CARRIER-Continued.

gave up his ticket to the conductor, requesting that he would stop at Monroe
station, which is a flag station a little east of Lexington. The conductor took
the ticket, saying, "I can't punch it, but I'll stop the train at that station."
There was a great crowd of passengers, and the train was long and heavy, and
did not start until long after the advertised time. On approaching Monroe sta-
tion the plaintiff left his seat and tried to make his way toward the door in
order to leave the train at that station. The train did not come to a full stop on
reaching the station, but the plaintiff, in making his way through the crowd,
reached the platform, and in the surging of the crowd fell, or was pushed out
at the platform, and down the steps of the car, and after holding on with his
hand for a short distance, finally fell to the ground and was injured. The court
ruled, at the defendant's request, that if the facts stated in the opening were
true, they did not make a case, and would not enable the plaintiff to maintain
his action. Held, that this ruling was erroneous, for the reason that on both
the questions, whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care, and whether
the defendants improperly and negligently managed their train so that the in-
jury occurred thereby, there was evidence which should have been submitted
to the jury. Treat v. Boston and Lowell R. R. Co., 423.

43. The railroad company's servants announced that the next stop of the train
on which the plaintiff's wife was riding would be at her station. The train ran
on a side track ten miles out from such station, in the night time, to permit a
freight train to pass, when the plaintiff's wife, supposing she had arrived at her
own station, no announcement having been made of the name of the station
where the train was then stopping, alighted with the assistance of a brakeman,
who did not inquire where she was going, and was left alone in the dark. Such
side track was not a regular stopping place for said train. Held, that she was
not guilty of negligence, and that the company was liable to her for damages
sustained. Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 436.

44. Plaintiff took passage on a street car of defendants and rode on the front
platform, as the defendant allowed smoking only there, and he was smoking.
The conductor took fare from him and allowed him to remain without objection.
There was abundance of room on the seats inside the car. By a jolt of the car
he was thrown off and injured. The statute of New York relieves railroad
companies from liability where they post on their cars warning against riding
on the platform and furnish seats to the passengers within the car. Defendants
had posted this notice only: "Passengers are forbidden to get on or off the car
while in motion, or on or off the front platform, or on or off the side except
nearest the sidewalk." Held, that the notice of defendant not forbidding pas-
sengers to ride on the platform, the statute did not relieve defendant from liability.
Held, further, that independent of the mandate of the statute it is not, even in
the case of steam cars, negligence per se for a passenger to stand on the front
platform of a moving car. Nolan. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 463.

45. Where one travelling on a passenger train of a railroad company presents
to the conductor a ticket issued by such company, authorizing him to ride from
one to another designated station, "only on such trains as stop regularly at both
stations," and is ejected from the cars by such conductor between such stations,
it will be no defence to the passenger's action against the company for damages,
that by the regulations of the company the train on which he was travelling did
not stop at the latter station, if the ticket was issued since the passage of the act
of 1867 [Ohio] and such station was in a municipal corporation which, at the
time the ticket was issued, had a population of three thousand inhabitants, and
the passenger believed, when he took passage on the train, that it stopped at
both stations. Pennsylvania Co. v. Wentz, 478.

46. By the terms of a contract for the transportation of sheep over the line of
the defendant company, it was released from liability originating in the vicious-
ness or weakness of the animals, or from delays, or in consequence of heat,
suffocation, or of being crowded, "or on account of being injured, whether
such injury shall be caused by burning of hay, straw, or any other material used
for feeding said animals or otherwise, and for any damage occasioned thereby,"
in consideration of a reduction in the charges for freight. There were no words

CARRIER-Continued.

expressly and definitely exempting the company from liability for its own negli-
gence. Held, that under the doctrine of Mynard v. S. B. and N. Y. R. R. Co.,
71 N. Y. 180, that when general words limiting the liability of a carrier may
operate without including his negligence or that of his servants, such negligence
will not lie within the exemption of the agreement. The carrier was liable for
injury done to the sheep by fire, which started in the bedding of their cars,
which injury resulted from the negligence of the railroad company in omitting
to supply the train in which the sheep were with such appliances as would have
enabled those in charge of it to have put out the fire before the injury was done.
Holsapple v. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 487.

47. H. E. & Co. delivered to the railroad company fifty-two barrels of whiskey
for shipment. The railroad at the time was under control of the Confederate
forces, and on account of the transportation of army stores the whiskey was not
shipped. Shortly after the whiskey was delivered to the company the Confed-
erate army was compelled to withdraw from Nashville, and before leaving the
city destroyed the whiskey. Held, that the company was not liable for the loss.
Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ester, 492.

