The difficulty of the business was equal to its | posed a contrary one would be more agreeable magnitude. No small share of wisdom and to those who sent me to the convention. I address is requisite to combine and reconcile could not, even in idea, expose myself to such the jarring interests, that prevail, or seem to a retort as, upon the last answer, might have prevail in a single community. The United been justly made to me. Pray, sir, what reaStates contain already thirteen governments sons have you for supposing that a right vote mutually independent. Those governments would displease your constituents? Is this the present to the Atlantic a front of fifteen hun- proper return for the high confidence they have dred miles in extent. Their soil, their climates, placed in you? If they have given cause for their productions, their dimensions, their num- such a surmise, it was by choosing a reprebers, are different. In many instances, a differ- sentative, who could entertain such an opinion ence and even an opposition subsists among of them. I was under no apprehension, that their interests; and a difference and even an the good people of this State would behold with opposition is imagined to subsist in many more. displeasure the brightness of the rays of deleAn apparent interest produces the same attach-gated power, when it only proved the superior ment as a real one; and is often pursued with splendor of the luminary, of which those rays no less perseverance and vigor. When all these were only the reflection. circumstances are seen and attentively considered, will any member of this honorable body be surprised, that such a diversity of things produced a proportioned diversity of sentiment? Will he be surprised that such a diversity of sentiment rendered a spirit of mutual forbearance and conciliation indispensably necessary to the success of the great work? And will he be surprised that mutual concessions and sacrifices were the consequences of mutual forbearance and conciliation? When the springs of opposition were so numerous and strong, and poured forth their waters in courses so varying, need we be surprised that the stream formed by their conjunction was impelled in a direction somewhat different from that, which each of them would have taken separately? I have reason to think that a difficulty arose in the minds of some members of the convention from another consideration-their ideas of the temper and disposition of the people, for whom the constitution is proposed. The citizens of the United States, however different in some other respects, are well known to agree in one strongly marked feature of their character-a warm and keen sense of freedom and independence. This sense has been heightened by the glorious result of their late struggle against all the efforts of one of the most powerful nations of Europe. It was apprehended, I believe, by some, that a people so high-spirited would ill brook the restraints of an efficient government. I confess that this consideration did not influence my conduct. I knew my constituents to be high-spirited; but I knew them also to possess sound sense. I knew that, in the event, they would be best pleased with that system of government, which would best promote their freedom and happiness. I have often revolved this subject in my mind. I have supposed one of my constituents to ask me, why I gave such a vote on a particular question? I have always thought it would be a satisfactory answer to say-because I judged, upon the best consideration I could give, that such a vote was right. I have thought that it would be but a very poor compliment to my constituents to say that, in my opinion, such a vote would have been proper, but that I sup A very important difficulty arose from comparing the extent of the country to be governed, with the kind of government which it would be proper to establish in it. It has been an opinion, countenanced by high authority, "that the natural property of small states is to be governed as a republic; of middling ones, to be subject to a monarch; and of large empires, to be swayed by a despotic prince; and that the consequence is, that, in order to preserve the principles of the established government the State must be supported in the extent it has acquired; and that the spirit of the State will alter in proportion as it extends or contracts its limits."* This opinion seems to be supported, rather than contradicted, by the history of the governments in the old world. Here then the difficulty appears in full view. On one hand, the United States contain an immense extent of territory, and, according to the foregoing opinion, a despotic government is best adapted to that extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that, however the citizens of the United States might, with pleasure, submit to the legitimate restraints of a republican constitution, they would reject, with indignation, the fetters of despotism. What then was to be done? The idea of a confederate republic presented itself. This kind of constitution has been thought to have "all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government." Its description is, "a convention, by which several States agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of farther association." The expanding quality of such a government is peculiarly fitted for the United States, the greatest part of whose territory is yet uncultivated. But while this form of government enabled us to surmount the difficulty last mentioned, it conducted us to another, of which I am now to take notice. It left us almost without prece Mont. Sp. L. b. 8, c. 20. + Id. b. 9, c. 1. 1 Paloy, 199-202. dent or guide; and, consequently, without the benefit of that instruction, which, in many cases, may be derived from the constitution, and history, and experience of other nations. Several associations have frequently been called by the name of confederate States, which have not, in propriety of language, deserved it. The Swiss Cantons are connected only by alliances. The United Netherlands are indeed an assemblage of societies; but this assemblage constitutes no new one; and, therefore, it does not correspond with the full definition of a confederate republic. The Germanic body is composed of such disproportioned and discordant materials, and its structure is so intricate and complex, that little useful knowledge can be drawn from it. Ancient history discloses, and barely discloses to our view, some confederate republics-the Achæan league, the Lycian confederacy, and the Amphictyonic council. But the facts recorded concerning their constitutions are so few and general, and their histories are so unmarked and defective, that no satisfactory information can be collected from them concerning many particular circumstances, from an accurate discernment and comparison of which alone, legitimate and practical inferences can be made from one constitution to another. Besides, the situation and