2. INSTRUCTIONS-PRINCIPLES GOVERNING.-An instruc-
tion must not only state correct legal principles, but so state them
that the jury may be enabled to apply them to the evidence. (Davis
v. State, 322.)

3. INSTRUCTIONS-WHEN ERRONEOUS.-An instruction is
erroneous, although correct as an abstract proposition of law, if it
leaves the jury in doubt or uncertainty as to how it should be ap-
plied to the evidence. (Davis v. State, 322.)

4. INSTRUCTIONS. — IF A SPECIAL VERDICT IS RE-
QUESTED, no instructions are proper, except such as are necessary
to inform the jury as to the issues made by the pleadings, the rules
for weighing and reconciling the testimony, and who has the burden
of proof as to the facts to be found, with whatever else may be
necessary to enable the jury clearly to understand their duties
concerning such special verdict, and the facts to be found therein.
It is not necessary or proper to give general instructions as to the
law of the case. (Udell v. Citizens' St. R. R. Co., 336.)

5.

INSTRUCTIONS-PRESUMPTION AS TO, ON APPEAL.-
Upon an appeal every reasonable presumption is indulged in favor
of the action of the trial court and this presumption extends to the
giving of instructions as well as to any other of the proceedings.
(Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

6. INSTRUCTIONS APPEAL - REVERSAL.— A
cause will
not be reversed on appeal, though the whole of the law upon a par-
ticular head is not fully stated in one or more of the separate parts
of the charge to the jury, if the instructions to them, taken as a
whole, correctly state the law. (Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

7. INSTRUCTIONS-CONSIDERATION OF, AS A WHOLE.-
Instruction should be construed with reference to each other. The
entire charge should be taken as a whole, and not in detached parts.
(Hamilton v. Love, 384.)

8. INSTRUCTIONS FACTS ADMITTED IN OPENING
STATEMENTS.-Instructions may be shaped in accordance with
facts conceded or admitted by counsel in their opening statements.
(Pratt v. Conway, 602.)

See Damages, 17; Forgery, 4; Homicide, 4-6, 11, 12, 14, 19; Negli-
gence, 2; New Trial, 1, 4.

1.

INSURANCE.

INSURANCE-LIFE-RIGHT OF ASSIGNEE TO SUE.-
One who holds the entire legal title to a life insurance policy by
assignment, as well as a beneficial interest therein as legatee, and
also an absolute interest in the proceeds of the policy to the extent
of premiums paid by him for other beneficiaries, may maintain an
action thereon in his own name, and the insurance company cannot
defend on the ground that the plaintiff does not own the entire
beneficial interest. (McElroy v. Hancock etc. Ins. Co., 400.)

2. INSURANCE-LIFE-TIME OF FURNISHING PROOF OF
DEATH.-A provision in a life insurance policy, that "notice of the
claim and proof of death shall be submitted to the company within
ninety days after the decease," does not defeat the claim of the
beneficiary, when he does not know of the existence of the policy
or of the death of the insured until more than a year thereafter,
and he notifies the company at once after acquiring such knowl-
edge. (McElroy v. Hancock etc. Ins. Co., 400.)

3. INSURANCE-LIFE-RIGHT OF TRUSTEE IN INSOL-
VENCY TO SUE-The trustee of an insolvent assignee of a life
Insurance policy may maintain an action thereon when the insolvent

holds the legal title and an equitable interest in the policy. (Me-
Elroy v. Hancock etc. Ins. Co., 400.)

4. INSURANCE-LIFE-WAIVER OF PROOF OF DEATH.-
Failure to furnish proof of death within the time limited by a life
Insurance policy is waived, when the company makes a proposal to
settle, or absolutely refuses to pay, or denies all liability, or asks
for additional proof without making objection that the proof given
was not furnished in time. (McElroy v. Hancock etc. Ins. Co., 400.)
5. INSURANCE - LIFE - TEMPORARY INSURANCE-NON-
FORFEITABLE PAID-UP POLICY—APPLICATION OF STAT-
UTES-LIABILITY-WAIVER.-The provisions of the Missouri
statute which concern temporary insurance and the amount thereof,
as well as the length of time that it shall, in each case, continue;
which make policies of insurance nonforfeitable after the payment
of two or more full annual premiums thereon; and which declare
that, in case of the death of the insured within the term of tem-
porary insurance, to be ascertained as provided by the statute,
the company shall be answerable for the full amount of the policy,
less the unpaid premiums with interest thereon, apply to a case in
which an insurance company has issued its fifteen year endowment
policy. where four annual premiums have been paid; where default
is made when the next annual payment becomes due in May, and
the insured dies in the following November; and where the policy
provides, in case of nonpayment of premiums, for the issuance, upon
demand, of a nonforfeitable paid-up policy after the original policy
has been in force for three years; but those provisions of the statute
concerning the paid-up policy are inapplicable where the insured
declines his right to it, and makes no demand therefor. Statutory
provisions of exemption from the control of certain statutes are also
inapplicable where there is nothing to bring the policy within the ex-
empted matters. Hence, if the insured dies. as in this case he did,
within the term of temporary insurance, thus fixed or ascertained
by the statute, the amount of the policy, less such unpaid premiums
and interest, must be paid, notwithstanding any waiver in the policy
by the insured of his statutory rights. (Cravens v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 628.)

