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there is need of government, which implies different stations and conditions ; as these again call for different abilities and qualifications. All, 'tis plain, cannot be governours, nor enjoy the benefits which attend some posts of wealth and
many have nothing left them but to obey, to execute the will of their superiors, and undergo the drudgeries of life.*
The same holds in the body politic, as in the natural; there must be many inferior and more feeble members, which yet are necessary; neither can the head say to the feet, I have no need of you.
But now, if all these different members of the world had naturally the self-fame sense and relish of things; if each man had originally and unchangeably the highest degree of understanding and acuteness; the greatest strength of reason, and fineness of imagination, that is to be met with in any of the species; how very unequal and incongruous must this unavoidable diversity of orders prove! How hard would be the case of them, whose lot is to fill the worst and lowest offices, and yet who find themselves as well qualified for, and as highly deserving too of the best, (since on this supposition, which leaves it so very little in any one's power to benefit either himself or others, there could scarce be any real desert at all) as those that hold them; and who likewise
can• Illi ergo omnes conditi sunt ut hæc opera præstent, quibus in civitate opus est; condi:us est autem vir scientia præditus fui gratia: [i. e. ob finem quem adeplus est, sc. scientiain.) atque ita fimul colitur terra, et reperitur fapientia. Quam fcite ergo dixit ille, quisquis fuit, Nifi effent ftulti, desolaretur terra! Maimon. Porta MS: p. 41. Vid. Eccio xxxvii. 32, 34. & Helberg N. Klim. p.533.
cannot but be as deeply sensible of all that misery and hardship which arises from the want of them! The common intellect and apprehension of man would be but ill placed in an ox or ass; nor would the genius and temper of some philosophic mind be any better suited to him that driveth them, and is occupied in all their labours.
But this must necessarily be the state of things, if all men were by nature furnished with all those rational or intellectual accomplishments, which adorn some few of them at present. Three parts in four of the world must be unfit for their particular circumstances, and at odds with their condition.
How inconsistent also would it be in nature to implant those various senses, appetites, and tastes in all men, which not one in a thousand would have
power to gratify! — that sublime degree of reason and reflection, which could only prove its own tormentor!
Not to mention what ill influence such a scheme would have on government itself; how difficult it must be to rule, where every one has the same strength and skill; how hard to obey, when all have equal abilities, and therefore (as they might imagine) an equal right to be their own direct* In short, how much more wise and be
neficial • Si omnes ingenio pares effent, omnesque in eofdem affectus proclives, aut iisdem virtutibus ornati; non esset qui alius imperiis parere vellet, aut ei quidpiam concedere, aut qui varietati minifteriorum et artium omnium generum aptus esset. Cum omnes omnia curare nequeant, fingulos in Societate suo munere, in gratiam aliofum, fungi oportet; nec vilifima munera minus sunt necessaria interdum quam fublimiora. Itaque effe oportuit omnibus suum ingenium, ut quisque quod suum est ad Societatis felicitatem conferret, et quod cæteris deest suâ induftriâ fuppleret. Cleric. Silu. Philol. ad Æschin. Soor. p. 170, 171.
neficial is the present constitution of things! where all is left to mankind themselves, who have both the forming and disposing of each other; nay, where men are at liberty in a great measure to frame their own natures, and dispositions: where they have no inconvenient or pernicious principle to lay to nature's charge *; no properly innate notions, or implanted instincts t; no truly natural appetite or affection, to sway or byass them; except that universal sense, and strong desire of happiness, which was so absolutely necessary to their preservation (a).
By • See Ibbot's Boyle's Leat. 2d sett, Serm. 5. p. 143, &c. or King's Origin of Evil, Note 38, p. 189. 4th Edit.
+ See Prelim. Diff. to King and Rem. i. p. 75. 4th Edit.
(a) To such as are desirous of forming more exact, philosophical notions on the present Subject, let it be observed, that when the first foundation of a diversity of sense and intellect is once laid in a greater or less susceptibility of pleasure or pain, by a perception of ideas more acute or dull, more quick or flow, and a proportioned reflection on them, (which proportion, by the bye, between these two powers (of perceiving and reflecting] is, I believe, in each Person pretty exactly kept up, as to the pitch of their vivacity in both the abovenamed respects) – from hence the whole tribe of affections,&c. and the several degrees in each, are very apparently deducible: supposing only this, I say, which seems to lie
in the original stamina of the body, and is so far not to be accounted for, at least by me ; which therefore, and which only I should term imate or strictly natural; fince every thing besides, that is comprehended under the name of natural appetite, &c. is properly so far from being such, that it is evidently posterior in the order of nature, and entirely grounded on the idéas which themselves arise from hence, and whole innateness in all senses of that word is now generally given up: - supposing then this one foundation laid by nature, a difference herein will be enough to constitute the being more or less sensible, or ra. cional in general; and tend to make it more or less passionate or mild, eager or indolent, &c. in whatsoever it applies itielf to: But can this ever actually determine it to any one peculiar sett of objects, or have any tendency towards giving what we mean by a particular genius, taite, or temper? That, and the whole constitution of the human mind, or its predominant qualities, seem to arise afterwards from the particular asociations which we form ourselves, or learn of
By these means we have at first only such thoughts and inclinations instilled into our minds as are agreeable to, and for the most part do in fact arise from our particular place and circumstances in the world; and afterwards find room
enough others, as these grow gradually, and even mechanically from the circumstances we are in,
or from those objects that more immediately surround and frike us * ; provided that a suitable attention and regard be paid to each as it presents itself.
