to unless satisfaction is voluntarily made, is not a threat within the section, though the wrong is one, the disclosure of which will bring disgrace upon the guilty party. People v. Wightman, 5 St. Rep., 787; 104 N. Y., 601; 5 N. Y. Cr., 549, aff'g 6 St. Rep., 521; 43 Hun, 358.

Illegal act. It is not essential that the threat on its face be to do an illegal act. Id. An accusation in writing of an act involving moral turpitude, known by the writer to be false, accompanied with a suggestion that legal proceedings will be taken, unless the person, against whom it is made, purchases silence, may be a threat within the section, though, in form, the accused is only called upon to render satisfaction for that which, if the charge is true, will entitle the accuser to pecuniary compensation. Id.

Crime. The gist of the offense is the attempt to extort money by a malicious threat to accuse of some crime. People v. Gillian, 18 St. Rep., 681; 50 Hun, 38; 2 N. Y. Supp., 477. The words used do not constitute the offense without the accompanying intent to extort. Id.

What constitutes.-What facts constitute the crime of forwarding threatening letters, under this section. People v. Wightman, 6 St. Rep., 521; 43 Hun, 358; aff'd, 5 St. Rep., 787; 104 N. Y., 601; 5 N. Y. Cr., 549.

§ 559. Sending, etc., of threatening or annoying letters, etc., penalty for.-A person who knowing the contents thereof, sends, delivers, or in any manner causes to be sent or received any letter or other writing threatening to do any unlawful injury to the person or property of another, or any person who shall knowingly send or deliver or shall make and for the purpose of being delivered or sent, shall part with the possession of any letter, postal card or writing with or without a name subscribed thereto or signed with a fictitious name or with any letter, mark or other designation, with intent thereby to cause annoyance to any person, is guilty of misdemeanor.

Am'd by chap. 120 of 1891.

This amendment added the latter provision of the present section.

$560. Attempt to extort money, or property, by verbal threats. A person who under circumstances not amounting to robbery, or an attempt at robbery, with intent to extort or gain any money or other property, verbally makes such a threat as would be criminal under either of the foregoing sections of this chapter, if made or communicated in writing, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

$561. Unlawful threat referring to act of third person. -It is immaterial whether a threat, made as specified in this chapter, is of things to be done or omitted by the offender, or by any other person.

See notes under section 558, ante.

CHAPTER VI.

False l'ersonation, and Cheats.

SECTION 562. Falsely personating another.

563. Limitations as to indictment.

564. Receiving property in false character.

565. Personating officers, policemen, and other persons.

SECTION 566. Obtaining signature by false pretenses.

566a. Obtaining or giving false pedigree of animals, how punished. 567. Obtaining property for charitable purposes.

568. Obtaining negotiable evidence of debt by false pretenses.

569. Using false check or order for payment of money.

570. Obtaining employment by false statements or fraudulent representations as a deaf and dumb person, a misdemeanor.

571. Selling or secreting property with intent to defraud.

572. Pawning, etc., borrowed property.

573. Personating beneficiary of entrance ticket.

574. Mock auctions.

§ 562. Falsely personating another.-A person who falsely personates another, and, in such assumed character,

1. Marries or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation towards another, with or without the connivance of the latter;

or

2. Becomes bail or surety for a party in an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, before a court or officer authorized to take such bail or surety; or

3. Confesses a judgment; or

4. Subscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a written instrument, which by law may be recorded, with intent. that the same may be delivered or used as true; or

5. Does any other act, in the course of any action or proceeding, whereby, if it were done by the person falsely impersonated, such person might in any event become liable to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to pay a sum of money, or to incur a charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any benefit might accrue to the offender, or to another person;

Is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than ten years.

The Code makes no attempt to define, in terms, what constitutes a cheat. People v. Olsen, 39 St. Rep., 297.