6.

INSURANCE-LIFE-PLACE OF CONTRACT.-If a con-
tract of insurance is delivered in one state, and the premiums are
there paid, upon performance of the conditions precedent that the
premiums shall be paid, and that the policy shall be delivered to the
insured during his life and good health, the contract is executed in
that state, although the insurance company is incorporated under the
laws of another state, and has its chief office there; and this is true,
although it is expressly agreed in the application and policy that the
place of the contract is in such other state, and that the contract
shall be construed according to the laws thereof. (Cravens v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

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7. INSURANCE COMPANIES FOREIGN LIMITATIONS
UPON TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS.-Foreign insurance com-
panies which do business in this state do so not by right but by
grace, and must, in doing so, conform to its laws. The state may
also prescribe conditions upon which it will permit such companies
to transact business within its borders, or exclude them altogether,
without violating any of their contractual rights. (Cravens v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

8. INSURANCE - CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGN COMPA-
NIES WHAT LAW CONTROLS.-When no statute intervenes pro-
hibiting it, an insurance company doing business, by permission, in

another state from that of its incorporation may, by contract, make
the law of the state of its incorporation the applicatory law of the
contract, but where the laws of the state in which it does business,
by license, prohibits such a corporation from making certain kinds
of contracts, it is bound by such laws and must conform to them.
(Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

9. INSURANCE-LIFE-DEMAND FOR PAID-UP POLICY-
CONDITION PRECEDENT-WAIVER.-If a policy of life insur-
ance requires a demand to be made for a paid-up policy within six
months after default in the payment of premium, such demand, with
a surrender of his policy, is a condition precedent to the holder's
right to a paid-up policy, and it cannot be waived by the company
so as to affect the rights of the insured. (Cravens v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 628.)

10. INSURANCE COMPANIES-FOREIGN-STATUTES CON-
CERNING-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-State laws regulating for
eign insurance companies, and prescribing rules by which they may
do business within a state, or prohibiting them from doing so alto-
gether, do not contravene any provision of either the state or federal
constitution. (Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

11.

INSURANCE-STATUTES AS PART OF CONTRACT OF.-
If a contract of insurance is executed in this state, the statute in
force respecting its subject matter becomes as much a part of the
contract as if copied therein. (Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
628.)

12. INSURANCE-CONTRACT OF-WAIVER OF STATUTORY
PROVISIONS.-The parties to a contract of insurance cannot, either
directly or indirectly, waive the provisions of the statute governing
it. (Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

13. INSURANCE-CONTRACT OF-LAW GOVERNING, AS TO
PLACE.-A contract of insurance, executed in this state, is subject
to the laws of this state, notwithstanding any stipulations therein
to the contrary. (Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 628.)

14. INSURANCE-PROVISIONS IN REGARD TO ARBITRA-
TION-NOTICE to the insured to protect the property from fur-
ther damage after the loss, and to preserve all that remains thereof
until the loss has been determined in the manner stipulated for in
the policy, and that the insurer would not pay any amount claimed
until sixty days after the amount of loss or damage has been deter-
mined in the manner stipulated in such policy, does not constitute
a demand for submission to appraisers for the ascertainment of the
amount of the loss as provided for in the policy. (Grand Rapids
Fire Ins. Co. v. Finn, 736.)

15. INSURANCE – PROVISIONS AS TO ARBITRATION.-
Provisions in a policy of fire insurance that, in case of disagree-
ment as to the amount of loss, it shall be ascertained by appraisers,
and shall not become payable until sixty days after notice and sat-
isfactory proof of loss have been given, including an award by ap-
praisers, when an appraisal has been required, and that no action
shall be sustainable on the policy until full compliance with all
such conditions, do not make either an ascertainment of the loss
by appraisers. or a demand by the insured therefor, a condition
precedent to a right of action on the policy, nor do they impose any
obligation on the insured to furnish an award of appraisers, except
when demanded by the insurer. (Grand Rapids Fire Ins. Co. v.
Finn, 736.)

-

ARBITRATION

-

16. INSURANCE
CONDITION PRECE-
DENT.-A condition in a policy of fire insurance, providing for an

arbitration in case the parties cannot agree as to the amount of
loss, cannot operate to deprive the assured of his right of action,
unless clearly made a condition precedent to the existence of such
right. (Grand Rapids Fire Ins. Co. v. Finn, 736.)

17.

INSURANCE-PROVISIONS IN REGARD TO ARBITRA-
TION.-Under provisions in a policy of fire insurance that, in case
of disagreement as to the amount of loss, it shall be ascertained by
appraisers, the demand of the insurer for an appraisal must be
made in good faith, within a reasonable time after proof of the loss
has been furnished, and in such direct and explicit terms that a
person of ordinary intelligence would fairly understand and be in-
formed that the insurer requests a submission to appraisers for the
ascertainment of the loss, and when it is claimed that the demand
was made in writing, the instrument, if ambiguous, must be con-
strued most strongly against the insurer. (Grand Rapids Fire Ins.
Co. v. Finn, 736.)