48. The plaintiff delivered cattle, carriage prepaid, to the defendant railway
company for carriage on the terms of signed conditions, whereby, in considera-
tion of an alternative reduced rate, it was agreed that the company were "not
to be liable in respect of any loss or detention of or injury to the said animals,
or any of them, in the receiving, forwarding, or delivery thereof, except upon
proof that such loss, detention, or injury, arose from the wilful misconduct of
the company or its servants." Gordon v. Great Western Ry. Co., 619.

49. The cattle were carried; but, on application made for them by the plain-
tiff, the defendants, in consequence of their clerk having negligently omitted to
enter the cattle on the consignment note as "carriage paid," refused to deliver
them, and alleged that the carriage was not paid. The cattle were kept exposed
to the weather until the next day, when the mistake having then been ascertained,
they were delivered. They were damaged by the exposure. In an action for
damages by reason of wrongful detention and negligence. Held, that the with-
holding of the cattle, under a groundless claim to retain them, at the end of the
transit was not " detention" within the conditions, and the company were there-
fore liable. Id.

50. A carrier of goods consigned to one person under one contract has a lien
upon the whole for the freight and charges on every part, and a delivery of part
of the goods to the consignee does not discharge or waive that lien upon the rest
without proof of an intention to do so. Potts v. New York and New England
R. R. Co., 424.

51. When the consignor delivers goods to one carrier to be carried over his
route, and thence over the route of another carrier, he makes the first carrier his
forwarding agent, and the second carrier has a lien, not only for the freight over
his own part of the route, but also for any freight on the goods paid by him to
the first carrier. Id.

52. The carrier's lien is as good against the consignor as against the consignee,
and therefore, where the consignor endeavored to exercise his right of stoppage
in transitu after a part delivery of the goods, it was held that he was entitled to
receive the goods not delivered, only upon payment of the freight upon all the
goods, including that paid by the defendant railroad to a water carrier, to whom
the plaintiff first delivered the goods and from whom the defendant immediately
received them. Id.

See NEGLIGENCE, 727; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 7-18, 26-29, 34, 35; STATUTE.
CAR TRUST, 159.

See BOND, 10, 11, 13; CARRIER, 18; EMINENT DOMAIN, 6; STATUTE, 3; Tax.

See CARRIER, 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 50; EMINENT DOMAIN, 8.

CONSENT OF VOTERS, 113.

1. A bill designated as "House Bill No. 231," and having for its title "An
Act to amend an act entitled 'An Act to incorporate the Illinois Grand Trunk
Railway," regularly passed the House of Representatives of the General Assem-
bly of Illinois. In its passage through the Senate "Illinois" was dropped from
the title, and in the message of the House to the Senate and of the Senate to the
House, reporting its passage by those bodies respectively, "Illinois" was left
out of the title, but the designation as House Bill No. 231 was retained. The
journals show no amendment to the title. The bill as above entitled was signed
by the presiding officer of each House. The Constitution of Illinois then in
force provides that "every bill shall be read on three different days in each
House, and every bill having passed both Houses shall be signed by the
speakers of their respective Houses." Held, that the act was duly and consti-
tutionally passed. Walnut v. Wade, 36.

See BOND, 4, 9, 28; STATUTE, 2, 4, 8.

1. Under the rule that the whole of an instrument should be construed to-
gether, and not detached parts, a clause of a mortgage conveying all the "prop-
erty" of a railroad, the word "property" being followed by the qualifying
phrase "that is to say," accompanied by a detailed description of specific things,

CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENT—Continued.

such as enter into the construction of a railroad. Held, not to pass county
bonds previously granted to the road to aid in its construction. Smith
McCullough, 159.

See CORPORATION, 1, 2, 3; EMINENT DOMAIN, 1.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE, 54, 1.

1. Corporations have no other powers than those which are conferred upon
them either by express concession or clear implication. McCalmont v. Philadel-
phia, etc., R. R. Co., 163.

2. The grant to a railroad company of the general power to borrow money,
and to issue bonds below par, will not authorize it to issue irredeemable bonds
at a rate below par, entitling the holder to a contingent share in the profits, nor
to execute a mortgage to secure such bonds. Id.

3. The Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. is authorized by its charter to borrow
money and to sell bonds therefor at a rate below par, and also to execute mort-
gages to secure its indebtedness. The company proposed to raise a large sum of
money by issuing to the stock and bondholders irredeemable bonds of $50 each,
at the price of $15 for each bond, to bear interest at the rate of six per cent on
their face value, payable annually out of the surplus earnings, after defraying
current expenses and distributing a dividend of six per cent on the common
stock, with a right to share equally with the stockholders any balance that
might remain after such six per cent and their face value was paid. It pro-
posed also to execute a blanket mortgage on the property of the road partly to
secure said bonds. Held, on the application of several stock and bondholders,
that the scheme was not authorized by the provisions of the company's charter;
that the issuing of such bonds and the execution of such a mortgage would be
ultra vires, and that therefore a court of equity would interpose by injunction
to restrain the same. Id.

