closed by these proceedings. If the assignment by the defendant to the receiver had been forced upon it at the instance of a creditor, this might have been regarded as an in invitum proceeding: Catlin v. Wilcox Silver-Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 18 Am. St. Rep. 338. As it is, that question is not involved, for the conveyance made to protect its interests, and under a decree which three-quarters of its shareholders had sought and none opposed, cannot fairly be regarded as other than a voluntary one. It was an exercise of the jus disponendi which is incident to ownership. It placed the goods which were its subject precisely where the defendant wished to have them placed, at the disposal of one representing primarily all its creditors and secondarily all its shareholders. This wish had been first expressed by the vote to wind up; then by the consent to an immediate hearing on a petition by three-quarters of the shareholders for the appointment of a receiver to aid in carrying out the vote; then by making no opposition to such an appointment, by what was virtually a consent decree; and finally by transferring to him whatever title it could to all that it possessed.

The effect of such a transfer on goods in another state is not to be determined simply by the rule of comity which is applicable to extraterritorial assignments by operation of law; but rests on the general principles of jurisprudence as to the right of everyone to dispose of what he owns: Egbert v. Baker, 58 Conn. 319; First Nat. Bank v. Walker, 61 Conn. 154.

The Davies & Thomas Company has come into this state 357 to secure, at the hands of a court of equity, the benefit of a winding-up suit, in the course of which it has acquired a special advantage by a seizure of assets of the estate in another jurisdiction, with actual notice of the pendency of the action, and equitable notice of the receiver's title under the conveyance which has been under consideration. No one can claim the benefit of such a proceeding without renouncing every right which is inconsistent with its proper object. That object is, primarily, to dispose of all the property which the defendant owned at the commencement of the suit, subject to existing liens and lawful preferences, for the equal benefit of all its creditors. This cannot be accomplished, if, without leave of the court, new liens can be created upon it or preferences secured, upon no new consideration, during the pendency of the action. The benefit of the first attachment can be lawfully retained. That of the second must be renounced, and the property taken upon it considered, as between the receiver and the Davies &

Thomas Company, as assets of the estate which it has wrongfully converted, and for which it must account, before it can be allowed to share as a creditor in the estate. The measure of liability is the fair value of the goods at the date of the attachment, with interest: Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479. As it had no equitable right to levy on them, it is immaterial that they brought less than their value at the sheriff's sale.

If the Davies & Thomas Company pays the amount above stated to the receiver, it should be admitted to prove its claim upon its original account against the defendant, less the net proceeds of the goods sold under the first attachment. In ascertaining such proceeds, no deduction from the gross amount received from their sale should be made on account of fees or costs accruing under the second attachment. If it does not make such payment, its claim should be wholly disallowed: In re Greeley, 70 Conn. 494; Cockerell v. Dickens, 3 Moore P. C. C. 98, 132.

The superior court is advised that the Davies & Thomas Company is not entitled to prove its claim against the estate in the hands of the receiver, unless it first pays him the 358 amount specified in the foregoing opinion, and that, upon such payment, it can prove a claim, but only for the original indebtedness, less the net proceeds of the original attachment, ascertained as indicated in said opinion.

No costs will be taxed in this court in favor of any party.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

RECEIVERS-RIGHTS OF NONRESIDENT CREDITORS TO ATTACH PROPERTY.—A foreign receiver cannot assert title to property within the state, as against the attachment of a resident creditor, especially when the sole purpose of the receivership is to enable the debtor to hinder, delay, and defraud resident creditors: Grogan v. Egbert, 44 W. Va. 75, 67 Am. St. Rep. 763; Holbrook v. Ford, 153 Ill. 633, 46 Am. St. Rep. 917.

RECEIVERS-ATTACHMENT AFTER APPOINTMENT — RIGHTS OF NONRESIDENT CREDITOR.-The general rule is, that property in the hands of a receiver is not subject to attachment: Texas Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1, 26 Am. St. Rep. 776. But, as applied to foreign receivers, the rights of nonresident attaching creditors are paramount in the courts of the state where the attachment is sued out to those of a receiver who was appointed by the court of another state, and whose appointment antedates by issuance of the writ of attachment: Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co. 123 Ind. 477, 18 Am. St. Rep. 338; Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal. 551, 15 Am. St. Rep. 76, and note. But, see Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn. 126, 29 Am. Rep. 668.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-CHANGE OF POSSESSION.-As opposed to the rule in the principal case, it has been held that leaving a debtor in possession of his property is such

a benefit as vitiates an assignment made by him, for the benefit of his creditors: Anderson v. Fuller, McMull. Eq. 27, 36 Am. Dec. 290. Contra, Pike v. Bacon, 21 Me. 280, 38 Am. Dec. 259.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-EFFECT.—A voluntary assignment in insolvency for the benefit of creditors, if valid where made, is valid everywhere, unless repugnant to the law of the place where property of the insolvent is situated, and detrimental to the rights of domestic creditors in the latter jurisdiction: Hayden v. Yale, 45 La. Ann. 362, 40 Am. St. Rep. 232, and note.

MAISENBACKER v. SOCIETY CONCORDIA.

[71 CONNECTICUT, 369.]

PLEADING-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.-Several causes of action may be stated in a single count, when such causes of action are not separate and distinct from one another; that is, separable by some distinct line of demarcation.

