Dickerson v. Acosta. whether the property was subject to taxes, or that the taxes were paid, or that the property was redeemed after sale; and says that the title to the land is vested in him by means of the sale if the land was subject to be taxed and the taxes were not paid or the land not redeemed. We cannot assent to a proposition so monstrous as this. It is not doubted that the government may sell property for taxes and make a good title to the purchaser. The very existence of the government depends upon this power, but in order to do this several things are essential. There must be a tax lawfully levied, an opportunity to pay it, a default and a sale, and these several matters must be conducted according to rules prescribed by the legislative authority or they cannot be exercised at all. The first thing to be regularly done is the levying of a tax authorized by law, which includes the listing, the valuation and the distribution or apportionment of the proper amount. If there has been no listing or valuation and no equal distribution of the tax, or if the tax upon the property of one-half the community is put designedly at an unequal proportion to that imposed upon the property of the other half, can there be no inquiry after a sale into the fraud and injustice of such proceedings? Is the auctioneer's hammer made more potent than constitutions and laws, and may the land of one man be transferred to another by force of an act of legislation which precludes inquiry? If such be the purpose of the act of Congress, we have no hesitation in declaring it of no force whatever. The power of the tax-commissioners to sell lands for unpaid taxes depends upon the appropriate performance by them of the necessary preliminary steps, and if one be omitted the power is equally absent as though every thing had been omitted. And if no tax had ever been apportioned by them, and yet they had made a sale without notice and without an opportunity to pay or to prevent the Dickerson v. Acosta. sale, the property would be transferred beyond recovery if this law, as insisted upon, could be enforced. Now, what is the first condition requisite to the levying of this tax? By the 6th section it is enacted, "That the said board of tax-commissioners shall enter upon the dis charge of the duties of their office whenever the commanding General of the forces of the United States, entering into any such insurrectionary State or district, shall have established the military authority of the United States throughout any parish or district or county of the same." The testimony of the witnesses, Governor Reed, Dr. Harrison and Billings, establish the fact that in 1863, when the commissioners commenced their operations in Nassau county, and fixed the amount of this tax and gave the notice that it must be paid in sixty days from January 31, 1863, at their office in Fernandina, there was no assessment for Nassau county, but only for the town of Fernandina on Amelia Island; that only Amelia Island was occupied by Federal forces, the balance of the county or more than four-fifths of it being and remaining under the control of the Confederate military power. The military authority of the United States from the time of the passage of the act of Congress had not been established throughout the county at the time of the imposition of the tax. The terms "parish, county or district," were used in the act to designate the municipal subdivisions of the Southern or seceded States, as in Louisiana they are called parishes, in Florida and other States counties, and in South Carolina they were called parishes or districts. The only other territorial subdivisions of the States by the name of districts, were the collection districts of the United States. The legitimate intention of the act, as we are enabled to understand, was, that wherever the military commander of the United States forces in Florida should establish the military authority of the United States throughout any county in this State, then the tax commissioner should enter upon Dickerson v. Acosta. the discharge of their duties and proceed to levy and collect taxes; and that until such military authority was established throughout the country so that the citizens could freely pass for the purpose of paying taxes, transacting business and taking care of their property, the tax commissioners had no right or authority whatever to impose taxes. The condition that the authority of the United States should be established by the commanding general throughout the county or district where taxes are to be levied, is essential to the power to exercise their duties by the tax commissioners. The condition not existing, the right to levy taxes does not exist, for the commissioners could enter upon the discharge of their duties when the commanding general should have rendered the performance of their duties possible throughout the county, and not before. The fundamental principles of equality and uniformity in the imposition of taxes could not be observed in this instance except by an assessment of all the taxable real estate in the county. It appears that the tax commissioners failed to find any assessment roll or list for the county or the city, and proceeded to make an assessment de novo. How, then, could an uniform tax be levied upon the property of the county to produce its proper ratio of tax without knowing, as a basis of the computation, the total amount of the taxable property to be assessed within the county? This dilemma would have been avoided by deferring the assessment and levying of the tax until the time appointed by the act. The proclamation of the commanding general, announcing that the authority of the United States had been established throughout a county or district, would have been an appropriate signal for the taxing officers to enter upon their duties. The absence of such announcement, and the fact, proven by members of the commission and by those who were in military command, that the town of Fernandina was the only place in the county where the Confederate military power was interrupted, leaves no room for doubt that the time for levying Dickerson v. Acosta. the tax in any portion of the county had not arrived according to law, and that the tax levied, under the circumstances established by the record in this case, was levied without authority of law. The notice that the tax was fixed and must be paid within sixty days, was given, and the time expired before the authority of the United States was so established, and no new notice seems to have been given after such authority was established, without which no sale could afterwards be legally made. This is all that is deemed necessary to be determined for the purpose of disposing of the present case. The further questions, whether levying fifty per cent. more of tax in one State than was authorized to be levied in another State upon a given valuation of property;and whether onerous conditions could be imposed upon the owners of property in one State before they would be allowed to pay their taxes, which conditions were not imposed upon the people of other States; and whether an additional sum could be imposed for costs, charges and expenses, without limit, except in the discretion of the commissioners and without express authority of law; and whether the commissioners could lawfully sell lands for taxes upon a day not named in a notice of sale, or on a day to which the sale had not been adjourned; these and other questions embraced in the assignment of errors are superseded by the conclusion we have reached, that the tax imposed upon the property in question was not authorized by law to be levied at the time it was levied, and that any subsequent sale therefor was, therefore, unauthorized and void, and carried no title to the purchaser. The certificate of sale, under the circumstances, is a nullity. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Soutter and McKaе v. Miller. JAMES T. SOUTTER AND JOHN MCRAE, REspondents, vs. JACOB MILLER, APPELLANT. I. The deed of trust executed by the Florida Railroad Company to Soutter and McRae, as Trustees, conveying certain lands and lots, in trust, to sell and convey the same by deeds of conveyance, and to devote the proceeds to the payment of liabilities of the company, is not a mortgage, but vests the legal title in the trustees, and they are the proper parties to protect the title of such lands as remain unconveyed by them. 2. The eighth section of the Act of Congress of June 7, 1862, for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts, provided that the owner might, at any time within one year after a sale of lands, prove to the satisfaction of the Commissioners that they belonged to a certain class of persons, and that they had been unable, by reason of the insurrection, to pay the taxes or redeem the lands from sale within the time limited for paying or redeeming the same, in which case the Commissioners were authorized to allow a further time to redeem the same, not exceeding two years from the time of sale; and any party interested may appeal from the decision of the Commissioners to the District Court of the United States. The plaintiffs, whose lands had been sold for taxes, applied to the Commissioners and made certain proofs, whereupon the Commissioners made an order that satisfactory proofs required by statute having been made, the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem within two years from the day of sale of their lands; and the plaintiffs within the two years redeemed the lands from saleall which appeared by the records of the Board of Tax Commissionsioners; and no appeal was taken from their decision to the District Court. The defendant now claiming that the plaintiffs were not entitled to redeem the lands sold, it is held, that the Board of Tax Commissioners were made by law the judges of the sufficiency of the application and the proofs, and their order standing unreversed, it is conclusive, the courts of the State having no power to review that judgment. The redemption by the plaintiffs extinguished the certificate of sale. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau county. Friend & Hammond for Appellant. |