tion into the judgment, from its date. The old debt ceases to exist
and the new, or judgment debt, takes its place. (Tourville v. Wa-
bash R. R. Co., 650.)

11. JUDGMENT, FINAL-REMANDING CAUSE, WITH DI-
RECTIONS.-When an appellate court remands a cause, with direc-
tions "to enter judgment for the plaintiff" in a certain amount, the
judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause,
and the entry of that judgment in the lower court is a purely min-
isterial act. (Tourville v. Wabash R. R. Co., 650.)

12. JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE.-In the absence of fraud and
collusion, a judgment is conclusive evidence, even against a stran-
ger, of the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties
thereto, and of the amount of the indebtedness. (Bolln v. Metcalf,
898.)

13. JUDGMENTS AGAINST COUNTIES ARE CONCLUSIVE,
as against collateral attack, upon the question of the validity of
county debts upon which they are founded, both as concerns the
county and a citizen or taxpayer thereof. (Grand Island etc. R. R.
Co. v. Baker, 926.)

14. JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION.-A board of county com.
missioners cannot confess judgment against the county, nor author-
ize an attorney so to do, without pleadings and a hearing on their
behalf. (Grand Island etc. R. R. Co. v. Baker, 926.)

See Appeal, 12; Attachment, 5, 6; Attorney and Client; Courts;
Ejectment; Execution, 1; Municipal Corporations, 15, 16.

JUDICIAL SALES.

1. JUDICIAL SALES-CAVEAT EMPTOR.-A purchaser at a
Judicial sale is bound to comply with his bid, even though he gets
no title to the property offered for sale. (Pinkston v. Harrell, 242.)
2. JUDICIAL SALES, EFFECT OF-CAVEAT EMPTOR.-A
purchaser at a judicial sale must comply with his bid, whether the
property offered for sale belongs to the defendant in execution or
not, and if the sale is regular and the amount bid equals or ex-
ceeds the amount due on the execution, it satisfies the judgment
and the plaintiff in execution is precluded by an entry of sale by
the sheriff on the execution from showing that there has been, in
fact, no sale. (Pinkston v. Harrell, 242.)

3. JUDICIAL SALES-COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH
BID.-A purchaser at a judicial sale is bound to comply with his
bid, and, upon his refusal, the sheriff may, by proper proceeding by
the defendant in execution, be compelled to enter the amount of
such bid as a credit upon the execution. (Pinkston v. Harrell, 242.)
4. JUDICIAL SALES-TITLE OF PURCHASER-LAND NOT
OWNED BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR.-Where two people enter
into a verbal agreement that one of them will furnish the purchase
price of certain land, and that the other will attend to the purchase
of the land in consideration of receiving one-half of the profits
which may later accrue from a resale of the land, and the land is
so purchased, the second party taking a deed in his own name, and
later, by two separate conveyances, transferring to the first party
first one and then the other undivided half of the land, the second
party at no time has an interest in the land subject to seizure and
sale under execution. A sale of an undivided half of the land,
under a judgment rendered against the second party subsequent to
his conveyance of the second undivided half, and decreed in disre
gard of such conveyance, passes nothing to a purchaser thereat.
(Perkins v. Meighan, 586.)

5. JUDICIAL SALES-PURCHASE BY ATTORNEY.-A pur-
chase of property by an attorney at a judicial sale in which his client
is interested is against public policy, and the client may elect to
treat him as a trustee; but if the client afterward deals with the at-
torney as the owner of the property he thereby ratifies the purchase
and is estopped from claiming the benefit thereof. (Olson v. Lamb,
670.)

6. JUDICIAL SALES-PURCHASE BY ATTORNEY-RATIFI-
CATION.-If an attorney, who has purchased property at a judicial
sale in which his client is interested, conceals from such client ma-
terial facts which might affect the latter's election to treat the at-
torney as a trustee, dealings between them on the basis of the at-
torney's ownership, the client being in ignorance of the facts, does
not prevent him, upon learning of such facts, from enforcing the
trust. (Olson v. Lamb, 670.)

7. JUDICIAL SALES-CONTRACT AS TO BIDS.-A contract
between two persons. whereby one of them is to bid at a judicial
sale and subsequently handle the property on behalf of both, is
valid, and does not vitiate the sale, when the effect is not to chill
bids nor prevent competition, but to enable persons to compete,
when without combining they cannot do so. (Olson v. Lamb, 670.)

8. JUDICIAL SALES-PURCHASE BY ATTORNEY-REIM-
BURSEMENT.-An attorney who purchases property at judicial
sale in which his client is interested is entitled to recover only the
amount he paid at such sale. (Olson v. Lamb, 670.)

9. JUDICIAL SALES-PURCHASE BY ATTORNEY-TRUSTS
-COMPENSATION.-An attorney who purchases property for his
own benefit at a judicial sale in which his client is interested can-
not, on a suit to declare him a trustee, be allowed compensation for
professional services in procuring the sale to be confirmed. (Olson
v. Lamb, 670.)

