shall be responsible for the sufficiency of the sureties in a replevin bond taken by him, if such sureties are excepted to, until they justify, an officer approves a replevin bond at his peril, after exception to, and before justification of the sureties therein. (Shull v. Barton, 698.)

10. BONDS IN REPLEVIN-ACTION AGAINST OFFICERPARTIES.-A sheriff, from whom attached property has been replevied, cannot, on the termination of the replevin suit in his favor, and the return unsatisfied of an execution on the judgment, maintain an action against an officer personally who took the property in replevin, for negligently approving an insufficient replevin bond. In such case, the creditor, and not the sheriff, is the real party in interest, although the sheriff may maintain an action on the replevin bond as the obligee named therein and trustee for the attaching creditor. (Shull v. Barton, 698.)

11. BONDS IN REPLEVIN-ACTION AGAINST OFFICER.— Several creditors, who have lost their claims against a debtor, and their attachment liens against his property, through a negligently approved and insufficient bond in replevin, cannot join as plaintiffs in a suit against the officer serving the writ of replevin for damages for negligently approving the replevin bond. (Shull v. Barton, 698.) See Receivers, 1.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

See Contracts, 1, 2.

SALES.

SALES-COMMERCIAL AGENCIES

FALSE STATEMENT.-If a proposed buyer of goods, upon the request of a commercial agency, makes a statement of his financial condition which is reported by such agency, together with its own conclusions, to the proposed seller, a sale made on the faith of such report as a whole, and not particularly on the faith of the statement made by the proposed buyer, cannot be rescinded on the mere ground that such statement is false. (Poska v. Stearns, 688.)

SELF-DEFENSE.

See Homicide, 1, 2, 15-17, 20

SEPARATE PROPERTY.

See Husband and Wife, 3; Pledge, 6; Statutes, 1.

SERVICES.

1. SERVICES-DEFENSE THAT WAGES WERE EARNED AFTER WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-SETOFF.-In an action by an employé wrongfully discharged before the expiration of his term of service, the fact that he earned wages after his discharge may be set up by way of partial answer to reduce the amount of his recovery, but cannot be pleaded as a setoff. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.) 2. SERVICES-COMPLAINT IN ACTION FOR-DEMURRER. A complaint by an employé, in an action for his wrongful discharge, is good on demurrer, where it alleges a violation of the contract of employment, and the amount that the plaintiff would have earned under it. Nothing more than the loss of compensation agreed upon for the unexpired term need be shown, as this is a sufficient allega tion of damages. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

3. SERVICES-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYÉ.— THE REMEDY of an employé, discharged without sufficient cause, before the expiration of the period of service stipulated for, is not in assumpsit as for implied services, or for wages, but is for damages for breach of the contract. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

4. SERVICES-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYÉ.— THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES for the wrongful discharge of an employé, before the expiration of the period of service stipulated for, is an amount equal to the stipulated wages for the whole period covered by the contract, less the sum earned, and which probably, can, by reasonable diligence, be earned during the time covered by the breach. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

5. SERVICES - COMPLAINT - UNNECESSARY ALLEGA. TION-MATTERS OF DEFENSE.-It is not necessary, in an action by an employé wrongfully discharged before the expiration of his term of service, for the complaint to allege that, since the discharge of the employé, he has been unable to obtain employment, and has earned nothing. If he has, or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have obtained employment, or earned wages after his discharge, the facts are matters of defense, and must be established by the employer. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

6. SERVICES-DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYÉ—INSUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR-OBSERVANCE OF RULES.-It is not good cause for the discharge of an employé before the expiration of his term of service, that he fails to observe his employer's rules for the conduct of business, where he does not have notice of such rules. (Hamilton v. Love. 384.)

7. SERVICES-DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYÉ INSUFFICIENT CAUSE.-Trivial and unimportant acts of disobedience or negligence are not a good cause for the discharge of an employé before the expiration of his term of service, particularly after the employer has previously passed them without complaint. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

8. SERVICES WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYÉ— REMEDY.—An employé, who has been wrongfully discharged before the expiration of his term of service, may sue at once for a breach of the contract, and recover his full damages to the end of the term. Or he may sue after the expiration of the term, within the statutory limit, but the measure of damages is the same in either case, for there can be but a single action. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

SETOFF.

