however, which can be determined by experiment only; and Congress have consented to make it, appropriating a half million of dollars, for the allotment of a district beyond the Arkansas, and the removal of such tribes as will consent to emigrate.

237. But the Cherokees will not depart. They have been assailed, by order of the administration, with bribes and threats, but they are immoveable. They cast themselves upon the graves of their fathers, and implore the Government, by the remembrance of their former power and hospitality, not to tear them from these relics of departed greatness; they point to their farms, their dwellings, their churches, and their schools, and cry, "these are the fruits of the white man's benevolence, let him not destroy the good work of his hands." We fear, however, they pray in vain. The administration has sped the bolt, which, unless averted, must prostrate the nation. But if the Indians were disposed, for the sake of present peace, to abandon their country, they cannot rely upon the promise of the United States for protection. To every assurance of this kind, they reply, we now hold your most solemn pledge for the same purpose. We have called upon you to redeem it in vain. How, then, can we confide in promises which we have found utterly worthless?

238. VI. Another portion of the message, highly characteristic of the disposition of the administration to enlarge its powers, was the premature introduction of the question relative. to the recharter of the United States Bank. At this period, the charter had more than six years to run, and the effect of immediate consideration was to agitate and disturb the country, upon a subject of the deepest interest. The institution, in the highest credit, was fulfilling all its duties, in the most satisfactory manner, and aiding in the most profitable way, the successful business of the whole country. This moment, the administration chose for sowing doubt and alarm; declaring, "Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this Bank, are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens; and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency."

239. The true cause of this untimely suggestion is to be found in the succeeding paragraph of the message. "Under these circumstances," the President observes, "if such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal operations of the Gov.. ernment, I submit to the wisdom of the Legislature whether, a

national one, founded on Government credit, and its revenues, might not be devised, which would avoid all constitutional difficulties, and, at the same time, secure all the advantages to the Government and country, that were expected to result from the present Bank."

240. A more insidious attack upon the liberties of the United States, could not have been made, than by this proposition; a more grasping effort at power, has never been known in this country. We know, however suitable its consequences might be to the President's disposition, that he did not originate it. It was a fruit of the mind of the American Talleyrand, who looked by elevation to the presidency, to the enjoyment of its maturity. Let us examine, for a moment, the nature of this monstrous conception.

For every effective purpose, the proposed Bank must have been one of discount and deposit, and have had branches, as many, at least, as the Bank of the United States, and probably many more. For, the administration would have had a direct interest in establishing a branch wherever it could place one. A great central Bank at Washington, without branches, would have been useless, in the great object of furnishing a uniform national currency; such currency depending upon the certain and prompt convertibility, at every point of the Union, of the notes of the Bank into coin. But a promise to pay specie at a place remote from the circulation of the notes, and where they would never come, save at great expense, and for the sole purpose of payment, would neither give credit to the notes, nor operate as an effective check upon over issues. The notes would rest upon the same basis of credit, as the paper money of our Revolution, the assignats of revolutionary France, and the treasury notes of the late war; all of which were receivable in payments to the Government: But the two first became wholly worthless, and the last, though bearing interest, sunk to 20 per cent. below par. But, the notes of such a Bank would depreciate from another cause, which constitutes a conclusive objection to the institu-. tion. There would be nothing to limit excessive issues, but the discretion and prudence of the Government, or of the direction.

241. The National Bank being one of many branches, its patronage would have been almost boundless. The Bank of the United States employs five hundred agents, and a Nationtional Bank would soon find means to double that number. But, the influence resulting from the annual appointment of

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these agents. great as it might be, would be harmless, in comparison with that flowing from the dispensation of bank accommodations, which might now be estimated at sixty millions of dollars, and which would increase, annually. What mind does not shrink from the contemplation of a project so ominous to the purity of the Government, and the liberties of the people. No Government, except, perhaps, the despotism of Russia, ever had a patronage so prodigious in its influence, and so dangerous in its character. In the most desperate financial extremity, no other European Government has ventured upon an experiment so perilous. If the American Executive possessed the whole patronage of the English monarchy, political and civil liberty would not be so much endangered, as by this pecuniary machine, giving to the administration a vast, almost unlimited, fund, for rewarding political partisans.

242. The committee of ways and means of the House of Representatives, composed of a majority of the friends of General Jackson, whose chairman was Mr. George McDuffie, one of the most distinguished of his partisans, ably exposed the true character of this conspiracy, of consummate and profligate art, with ignorant and reckless audacity, against the nation; and thus indicated the probable conséquences of its

success.

