The extent of the land about a passenger station which may be appropriated as station grounds is determined by the railroad company, with the approval of the proper authorities of the state, in view of the number of those who will probably have lawful occasion to use the station from time to time, and the accommodations necessary for their convenience and for the proper management of the road.

Every one who is driven to a station to take passage on a train can select his own conveyance, but he has no absolute 147 right to insist on its admission within the station grounds. His driver has no greater right. These grounds may be, and in cities often must be, so cramped as to preclude the entrance of any vehicles so employed. Where the space is greater, the question of admitting them is to be determined wholly by the convenience of the passenger and the railroad company. That of the driver or owner of the vehicle need not be consulted, except so far as it is involved in that of those whom he is carrying to the station.

In regulating matters of this kind, a wide discretion is necessarily intrusted to the managers of the railroad. They are in a situation which should make them the best judges of what promotes the comfort of those who ride upon their road. Courts will always be slow to pronounce unreasonable any rule purporting to be directed toward that end, which they have deliberately adopted.

That now under review cannot fairly be construed to prevent the driver of any vehicle from entering the station grounds of the plaintiff to fulfill a contract of employment with a passenger or intending passenger. It forbids him from entering such grounds to solicit such business, or to ply there the business of a hack driver or baggage expressman. The latter prohibition, when found in a regulation of this nature, cannot be taken to cover the pursuit of such business by the conveyance of a passenger or his luggage in the execution of a lawful contract already made. The word "ply" imports the performance of repeated acts of the same kind. A reference to plying a business at a certain place ordinarily imports that such place is a seat of the business, and such in law is its meaning as used in the rule now in question.

It appears from the complaint that the station grounds at Middletown are sufficiently large to allow the establishment there of a public stand at which to ply the carriage and express business, and also that an exclusive privilege for maintaining

AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXXI.—11

such a stand there has been granted by the plaintiff to a third party.

Such a grant was within its lawful powers, provided its terms were not inconsistent with the reasonable accommodation 148of the passengers upon its road. Nothing appears on the record to indicate any such inconsistency. It may well be more convenient for them to deal with a single local carrier, than to be met, on alighting from their train, by importunate solicitations from a number of rival competitors for their custom; and, in the absence of averments to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the prices at this stand are fair and the service sufficient. If any of them prefer that of some other person, they can secure it by an order in advance, which would justify his entrance on the grounds; or, by passing by the stand established there and going into the streets outside, to engage whomsoever they think fit.

It follows that the defendant had no right to enter the Middletown station grounds for the purpose of soliciting business. It is contended, however, that be this as it may, an injunction was not the proper remedy.

The averments that the defendant had inflicted great damage on the plaintiff, and had not sufficient property, subject to execution, to respond to the judgments, should he be sued at law, were statements and sufficient statements of fact. It would not have been good pleading to set out the evidence which might be adduced in their support. Enough circumstances were elsewhere disclosed to show that the damage might be great from the obstruction caused by the presence of intruders to the expedition of trains and the proper management in general of the plaintiff's business.

A judgment at law, also, would be no guaranty against future trespasses, and it is explicitly alleged that these are contemplated and threatened. Such wrongs in respect to land in the use of which the public interest is involved may be prevented by injunction: Burlington v. Schwarzman, 52 Conn. 181, 184, 52 Am. St. Rep. 571; Stamford v. Stamford Horse Ry. Co., 56Conn. 381, 395.

The action is not barred because Carrier, who holds the exclusive privilege in which the defendant seeks to share, could have brought a similar one or may have brought this one. It is immaterial to the defendant, who is paying the 149 expenses of the litigation or directing its course. He has violated the right of possession which exists in favor of the plaintiff as to

its Middletown station grounds, and is answerable to an action in its favor precisely as if its contract with Carrier had never been made. Had Carrier sued at law in the plaintiff's name, the damages recovered would have been those only which had been suffered by the plaintiff. This remedy in equity also stands upon its rights, not his.

The complaint was sufficient if, upon any state of proof which its allegations justified, the court could, in the reasonable exercise of judicial discretion, have granted an injunction. Tested by this criterion (and without intending to determine whether one should or should not issue in this cause), the demurrer should have been overruled.

There is error and the judgment of the superior court is set aside.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

RAILROADS-EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO HACK DRIVERS.-The authorities are conflicting upon the question of the right of a railroad company to grant exclusive privileges or preferences to hackmen or other solicitors. The rule in the principal case that a railroad company can grant the exclusive right to solicit the carriage of passengers and baggage to one hackman is sustained in Massachusetts: See Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, 9 Am. St. Rep. 661. The weight of authority seems to be the other way, however: See Kalamazoo Hack etc. Co. v. Sootsma, 84 Mich, 194, 22 Am. St. Rep. 693, and the extended note thereto; Montana Union Ry. Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419, 18 Am. St. Rep. 745, and note.