SETOFF-PARTNERSHIP.-A claim owing to a partnership cannot be set off against debts owing to a member of such partnership individually. (Olson v. Lamb, 670.)

See Services, 1.

SHERIFFS.

1. SHERIFFS-WRONGFUL ACTS-LIABILITY OF SURETIES.-The sureties of a sheriff are liable for his wrongful acts done virtute officii, but not for those done colore officii. Acts done virtute officii are such that, if properly done, they create no liability, but which, if neglected, or improperly done, or which involve an abuse of discretion, render the officer and his sureties liable. Acts colore officii are such as neither the office nor the writ gives the officer authority to do. and for the latter his sureties are not liable (State v. Fowler, 452.)

2. SHERIFFS-WRONGFUL LEVY ON EXECUTION-LIABILITY OF SURETIES.-The levy of an execution by a sheriff upon a growing crop of fruit, which he forbids the owner to pick, and which he neglects to pick himself, thus causing its loss, is a wrongful act for which his sureties are liable in damages. (State v. Fowler, 452.)

3. SHERIFFS-LIABILITY OF SURETIES FOR LEVY OF EXECUTION.-The illegal and oppressive levy of an execution upon property subject thereto by a sheriff, is an official act for which his sureties are liable. (State v. Fowler, 452.)

See Replevin, 9, 10.

SHIPPING.

1. SHIPPING-ATTACHMENT OF VESSEL DOES NOT DISPLACE PRE-EXISTING LIEN.-A stipulation that, at the time of the commencement of an action to enforce a lien upon a steamer, for a balance due on a contract of construction, the vessel had been seized upon attachment and released upon a bond, does not justify a conclusion of law that the plaintiff did not have, at the time, a lien upon the steamer. (Moynihan v. Drobaz, 46.)

2.

SHIPPING-REGISTRATION OF VESSEL AS EVIDENCE OF ITS OWNERSHIP.-An entry in the custom-house books of the registry or transfer of a vessel is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing ownership in the craft. It is not even prima facie evidence of ownership as against one not claiming to be an owner, unless the entry is shown to have been made by authority of the person named in it. (Moynihan v. Drobaz, 46.)

3. SHIPPING-DECREE AND PAPERS IN ADMIRALTY AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF VESSEL.-A decree and copies of papers in a libel suit against a vessel, brought in the United States district court, are not admissible in evidence, in an action brought to enforce a demand against the vessel, for the purpose of proving that a person who did not appear or assert any interest in the admiralty proceeding, owns a part of the vessel. (Moynihan v. Drobaz, 46.)

SITUS OF DEBT.

See Attachment, 2-4.

SLEEPING-CAR COMPANIES.
See Railroads, 5-7.

STATUTES.

1. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-INVENTORY OF WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-Whatever may be the scope and purpose of a statute, authorizing a wife to file, and have recorded, an inventory of her separate estate, it is not entitled to such a construction as would nullify the provisions of another act concerning fraudulent transfers of personal property. (O'Kane v. Whelan, 42.)

OF MORT

2. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-EXECUTION GAGES ON RAILWAY PROPERTY.-Although one part of a code of laws, conferring upon railroad corporations the power to mortgage their property, fails to prescribe the mode of executing such mortgages, yet if the mode and manner of executing mortgages of real and personal property is pointed out in another part of the code, without exception in favor of any person or corporation, the mode and manner thus pointed out must govern as to the execution of railway mortgages. (Bishop v. McKillican, 68.)

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VOID ORDINANCE.-If a statute provides that the punishment for a violation of a town ordinance shall consist of a fine, or, in default of the payment thereof, certain imprisonment, a town ordinance which allows imprisonment for a violation thereof, without first giving the person convicted an opportunity to pay a fine, is void. (Calhoun v. Little, 254.)

