This section does not expressly or impliedly repeal section 717 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. People ex rel. Knowlton v. Sadler, 2 N. Y. Cr., 439. Se People v. Meakim, 133 N. Y., 224; 8 N. Y. Cr., 412; 44 St. Rep., 752; aff'g 61 Hun, 327; 40 St. Rep., 686; People v. Upton, 38 Hun, 107; 4 N. Y. Cr., 469; Brummer v. Downs, 43 St. Rep., 824; 17 N. Y. Supp., 636; Matter of ampe, 2 City Ct., 403, note. TITLE I PERSONS PUNISHABLE FOR CRIME. SECTION 16. What persons are punishable criminally, 17. Presumption of responsibility in general. 18. Id., as to child under seven years. 19. Age of capability for crime. Age, how determined by examina tion. By record of baptism or birth. By family bible. 20, 21. Irresponsibility, etc., of idiot, lunatic, etc. 22. Intoxicated persons. 23. Morbid criminal propensity. 24. Rule as to married woman. 25. Rule as to persons acting under threats, etc. 26. Id., when not done in defense of self or another. § 16. What persons are punishable criminally.--The following persons are liable to punishment within the state: 1. A person who commits within the state any crime, in whole or in part; 2. A person who commits without the state any offense which, if committed within the state, would be larceny under the laws of the state, and is afterward found with any of the property stolen or feloniously appropriated within this state; 3. A person who, being without the state, causes, procures, aids or abets another to commit crime within the state; 4. A person who, being out of this state, abducts or kidnaps by force or fraud, any person contrary to the laws of the place where such act is committed, and brings, sends or conveys such person within the limits of this state, and is afterward found therein; 5. A person who, being out of this state, and with intent to cause within it a result contrary to the laws of this state, does an act which, in its natural and usual course, results in an act or effect contrary to its laws. See sections 185, 540 and 676, post. See People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y., 79; 14 St. Rep. 495 People v. Lyon, 99 id., 210; 3 N. Y. Cr., 161; People v. Marra, 4 id., 304. § 17. Presumption of responsibility in general.-A person is presumed to be responsible for his acts. The burden of proving that he is irresponsible is upon the accused person, except as otherwise prescribed in this Code. The provision of the Revised Statutes (part 4, chap. 1, title 7. section 2) was abrogated by this section. People v. Taylor, 52 St. Rep., 919; 138 N. Y., If the prisoner is sufficiently in possession of his faculties to form an intent, and voluntarily and willfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another's life, the jury ha e the right-are not bound to do so-to presume that he intends the natural consequences of his act. People v. Fish, 125 N. Y., 153; 8 N. Y. Cr., 143; 34 St Rep., 843. In capital, as well as other cases, it must be presumed that a person in ends that which is the natural and necessary consequence of the act done by him, unless such act was done under circumstances which preclude the existence of such an intent. People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y., 77. All homicide is presumed to be malicious, and amounting to murder until the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, excuse or justification. Id. But there is no legal presumption arising from the proof of the commission of a homicide which concludes a jury from finding upon such evidence alone that there was not such deliberation and premeditation as constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, or but that the act was justifiable or excusable. Id. § 18. Presumption as to child under seven years.-A child under the age of seven years is not capable of committing crime. Child under seven.-The law does not define when a child becomes sui juris. Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 N. Y., 351; 5 St. Rep. 642. A child under seven years has not reached an age at which infants are generally supposed to be of full discretion or capable of crime, of which laches and neglect are but degrees. Moebus v. Herrman, 108 N. Y., 353; 13 St. Rep. 648. Infants under seven years of age are deemed incapable of committing crime, and such incapacity presumptively continues until the age of twelve. Stone v. Dry Dock, etc., 115 N. Y., 109; 23 St. Rep., 551. $ 19. Age of capability for crime. Age, how determined by examination. By record of baptism or birth. By family Bible.-A child of the age of seven years, and under the age of twelve years, is presumed to be incapable of crime, but the presumption may be removed by proof that he had sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect charged against him and to know its wrongfulness. Whenever in any legal proceedings it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, the child may be produced for personal inspection, to enable the magistrate, court or jury, to determine the age thereby and the court or magistrate may direct an examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall also be competent evidence upon the question of age. A copy of the record of baptism of any child in any parish register, or register kept in a church, or by a clergyman thereof, or a certificate of baptism duly authenticated by the person in charge of such register, or who administered said baptism, and also a transcript of the record of birth recorded in any bureau of vital statistics or board of health, duly authenticated by its secretary or under its seal, and the entries made in a family Bible, shall also be competent evidence upon the question of the age. Amended by chap. 46 of 1884. This amendment added to the original section a provision as to an examination to determine age. Amended by chap. 145 of 1888. This amendment added to this section. as amended in 1884, a provision as as to proof of age by record of baptism or birth, and family Bible. See section 279, post. Effect. The Code preserves the rule of the common law, except that it fixes the age of twelve instead of fourteen as the time when the presumption of incapacity ceases. Stone v. Dry Dock, etc., 115 N. Y., 109; 23 St. Rep., 551. Burden.-On a criminal charge against an infant between the years of seven and twelve, the burden is on the People to show that he has intelligence and maturity of judgment sufficient to render him capable of harboring a criminal intent. Stone v. Dry Dock, etc., 115 N. Y., 109; 23 St. Rep., 551. Appearance. In determining the age of a child at the time an offense is alleged to have been committed, her appearance upon the witness stand may be taken into consideration by the jury. People v. Stott, 4 N. Y. Cr., 308. The jury have the right to determine the age of the female alleged to have been abducted, by personal inspection and by her general appearance, in connection with other competent testimony. People v. Platt, 3 N. Y. Cr., 137. This case was reversed in 100 N. Y., 590, but upon another point. Production. As to the production of a child for personal inspection, see People v. Sheppard, 9 St. Rep. 35; 44 Hun, 565; 5 N. Y. Cr., 136. § 20. Irresponsibility of idiot, lunatic, etc.-An act done by a person who is an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane, is not a crime. A person cannot be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for a crime, while he is in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity, so as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making his defense. Amended by chap. 384 of 1882. This amendment was made before Code took effect. Presumption -The law presumes sanity in all cases. People v. Coleman, 1 N. Y. Cr.. 5. To overthrow this presumption, the burden is upon the person who alleges the insanity. Id. When evidence has been given in its support, the prosecution then holds the affirmative. Id. Insane person.-An insane man frequently deliberates, and, after the most mature deliberation, commits acts which, but for his insanity, would be crimes. People v. Wood, 126 N. Y., 268; 36 St. Rep., 963. The question always is, not whether the party deliberated, but whether he was, at the time, insane within the legal definition of the the term. Id. An insane person cannot be lawfully punished for an act which was committed by him while in a state of insanity, or when he has become insane during or after a trial or conviction. People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y., 600; 36 St. Rep., 181. An insane person is incapable of crime. People v. Coleman, 1 N. Y. Cr., 2. Lunatic. A lunatic is not criminally liable for his unlawful acts. Autremont v. Fire Ass'n. 48 St. Rep. 43; 65 Hun, 477; 20 N. Y. Supp., 345. But he is responsible civilly for any tort committed by him where a wrongful intent is not an essential thing to be proved. Id. Moral insanity.--The species of insanity, called by some moral insanity, constitutes no defense for the commission of crime. People v. Wood, 126 Ň. Y.. 269; 36 St. Rep., 963. Epileptic mania.-Where the defense is that the homicide was the unconscious and uncontrollable result of epileptic mania, the absence of motive is important. as beating upon the issue so presented. People v Barber, 115 N. Y., 475; 25 St. Rep.- 184. Irresistible impulse.-The doctrine that a criminal act may be excused upon the notion of an irresistable impulse to commit it, when the offender has the ability to discover his legal and moral duty in respect to it, has no place in the law. Flanagan . People, 52 N. Y., 467; People v. Carpenter, 1 St. Rep., 642; 102 id., 250; 4 N. Y. r.. 187; People v. Walworth id., 395; Willis . People, 32 N. Y., 717; Moett v. People. 85 id., 379. Where the offender knew what he was doing and had the ability to discover his legal and moral duty in respect to it, the theory of irresistible impulse cannot be invoked, in order to excuse the criminal act. People v. Coleinan, 1 N. Y. Cr.. 3. Test. When it is said that a prisoner must, at the time of the alleged criminal act, have sufficient capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to such act, it is implied that he must have sufficient capacity to know whether such act is in violation of the law of God or of the land, or of both. Moett v. People, 85 N. Y., 380. The test of responsibility is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time the act was done, and in respect thereto. People v. Casey, 2 N. Y. Cr., 190. The law does not find irresponsibility where the claim is that such capacity exists, without the power to chose between them. Id; Flanigan v. People, 52 N. Y., 467. The case of People v. Casey ante, was reversed in 2 N. Y. Cr., 194; 96 N. Y.. 115, on other grounds. The test of responsibility for criminal acts, where insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is the subject of inquiry. People v. Coleman, 1 N. Y. Cr., 2. The true test of criminal responsibility is whether the accused had sufficient reason so know the nature and quality of his act, and whether he has sufficient reason to know right from wrong. Walker v. People, 1 N. Y. Cr., 24. Reasonable doubt.