INJUNCTION TO PREVENT TRESPASS.-It is not usual to issue an injunction to restrain a trespass merely because it is such. Some other injury, such as irreparable injury or inadequate remedy at law must be shown: McGregor v. Silver King Min. Co., 14 Utah, 47, 60 Am. St. Rep. 883, and note thereto collecting the cases.

SMITH V. GIlbert.

[71 CONNECTICUT, 149.]

EXECUTION—INTEREST TOO REMOTE.-Where a testator left property to his wife for life, and after her death to be divided equally between two sons, and if either son should die before the decease of his wife, leaving lawful issue, such issue should inherit in the place of the parent so deceased, the interest in remainder which such sons acquired is too remote and uncertain to be subject to attachment.

EXECUTION-INTEREST SUBJECT TO.-Under a statute providing that execution may run against "goods or lands" of the defendant, an interest which may be strictly neither goods nor land, but which is nevertheless clearly property, capable of being fairly sold and appraised, and which is subject to the debtor's control, is attachable property.

EXECUTION-ATTACHMENT OF UNCERTAIN INTEREST.-An uncertain interest in property, incapable of just appraisal, and possibly of no value, is not subject to attachment.

EXECUTION.-In Connecticut no estate in land can be taken on execution, unless at its "true value;" hence an interest, the true value of which cannot be ascertained, cannot be taken on execution.

EXECUTION-UNCERTAIN INTEREST.-The process of foreign attachment is not adapted to secure an interest in property, to the possession and enjoyment of which the defendant may never succeed.

Action in the nature of assumpsit against a nonresident. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court.

J. Belden Hurlbutt and H. Whitmore Gregory, for the defendant.

George P. Carroll, for the plaintiffs.

152 HALL, J. The complaint describes the plaintiffs as residents of Maryland, the defendant as a resident of Wisconsin and as owning property in Connecticut.

By the doings of the officer, as set forth in his return upon the original complaint, the plaintiffs claim to have attached, under sections 910 and 916 of the General Statutes, the defendant's interest in the land owned by his father at the time of his death, and to have attached, under sections 1231 and 1245, the legacy or distributive share to become due to the defendant from the estate of his father, and to have garnisheed the defendant's interest in certain funds belonging to his father's estate, deposited in certain savings banks.

The defendant appeared by attorney for the sole purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction of the court. The substance of his plea is, that all the parties to the suit are nonresidents; that no service was made upon the defendant, and that at the time of the alleged attachment the defendant owned no interest in the property described in the officer's return, and no property in Connecticut subject to attachment; and that there was no debt, legacy, or distributive share due or to become due him from his father's estate liable to attachment, and no sum due him from said savings banks liable to garnishment.

It is admitted that all the money and property claimed to have been attached belongs to the estate of the defendant's father, and that the defendant owns no property in this state, 153 except such interest in said attached property as he may have under the third and fourth provisions of the will of his father, Harmon Gilbert, executed in 1889 and admitted to probate in 1893, which provisions are as follows: "Third. I give to my wife, Mary Elizabeth Gilbert, during the term of her

natural life, the use and income of all the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, of every description whatsoever and wheresoever it may be, which I may possess at the time of my decease. This shall include the right to cut all necessary wood for fuel, or timber for such repairs as may be needed upon the buildings and adjacent fences, and it is my wish that the said buildings and fences about the same be kept in proper repair so long as my wife shall use and occupy them as aforesaid. Fourth. After the decease of my wife, to whom the use of my property has been given as aforesaid, I order and direct that my estate, both real and personal, be divided equally between my two sons, Thomas F. Gilbert of Wilton, and Henry W. Gilbert of Poughkeepsie aforesaid, to wit, one equal share to said Thomas F. and one equal share to said Henry W., and if either of my said sons shall die before the decease of my said wife, and leave lawful issue, it is my wish that said issue shall inherit in the place of the parent so deceased."

As it is not claimed that-the superior court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who is a nonresident upon whom no service was made in this state, the power of the court in this case is limited to an appropriation of the defendant's property within this state, to the payment of the plaintiffs' debt; and so the sole foundation of its jurisdiction is the existence in this state of property which, under process of court, may be thus taken and appropriated: Easterly v. Goodwin, 35 Conn. 273; O'Sullivan v. Overton, 56 Conn. 102.

Unless the property in question is of such a character that it may be subjected to the payment of the defendant's debt, under our statute laws regulating the manner in which property may be taken upon mesne and final process, the superior court cannot entertain this action.

The estate of Harmon Gilbert, at the time of the claimed 154 attachment, consisted of real estate of the appraised value of about two thousand dollars, household furniture of the appraised value of two hundred dollars, and of about four thousand dollars in money. The estate has not yet been settled. The widow is still living, as are the two sons, Thomas F., and the defendant. Each of said sons had a child at the date of the will. The defendant has another child, born since the testator's death. All said children are still living.

In 1647, it was laid down as the foundation of our insolvency law, that "every man should pay his debts with his estate, be it what it will be, either real or personal": 1 Col. Rec. 151. In