STREETS. See "Municipal Corporations," § 1. TARIFF. See "Customs Duties." TAXATION. See "Customs Duties." § 1. Sale of land for nonpayment of tax. Where each of two tracts of land was assessed for taxation at its true value as the property of the owner of the fee, and she paid the full amount of the taxes due thereon, notwithstanding an outstanding one-sixteenth interest in any oil that might be produced from the land, a sale of such interest for nonpayment of taxes assessed thereon was void. -Bee v. Barnes, 149 Fed. 727... TENDER. Of price for land, see "Vendor and Purchaser," § 2. ..79 C. C. A. 433 See "Larceny." THEFT. TIME. For particular acts in or incidental to judicial proceedings. For particular acts not judicial. Delivery of goods sold, see "Sales," § 1. TITLE. Removal of cloud, see "Quieting Title." To patent, see "Patents," § 4. TOOLS. Liability of employer for defects, see "Master and Servant," § 1. TORTS. Particular torts. See "Conspiracy"; "Fraud"; "Libel and Slander"; "Negligence." TOWAGE. Collisions with tugs and vessels in tow, see "Collision," § 2. A steamship held not in fault for the sinking of a barge which she was towing on one of her regular trips from New York to Cuba, because of her keeping up her regular speed until the barge was found to be in distress, where the weather was fair, and the sinking resulted from the unseaworthiness of the barge for such a voyage due to her age and structural weakness, which condition was not known to the master of the steamship nor apparent; he having the right to rely on the assumption that her owner considered her fit for the voyage when he contracted for the towage, knowing that the steamship was required to make schedule time. -Dady v. Bacon, 149 Fed. 401.... ......79 C. C. A. 221 A finding affirmed that a tug was in fault for the loss of her tow by running her upon a sunken wreck at night, upon evidence showing without contradiction that a lantern showing a red light, and capable of burning for 24 hours after each filling, was filled, lighted, and set above the wreck on the evening before, and that it was burning brightly two hours before the collision, and that the tug maintained no sufficlent lookout. -The Volunteer, 149 Fed. 723..... ......79 C. C. A. 429 A tug is not liable merely because a tow was injured while in its custody, but in an action against it to recover for the injury, the burden rests upon the libelant to affirmatively prove negligence or fault, which cannot be presumed merely because the injury is not otherwise accounted for. ..79 C. C. A. 431 -The Winnie, 149 Fed. 725.. TOWNS. See "Municipal Corporations." Town sites in Alaska, see "Public Lands," § 1. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES. 1. Infringement and unfair competition. Complainants adopted the name "Angostura" as the name of bitters originally manufactured by them in the town of that name in Venezuela, and continuously used the same thereafter, though the name of the town was subsequently changed. Complainants' bitters became widely and favorably known under such name. Held, that complainants were entitled to protection in the use of the name as against persons using it to create dishonest competition, though complainants could not obtain a monopoly in the use of the word as a trade-mark. -Siegert v. Gandolfi, 149 Fed. 100..... ..79 C. C. A. 142 Where defendants imitated both the name and bottles in which complainants' "Angostura" bitters were sold, the labels being similar, except that they disclosed the fact that defendants' bitters were made in Baltimore, Md., instead of Port of Spain, in Trinidad, where complainants' bitters were made, defendants were guilty of unfair competition. -Siegert v. Gandolfi, 149 Fed. 100..... ...79 C. C. A. 142 Complainants manufactured and sold "Angostura" bitters under representations that it consisted of a mixture of certain bitter, aromatic, and carminative substances, together with alcohol added as a preservative solvent, and that the bitters did not contain any "intoxicating ingredients." An advertising circular contained certificates of physicians and customers, representing that the bitters were a valuable remedy for nearly all ills, and when mixed with water, beer, wine, and spirits, made a "splendid drink," and also that the bitters were free from dangerous ingredients and might be used by invalids, adults, and children to advantage. Held, that the statement that the bitters contained no intoxicating ingredients should be construed as referring to the herbs and simples of which it was composed, and that such representations were not so false and fraudulent as to deprive complainants of relief in a suit to enjoin unlawful competition. -Siegert v. Gandolfi, 149 Fed. 100... ..79 C. C. A. 142 TRIAL. See "Witnesses." Exceptions for purpose of review of instructions, see "Appeal and Error," § 2. Harmless error in submission of issues to jury, see "Appeal and Error," § 7. Proceedings incident to trials. Summoning and impaneling jury, see "Jury," § 1. Trial of particular civil actions or proceedings. See "Libel and Slander," § 2; "Negligence," § 1. For compensation of agent, see "Principal and Agent," § 1. For death caused by operation of railroad, see "Railroads," § 2. For death of servant, see "Master and Servant," § 2. For personal injuries, see “Shipping,” § 1; “Master and Servant," § 2. Trial of criminal prosecutions. See "Criminal Law,” §§ 3, 4; "Larceny," § 1. § 1. Taking case or question from jury. On a motion to direct a verdict, the court must take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom the direction is requested, who is entitled to the benefit of all fair and reasonable inferences from the testimony. -Williams v. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co., 149 Fed. 104. .79 C. C. A. 146 A question of law arises at the close of the evidence whether there is any substantial evidence on which a verdict can be sustained in favor of the party producing the evidence, and, if there is no such evidence, it is the duty of the court to direct the jury to return a verdict against them. -First Nat. Gold Min. Co. of New York & Colorado v. Altvater, 149 .....79 C. C. A. 213 Fed. 393. A question of law always arises at the close of the evidence in any case in the federal courts, whether there is any substantial proof warranting a verdict in favor of plaintiff; and, in determining such question, all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff. -Crookston Lumber Co. v. Boutin, 149 Fed. 680.....79 C. C. A. 368 In order to justify the direction of a verdict, in an action tried in the federal courts, the undisputed evidence must be so conclusive that all reasonable men, in the exercise of an honest and impartial judgment, can draw but one conclusion therefrom, and that the court, in the exercise of a sound judgment, would be required to set aside a verdict returned in opposition thereto. -Crookston Lumber Co. v. Boutin, 149 Fed. 680.....79 C. C. A. 368 79 C.C.A.-39 2. Instructions to jury. An instruction that a witness might be contradicted, not simply by a witness swearing to the opposite, but by the improbability of his story, and by anything, either in the testimony as given or in the circumstances of the case presented, which in the judgment of the jury tended to discredit the witness' statements, the jury being required to ascertain the truth by the exercise of common sense, etc., was proper. -Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Connolly, 149 Fed. 398.... 79 C. C. A. 218 It is not the duty of a court to reform a requested instruction and to cast out such parts as render it improper as a whole. -Exchange Bank v. Moss, 149 Fed. 340; Same v. Davis, Id... 79 C. C. A. 278 In an action to recover for the death of a boy 12 years old through the alleged negligence of defendant, a requested instruction, stating generally that plaintiff could not recover if the deceased failed to exercise reasonable care, was properly refused, where it did not explain or define what would constitute reasonable care in one of his age. -Coney Island Co. v. Dennan, 149 Fed. 687....... § 3. Verdict. .79 C. C. A. 375 Where several issues are submitted to a jury and a general verdict returned, the court may interrogate the jurors to specialize the verdict and state on which issue or issues it is based. -Rockefeller v. Wedge, 149 Fed. 130..... .79 C. C. A. 26 A verdict that "we the jury in the above case sustain the validity of the contract sued upon, and fix the damages at ten dollars," was fataily defective and insufficient to sustain a judgment. -Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Steel Car Forge Co., 149 Fed. 182...... A verdict that "We, the jury in the above case, sustain the validity of the contract sued upon and fix the damages at $10," was incapable of amendment after the separation of the jury. -Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Steel Car Forge Co., 149 Fed. 182.... TROVER AND CONVERSION. Set-off in action for conversion, see "Set-Off and Counterclaim," § 1. TRUSTS. Trust deeds, see "Mortgages." TUGS. See "Towage." ULTRA VIRES. Acts of corporation, see "Corporations," § 1. UNFAIR COMPETITION. See "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 1. See "Customs Duties." UNITED STATES. Courts, see "Courts," § 1; "Removal of Causes." Public lands, see "Public Lands," § 1. 1. Government and officers. Where a marshal has in good faith rendered accounts against the United States, covering services of his deputies, which have been audited and allowed by the proper accounting officers, and paid in accordance with the rules which have always previously been recognized as governing such allowances, and with knowledge that the greater part of the money would be paid over to the deputies rendering the services, the government is not entitled to recover the sums so paid from the marshal after years have elapsed, and he has gone out of office, and is without remedy to recoup his loss, and during which time no objection has been made to such payments by the executive departments or by Congress, which contined to appropriate money therefor, even though the allowances may have been made under an erroneous construction of the law. -United States v. Walker, 148 Fed. 1022... § 2. Actions. .79 C. C. A. 392 When the sovereign comes into court to assert a pecuniary demand against the citizen or subject, the court has authority and is under duty to withhold relief to the sovereign, except upon terms which do justice to the citizen or subject, as determined by the jurisprudence of the forum in like subject-matter between man and man. -United States v. Walker, 148 Fed. 1022... ..79 C. C. A. 392 The limitation contained in Act March 3, 1887, c. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 752], authorizing suits against the United States that "no suit against the government of the United States shall be allowed under this act unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made," in the case of a suit by a marshal to recover fees or disbursements, begins to run as to each item from the time the service was rendered or the disbursement made, and not from the expiration of the plaintiff's term of office. -United States v. Walker, 148 Fed. 1022. .79 C. C. A. 392 UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS. Criminal jurisdiction of, see "Criminal Law," § 1. UNITED STATES MARSHALS. Recovery back by United States of compensation paid marshals, see "United States," § 1. VACATION. Of sale of property of bankrupt estate, see "Bankruptcy," § 4. See "Sales." VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Mortgage securing purchase price of realty, see "Mortgages," § 1. |