dimensions of those confederacies, and the state of society, manners, and habits in them, were so different from those of the United States, that the most correct description could have supplied but a very small fund of applicable remark. Thus, in forming this system, we were deprived of many advantages, which the history and experience of other ages and other countries would, in other cases, have afforded us. subsequent ages, have been made in government, and not to be drawn immediately from the ancient constitutions themselves, as they were intended and understood by those who framed them. To illustrate this, a similar observation may be made on another subject. Admiring critics have fancied, that they have discovered in their favorite Homer the seeds of all the improvements in philosophy, and in the sciences, made since his time. What induces me to be of this opinion, is, that Tacitus, the profound politician Tacitus, who lived towards the latter end of those ages which are now denominated ancient, who undoubtedly had studied the constitutions of all the states and kingdoms known before and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each of them, considers, after all he had known and read, a mixed government, composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather to be wished than expected; and he thinks, that if such a government could even be instituted, its duration could not be long. One thing is very certain, that the doctrine of representation in government was altogether unknown to the ancients. Now the knowledge and practice of this doctrine is, in my opinion, essential to every system, that can possess the qualities of freedom, wisdom and energy. It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite some surprise, that representation of the people is not, even at this day, the sole principle of any government in Europe. Great Britain boasts, and she may well boast, of the improvement she has made in polities, by the admission of representation: for the improvement is important as far as it goes; but it Permit me to add, in this place, that the by no means goes far enough. Is the executive science even of government itself, seems yet to power of Great Britain founded on representabe almost in its state of infancy. Governments, tion? This is not pretended. Before the Revoin general, have been the result of force, of lution, many of the kings claimed to reign by fraud, and of accident. After a period of six divine right, and others by hereditary right; thousand years has elapsed since the creation, and even at the Revolution, nothing farther was the United States exhibit to the world the first effected or attempted, than the recognition of instance, as far as we can learn, of a nation, certain parts of an original contract,* supposed unattacked by external force, unconvulsed by at some remote period to have been made bedomestic insurrections, assembling voluntarily, tween the king and the people. A contract deliberating fully, and deciding calmly, con- seems to exclude, rather than to imply, delecerning that system of government, under gated power. The judges of Great Britain are which they would wish that they and their appointed by the Crown. The judicial authorposterity should live. The ancients, so enlight- ity, therefore, does not depend upon representaened on other subjects, were very uninformed tion, even in its most remote degree. Does with regard to this. They seem scarcely to representation prevail in the legislative departhave had any idea of any other kinds of gov-|ment of the British government? Even here ernment, than the three simple forms desig- it does not predominate; though it may serve nated by the epithets, monarchical, aristocra- as a check. The legislature consists of three tical, and democratical. I know that much branches, the king, the lords, and the commons. and pleasing ingenuity has been exerted, in Of these, only the latter are supposed by the modern times, in drawing entertaining parallels constitution to represent the authority of the between some of the ancient constitutions, and people. This short analysis clearly shows, to some of the mixed governments that have since what a narrow corner of the British constituexisted in Europe. But I much suspect that, tion the principle of representation is conon strict examination, the instances of resem- fined. I believe it does not extend farther, if blance will be found to be few and weak; to be suggested by the improvements, which, in 1 Bl. Com. 283. so far, in any other government in Europe. For the American States were reserved the glory and the happiness of diffusing this vital principle through all the constituent parts of government. Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those to whom they have committed the exercise of the powers of government. This chain may consist of one or more links; but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong and discernible. | with the whole. It is not more reasonable to suppose, that the counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole. I intend not, sir, by this description of the difficulties with which the convention was surrounded, to magnify their skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to insinuate that any predicament, in which the convention stood, To be left without guide or precedent was not should prevent the closest and most cautious the only difficulty in which the convention were scrutiny into the performance, which they involved by proposing to their constituents a have exhibited to their constituents and to the plan of a confederate republic. They found world. My intention is of far other and higher themselves embarrassed with another of pecu- | aim-to evince by the conflicts and difficulties liar delicacy and importance; I mean that of which must arise from the many and powerful drawing a proper line between the national causes which I have enumerated, that it is government and the governments of the seve- hopeless and impracticable to form a constitural States. It was easy to discover a proper tion, which will, in every part, be acceptable and satisfactory principle on the subject. What- to every citizen, or even to every government ever object of government is confined in its ope- in the United States; and that all which can be ration and effects within the bounds of a par- expected is, to form such a constitution as, upon ticular State, should be considered as belonging the whole, is the best that can possibly be obto the government of that State; whatever obtained. Man and perfection!-a State and perject of government extends in its operation or fection!