4. The board of directors of a railroad company, who are authorized by the
act of incorporation to construct, maintain and operate a railroad, and, for
that purpose, are empowered to make contracts and "to do all acts needful to
carry into effect the objects for which it was created," including the right to
demand and receive for the transportation of passengers and property a com-
pensation not exceeding a maximum rate, may, within that limit, make con-
tracts for transportation for a fixed future period. Such a contract, if otherwise
valid, is not ultra vires and void, for the reason that it binds the corporation for
a fixed period of time. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Himrod Furnace Co., 471.
5. Although a franchise is property, and as such may be taken by a corpora-
tion having the right of eminent domain, yet in favor of such right there is no
implication, unless it arises from a necessity so absolute that without it the grant
itself will be defeated. It must also be a necessity that arises from the very
nature of things, over which the corporation has no control, and not a necessity
created by the corporation itself for its own convenience or for the sake of
economy. Pennsylvania R. R. App. 507.

CORPORATION—Continued.

6. A street is a public franchise, and cannot be invaded, except by direct leg-
islative grant.
Id.

7. By the Act of March 12th, 1873, the Pennsylvania R. R. Co. was author-
ized to lay a track on Delaware avenue as far north as Dock street, and to
acquire such "ground and property, near or convenient to said avenue or street,
as said company may deem necessary for depot and other railroad purposes.
The company constructed a depot a short distance above the north-west corner
of Dock street and Delaware avenue. To connect their line on Delaware ave-
nue with this depot they tore up the tracks of a street passenger railway on
Dock street. It was shown that if the company had bought the property at
the corner there would have been no necessity to cross Dock street to reach their
depot, but without this purchase there was no other way of reaching it, unless
they removed the street railway tracks. Held, that under the Act of 1873, the
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. had no authority to interfere with the franchise of the
street railway. Id.

8. A contract by a railroad corporation to pay or guarantee, the expenses of
a "world's peace jubilee and international musical festival," is neither a neces-
sary nor appropriate means of carrying on its business, and is ultra vires, and
cannot bind it by reason of benefit to be derived from possible increase of pas-
sengers over its road. Davis v. Old Colony Ry. Co., 543.

9. The power to manufacture and sell goods of a particular description does
not include the power to partake in, or to guarantee, the profits of an enterprise
that may be expected to increase the use or demand for such goods. Id.

10. By the Cornwall Minerals Railway Act, 1873, the Cornwall Minerals Ry.
Co. was empowered to borrow on mortgage to the extent of £250,000, and to
issue debenture stock subject to the provisions of the Companies Clauses Act,
1863, Part III., but notwithstanding anything therein contained, the interest of
all debenture stock "at any time created by the company" was to rank pari
passu with the interest of all mortgages "at any time granted by the company,'
and should have priority over all principal moneys secured by such mortgages.
Harrison v. Cornwall Minerals Ry. Co., 606.

11. By a later Act of 1875, the company were empowered to raise additional
capital; and after providing that the principal secured by all mortgages granted
by the company before the passing of the Act, should have priority over the
principal secured by all mortgages granted by virtue of that Act, the company
was empowered to issue debenture stock, subject to the provisions of the Com-
panies Clauses Act, 1863, but the interest of all debenture stock created and
issued at any time after the passing of that Act was to rank pari passu with the
interest of all mortgages granted after the passing of that Act, and should have
priority over all principal moneys secured by such mortgages. Id.

12. By another Act of 1877 power to raise a further sum by the issue of de-
benture stock under provisions similar to those in the Act of 1875 was given to
the company. Id.

13. The company granted mortgages and issued debenture stock under the
powers of the Act of 1873 before the passing of the Act of 1875. Id.

14. They also issued further debenture stock under the powers of the Act of
1873 after the passing of the Act of 1875, but before the passing of the Act of
1877. They also issued further debenture stock under the powers of the Act of
1873 after the passing of the Act of 1877; and also issued debenture stock under
the powers of the Acts of 1875 and 1877, after the passing of the Act of 1877.
Id.

15. The company being unable to pay the interest on all these mortgages and
debenture stocks in full, a receiver of the undertaking was appointed by the
Court, and a special case settled for ascertaining the priorities:-

Held, first, that notwithstanding the words "at any time," in the Act of 1873,
the enactment therein contained applied only to the mortgage debt and debent-
ure stock for which provision was made by that Act.

Secondly, that upon the true construction of the several Acts of 1873, 1875,
and 1877, the order of priority of the interest on the mortgages and debenture
stock was as follows: