cannot give the court jurisdiction over the subject-matter over which the court is not authorized to exercise its jurisdiction.23 22 It has been well said by the Supreme Court of this State that where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause; and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers. This distinction runs through all the cases on this subject; and it proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into in every court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. The principle that a record cannot be impeached by pleadings is not applicable where there is want of jurisdiction. The want of it makes a record utterly void and unavailable for any purpose. The want of jurisdiction is a matter that may always be set up against a judgment when it is to be enforced, or when any benefit is claimed under it.23 Sec. 88. Judgments import absolute verity and cannot be collaterally attacked. When a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, and the case is made by the pleadings, its judgment, however erroneous, is binding until reversed, and such errors are not available on collateral attack on the judgment.2 24 22 Kinkead's Practice, Sec. 806; Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 O. S. 223. 23 Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U. S. 340, 7 L. Ed. 164; Hickey v. Stewart, 44 U. S. 750, 11 L. Ed. 814; Williamson v. Berry, 42 U. S. 541, 12 Fed. 1,170. 24 Hammond V. Davenport, 16 O. S. 182; Smith v. Finger, 15 Okla. 120, 79 Pac. 759; Mackee v. Where a judgment shows a finding by a court of record of personal service, the judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.25 A direct attack on a judgment is one by which the judgment is directly assailed by some method authorized by law. A collateral attack on a judgment is an attempt to defeat the operation of the judgment in proceedings where some new right derived from or through the judgment is involved.20 Sec. 89. Judgment of the court as between the parties, final. A judgment in an action upon the merits of a case is final, and such judgment is a bar to a second suit for the same cause, and when a matter is finally determined in an action between the same parties by a competent tribunal, it is to be considered at an end, not only as to what was determined, but also as to every other question that the parties might have litigated in the case. As to these two propositions, decrees in chancery stand upon the same footing as judgments in law.27 Purcell, 1 Ind. Ty. 288, 37 S. W. 55; Thurston v. Washington, 18 Okla. 362, 90 Pac. 16; Gooden v. Buffalo, 104 S. W. 94; Crist v. Crosby, 11 Okla. 635, 69 Pac. 885. In an action where a journal entry shows that the plaintiff in the action "moves the court here to dismiss the action without prejudice to a future action at the cost of the plaintiff, which is accordingly done," and afterward an execution is issued, to recover costs, and the real estate of the plaintiff is levied on and sold for that purpose, and the sale confirmed by the court, a sheriff's deed executed, and the purchaser takes possession of the real estate, held, that such journal entry is a sufficient judgment in a collateral attack to uphold the sheriff's deed and the other proceedings under it. Houston v. Clark, 36 Kan. 412, 13 Pac. 739. 25 Crist v. Crosby, 11 Okla. 635, 69 Pac. 885; Wallace v. Adams, 143 Fed. Rep. 716, 74 C. C. A. 540; Plummer v. Wells, 6 Ind. Ty. 189, 90 S. W. 303. 26 By the court in Kingsborough v. Towsley, 56 O. S. 458. In an action on a personal judgment, whether rendered by a court of this State or elsewhere, it is competent to prove in defense, though it be in contradiction of the record, that the defendant was not served with process, nor jurisdiction of his person otherwise obtained by the court rendering the judgment. Such defense is not a collateral attack on the judgment. Ibid. 27 Pratt v. Ratcliffe, 10 Okla. 168, 61 Pac. 125; Williamsburg v. Mr. Freeman, in his work on judgments, puts the propositions above in the following language: "Adjudication is final and conclusive, not only as to matters actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have decided as incidental to, or essentially connected with, the subject-matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action, both in respect to matters of claim and defense. 17 28 This principle of the finality of a judgment is known as res adjudicata. It has been said as a familiar rule that when a matter has once become res adjudicata, there shall be an end to the question.* The reason and principle upon which this rule is based rest upon the expediency of ending the contention of the parties and accomplishing the ends of justice by a single speedy decision of all their rights. Again, "human life is not long enough to allow of matters once disposed of being brought under discussion again." 29 If the rule were otherwise, there would be no end to litigation; for the judgment would finally go to the one whose money or time would enable him to exhaust his adversary. All Towne, 32 N. E. 1,058; City v. West, 7 Wall. 82, 19 L. Ed. 42; Van Renselaer v. Carney, 11 Howard, 326, 13 L. Ed. 715; Hollister v. Abbot, 31 N. Hamp. 448, 64 Am. Dec. 342; Randolph v. Hudson, 12 Okla. 516, 74 Pac. 946; Robey v. Rainsberger, 27 O. S. 677; Petersine v. Thomas, 28 O. S. 597; Covington v. Saergeant, 27 O. s. 233; Hinton v. McNeal, 5 Ohio, 509; Bobcock v. Camp, 12 O. S. 11; Loudenback v. Collins, 4 O. S. 251; Welsch v. Childs, 17 O. S. 319. 28 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 249; Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; 59; Burford v. Kursey, 48 Miss. 643; Bass v. Spooner, 45 Ind. 489; Tusca v. O'Brien, 68 N. Y. 446; Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688; 29 Robey v. Rainsberger, 27 O. S. 677; Great Northern v. Mosop, 17 Com. B. 140; Boswell v. Sharp, 15 Ohio, 441; Kingsbury v. Towsley, 56 O. S. 450. This rule seems to have been adopted from right and necessity to give confidence to the judicial action of the country, and to protect those who have made purchases on the faith of judicial sales. Boswell v. Sharp, 15 Ohio, 441. judgments of the court in Indian cases import absolute verity.30 Sec. 90. The effect of the finding of the court of facts giving it power to enter judgment. In a case where the court finds and states in the judgment facts giving the court power and jurisdiction to enter judgment and decree, such finding imports absolute verity upon the parties and the privies, and while such finding is not reversed, it is conclusive of the matters so found. A judicial record, judgment or decree cannot be contradicted by parol, nor is the truth of the matters therein recited open to investigation. Were the findings, judgments and decrees of the court open to investigation, there would be no security for the innocent purchasers of real estate at a judicial sale. If the records of a sale of real estate under decree of the court, did not import absolute verity, then every purchaser of real estate, under decree of court, would be required to look beyond the record to see whether the clerks, sheriffs, courts and attorneys did their duty, and committed no error, and that each had power to do the various things set forth in the record. Such a condition would make the pleadings and records of our courts on judicial sales of real estate, no protection whatever, and would be a snare to innocent purchasers.31 30 Barbee v. Shannon, 1 Ind. Ty. 199, 40 S. W. 584; Mohlin v. Ice, 56 Fed. Rep. 12, 5 C. C. A. 403; Stanley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. Rep. 836, 8 C. C. A. 305; Boudinot v. Boudinot, 2 Ind. Ty. 107, 48 S. W. 1,019. Under the statutes of this territory, proceedings in the probate court, when exercising jurisdiction concurrent with the district court are considered in the same manner and with like intendment, as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction; and its records, orders, judgments and decrees are accorded like force and effect, and legal presumption, as the records, orders, judgments and decrees of the district court. Carmichael v. Pierce, 10 Okla. 176, 61 Pac. 583; Greer v. McNeal, 11 Okla. 519, 69 Pac. 891; Ward v. Board, 12 Okla. 267, 70 Pac. 378. 31 Kallen v. Ellison, 13 O. S. 455; Lessee v. Whitman, 2 O. S. 270; Moore v. Starks, 1 O. S. 369; Boswell V. Sharp, 15 Ohio, Buchanan v. Roy, 2 O. S. 447; 261; Sec. 91. Effect of void and voidable judgments. Judgments are either voidable or void. And any judgment, in so far as the record is concerned, and in so far as it concerns property rights, is good, valid and binding until it is set aside by the court in an action brought for that purpose. Voidable judgments, as shown above, cannot be attacked collaterally. This principle is assuming a great deal of importance in the courts everywhere, especially as to judicial sale of real estate. Real estate sold under a voidable judgment or decree, gives a title that cannot be assailed except by some method given by statute, to reverse the order of decree or judgment in the case in which the real estate was sold. The statute gives the right to prosecute error for the reversal or setting aside of a judgment within a proper time. It also gives any aggrieved party the right at any time after the term at which the judgment was rendered, to file his petition to vacate and set aside the judgment for any grounds mentioned and set forth in the statute. In addition to these methods, a judgment or decree may be set aside by proceedings in equity.32 We find an entirely different principle applicable to void judgments. A void judgment is subject to collateral attack. If a judgment is void, it has no force and effect, and can be assailed in any action by anyone, and such a judgment is void anywhere and for every purpose. A purchaser of real estate under a void judgment takes no title.33 It has been said of such a judgment: "A void judgment, is in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are Richards v. Shiff, 8 O. S. 589; Trimble v. Longworth, 13 0. S. 431. 32 Kingsborough v. Towsley, 56 0. S. 962. 33 Kingsborough v. Towsley, 56 0. S. 450; Ream v. Wools, 61 O. S. 131; Spoors v. Coen, 44 O. S. 497; Moore v. Starks, 1 O. S. 369; |