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Without assuming that a corrupt use would be made of this new species of government patronage, a very slight acquaintance with the practice of all political parties, whatever be their professions, will be sufficient to satisfy any reflecting mind, that, all the evil consequences of corruption would flow from its exercise. Have not our political contests, too frequently, degenerated into a selfish scramble for the offices of the country? Are there not those, who sincerely and honestly believe, that these offices are legitimate objects of political warfare, and the rightful reward of the victorious party? And disinterested and patriotic as the great body of every political party is admitted to be, the fact is no less true than it is lamentable, that the most devoted and active partisans are, very often, mere soldiers of fortune, who watch the political signs, and enlist at the eleventh hour, under the banners of the party most likely to prove successful. Such being, more or less, the composition of all political parties, what would be the probable use made of fifty millions of bank patronage, by a political party which conscientiously, held the doctrine, that all the offices in the gift of the Executive should be divided

among the partisans of a successful political leader? Would not the same principle be even more applicable to Bank loans? And would not the Treasury of the United States, under the sanctifying influence of party delusion and party infatuation, be literally plundered, by mercenary retainers, bankrupts in fortune, and adventurers in politics?"

243. With such views the committee, unreservedly, reprobated the project of a Government Bank, and the House, though composed of a majority of Jackson men, being not yet reduced to absolute submission to the Chief, sanctioned the reprobation. The committee endeavour to qualify the bitterness of their reproof, by asserting, "unequivocally, their conviction that the suggestion of the Chief Magistrate, which they had thus freely examined, proceeded from motives of the most disinterested patriotism, and was, exclusively, designed to promote the welfare of the country." For the following expressions of gross adulation, knowing, as we do, the character of the individual to whom they relate, we feel any sentiment save respect; and we are conscious that the worthy chairman, who wrote them, must now view them with the most painful feeling of self-abasement. "This is not," con

tinues the report, "the mere formal and heartless homage, sometimes offered up to official station, either from `courtesy or interest, but a tribute, which is eminently due, and cheerfully rendered to the exalted character, of the distinguished individual on whom it is bestowed."

244. Now, with all due respect for the honourable committee, we contend, that their report exhibits the President in the most unfavourable light. Either, he comprehended the nature and consequences of the plan he recommended, or he did not. If he did; then, he was urging upon the nation a measure, which he knew to be grossly corrupt, and imminently dangerous: If he did not; then, as, according to the committee, they were glaring and palpable, he was incompetent to appreciate measures whose offensiveness struck forcibly the senses of every other person.

We believe that the consequences of the measure were perfectly apprehended, and wittingly designed, and that, notwithstanding the laboured and just exposition of the committee, like objects have been earnestly, ardently, and successfully pursued. The project was again urged upon Congress in the message of 1830, and the seizure of the money power of the country, which it contemplated, was effected, by the subsequent removal of the funds of the nation from the custody of the

Bank of the United States, its chosen depository, into Banks, selected by, and dependent upon, the administration.

245. The measures we have reviewed, were the most important of many proposed by the new administration. In both Houses of Congress, there was a decisive majority in favour of the administration. Yet these prominent measures were all, save that for the removal of the Indians, rejected— demonstrating, that, though, the lust of power and of office had supplied an amalgam for connecting politicians, the administration and the people were not homogeneous-that their interests were not united. The influence of the executive department over the legislative, was not then established; but the resistless power it has since acquired over the popular branch of Congress, is the corrupted fruit of the executive faculties of appointing and removing from office,

The present hostility of the House of Representatives to the measures of the administration, and its subsequent subserviency, is too important a matter in our political history, and too ominous of our danger, to suffer the first to remain a moment in doubt, and we, therefore, give the evidence of Mr. Barbour, once a fast friend of the administration. Mr. Burgess, in the debate upon the appropriation for Mr. Randolph's ten days' mission to Russia, for which the usual salary for one year (9,000 dollars) was required, declared, doubtless, from the visible disposition to support this appropriation, that subserviency to executive will, was far beyond all past extent in the history of this country. Mr. J. S. Barbour replied

"If there be any thing at this time, more remarkable than all other things, it is the utter absence of executive influence over the deliberations of this House, as well as of the Senate." ***"It is, however, a fact, as singular as true, that a President of the United States, holding in full and sure possession a larger share of popular favour than most of his predecessors, finds that most of his prominent recommendations to Congress have been neglected. Invested, as he is, with strongest evidences of popular regard, all his most prominent recommendations have perished, by inertion or rejection. This may present a question between the constituent body and their agents, of which I mean to give no opinion. Those to whom the public weal has been entrusted, have doubtless acted upon their own views of right and wrong. But this fact, alone, repels the ill-founded insinuation of subserviency to executive behests."

246. In connection with these remarks, however, it will be