18.

INSURANCE, LIFE-DEATH FROM ABORTION.-Under
a life insurance policy providing that it shall be void if the insured
dies in consequence of any violation of, or attempt to violate, any
criminal law of the United States, or of any state where the in-
sured may be, no recovery can be had if death results from the
insured having voluntarily submitted to an illegal operation known
to be dangerous to life, with intent to cause an abortion, without
any justifiable medical reason. To permit a recovery in such case
is against public policy. (Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
763.)

19. INSURANCE.-STATUTES MERELY REGULATING the
methods of conducting the business of insurance, foreign and do-
mestic, are but the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interests of the public, and are valid and constitutional. (Swing v.
Munson, 772.)

-

-

20. INSURANCE FOREIGN POLICY NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH STATUTES.-A contract of insurance made with a foreign
insurance company, though valid where made, cannot be enforced
in another state where the insured property is located, when the
insurance company has never complied with the conditions of the
statute of the latter state essential to the making of a valid con-
tract of insurance therein. (Swing v. Munson, 772.)

21. INSURANCE - FOREIGN POLICY - NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH STATUTES.-A contract of insurance made with a foreign
insurance company, and valid where made, cannot be enforced in
another state, when in conflict with its statutes and the declared
policy of its laws. (Swing v. Munson, 772.)

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
A state statute restricting contracts limiting the time in which suit
may be brought, or providing for notice before suit is brought on
contracts for the sending and delivery of telegraph messages, is
not unconstitutional as an unlawful interference with interstate
commerce, when applied to contracts for the transmission of inter-
state messages. (Burgess v. Western Union Tel. Co., 833.)

JUDGES.

1. JUDGES-EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY.-Judges of in-
ferior courts, as well as judges of courts of superior and general
jurisdiction, are exempt from liability in damages for judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction. (Calhoun
V. Little, 254.)

2. JUDGES-EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY.-A judge of an
Inferior court which has jurisdiction of the person and jurisdiction
to try and punish the accused for the offense with which he is
charged is not liable in damages for exceeding his authority in
fixing and inflicting punishment under an ordinance subsequently
declared void. (Calhoun v. Little, 254.)

JUDGMENT.

1. JUDGMENT LIEN-CONTINUANCE OF, AFTER DEATH
OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR.-A judgment docketed against the
judgment debtor during his lifetime does not cease to be a lien
upon his death, but continues to be a lien for the period prescribed
by statute as the lifetime of judgment liens. (Morton v. Adams,
53.)

2. JUDGMENT LIEN-CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE-INCON-
SISTENCY.-It is not inconsistent with the continuance of a judg-
ment lien, after the death of the judgment debtor, that the judg-
ment must, as required by law, be presented as a claim against
the estate of the judgment debtor, to be paid in the due course of
administration, and that it is not enforceable by execution. (Morton
v. Adams, 53.)

3. JUDGMENT LIEN - CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE-DE-
STRUCTION OF LIEN-MERGER.-The presentation and allow-
ance of a judgment as a claim against the estate of the judgment
debtor does not destroy the lien of the judgment by merger in the
allowance of the claim, or otherwise. (Morton v. Adams, 53.)

4. JUDGMENT-CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE-MERGER.-The
allowance of a claim against an estate is not, in any true sense, a
judgment; and none of the grounds upon which one judgment has
been held to be merged in another apply to the allowance of a judg-
ment as a claim against an estate. (Morton v. Adams, 53.)

5.

JUDGMENT-PERSONAL-CLAIM AGAINST RECEIVER.
A judgment recovered by default in New York, where the only
service of process upon the defendant was made out of that state,
cannot found a claim against the estate in the hands of the receiver.
(Ward v. Connecticut Pipe Mfg. Co., 207.)

6. JUDGMENT-ASSIGNMENT.-The assignee of a judgment,
which is vacated on appeal, takes no interest under the assign-
ment. (Bennet v. Lathrop, 222.)

7. JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA.—A judgment by default in
favor of a physician for professional services is not a bar to an ac-
tion against him for malpractice in the performance of such services.
(Jordahl v. Berry, 469.)

8. JUDGMENTS-COLLATERAL ATTACK.-A judgment of a
court having jurisdiction of the parties, and of the subject matter,
cannot be impeached collaterally. (Hall v. Sauntry, 497.)

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9. JUDGMENTS AGAINST RECORD OWNER EFFECT
AGAINST GRANTEE UNDER UNRECORDED DEED.-A stat-
ute providing that "every conveyance of real estate not so re-
corded shall be void as against any judgment lawfully obtained, at
the suit of any party, against the person in whose name the title
to such land appears of record prior to the recording of such convey-
ance," is not limited in its application to money judgments in favor
of creditors, but applies to any judgment affecting the title to real
estate, where such title appears of record in the name of the per-
son against whom the judgment is rendered. (Hall v. Sauntry, 497.)
10. JUDGMENT-DEBT-MERGER OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
When a debt is sued for, a final judgment merges the cause of ac-