjoy; they muft vote for thofe they know to be men of no worth or honour; men whom they know to be mere tools of power; or otherwife they must expect to be stript of all their preferments under the Government, and thereby rendered incapable of fupporting themselves in their native country as noblemen, perhaps even as gentlemen. This is a misfortune which certainly may happen: this, my Lords, is a misfortune which, in regard to our country, in regard to the honour and dignity of this House, in regard to our own families, we ought to provide againft, and we cannot provide against it too soon.

I fay, my Lords, that it is a misfortune which, in regard even to our own families, we ought to provide against; for it is well known, that there is but feldom any difference between the Royal and the Ministerial power. There can never be any difference between the two, but when there is a just, a wise, and an active Prince upon the throne; for when there is an ambitious, and an unjuft Prince upon the throne, his Ministers will readily fubmit; he will make every thing fubmit to his power if he can; and when a weak or an indolent Prince happens to be upon the throne, the whole Royal power will always be lodged with the Ministers, and generally in one prime Minister; and as fuch Minifters always endeavour to act in an arbitrary way, they never will employ any but those who will meanly fubmit to be their tools; all others they will endeavour to oppose or destroy. It is certain, that men of great families and fortunes, who have any sense or penetration, will never so easily submit to the arbitrary views of an ambitious Prince, nor will they fo eafily fubmit to be the tools of an over-bearing Minifter, as fools or mean upftarts; and, therefore, no fuch Prince or prime Minister never will employ any of them, if they can do without. While the ancient dignity and weight of this House is preserved, the ancient and great families of the kingdom will be able to confine the reins of an ambitious Prince, and to force him to delegate a juft proportion of his power to

them;

them; and they will always be in a condition to force themfelves in upon a prime Minifter, not as his tools, but as his partners in power. But if it should once come to be in the power of a prince, or Minifter, to fecure, by difhonourable means, a majority in this House, the greatest part of our pofterity will for ever be excluded from all share in the Government of their country; none but mean tools of power, and knavish upstarts, will be employed in the Administration; and, perhaps, even our next fucceffors may fee a wicked and overbearing prime Minister of State at the head of a parcel of fools and knaves, carrying things in the House by a majority, contrary to the opinion of the generality of mankind out of doors, and contrary to the opinion of every honeft man of fense within.

To me, my Lords, it is as clear as demonftration, that an utter exclufion of all the nobility in Great Britain, who had either honour or good fenfe, from any share in the Adminiftration, will be the certain confequence of the Court's getting it in their power, to fecure, by corruption, a majority in this House. But, I am much afraid, the misfortune would not stop here; I am afraid, that such a Court would foon begin to think of getting rid of every family in the nation which could be any way troublesome, to them; and of fuch a refolution, my Lords, fupported by fuch a majority, how fatal might be the confequences to every one of your Lordships' families, which happened unfortunately, at that time, to have a reprefentative beloved in his country, and efteemed for his great honour, and his good fenfe. Of fuch confequences I have the most terrible apprehenfions; I hope no fuch case will ever happen; but I muft defire your Lordships to confider how great an influence a number of fixteen fuch votes might have upon all the refolutions of this Houfe. Look into your journals, look into the hiftories of this nation, and you will fee how many questions, queftions in which the very being of our Conftitution was deeply concerned, have been carried against

the

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