DAMAGES-EVIDENCE.-All the attending acts and circumstances, which accompany and give character to an assault, may be given in evidence to enhance the damages.

DAMAGES-MENTAL

SUFFERING.-Mental as well as physical suffering, when properly alleged, may be proved as an element of actual damage, and as naturally and directly resulting from an assault.

DAMAGES.-PUNITIVE damages, which are awarded with the view of punishing the defendant for his wrongful act, may be recovered in Connecticut.

DAMAGES-PUNITIVE-WHEN ALLOWED.-The cases in which punitive damages may be awarded are only those actions of tort, founded on the malicious or wanton misconduct of the defendant, or upon such culpable neglect of the defendant as is tantamount to malicious or wanton misconduct.

DAMAGES-PUNITIVE.-PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, as well as individuals, may for their own acts become liable in punitive damages.

DAMAGES.-EXPENSES OF LITIGATION are not an element of the damages, termed in law actual or compensatory, and can only be considered in those cases in which exemplary damages may be awarded.

DAMAGES.-THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES which can be awarded, in a proper case, is limited to the expenses of litigation in excess of taxable costs.

DAMAGES-MASTER AND SERVANT.-A master is liable for compensatory damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the servant within the scope of his employment.

DAMAGES-MASTER AND SERVANT-AGENCY.-A principal cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the agent.

ex

DAMAGES-PUNITIVE-AGENCY.-No recovery of emplary damages can be had against a principal for the tort of an agent or servant, unless the defendant expressly authorized the act as it was performed, or approved it, or was grossly negligent in hiring the agent or servant.

Action to recover damages for assault and battery, and for the wrongful ejection of the plaintiff from a dance hall. Eugene C. Dempsey and John R. Booth, for the defendant. Daniel Davenport and Howard W. Taylor, for the plaintiff.

875 HALL, J. The complaint alleges in substance that the plaintiff, having contracted with and paid the defendant for the privilege of dancing at a certain ball, was, by the forcible 376 acts of the defendant's agents, prevented from exercising her said right, and was thereby caused pain and damage.

The trial court correctly charged the jury that the complaint described two causes of action, one for personal injury, and the other for a breach of contract. Under the averments of the complaint, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a verdict upon proof either that she was forcibly prevented from dancing, as alleged, or that the defendant's agents, without using force, unlawfully deprived her of the privilege which was granted to her by her contract with the defendant.

We have no occasion to decide whether these two causes of action should have been stated in separate counts. Several causes of action may be stated in a single count, when such causes of action are not separate and distinct from each other; that is, separable from each other "by some distinct line of demarcation": Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 563. The defendant, not having demurred to the complaint, has waived the question whether the two causes of action were improperly joined in one count: Practice Book, p. 17, rule 4, sec. 13.

Apparently, no question was made at the trial but that under the pleadings the plaintiff, upon proof that the defendant's agent forcibly prevented her from dancing, became entitled to a verdict for a sum sufficient to indemnify her for the actual injuries she sustained, and which were the direct and natural consequences of the wrongful act complained of. The complaint alleges that in consequence of the assault the plaintiff was deprived of the privileges of the ball, that she suffered physical and mental pain and anguish, and lost her earnings in the trade at which she had been employed. The court instructed the jury that in determining the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded the plaintiff, they might take into consideration the indignity she had suffered by an assault in so public a place, the mental as well as her physical suffering

which it caused her, and such loss as had been proved she had thereby sustained from inability to work at her trade.

"All the attending acts and circumstances which accompany 377 and give character to the assault may be given in evidence to enhance the damages": Brzezinski v. Tierney, 60 Conn. 55, 62. Mental as well as physical suffering, when properly alleged, may be proved as an element of actual damage, and as naturally and directly resulting from an assault of the character described in the complaint: Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392, 396; Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. *290, *298; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. *293, 299. The defendant has no cause to complain of the charge of the court with reference to the elements which go to make up compensatory damages.

The complaint alleges that the defendant's agent, in committing the assault, "addressed the plaintiff in loud, threatening, and insulting language," and that the assault upon the plaintiff was "committed in a gross, wanton, and reckless manner, and with intent to" injure the plaintiff.

"

The defendant, in effect, requested the court to charge the jury that the defendant society could not, upon the proof presented, be held liable in exemplary damages. The court did not comply with this request, but instructed the jury that in case they found that a battery had been inflicted upon the plaintiff by the defendant's agent, "wantonly, maliciously, or in wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights," they might add to that sum which they should find sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries, "a sum as exemplary or punitive damages,' and might award her as punitive damages such sum as the jury, from their "knowledge of the course of business in the courts of law in this state," should find "to be her expense in conducting this trial," less the taxable costs which she would recover. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for three hundred dollars. We have not the evidence in the case before us; but from the finding of facts and from the charge of the court, stating the claims of the parties as to the character and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, we think the jury may, under such instruction, have included in their verdict, as an element of damages, the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in conducting her trial, less the taxable costs; and unless this is a case in which such expenses could lawfully be recovered, the 378 charge of the court was incorrect and a new trial should be granted.

That a plaintiff may, in an action for an assault and battery and in certain other actions of tort, recover certain damages