See Execution, 13, 16, 17; Liens, 2, 4; Taxation, 1; Trusts, 1-4, 8-11.

JURISDICTION.

JURISDICTION-QUESTION OF TITLE IN FORECLOS-
URE PROCEEDINGS-CONTINGENT REMAINDERMAN-LIFE
TENANT.—In a foreclosure suit, brought by the mortgagee of a
contingent remainderman, the court has jurisdiction to determine
the question of title, where the life tenant, by his answer, asserts
absolute title in himself, and denies that either the mortgagee or
his mortgagor has any interest in the mortgaged premises. (People's
Loan etc. Bank v. Garlington, 800.)

See Appeal, 15; Associations, 5, 6; Attachment, 1.

JURY TRIAL.

See Homicide, 8; Master and Servant, 5, 6; Negligence, 5, 6; New
Trial, 2, 3; Statutes, 16; Trial, 2, 6.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. LANDLORD AND TENANT-PAROL PROMISE TO PAY
RENT-ESTOPPEL.-A parol promise by one in possession of land
to pay rent to one out of possession, who has neither title nor right
of possession, is void for want of consideration, and is not an es-
toppel in favor of a landlord as against a tenant. (Clary v. O'Shea,
465.)

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT-ADVERSE POSSESSION.-A
tenant who remains in possession after the expiration of his term,

without any express repudiation of the relation created by the lease,
does not hold adversely to the landlord, no matter what his secret
intention may be. (Carson v. Broady, 691.)

3. LANDLORD AND TENANT-DENIAL OF TITLE BY TEN-
ANT.-A tenant cannot, while in possession of the premises, deny
his landlord's title, even before the lease is made, and this rule is
applicable in every case in which such possession has been ob-
tained by permission of the owner and in recognition of his title.
(Carson v. Broady, 691.)

4. LANDLORD AND TENANT-PAROL AGREEMENT FOR
LEASE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-A parol agreement for a lease
to begin at a future date to a person already in possession as a ten-
ant, is within the statute of frauds. (Gladwell v. Holcomb, 724.)

5. LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO
YEAR-ELECTION OF LANDLORD-NOTICE TO QUIT.-If a
tenant for a year holds over after the expiration of his term, the
landlord may elect to treat him as a tenant for another year, or as
a trespasser, and, in the latter case, may maintain ejectment
against him without notice of his intention not to prolong the ten-
ancy or he may maintain an action of forcible detainer, without
notice to the tenant to quit the premises, except the statutory writ
ten notice of three days required by statute. (Gladwell v. Hol-
comb, 724.)

6. LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO
YEAR-HOLDING OVER.-A tenant for a year holding over with
the assent of his landlord after the expiration of the lease becomes
a tenant from year to year, upon the terms, and subject to the con-
ditions, of the original lease. (Gladwell v. Holcomb, 724.)

7. LANDLORD AND TENANT-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO
YEAR.-NOTICE TO QUIT is not necessary to terminate a ten-
ancy from year to year arising from the tenant holding over after
the expiration of his term. (Gladwell v. Holcomb, 724.)

TELEGRAPH-PUBLICA-

TION.-If a libelous telegraphic message is delivered to an operator
at one place, and by him transmitted by sound over the wires to
the operator at another place, and by the latter reduced to writing
and delivered to the addressee, this constitutes a publication of the
libel. (Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 461.)

LIENS.

-

1. LIENS-RIGHTS OF JUNIOR LIENOR – VOLUNTARY
PAYMENT.--The discharge by a lienholder of a valid prior tax, or
other valid lien, is not a voluntary payment, but a payment in in-
vitum. (New England Loan etc. Co. v. Robinson, 657.)

2.

LIENS-RELEASE OF-EXECUTION SALES-NOTICE.—
If a release of a lien is filed of record, and on the same day the
debtor files a refusal to accept such release, both appearing on the
same docket, purchasers at execution sale are bound to take notice
of such refusal. (Fisler v. Laubach, 769.)

3. LIENS-RELEASE OF.-The holder of a first lien cannot re-
lease land of his debtor, taken in execution on a junior judgment,
so as to preserve his lien for its full amount against other land of
the debtor, against the latter's will. (Fisler v. Laubach, 769.)

4. LIENS ORDER OF DISCHARGE OF EXECUTION
SALES.-In the absence of any equity to prevent him, a debtor
has the absolute right to insist on the regular process of the law
with its regular and usual result for the discharge of liens on his
property, and their payment out of the proceeds according to their
legal priority. (Fisler v. Laubach, 769.)

-

5. LIENS PRIORITIES - FORECLOSURE-PARTIES-RE-
IMBURSEMENT.-The holder of a junior lien on a tract of land, not
made a party to the foreclosure of a prior lien upon a larger tract,
including the former, cannot enforce his lien against the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale without first compensating him to the ex-
tent that he has discharged such prior lien. (Spencer v. Jones, 870.)
See Cotenancy, 1-4; Judgment, 1-3; Mechanics' Liens; Mortgages, 4;
Pledge, 3; Receivers, 5, 7; Shipping, 1; Taxation, 2-4.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DEMURRER.-The

statute

of limitations may be invoked by general demurrer when the lapse
of time appears on the face of the petition. (Zuellig v. Hemerlie,
707.)