-an assemblage of States and perfeceffects beyond the bounds of a particular State, tion! Can we reasonably expect, however should be considered as belonging to the gov- ardently we may wish, to behold the glorious ernment of the United States. But though this union? principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much difficulty; because, in its application, room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particular instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in mathematical science, that a line can be described with mathematical precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable; and accurate too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a subject of this nature. Particulars under this head will be more properly explained when we descend to the minute view of the enumeration which is made in the proposed constitution. I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to others, the impression which, on many occasions, was made by the difficulties which surrounded and pressed the convention. The great undertaking, at some times, seemed to be at a stand; at other times, its motions seemed to be retrograde. At the conclusion, however, of our work, many of the members expressed their astonishment at the success with which it terminated. Having enumerated some of the difficulties which the convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I shall next point out the end which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we were made for a state of society. But a state of society could not be supported long or happily without some civil restraint. It is true that, in a state of nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others; but it is equally true After all, it will be necessary that, on a sub- that, in such a state, every other individual ject so peculiarly delicate as this, much pru- may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this dence, much candor, much moderation, and universal independence, the dissensions and much liberality should be exercised and dis- animosities between interfering members of played, both by the federal government and by the society would be numerous and ungovernthe governments of the several States. It is to able. The consequence would be, that each be hoped, that those virtues in government will member, in such a natural state, would enjoy be exercised and displayed, when we consider, less liberty, and suffer more interruption, than that the powers of the federal government, and he would in a regulated society. Hence the those of the State governments, are drawn from universal introduction of governments of some sources equally pure. If a difference can be dis-kind or other into the social state. The liberty covered between them, it is in favor of the federal government; because that government is founded on a representation of the whole Union; whereas the government of any particular State is founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable when compared of every member is increased by this introduc- The result government, and carrying it into execution, it | of different confederacies, than in the instance is essential that the interest and authority of of different, though more numerous unassocithe whole community should be binding on every part of it. ated States. These observations, and many others that might be made on the subject, will The foregoing principles and conclusions are be sufficient to evince, that a division of the generally admitted to be just and sound with United States into a number of separate conregard to the nature and formation of single federacies, would probably be an unsatisfactory governments, and the duty of submission to and an unsuccessful experiment. The remainthem. In some cases they will apply, with ing system, which the American States may much propriety and force, to States already adopt, is a union of them under one confedeformed. The advantages and necessity of civil rate republic. It will not be necessary to emgovernment among individuals in society are ploy much time or many arguments to show, not greater or stronger than, in some situations that this is the most eligible system that can be and circumstances, are the advantages and ne- proposed. By adopting this system, the vigor cessity of a federal government among States. and decision of a wide-spreading monarchy A natural and a very important question now may be joined to the freedom and beneficence presents itself. Is such the situation-are such of a contracted republic. The extent of territhe circumstances of the United States? A pro-tory, the diversity of climate and soil, the numper answer to this question will unfold some very interesting truths. ber, and greatness, and connection of lakes and rivers, with which the United States are intersected and almost surrounded, all indicate an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and dispositions of their citizens indicate, that in this government liberty shall reign triumphant. Such indeed have been the general opinions and wishes entertained since the era of our independence. If those opinions and wishes are as well founded as they have been general, the late convention were justified in proposing to their constituents one confederate republic, as the best system of a national government for the United States. In forming this system, it was proper to give minute attention to the interests of all the parts; but there was a duty of still higher import-to feel and to show a predominating regard to the superior interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance. The same principle that was so necessary in forming it, is equally necessary in our deliberations, whether we should reject or ratify it. The United States may adopt any one of four different systems. They may become consolidated into one government, in which the separate existence of the States shall be entirely absorbed. They may reject any plan of union or association, and act as separate and unconnected States. They may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one federal republic. Which of these systems ought to have been proposed by the convention? To support with vigor, a single government over the whole extent of the United States, would demand a system of the most unqualified and the most unremitted despotism. Such a number of separate States, contiguous in situation, unconnected and disunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, and foreign intrigue; at another, the victim of mutual rage, rancor, and revenge. Neither of these systems found advocates in the late convention: I presume they will not find advocates in this. Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies? It will not be unadvisable to take a more minute survey of this subject. Some aspects, under I make these observations with a design to which it may be viewed, are far from being, at prove and illustrate this great and important first sight, uninviting. Two or more confede-truth-that in our decisions on the work of the racies would be each more compact and more manageable, than a single one extending over the same territory. By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the great collision of interests, apparently or really different and contrary, in the whole extent of their dominion, would be broken, and in a great measure disappear in the several parts. But these advantages, which are discovered from certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination. Animosities, and perhaps wars, would arise from assigning the extent, the limits, and the rights of the different confederacies. The expenses of governing would be multiplied by the number of federal governments. The danger resulting from foreign influence and mutual dissensions would not, perhaps, be less great and alarming in the instance late convention, we should not limit our views and regards to the State of Pennsylvania. The aim of the convention was, to form a system of good and efficient government on the more extensive scale of the United States. In this, as in every other instance, the work should be judged with the same spirit with which it was performed. A principle of duty as well as of candor demands this. We have remarked, that civil government is necessary to the perfection of society: we now remark, that civil liberty is necessary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested only of that part which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community, than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows, that civil liberty, while it resigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the human facul- | expectations did we form concerning ourselves! ties, so far as it is compatible with the public Have those expectations been realized? No. welfare. What has been the cause? Did our citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity? No. Did they become insensible of resentment and indignation, at any high-handed attempt that might have been made to injure or enslave them? No. What then has been the cause? The truth is, we dreaded danger only on one side: this we manfully repelled. But on another side, danger, not less formidable, but more insidious, stole in upon us; and our unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive, either to its approach or to its operations. Those whom foreign strength could not overpower, have well nigh become the victims of internal anarchy. In considering and developing the nature and end of the system before us, it is necessary to | mention another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the appellation of federal liberty. When a single government is instituted, the individuals of which it is composed surrender to it a part of their natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities of which it is composed surrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as States. The principles which directed, in the former case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give similar directions in the latter case. The States should resign to the national government that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which, placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole, than if it had remained in the several States. While they resign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercise of all their other faculties as States, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending confederacy. Since States as well as citizens are represented in the constitution before us, and form the objects on which that constitution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty. These general reflections have been made in order to introduce, with more propriety and advantage, a practical illustration of the end proposed to be accomplished by the late con vention. It has been too well known-it has been too severely felt that the present confederation is inadequate to the government and to the exigencies of the United States. The great struggle for liberty in this country, should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which she will have for her existence and prosperity, in any part of the globe. And it must be confessed, that this struggle has, in some of the stages of its progress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded no fortunate issue. To the iron hand of tyranny, which was lifted up against her, she manifested, indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the fetters which were forged for her, and showed that she was unassailable by force. But she was environed by dangers of another kind, and springing from a very different source. While she kept her eye steadily fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was secretly undermining the rock on which she stood. Need I call to your remembrance the contrasted scenes, of which we have been witnesses? On the glorious conclusion of our conflict with Britain, what high expectations were formed concerning us by others! What high If we become a little more particular, we shall find that the foregoing representation is by no means exaggerated. When we had baffled all the menaces of foreign power, we neglected to establish among ourselves a government that would ensure domestic vigor and stability. What was the consequence? The commencement of peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress that could befall a people in a peaceful state. Devoid of national power, we could not prohibit the extravagance of our importations, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess. Devoid of national importance, we could not procure for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national credit, we saw our public securities melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before the sun. Devoid of national dignity, we could not, in some instances, perform our treaties on our part; and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor compel the performance of them on the part of others. Devoid of national energy, we could not carry into execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws. We Shall I become more particular still? The tedious detail would disgust me: nor is it now necessary. The years of languor are past. We have felt the dishonor with which we have been covered: we have seen the destruction with which we have been threatened. have penetrated to the causes of both, and when we have once discovered them, we have begun to search for the means of removing them. For the confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal to an enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and of the several States, are replete with them. They all point out the weakness and insufficiency of the present confederation as the cause, and an efficient general government as the only cure of our political distempers. Under these impressions, and with these views, was the late convention appointed; and under these impressions and with these views, the late convention met. We now see the great end which they proposed to accomplish. It was to frame, for the consideration of their constituents, one federal and national constitution-a constitution that |