-In order to sustain the defense of insanity, the evidence should be clear and substantial. Walker v. People, 1 N. Y. Cr., 27. And if there is upon the whole evidence in the case any reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and to an acquittal. Id. Effect of commissioner's report. The report of the commissioners under sections 636 to 662 of Criminal Code will not prevent the accused from having the question as to sanity passed upon by a jury on the trial of the indictment. People v. Haight, 13 Abb. N. C., 198. See People v. Haight, 3 N. Y. Cr., 61; People v. Rhinelander, 2 id., 340. § 21. Irresponsibility, etc., of idiots, lunatics, etc.-A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason, as either or 1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 2. Not to know that the act was wrong Amended by chap. 384 of 1882. This amendment was made before Code took effect. See notes under preceding section. See notes under section 23. post. The rule established by this section has been criticised because it excludes consideration of the question whether the accused possessed sufficient power of self-restraint to forbear the commission of an act which he clearly perceived to be criminal. People v. Taylor, 52 St. Rep., 920: 138 N. Y., 407. An insane delusion with reference to the conduct and attitude of another cannot excuse the criminal act of taking his life, unless it is of such a character that, if it had been true, it would have rendered the homicide excusable or justifiable. People v. Taylor, 52 St. Rep., 919; 138 N. Y., 406. Under the provision of this section partial insanity, or incipient insanity, is not sufficient. if there is still the ability to form a correct perception of the legal quality of the act and to know that it is wrong. People v. Taylor, 52 St. Rep., 919; 138 N. Y., 407. In such case the law presumes that the person has also the power to choose between the right and wrong course of action, and will not permit either courts or juries to speculate as to its possible nonexistence. Id. A desire for self-destruction, and the adoption of means to secure it, do not of themselves indicate a mental impairment, which has advanced to the stage of irresponsibility, otherwise the law would not make the attempt to kill one's self a crime. People v. Taylor, 52 St. Rep., 920; 138 N. Y., 403. See 1 St. Rep., 648; People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y., 250; 4 N. Y. Cr., 187; People. Haight, 3 id., 61; 13 Abb. N. C., 198; People v. Rhinelander, 2 N. Y. Cr., 340. § 22. Intoxicated person-No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication, shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act. Effect of intoxication.—The law expressly declares that voluntary intoxication, though furnishing no excuse for a criminal act, may be considered by the jury upon the questions of intent and of the degree of crime. People v. Conroy, 2 N. Y. Cr., 248; 33 Hun, 121. It may also be considered upon the question of deliberation. Id. The jury have a right to consider the intoxicated condition of the accused. People v. Cassiano, 30 Hun, 388; 1 N. Y. Cr., 505. Intoxication does not absolutely tend to show an absence of deliberation and premeditation. People v. Mills, 98 N. Y., 181; 3 N. Y. Cr., 187; 21 W. Dig., 137. It is a question for the jury to determine whether it did not tend to show such absence. Id. The only materality of the evidence of the defendant's intoxication is its bearing upon the questions of deliberation, premeditation and intent. People . Fish, 125 N. Y., 146; 8 N. Y. Cr., 136; 34 St. Rep., 843. If he was sober enough to form an intent and to deliberate and premeditate the crime, his responsibility is the same as though he had been perfectly sober. Id. His condit on in this respect must be taken into account in weighing the evidence as to deliberation and meditation. Id. An appetite for strong drink, so powerful as to overcome the will of the accused, and to amount to a disease, where he was able, at the time of, and in respect to, the act committed, to distinguish between right and wrong, will not exonerate him from responsibility for the crime. Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y., 559. In the case last cited, it was held that the rule is well settled that voluntary intoxication of one who, without provocation, commits a homicide, although amounting to a frenzy, does not exempt him from the same construction of his conduct, and the same legal inferences, upon the question of intent, as affecting the grade of his crime, as are applicable to a person entirely sober. But this section seems to have changed this principle of law by making this fact an element for the consideration of the jury in determining the purpose, motive or intent. § 23. Morbid criminal propensity. A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been capable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense to a prosecution therefor. Eccentricities -Where the acts of the accused were such as to satisfy the jury that the killing was the result of premeditation and deliberation, his bad temper or eccentricities of character, not amounting to insanity, cannot detract from the effect of his acts or shield him from responsibility therefor. Sindram v. People, 88 N. Y., 200. |