For that amidst all. this mechanic apparatus we have such a distinct faculty of attending, and determining the subordinate powers in consequence thereof, as is stated at large by ABp. King, I must beg leave to suppose, till all the various appearances, which seem so much to require it (of which in the following Note 4) are solved on other principles; and then indeed this, which, it must be owned, contains something inexplicable, will be of course excluded. I may add here, that neither are those associations themselves, from whence some very ingenious persons would deduce a total mechanism, altogether necessary; nor we so far paflive under them, as to be left without a power of curbing and correcting, breaking and eradicating; as well as of contracting them at first, and afterwards confirming them: to assert this would be advancing a new doctrine of habits contrary to the general sense and language of mankind.
Well then, allowing such a degree of liberty, or active power to be joined with the other pafive ingredients in our composition, as such, it must in some measure act independently on each of them, and be capable of forming new asociations from its own proper acts, which will extend to all the rest, and influence them: and yet as it will also have some such sort of connection with them all, as to be
See Hartley's Observations on Man, part 1. A book well worth the pains required to understand it, and which I must beg leave to recommend, as exhibiting a very curious history of man's frame, and well founded in the main; though the ingenious author carries some points, particularly that of mechanism, farther perhaps, than either experience feems to justify, or we are at present willing to ailow. Perhaps it exceeds the power of human underitanding to decide where mechanism ends, and where the liberty of indiference (the only notion of liberty that comes up to the purpose) may be supposed to commence. However, it seems clear that some share of each is to be admitted into the human composition, as well towards folving several phænomena, as giving due satisfaction in the great articles of religion and morals; and that after all the attempts of the moft able writers on this subject, neither principle can be wholly excluded. This appears fufficiently from a late humorous treatife, where the fagacious Mr. Search, in order to reconcile his scheme to common sense, either plays continually on a false and foreign notion of freedom, or is forced to adopt a main part of the real fyftem, even while he is endeavouring to exclude it.
enough to refine, improve, and enlarge our faculties; to qualify ourselves for, as well as, by a right application of them, to merit some superior station, whenever that shall become void. How regular and beautiful a subordination must this
foon itself in fome respect or other influenced by them reciprocally; or (which comes to the same thing) the mind will be so far affected in, and through them as to influence it; which we all daily feel : (else how come these parts of our conftitution to be constantly applied to with success for the determination of it? Why is pain presert or in prospect used to move a man, or arguments and motives urged, if they are really matters of indifference to his choice, and have no natural effect upon it?] As this grows and gathers strength, like all our other faculties; and is equally capable of being impaired, and rectified again : (King. Note X. p.360. 4th Ed.) – As it is limited and subject to its laws, not perhaps wholly different, though of a kind diftin&t from those of the other appetites: (however, such as make it no less governable, Ibid. c. v. 9 5. sub. 4. p. 372, &c. with Notes 69, p. 366, and 70, p. 371.) and cannot go against these appetites without manifest pain and misery to the person : (Ib. note
. p. 241, &c.) — As it may be inclined, both by them and its own course of operation, and will become daily more and more conformed to them, by due regular exercise; which we likewise experience; - its operations will become as much the objects of foreknowledge; ror will it be much less easy to account for either the formation, or increase of any particular turn of mind, in any given situation, than if all were performed in us necessarily, and at once.
This plan of human nature, which derives every thing from a few principles, and yet makes soom for that endless variety confpicuous in it, might, I am sensible, be set in a good light, and mewn to be free from some of the greatest difficulties that must clag all others. In this view, a juft uniformity is, by the Deity, so far as his immediate acts reach, always, and might be by us, generally, preserved among all its constituent parts; our talents suited to our capacity of using them; our sphere enlarged, as that increases; and regularly keeping pace with our improvements; each dispensation put upon a reasonable foot; and all discoveries made in due proportion to our qualifications for judging of them, and our dispositions to apply them. Whereas the contrary scheme, of bringing all things to an original, equal, and immediate intuition; or of fixing every man to certain impulses, or inftincts, independent on his ftation and endeavours, and intirely unimprovable by them; this must be quite arbitrary, and in a great measure useless; and attended with all the inconsistences and inconveniences already mentioned.
Such would the consequences be of that pretended universal equability, in natural religion ; nor is the levelling scheme, so much contended for in revelation, less absurd as will appear below.