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bidding a foreign corporation to sue upon a contract made within a State, until it shall have procured a certificate authorizing it to do business there, does not prevent the maintenance of such an action at common law in a Federal court, unless the statute makes such contracts void. It has been said that a District Court should not hold an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, unless, in a clear case, to prevent irreparable injury to property.50

§ 477a. Common law of the United States. The Supreme Court has frequently laid down the doctrine that there is no common law of the United States regulating civil cases 1 or criminal prosecutions. "There is no body of Federal common law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the several States in the sense that there is a body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and distinct from the body of statute law enacted by the several States." "There is no com

mon law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England, as adopted by the several States, each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alterations as may be provided by its own statutes." "It is an entirely different thing to hold that there is no common law in force generally throughout the United States, and that the countless multitude of interstate

Auto Club of America, 225 U. S. 489; Sullivan v. Beck, 79 Fed. 200; Eastern B. & L. Ass'n v. Bedford, 88 Fed. 7; Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Bridge Co., 151 Fed. 871. See § 87, supra. Contra, Re Monongahela Distillery Co., 186 Fed.

220.

49 Michie v. N. H. & H. R. Co., 151

Fed. 694. Contra, Am. L. & Tr. Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 Fed. 775.

50 U. S. v. Scott, 148 Fed. 431; Ex parte Wood, 155 Fed. 190; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 155 Fed. 220; Consolidated Gas Co. v. New York, 157 Fed. 849.

§ 477a. 1 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Peters 591; Smith v. Alabama, 124

U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. 564;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub.
Co., 1 U. S. 92, 47 L. ed. 765. See
DuPonuceau on Jurisdiction passim;
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. U. S., C.
C. A., 211 Fed. 64.

2 U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dallas, 384, 1 L. ed. 426; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch. 32, 3 L. ed. 259; U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheaton 415, 4 L. ed. 124; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 262, 35 L. ed. 159, 166. See infra, § 483.

3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92, 45 L. ed. 765, per Mr. Justice Brewer.

4 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. 564. Per Mr. Justice Matthews.

commercial transactions are subject to no rules and burdened by no restrictions other than those expressed in the statutes of Congress."

"There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history. The code of constitutional and statutory construction, which, therefore, is gradually formed by the judgments of this court, in the application of the constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so much of the common law as may be implied in the subject and constitutes a common law, resting on national authority."5

5 Ibid. Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 24, 33, 34, per Oliver P. Shiris J.; "The meaning to be given to this last sentence quoted from the opinion of Mr. Jus tice Matthews is not at all clear. If it be true that the Supreme Court, in construing the provisions of the Constitution, and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has the right to adopt, as the basis of its construction, so much of the common law as may be implied in the subject, which proposition seems to be affirmed, then is it not true that the principles of the common law, so far as applicable to the subjectmatter, are recognized as in force touching matters of national control? It is evident that it was present to the mind of the learned justice whose opinion we are considering that it would not do to hold that the failure of Congress to legislate touching the duties and obligations of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce left the public without any law for its protection, and therefore the suggestion is made that: The failure of congress to

legislate can be construed only as an intention not to disturb what already exists, and is the mode by which it adopts, for cases within the scope of its power, the rule of the state law.' The rules prevailing in the different states may be variant or antagonistic. A delivery of goods may be made to a common carrier in California, for transportation to New York. Do the legal relations, duties and obligations existing between the shippers and carrier vary and change as the shipment passes state boundaries, so as to accord with the local law of each State through which the carrier may choose to take them? Upon such a theory, what becomes of the principle that the exclusive control of foreign and interstate commerce was committed to congress in order to secure a uniform rule touching the same? I would amend the statement of Mr. Justice Matthews so that it should read: The failure of congress to legislate can be construed only as an intention not to disturb what already exists; and as, at the time of the adoption of the constitution,

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The failure of Congress to legislate can be construed only an intention not to distrub what already exists; and as, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, common carriers, under the principles of the common law, were subject to certain duties and obligations, the failure on the part of Congress to legislate thereon evinces the legislative intent to leave the rules and principles of the common law in force, as controlling and defining the relations, duties, and obligations of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce.6

common

carriers, under the principles of the common law, were subcertain duties and obligajeet to the failure on the part of tions, congress to legislate thereon evinces the legislative intent to leave the rules and principles of the common law in full force, as controlling and defining the relations, duties, and obligations of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce!' "' stating the proposition set forth in the text Over the following note.

6 Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 24, 34, per Oliver P. Shiras J.

were then

Ibid (p. 27): "It appears when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, the general rules of the common law, in so far as they applicable to the conditions existing in the colonies, and subject to the modifications necessary to adapt them to the uses and needs of the people, were recognized and were in force in the colonies, and the people thereof were entitled to demand the enforcement thereof through the judicial tribunals then existing. The adoption of the Constitution did not deprive the people of the several colonies of the protection and advantages of the common law. The Constitution itself recognizes the fact of the continued existence of the common law, and Fed. Prac. Vol. III-17

indeed it is based upon the princi

ples thereof, and its correct inter-
pretation requires that its provisions
shall be read and construed in the
light thereof." Ibid (32, 36, 38,
39): To me it seems clear, beyond
question, that neither in the Con-
stitution, nor in the statutes en-
acted by congress, nor in the judg
ments of the Supreme Court of the
United States can there be found
any substantial support for the prop-
osition that, since the adoption of
the Constitution, the principles of
the common law have been wholly
abrogated touching such matters as
are by that instrument placed with-
in the exclusive control of the na-
tional government
* I cannot
concur in the proposition that the
principles of the common law have
no existence in this country, as ap-
plicable to national affairs, or that
these principles have only a local
existence, due to their adoption by
the several states. It is certainly a
novel proposition that up to the date
of the enactment of the interstate
commerce act in 1887, all the foreign
and interstate commerce of the coun-
try was without the pale of law,
and that there were no legal rules
or principles which governed or con-
trolled the relations between the
shippers or carriers engaged in that
business. *
Perhaps the most

Independently of any statute, Federal courts sustain suits against telegraph companies, railroad companies, or other com

forcible illustration of the fact that the government of the United States does recognize and enforce the prin ciples of the common law with regard to subjects wholly within national control, and not as part of the municipal law of any state, is found in connection with the organization and proceedings of the court of claims. This court is not a court in and for the district of Columbia nor is it a court of any district or circuit. ** As to this court thus organized, and clothed with a jurisdiction wholly national in its character, the express ruling of the Supreme Court is to the effect that the general law controlling its action is the common law *

*

Ibid. (41, 42): "The conclusion I reach upon this subject is that at the time of the separation of the colonies from the mother country, and at the time of the adoption of the constitution, there was in existence a common law, derived from the common law of England, and modified to suit the surroundings of the people; that the adoption of the Constitution and consequent creation of the national government did not abrogate this common law; that the division of governmental powers and duties between the national and state governments provided for in the constitution did not deprive the people who formed the Constitution of the benefits of the common law; that, as to such matters as were by the Constitution committed to the control of the national government, there were applicable thereto the law of nations, the maritime law, the principles of equity, and the common law, according to the nature of

the particular matter; that, to secure the enforcement of these several systems when applicable, the Constitution and congress, acting in furtherance of its provisions, have created the Supreme Court of the United States and the other courts inferior thereto, and have conferred upon these courts the right and power to enforce the principles of the law of nations, of the law maritime, of the system of equity, and of the common law in all cases coming within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, applying, in each in stance, the system which the nature of the case demands; that, as to all matters of national importance over which paramount legislative control is conferred upon congress, the courts of the United States (the Supreme Court being the final arbiter), have the right to declare what are the rules deducible from the principles of general jurisprudence which control the given case, and to define the duties and obligations of the parties thereto; that the common law now applicable to matters committed to the control of the national government is based upon the common law of England, as modified by the surroundings of the colonists and as developed by the growth of our institutions since the adoption of the constitution, and the changes in the business habits and methods of our people; that the binding force of the principles of this common law, as applied to matters affecting the entire people, and placed under the control of the national government, is not derived from the action of the states, and is no more subject to abrogation or modifica

mon carriers for unjust discrimination," or excessive charges,8 for transportation in the course of interstate commerce.

§ 477b. The effect of decisions of State courts, establishing Rules of Property. When the decisions of the State courts establish a rule of property, they will be followed by the Federal courts, unless they relate solely to questions of commercial law,1 or involve the application of principles of the common law which are general throughout the United States.2 Thus the Federal courts will follow the decisions of the State courts, at least if they were made before the cause of action arose and in the absence of constitutional difficulties.

Water rights, the right to a wharf extending into navigable

tion by state legislation than are the principles of the law of nations or of the law maritime.'

7 Western U. Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92, 45 L. ed. 765.

8 Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 24; contra, Swift v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 58 Fed. 858; S. C. 64 Fed. 59, 60; per Grosscup, J.: "The right to recover from common carriers for unreasonable exactions must be found in some positive law of the land, applicable to the case in hand. Such a prohibition is in fact found in the common law; but it is not applicable to the case in hand, unless there be a common law of the United States, as a distinct sovereignty, because the regulation of the rates upon which the suit is dependent is within the scope of the interstate commerce, and an exclusively national affair, in which the need of uniformity is imperative. There is no common law of the United States, as a distinct sovereignty; and there being no pronouncement of congress upon this subject, either expressly or impliedly, outside of the interstate commerce act, and this action not having been brought under the inter

state commerce act, there is no law, either of the United States or the state, applicable to the case in hand, and there can therefore be no recovery."

As to the liability of a railroad company for damages caused by fire, see Denver & R. G. Co. v. U. S., C. C. A., 241 Fed. 64.

§ 477b. 1 Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268, 271, 14 L. ed. 140; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 20, 23, L. ed. 524, 528; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean, 568, 577; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 729, 23 L. ed. 254, 258; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 27 L. ed. 1006; Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U. S. 133, 37 L. ed. 109; St. Louis & S. F. R. v. S. W. Tel. & T. Co., C. C. A., 121 Fed. 276; Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Baltimore Tr. Co., 197 Fed. 347. See supra, § 82. Graysonia-Nashville Lumber Co. v. Goldman, C. C. A., 247 Fed. 423; Ramsay v. Crevlin, C. C. A., 254 Fed. 813.

2 Supra, § 477.

3 Hart v. Dair, C. C. A., 244 Fed. 897. See other authorities cited in this section, infra, section 477c.

4 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Board of Sup'rs. of Appanoose

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