§ 563. Limitations as to indictments.-An indictment cannot be found, for the crime specified in subdivision first of the last section, except upon the complaint of the person injured, if there be any such person living, and within two years after the perpetration of the crime.

564. Receiving property in false character.-A person, who falsely personates another, and in such assumed character receives any money or property, knowing that it is intended to be delivered to the individual so personated, with intent to convert the same to his own use, or to that of another person who is not entitled thereto, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent, as for larceny of the money or property so received.

$565. Personating officers, policemen and other persons. -A person who falsely personates a public officer, civil or

military, a policeman, or a private individual having special authority by law to perform an act affecting the rights or interests of another, or who assumes, without authority, any uniform or badge by which such an officer or person is lawfully distinguished, and in such assumed character does an act, purporting to be official, whereby another is injured or defrauded, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

A port warden of another state, who had assumed the office of port warden in this state, was held, in Curtin v. People, 26 Hun, 564; aff'd, without opinion, in 89 N. Y., 621, punishable under chap. 87 of 1881.

§ 566. Obtaining signature by false pretenses. - A person who, with intent to cheat or defraud another, designedly, by color or aid of a false token or writing, or other false pretense, obtains the signature of any person to a written instrument, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than three years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than three times the value of the money or property affected or obtained thereby, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

See sections 528, 529 and 544, ante.

What constitutes.-The obtaining of the signature of a person as an indorser upon a promissory note by false pretenses, with the intent to cheat and defraud him, is an offense within this section. People v. Cole, 48 St. Rep., 351; 20 N. Y. Supp., 505.

The fact that the person so defrauded was credulous and unwary is immaterial. Id.

Where the signature of a municipal officer was procured to a false claim of indebtedness against the municipal corporation by its presentation under such circumstances and in such a manner as was calculated to deceive him, a conviction will be sustained. People ex rel. Phelps v. Court, etc., 83 N. Y., 436. Sole inducement. -The false pretense need not be the sole inducement to the act of the party defrauded. Id.

The signing of the instrument must be occasioned, or materially influenced, by the false pretenses. Therasson v. People, 82 N. Y., 238; rev ́g 20 Hun, 55. The defrauded party, in giving his signature, must rely upon them. Id. This fact need not be established by direct proof, but may be inferred from the facts tending legitimately to show it. Id.

Silence.-To create the false representation, spoken or written words are not necessary. People ex rel. Phelps v. Court, etc., 83 N. Y., 436. A mute or silent act may convey the falsehood, and if it does, it constitutes the offense. Id.

Indictment. It is not essential to set forth all the details of the fraud. Id. It is sufficient to specify particularly the pretenses, to aver their falsity and the fraudulent intent, and to show how they were effectual in accomplishing the fraud. Id. If the false pretense is capable of defrauding, it is sufficient; this must be determined by the circumstances of each particular case. Id. Evidence. On the trial of an indictment under this section, evidence that defendant procured the defrauded person to indorse other notes from time to time to a large amount, which finally resulted in his financial ruin, is competent as bearing on the former's motive. People v. Cole, 48 St. Rep., 351; 20 N. Y. Supp., 505.

Question for jury-Whether the representations were made for the purpose of inducing the defrauded person to indorse the note, and with intent to cheat and defraud him, and whether they wore false and were calculated to deceive him, are questions for the jury. Id.

The question whether the false pretense was calculated to deceive and was capable of defrauding, is one for the jury. People ex rel. Phelps v. Court, etc., 83 N. Y., 436.

In order to convict under this section, the jury must find as a fact that the false pretense was uttered with the intent to cheat or defraud another. Brown v. People, 16 Hun, 535. The intent to cheat and defraud" is an essential element of the offense. Id.

§ 566a. Obtaining or giving false pedigree of animals, how punished.-Every person who by any false pretense shall obtain from any club, association, society or company for improv ing the breed of cattle, horses, sheep, swine or other domestic animals the registration of any animal in the herd register or other register of any such club, association, society or company or a transfer of any such registration, and every person who shall knowingly give a false pedigree of any animal, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceed ing one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Added by chap. 153 of 1887.

§ 567. Obtaining property for charitable purposes.-A person, who willfully, by color or aid of any false token or writ ing, or other false pretense, obtains the signature of any person to any written instrument, or any money or property, for any alleged or pretended charitable or benevolent purpose, is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years, or by a fine to an amount not exceeding the value of the money or property obtained, or by both.

In People v. Clough, 17 Wend., 351, it was held that an indictment would not lie for obtaining money by false pretenses, where the money was parted with as a charitable donation, though the pretenses moving to the gift were false and fraudulent. This case was decided under section 53, art. 4, title 3, chap. 1, part 4 of the Revised Statutes, prior to the enactment of chap. 144 of 1853.

§ 568. Obtaining negotiable evidence of debt by false pretenses. If the false token, by which money or property is obtained in violation of sections five hundred and sixty-six and five hundred and sixty-seven, is a promissory note or other negotiable evidence of debt purporting to be issued by or under the authority of any banking company or corporation not in exist ence, the person guilty of such cheat is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding seven years, instead of by he punishments prescribed by those sections.

569. Using false check or order for payment of money. -The use of a matured check, or other order for the of payment money, as a means of obtaining a signature, or money or property, such as is specified in sections five hundred and sixty-six and

five hundred and sixty-seven, by a person who knows that the drawer thereof is not entitled to draw for the sum specified therein, upon the drawee, is the use of a false token within the meaning of those sections, although no representation is made in respect thereto.

See section 529, ante.

Fraudulent check.-If one who has no money or credit at a bank draws a check thereon and obtains money therefor from some third person, he may, it seems, be guilty of a crime under this section. People v. Clements, 3 St. Rep., 700: 42 Hun, 289; 5 N. Y. Cr., 280.

The mere possession of the check by such third person would be no evidence of the crime.

Id.

Proof would have to be given of the obtaining of the money from him by such cbeck.

Id.

Obtaining goods on a worthless, post-dated check of a third party who had kept no account at the bank on which it was drawn, is within the statute. Lesser v. People, 12 Hun, 668; aff'd, 73 N. Y., 78.

Where a person purchases property and gives ther for his check dated the day of the sale, but payable subsequently, when he has no account in the bank on which the check is drawn, but the whole transaction is a device to cheat, he is properly conuicted of obtaining goods by false pretenses. Foote v. People, 17 Hun, 213.

§ 570. Obtaining employment by false statement or fraudulent representation as a deaf and dumb person, a misdemeanor. A person who obtains employment, or appointment to any office or place of trust by color or aid of any false or forged letter or certificate of recommendation, or of any false statement in writing as to his name, residence, previous employment or qualification, or any person who shall willfully and intentionally fraudulently represent himself or herself to be a deaf and dumb person in order to collect, receive or otherwise obtain moneys, food, clothing or anything of value whatsoever, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Am'd by chapter 654 of 1886.

This amendment added the latter provision of the present section.

$571. Selling or secreting property with intent to defraud.-A person who, having theretofore executed a mortgage of personal property, or any instrument intended to operate as such, sells, assigns, exchanges, secretes, or otherwise disposes of any part of the property, upon which the mortgage or other instrument is at the time a lien, with intent thereby to defraud the mortgagee, or a purchaser thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

This section was inserted by chap. 384 of 1882.

The sale of mortgaged chattels by the mortgagor, with the full permission of the mortgagee to sell, is not within the statute. Millichamp v. People, 14 W. Dig., 252. But where such permission is only to enable him to pay the mortgage, and he, with fraudulent intent, planned to sell and convert the proceeds to his own use, the case is within the statute. Id.

The People ex rel. Stokes v. Risely, 38 Hun, 281; 4 N. Y. Cr., 109, Vaus v. Middlebrook, 3 St. Rep., 277.