4. STATUTES-LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO EMPLOYÉ BY COEMPLOYE-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-A statute making railroad and other corporations, except municipal, answerable for injuries to their employés, resulting from the negligence of coemployés, does not deny to railroad companies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, and is, therefore, constitutional. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

5. STATUTES FIXING LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONSLITIGATING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF.-If an act fixing the liability of all corporations, except municipal, is valid as to a railroad corporation, a railroad company cannot litigate its constitutionality as to other corporations. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

6. STATUTES FIXING LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONSEXEMPTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-A statute fixing the liability of railroad and other corporations is not unconstitutional because it exempts municipal corporations from its operation, for there is no necessary similarity between railroad corporations and municipal corporations, and many statutes apply to the former that do not apply to the latter. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

7. STATUTES-EXEMPTING CORPORATIONS FROM FUTURE LIABILITY-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-A statute which nullifies contracts made by railroad or other corporations, releasing them from future liability for personal injuries to employés, is not unconstitutional as violating the equality clause of either the state or federal constitution. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 801.)

8.

STATUTES-WHAT IS GERMANE TO SUBJECT OF ACT AND NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED IN TITLE.-The prohibition of contracts releasing corporations from their liability, contained in an act which enlarges the liability of railroads, is germane to, and properly connected with, that main subject of the act, and need not be expressed in the title. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

9. STATUTES-SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE-DETAILS.-The title of an act need not go into details. It is sufficient if it indicates, with reasonable precision and clearness, the subject it embraces. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

10.

STATUTES-DETAILS IN TITLE MUST BE GERMANE TO SUBJECT OF ACT.-An act is not invalid because it includes details not mentioned in the title, provided the details are germane to the general subject designated in the title. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 301.)

11. STATUTES SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE AS TO EXPRESSION OF SUBJECT-ILLUSTRATION.-The subject of an act, entitled, "An act regulating railroads and other corporations," is sufficiently expressed in its title, although the act creates a liability which, up to the time of such enactment, had no existence. The act is, therefore, not unconstitutional on the ground that its subject is not expressed in its title. (Pittsburgh etc. Ry. Co. v. Montgom ery, 301.)

12. STATUTES-EX POST FACTO LAW-WHAT IS NOTMETHOD OF FIXING AMOUNT OF PUNISHMENT.-An indeterminate sentence law which does not add to, or increase, the punishment of an offense beyond that existing at the time of its commission is not ex post facto, though the crime was committed before the passage of the act. A different method of fixing the amount of punishment between certain limits, which merely mitigates the punishment, does not add to or increase it. (Davis v. State, 322.)

13. STATUTES-EX POST FACTO LAW-WHAT IS NOT— PRISON CREDITS.-An indeterminate sentence law is not ex post facto on the ground that it repeals a "good time" law, where the former simply substitutes a new and different method of crediting good time to the convict, and the latter is merely a rule for the government of prison officials, not applicable to one sentenced under the former law. (Davis v. State, 322.)

14. STATUTES - AMENDATORY ACT - SUBJECT IS EXPRESSED IN TITLE, WHEN.-An act amending a practice act and providing for special verdicts has its subject sufficiently expressed by a title which purports to amend a designated section of "an act concerning proceedings in civil cases." (Udell v. Citizens' St. R. R. Co., 336.)

15.

STATUTES-VALIDITY.-ACQUIESCENCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY of a statute for over forty-five years by the courts of a state is a circumstance of some weight in determining the question of the validity of a similar statute. (Udell v. Citizens' St. R. R. Co., 336.)

16.

STATUTES-PROVISION FOR SPECIAL VERDICTSCONSTITUTIONALITY-TRIAL BY JURY.-A statute amending a practice act, and providing for special verdicts, is not unconstitutional, as violating the right of trial by jury. (Udell v. Citizens' St. R. R. Co., 336.)

17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-STATUTES CANNOT VALIDATE BY ESTOPPEL an act that they are forbidden by the state constitution to authorize. (Hutcheson v. Storrie, 884.)

See Appeal, 6; Attachment. 15; Codes; Contracts, 9; Corporations, 11, 20; Estates, 2-4; Execution, 2; Highways, 2, 4; Insurance, 5, 10-12, 19-21; Mechanics' Liens; Municipal Corporations, 9-11, 15; Replevin, 9; Taxation, 5-8; Telegraph Companies, 2.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

See Landlord and Tenant, 4; Suretyship, 1

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

See Limitation of Actions.

STATUTE OF USES.
See Trust, 15.

STIPULATION.

See Damages, 1.

SUBROGATION.

See Corporations, 3; Suretyship, 6, 7.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.
See Execution, 2-6.