See Suretyship, 6; Taxation, 2-4; Vendor and Purchaser, 3.

MANSLAUGHTER.

See Homicide, 19, 20.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-DECREE FOR MAINTE-
NANCE-RECEIVER.-If a wife sues her husband for a divorce on
the ground of his extreme cruelty, praying that a portion of what
she claims to be the community property be awarded to her, that
a receiver be appointed, and for general relief, but the divorce is
denied, she is entitled to a decree for the maintenance of herself,
and the children under her care, and for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to enforce such decree, where the statute authorizes such a
decree in case the divorce is denied, if the case, made by her shows
that her husband has left her without cause; that he has been guilty
of conduct which the court finds makes it impossible for her to live
with him; that she has no means; that he is a nonresident of the
state; that he owns property of great value, both in the state and
out of it; and that he has endeavored, and is endeavoring, to dis-
pose of his property for the purpose of depriving her of the means
of support. It is not necessary, in such a case, to charge a failure
to provide the plaintiff with the necessaries of life. (Anderson v.
Anderson. 17.)

2. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-NECESSITY FOR MAINTE-
NANCE UPON REFUSAL OF DIVORCE.-Upon the refusal of a
divorce asked for by a wife, the necessity of a separate mainte-
nance for her, and the children under her care, is shown by an unde-
nied averment in her complaint that her husband was threatening
to dispose of his property in order to deprive her of the means of
support. (Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

3. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-MAINTENANCE UPON RE-
FUSAL OF DIVORCE-SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILD.-Upon the
AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXXI.-64

denial of a wife's application for a divorce, the court, in granting
a decree for the maintenance of the plaintiff, may properly make
an allowance to her for the support of a minor child, who is in the
mother's custody and is supported by her, although the custody of
the child has not been awarded to the plaintiff. The husband has
no reason to complain, for such a provision relieves him from liabil-
ity for the support. (Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

4.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-MAINTENANCE UPON RE-
FUSAL OF DIVORCE SUPPORT OF INVALID ADULT
DAUGHTER.-Upon the denial of a wife's application for a divorce,
the court, in granting a decree for her maintenance, may properly
make an allowance to her for the support of an invalid daughter un-
der her care, who is past eighteen years of age, and who is depend-
ent upon her parents for support. (Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

5.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-MAINTENANCE UPON DE-
NIAL OF DIVORCE-WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED.-In fixing
the amount of maintenance, upon a refusal of the wife's application
for a divorce, her condition in life may always be considered.
(Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

6. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-ALLOWANCE FOR MAIN-
TENANCE UPON DENIAL OF DIVORCE-WHEN NOT EXCES-
SIVE-DISCRETION.-There is no settled rule to control the dis-
cretion of the trial court in making an allowance to the wife for her
maintenance upon a denial of her application for a divorce. An al-
iowance to her, however, of one hundred and fifty dollars per
month, out of an income of two hundred and thirty dollars, from
property in this state, beside the privilege of a dwelling-house and
furniture, is not excessive, where the husband has an income, from
property in another state, of four hundred and forty dollars per
month. (Anderson v. Anderson. 17.)

7.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-MAINTENANCE-FINDING
AS TO PROPERTY OUT OF THE STATE.-Upon denying a wife's
application for a divorce, and in making an allowance for mainte-
nance, the court's omission to find as to the expenses of property
owned by the husband in another state, as to an alleged indebted-
ness thereon, and as to whether its income was gross or net, is not
material, where the answer admits a valuation with a gross income
of two hundred and eighty-seven dollars per month, and its aver-
ments as to expenses are too vague to be the subject of a finding.
(Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

8. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE - APPOINTMENT OF RE-
CEIVER IN ACTION FOR DIVORCE-WHEN JUSTIFIABLE.—
In an action by a wife against her husband for a divorce, where it
appears that he is a resident of another state, to which he is at-
tached by large holdings of property therein, and that, by reason of
his nonresidence, he cannot give personal attention to his property
in this state, but leaves it to the management of agents, and it is
admitted by the pleadings that he has endeavored, and is endeavor-
ing, to sell or encumber his property so as to deprive his wife of a
support, the court is justified in appointing a receiver to enforce its
decree of maintenance. (Anderson v. Anderson, 17.)

9. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-MAINTENANCE-MODIFY.
ING DECREE FOR, ON APPEAL.-If a decree for maintenance
contains no provision for its modification or change, the court will,
upon an appeal from the judgment, be required to modify it by pro-
viding therein that, upon application of either party, upon notice to
the other, and upon the proper showing therefor, it may modify or
change the judgment in such mode and to such extent as it may
deem just, or may set the judgment aside. (Anderson v. Anderson,
17.)